Sellars v. C. D. Walters Construction

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Kenneth Sellers, Employee,       
Respondent,

v.

C.D. Walters Construction, Employer, and Capitol City Insurance Co.,
Carrier,        Appellants.

Appeal From Charleston County

J. C. Buddy Nicholson, Jr., Circuit
Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-718

Submitted October 15, 2003 – Filed December 11, 2003

APPEAL DISMISSED

James Robert Porter, Jr., and Joseph Hubert Wood, III, both
of Charleston, for Appellants.

Daniel A. Beck, and Etta K. Simons Collins, both of Charleston,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  C. D. Walters Construction
and Capital City Insurance Co., (collectively Appellants) appeal from the circuit
court’s affirmance of the South Carolina Worker’s Compensation Commission’s
order holding Appellants responsible for Kenneth Sellers’s continued epidural
treatment and remanding the matter to the single commissioner for a determination
of Sellers’s entitlement to compensation for permanent partial disability and
Appellants’ entitlement to credit for overpayment of temporary total disability. 
We find the matter is not immediately appealable and, therefore, dismiss the
appeal. 

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Sellers suffered an injury by accident
on September 5, 2000. [1]   After
initially denying the claim, Appellants entered into a consent order with Sellers. 
In the consent order, the parties agreed Sellers had sustained an injury to
his mid-back only and he was entitled to medical care for this injury and temporary
total disability benefits beginning December 15, 2000.  Thereafter, Appellants
filed a Form 21, Application to Stop Payment of Temporary Disability Compensation
asserting Sellers had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). 

 The Single Commissioner held the parties
were bound by the consent order and although Sellers was precluded from receiving
benefits for any problems he was having as of March 21, 2001, he was not precluded
from receiving benefits for any causally related conditions that might have
presented or may yet present after the date of the consent order for as long
as the claim remains active or open.  The commissioner held Sellers had failed
to prove entitlement to benefits for anything other than injury to his mid-back
as a result of the September 5, 2000 accident and he had not reached MMI for
this injury.  She ordered Appellants to continue to be responsible for Sellers’s
treatment for his mid-back injury.  Although she ruled Sellers was not entitled
to weekly total temporary disability compensation after August 30, 2001, the
date of the hearing, she stated this did not prohibit a claim for temporary
partial disability compensation.  The commissioner ruled issues regarding credit
would be decided when there was a determination of permanency. 

Appellants appealed to the full commission,
which affirmed in part with amendments, reversed in part, and remanded to the
single commissioner.  The full commission held the consent order was valid and
constituted the law of the case.  It thereby reversed the findings of the single
commissioner that indicated or suggested otherwise and any corresponding ruling
of law.  The full commission also held the single commissioner erred in failing
to find Sellers had reached MMI for his mid-back injury.  In view of this finding,
it ruled Appellants were entitled to stop payment of temporary disability compensation. 
However, the full commission ruled Appellants were responsible for paying for
Sellers’s continued epidural injections as they “are beneficial to [Sellers]
and tend to lessen his causally related period of disability associated with
his mid-back injury sustained on September 5, 2000.”  Finally, the full commission
remanded to the single commissioner the issues of Sellers’s entitlement of compensation
for permanent disability or permanent loss of use of a scheduled body member
and Appellants’ entitlement to credit for overpayment of temporary disability
compensation.  Appellants appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the
order of the full commission.  This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

Under Montjoy v. Asten-Hill Dryer Fabrics,
316 S.C. 52, 446 S.E.2d 618 (1994), an order of the circuit court remanding
a case for additional proceedings before an administrative agency is not directly
appealable.  In the present case, the circuit court affirmed the decision of
the full commission remanding the case to the single commissioner for additional
proceedings on the issues of compensation for permanent disability and credit
for overpayment of temporary disability compensation.  As the circuit court’s
affirmance of the commission order results in remand to the single commissioner,
this order is not directly appealable. 

APPEAL DISMISSED. 

HUFF, STILWELL, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.

[1]    Sellers had suffered a previous compensable
injury while working for the same employer on September 17, 1999.  The parties
settled this claim on January 19, 2001.