State v. Murphy

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Bernard Murphy,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Richland County

 L. Henry McKellar, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-739

Submitted October 15, 2003 – Filed December
17, 2003

AFFIRMED

Assistant Appellate Defender Tara S. Taggart, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles W. Richardson,
all of Columbia; and Solicitor Warren B. Giese, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Bernard Murphy appeals his
conviction and sentence for first-degree burglary and petit larceny, arguing
the trial court erred in admitting the witness’s identification.

 We affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR and the following
authorities:  State v. Moore, 343 S.C. 282, 540 S.E.2d 445 (2000) (Generally,
the decision to admit an eyewitness identification is in the trial judge’s discretion
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion, or the commission
of prejudicial legal error.); see also State v. Mansfield, 343
S.C. 66, 538 S.E.2d 257 (Ct. App. 2000) (The admissibility of evidence is within
the sound discretion of the trial judge and evidentiary rulings of the trial
court will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion or commission
of legal error which results in prejudice to the defendant.); Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188 (1972) (There is a two-prong test to determine the admissibility
of an out-of-court identification.); Moore, 343 S.C. at 287, 540 S.E.2d
at 447 (2000) (First, a court must ascertain whether the identification process
was unduly suggestive.  The court must next decide whether the out-of-court
statement was nevertheless so reliable that no substantial likelihood of misidentification
was possible.); State v. Blassingame, 338 S.C. 240, 525 S.E.2d 535 (Ct.
App. 1999) (Single person show-ups are disfavored because they are suggestive
by their nature.); Id. at 251, 525 S.E.2d at 541 (However, an identification
may be reliable under the totality of the circumstances even when a suggestive
procedure has been used.); State v. Patterson, 337 S.C. 215, 522 S.E.2d
845 (Ct. App. 1999) (Suggestiveness alone does not mandate the exclusion of
evidence.); Blassingame, 338 S.C. at 251, 525 S.E.2d at 541 (Reliability
is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.). 
See Mansfield 343 S.C. at 78-79, 538 S.E.2d at 263 (To determine
whether an identification is reliable, it is necessary to consider the following
factors: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time
of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the
witness’s prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the amount of time between the
crime and the confrontation); Id. at 79, 538 S.E.2d at 263 (“The corrupting
effect of a suggestive identification is to be weighed against these factors.”);
Id. (“After the trial court determines the witness’s identification is
reliable, the witness is permitted to testify before the jury.”). 

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, STILWELL and BEATTY, JJ., concur

[1]        We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.