Dodd v. Exide Battery

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE
239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Willie Earl Dodd, Employee,       
Respondent,

v.

Exide Battery Corporation, Employer, and Risk Enterprise Management,
Ltd.,        Appellants.

Appeal From Greenville County

John W. Kittredge, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2005-UP-014

Heard December 14, 2004 – Filed January
13, 2005

AFFIRMED

Michael M. Farry and David A.
Wilson, both of Greenville, for Appellants.

Eddie R. Harbin, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: This is a workers’ compensation
case.  The single commissioner found the claimant Willie Earl Dodd, an assembly
line worker, sustained a compensable injury by accident on January 3, 1995,
while employed by the Appellant Exide Battery Corporation.  The single commissioner
described the injury as one in which repetitive trauma caused Dodd to suffer
“bi-lateral carpal tunnel syndrome to both wrists and hands.”  The full commission
adopted the single commissioner’s findings of fact.  The circuit court affirmed. 
Exide and its insurance carrier, Risk Enterprise Management, Ltd., appeal. 
We affirm.

1.       We find no error in the circuit court’s
holding that the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by S.C. Code Ann.
§ 42-15-40 (Supp. 2003) did not bar Dodd’s claim.  Dodd, as found by the commission,
suffered a repetitive trauma injury, an “injury by accident” under the workers’
compensation act.   Pee Dee v. AVM, 352 S.C. 167, 174, 573 S.E.2d 785,
789 (2002).  In cases involving repetitive trauma, the statute of limitations
runs from the date of last exposure.  Schurlknight v. City of Charleston,
352 S.C. 175, 178-179, 574 S.E.2d 194, 195 (2002);
[1] see also White v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 355 S.C. 560, 565-66,
586 S.E.2d 157, 160-61 (2003).  Here, the last day of exposure ─ when
Dodd engaged in the repetitive activity that caused his injury ─ occurred
on January 31, 1996, the last day Dodd worked for Exide. 

2.  We do not address the issue, raised in Appellants’
brief, of whether Exide received notice of Dodd’s accident within ninety days
of its occurrence as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-20 (Supp. 2003).   The
trial court did not address the issue and Appellants never specifically raised
it to the trial court.  Winter v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 240
S.C. 561, 573, 126 S.E.2d 724, 730 (1962); Gaddy v. Douglass, 359 S.C.
329, 350, 597 S.E.2d 12, 23 (Ct. App. 2004); cf. State v. Bailey,
298 S.C. 1, 5, 377 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1989) (holding the making of “standard motions”
at trial does not preserve an issue for appellate review); 4 C.J.S. Appeal
and Error § 213, at 293 (1993) (“At the very least, the matter must have
definitely been called to the attention of the trial court sufficiently to obtain
a ruling thereon.”).   

3.       We find no error in the circuit court’s
holding that the full commission did not err in remanding Dodd’s carpal tunnel
claim to the single commissioner for additional evidence.  See S.C. Code
Ann. § 42-17-50 (Supp. 2003)  (authorizing the commission, among other things,
to receive further evidence and rehear the parties); Spearman v. F.S. Royster
Guano Co., 188 S.C. 393, 403-04, 199 S.E. 530, 535 (1938) (stating the commission
possesses broad authority to take additional testimony); see also 25A
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-707(A) (Supp. 2003) (authorizing the commission, in
its discretion, to order additional evidence when necessary for the completion
of the record); Solomon v. W.B. Easton, Inc., 307 S.C. 518, 521, 415
S.E.2d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding the commission, as the fact finder
in a workers’ compensation case, has the authority to receive further evidence).

4.  We agree with the circuit court’s
holding that substantial evidence supports the finding by the commission linking
Dodd’s carpal tunnel syndrome with his employment at Exide.  An appellate court
must affirm the findings of the commission if they are supported by substantial
evidence.  Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360
S.C. 276, 289, 599 S.E.2d 604, 610-11 (Ct. App. 2004).  Dodd’s work on the assembly
line involved repetitive grasping, gripping, squeezing, and breaking grids. 
On April 1, 1996, just a little over two months after Dodd left Exide’s employ
and some fifteen to eighteen months after he began experiencing numbness and
tingling in his fingers, a physician diagnosed Dodd’s condition as carpal tunnel
syndrome.  A nerve study conducted by a physical therapist revealed Dodd suffered
from a “demyelinating lesion of the Median nerves in the carpal tunnel [and]
distally at the wrists, bilaterally.”  An orthopedist physician opined the cause
of Dodd’s carpal tunnel syndrome was most probably due to the type of work Dodd
performed with Exide. 

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., and GOOLSBY and WILLIAMS, JJ.,
concur.

[1] Appellants attempt to distinguish Schurlknight on the grounds
that the commission found Dodd sustained an injury by accident, not a repetitive
stress injury.  The commission, however, also found that Dodd’s injuries “were
caused by repetitive trauma.”