Armstrong v. Food Loin, Inc

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT
IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Ronnie Armstrong and Tillie Armstrong,       
Appellants,

v.

Food Lion, Inc.,       
Respondent.

Appeal From Fairfield County

Paul E. Short, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-366

Submitted May 12, 2004 – Filed June
10, 2004

AFFIRMED

Katherine Carruth Link, of Columbia,
and Ross Alan Burton, of Winnsboro, for Appellants.

Paul Harrill and Jonathan Milling, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Ronnie and Tillie Armstrong
appeal a directed verdict in favor of Food Lion on the Armstrongs’ claims of
assault, battery, and outrage.  We affirm
[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR and the following authorities:  Hinkle
v. Nat. Cas. Ins. Co., 354 S.C. 92, 96, 579 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2003) (noting
on appeal from the denial of a directed verdict motion, the evidence and inferences
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but the
trial court will be reversed only when the ruling is without evidentiary support
or controlled by an error of law); Wade v. Berkeley County, 330 S.C.
311, 318, 498 S.E.2d 684, 688 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the torts of his employee committed
while the employee is acting within the scope of employment); Lane v. Modern
Music, Inc., 244 S.C. 299, 304-05, 136 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1964) (holding plaintiff
bears burden of proving the employment relationship and that the employee was
acting in the scope of his employment); Vereen v. Liberty Life Ins. Co.,
306 S.C. 423, 429, 412 S.E.2d 425, 429 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding whether the
employee was furthering his employer’s business is an important factor in determining
if he acted within the scope of his employment and, if “he act[ed] for some
independent purpose of his own, wholly disconnected from the furtherance of
his employer’s business, his conduct f[ell] outside the scope of his employment”);
Hamilton v. Davis, 300 S.C. 411, 415-17, 389 S.E.2d 297, 299-300 (Ct.
App. 1990) (holding where evidence demonstrates without doubt that assault was
personal in nature and no evidence showed it was in furtherance of the employer’s
business, the assault was not within the scope of employment); Lane,
244 S.C. at 305, 136 S.E.2d at 716 (“The act of a servant done to effect some
independent purpose of his own and not with reference to the service in which
he is employed, or while he is acting as his own master for the time being,
is not within the scope of his employment so as to render the master liable
therefor.”); Holder v. Haynes, 193 S.C. 176, 182-92, 7 S.E.2d 833, 836-39
(1940) (finding an auto accident caused by an employee while embarked on a trip
wholly unrelated to his employer’s business did not warrant employer liability,
notwithstanding the fact the vehicle was provided by the employer).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., STILWELL, J., and CURETON,
A.J., concur.

[1]        We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.