Stewart v. Stewart

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE
239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Shelley Diane Stewart,       
Respondent,

v.

Mark Francis Stewart,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Lancaster County

Brooks P. Goldsmith, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-548

Submitted October 1, 2004 – Filed October 27, 2004

AFFIRMED

Stephen D. Schusterman, of Rock Hill, for Appellant.

Philip E. Wright, of Lancaster, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Mark Francis Stewart appeals
the family court’s denial of his Rule 60(b)(3), SCRCP, motion for relief from
the decree of divorce.  We affirm
[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:  Raby
Const., L.L.P. v. Orr, 358 S.C. 10, 20, 594 S.E.2d
478, 483 (2004) (stating that in order to be entitled to relief due to fraud,
the party seeking such relief must establish extrinsic rather than intrinsic
fraud); Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 81, 579 S.E.2d 605,
610 (2003) (“[T]he failure to disclose to an adversary or court matters which
would defeat one’s own claim is intrinsic fraud.”); Raby, 358 S.C. at
21 n.7, 594 S.E.2d at 484 n.7 (quoting Chewning, 354 S.C. at 82 n.6,
579 S.E.2d at 611 n.6.) (“[E]ven in cases of extrinsic fraud, a party does not
have a claim ‘if he failed to exercise due diligence in discovering the existence
of facts or documents during the underlying litigation.’”).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., and HUFF and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur. 

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.