State v. Daniels

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT
IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Tracy Willard Daniels,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Florence County

Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-394

Heard May 13, 2004 – Filed June 22,
2004

AFFIRMED

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson,
and Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia,
and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, of Florence, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Tracy Willard Daniels was charged
with murder following a shooting death at his home.  His testimony at trial,
that the shooting was accidental, differed significantly from his statements
given at the scene and at the police station.  The trial court submitted voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser-included offense to the jury over Daniels’ objection
and the jury convicted him of that charge.  He appeals.  We affirm.

1.       We find no error in the trial court’s decision
to submit voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of the indicted
offense of murder.  The statement Daniels gave at the police station, that the
shooting occurred immediately after the victim cut him, trying to cut off his
thumb, and threatened to turn his “insides out,” was sufficient to support the
voluntary manslaughter charge.  See State v. Locklair, 341 S.C.
352, 359, 535 S.E.2d 420, 424 (2000) (defining voluntary manslaughter as the
unlawful killing of another person in sudden heat of passion upon sufficient
legal provocation); State v. Lowry, 315 S.C. 396, 399, 434 S.E.2d 272,
274 (1993) (“To warrant a court’s eliminating the offense of manslaughter, it
should very clearly appear that there is no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce
the crime from murder to manslaughter.”); Locklair, 341 S.C. at 360,
535 S.E.2d at 424 (explaining sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation
is such as would “render the mind of an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection”);
State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 549, 500 S.E.2d 489, 495 (1998) (noting
“fear can constitute a basis for voluntary manslaughter” as the mind can be
rendered incapable of cool reflection by a number of strong emotions); State
v. Johnson, 333 S.C. 62, 65, 508 S.E.2d 29, 31 (1998) (“Although words alone
may not constitute sufficient legal provocation, words accompanied by some overt,
threatening act may be sufficient.”). 

2.       The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in excluding testimony that the victim’s medical condition and the substances
in his system might have made him agitated and affected his aggressiveness. 
This evidence was speculative, might have confused the jury, and might have
unfairly prejudiced the jury against the victim.  See Rule 403, SCRE
(providing relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury . . .”); State v. Brown, 344 S.C. 302, 308, 543 S.E.2d 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2001) (noting rulings on the admissibility of evidence are left
to the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed absent clear
abuse of that discretion).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., STILWELL, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur.