State v. Gilbert

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT
IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Charles Gilbert, Jr.,
Appellant.

Appeal
From Lexington County

 Marc H. Westbrook, Circuit
Court Judge

Unpublished
Opinion No.  2004-UP-428

Heard June 8, 2004 – Filed
July 9, 2004

AFFIRMED

Acting Deputy Chief Attorney
Wanda P. Hagler, Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan
McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant
Attorney General W. Rutledge Martin, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.

PER
CURIAM:  Charles Gilbert, Jr. appeals his conviction for trafficking cocaine,
arguing the trial court erred in: (1) admitting evidence discovered during the
search of his vehicle because the arresting officer did not have probable cause
to make the traffic stop; (2) admitting evidence discovered during the search
of his vehicle because the traffic stop was the result of impermissible racial
profiling; (3) finding the State’s strike of a black, female juror was proper;
(4) refusing to admit into evidence a copy of section 56-5-4450 of the South
Carolina Code and refusing to charge the jury on that statute; and (5) refusing
to charge the jury with the law concerning the requirement that police have
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle.  We affirm pursuant
to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the authorities that follow.

Probable
Cause for Traffic Stop: Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810
(1996) (explaining that the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when
police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred); S.C.
Code Ann. § 56-5-4840 (Supp. 2003) (prohibiting the use of any device that alters
the original design or performance of headlights).

Racial
Profiling: Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (holding that when there are adequate
grounds to perform a traffic stop, the officer’s subjective motivations for
making the stop do not cause evidence obtained during the stop to become inadmissible);
State v. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machs., 338 S.C. 176, 200, 525
S.E.2d 872, 885 (2000) (requiring defendants attempting to establish a case
for selective prosecution to show: (1) they were singled out for prosecution
when others similarly situated were not, and (2) the government’s discriminatory
selection was based upon an impermissible ground, such as the defendants’ race,
religion, or the exercise of their first amendment right to free speech).

Peremptory
Strikes: Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (requiring the proponent
of a peremptory strike to offer a race-neutral explanation for using the strike
once the other party challenges the strike); State v. Adams, 322 S.C.
114, 470 S.E.2d 366 (1996) (explaining that the opponent of a peremptory strike
carries the ultimate burden of persuading the trial court that the other party
exercised strikes in a discriminatory manner).

Admitting
Statutes into Evidence and Refusing To Charge the Jury on Statutes and Probable
Cause: Rule 104(a), SCRE (providing judges, not juries, determine questions
concerning the admissibility of evidence).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN,
C.J., STILWELL, J. and CURETON, A.J., concur.