Cartrette v. SCPPPS

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Billy Cartrette, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and
Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2011-205106

Appeal From the Administrative Law Court
Shirley C. Robinson, Administrative Law Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-591
Submitted October 1, 2012 – Filed October 31, 2012

AFFIRMED

Billy Cartrette, pro se.

Tommy Evans, Jr., of the Department of Probation,
Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Billy Cartrette appeals an Administrative Law Court's (ALC)
order, affirming the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services's (the
Department) denial of his parole. On appeal, Cartrette argues the ALC erred in
finding the Department properly applied the statutorily created parole criteria in
denying his parole. We affirm.1

We hold the ALC did not err in determining the Department properly applied the
statutorily created parole criteria in denying Cartrette's parole. Section 24-21-640
of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011) provides in pertinent part, "The
[Department] must carefully consider the record of the prisoner before during and
after imprisonment." "This [c]ourt has the authority to interpret the parole statute."
Cooper v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 377 S.C. 489, 496, 661
S.E.2d 106, 110 (2008). Courts look to the plain meaning of the statute and the
intent of the General Assembly when interpreting statutes. Hinton v. S.C. Dep't of
Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 357 S.C. 327, 332-33, 592 S.E.2d 335, 338-39 (Ct.
App. 2004). Here, section 24-21-640 plainly permits the Department to consider
"the record of the prisoner." S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640 (Supp. 2011). Nowhere
in the statute is there language restricting "the record of the prisoner" to only those
acts committed by the prisoner. Such an interpretation would seem to be in direct
conflict with South Carolina's established accomplice liability law. See State v.
Thompson, 374 S.C. 257, 261-62, 647 S.E.2d 702, 704-05 (Ct. App. 2007) (noting
according to an accomplice liability theory "'one who joins with another to
accomplish an illegal purpose is liable criminally for everything done by his
confederate'" (quoting State v. Condrey, 349 S.C. 184, 194, 562 S.E.2d 320, 324
(Ct. App. 2002))). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in applying the parole
statute criteria.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.