State v. Burnett

PREHEARING REPORT

THIS OPINION HAS
NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR

 RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 

239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Chase Randlyn Burnett, Appellant.

Appeal From Spartanburg County

J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2004-UP-487

Submitted September 15, 2004 – Filed
September 21, 2004

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Attorney Joseph L. Savitz, III, Office of Appellate
Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald
J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General Melody J. Brown, all of Columbia; and
Solicitor Harold W. Gowdy, III, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

 

PER CURIAM:  Chase Randlyn Burnett appeals
her transfer from family court to circuit court and her conviction for murder. 
We affirm. [1]

FACTS

On September 21, 1998, Jonathan Burnett found his
mother, Robin Burnett, dead in her bedroom.  Police officers discovered Robin
had a single gunshot wound to the head and a gun in her hand, giving the initial
appearance of suicide.  Officers also determined Robin had most likely died
on the night of September 20.  Almost immediately, officers were concerned with
the odd position of the gun in Robin’s hand and focused their investigation
on Chase Burnett, Robin’s fifteen-year-old daughter. 

Alan Wood and Tim Tucker, of the Spartanburg sheriff’s
department, questioned Chase.  After waiving her rights, Chase made two statements
to the police.  In her first statement, she denied any knowledge of her mother’s
death and stated she spent the day of September 21 with her friends.  However,
in her second statement, made approximately one and a half hours after the first,
she recalled a nightmare where her mother pointed a gun at her father and herself. 
Chase stated she then woke up in her mother’s room, retrieved a gun from under
the bed, and pulled the trigger. 

Chase was charged with murdering her mother in
a juvenile proceeding in the family court; however, the family court transferred
jurisdiction to the circuit court, where Chase was tried and convicted of murder. 
The circuit court sentenced Chase to forty years.  The court noted credible
evidence of a history of criminal domestic violence pursuant to Section 16-25-90
of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2003), which makes Chase eligible for parole
after serving one-fourth of her sentence.  Chase appeals her transfer to circuit
court and her conviction for murder.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The appellate court will affirm a transfer order
unless the family court has abused its discretion.”  State v. Avery, 333
S.C. 284, 292, 509 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1998).  An abuse of discretion occurs
when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or
are controlled by an error of law.  State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21,
596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Chase appeals her
conviction on the grounds that the family court judge’s transfer order was
conclusory and without a sufficient factual basis.  We disagree.

Section 20-7-7605(5) of the South Carolina Code
(Supp. 2003) allows transfer of jurisdiction over minors ages fourteen and
fifteen charged with a serious felony, if after full investigation and a hearing,
the family court determines it is contrary to the interest of the child or
public to retain jurisdiction.  In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966), the United States Supreme Court enunciated eight factors for the
family court to consider when transferring a juvenile from family court to
circuit court.  In a recent case, our supreme court reiterated those factors:

1.  The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community
and whether the protection of the community requires waiver. 

2.  Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated, or willful manner. 

3.  Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially
if injury resulted. 

4.  The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether
there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment…. 

5.  The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire
offense in one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense
are adults who will be charged with a crime…. 

6.  The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined
by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude
and pattern of living. 

7.  The record and previous [criminal or adjudicative] history
of the juvenile…. 

8.  The prospects for adequate protection of the public and
the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found
to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services
and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.

State v. Corey D., 339 S.C. 107, 117 n.4,
529 S.E.2d 20, 26 n.4 (2000) (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67).

The family court
order that transferred jurisdiction over Chase to the circuit court contained
findings of facts regarding all of the Kent factors.  Chase argues
some of these findings were not supported by evidence and the court’s findings
were conclusory. 

Chase specifically addresses the eighth
Kent factor, and claims the family court’s finding that “a prospect
of rehabilitation within the juvenile system is not good” is unsupported by
the record.  However, this finding of fact does have evidentiary support. 
While Chase’s mental health diagnosis was in dispute, there was a consensus
that she had serious mental health problems.
[2]   The issue represented by the eighth Kent factor is whether
a family court sentence would offer sufficient time in the Department of Juvenile
Justice for Chase to be rehabilitated.  See Sanders v. State,
281 S.C. 53, 56, 314 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1984) (stating the serious nature
of the offense is a major factor in the transfer decision, especially where
a family court sentence cannot extend past the twenty-first birthday, whereas
the circuit court can impose an adult term sentence).

Several expert witnesses testified
at the transfer hearing.  Two psychiatrists and a psychologist testified for
the defense and thought it would be appropriate for the Department of Juvenile
Justice to rehabilitate Chase, yet none could guarantee rehabilitation under
the maximum juvenile detention time frame.  The Department of Juvenile Justice
psychiatrist also could not determine with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty whether his department could rehabilitate Chase within the time
frame.  The evidence of rehabilitation was inconclusive at best. 

Furthermore, evidence indicated
that the prospect of rehabilitation prior to Chase’s twenty-first birthday
or confinement release date was unlikely.  Chase had ten infractions in the
Department of Juvenile Justice that showed “oppositional behavior.”  This
resistance to authority was also demonstrated by Chase’s decision to quit
taking medication despite the treating physician’s advice to the contrary. 
Evidence concerning Chase’s resistance to authority undermines her ability
to be rehabilitated within the short time period that a family court sentence
would provide and supports the family court’s decision to transfer jurisdiction
to the circuit court. 

Additionally, Chase argues
the transfer order was conclusory and it was the responsibility of the family
court to include a sufficient statement of reasons for, and considerations
leading to, its decision.  See In re Sullivan, 274 S.C. 544,
548, 265 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1980).  The family court’s transfer order, however,
when paired with the extensive hearing transcript, shows Chase is not deprived
of this court’s meaningful review of the decision.  Id. 274 S.C. at
547-48, 265 S.E.2d at 529.  Instead, the entire record demonstrates the family
court devoted substantial time and consideration to this issue.  In light
of evidence supporting the family court’s decision, we find no error in the
family court’s order.

AFFIRMED.

STILWELL, BEATTY, and SHORT, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.

[2]   A defense expert diagnosed Chase as suffering from post-traumatic
stress disorder and secondary depression whereas the state psychiatrist diagnosed
her with depression, features of borderline personality disorder, and adjustment
and anxiety disorders.