Babb v. Thompson

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Mac Babb,       
Appellant,

v.

Nina Lee Thompson, Personal Representative
for the Estate of Helen W. Thompson and Charles Wiriden, Jr.,       
Defendants,

and

Mac Babb,       
Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.

Waterway Mobile Home Park, Inc., a North Carolina
Corporation, and Cheryl Lloyd, Personal Representative of the Estate of
H.O. Taylor, individually, and as Registered Agent for Waterway Mobile
Park, Inc., and as Officer, Shareholder, and Director of Waterway Mobile
Home Park, Inc.,        Respondents.

Appeal From Horry County

J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-630

Submitted September 8, 2003 – Filed
October 22, 2003

AFFIRMED

Mac Babb, of Little River, pro se.

Nina Lee Thompson, of Acron, California, pro se.

PER CURIAM:  Mac Babb received
a default judgment against Helen W. Thompson and subsequently attached a bank
account in the name of Waterway Mobile Home Park Inc. (“Waterway”), a corporation
solely owned by Thompson.  On motion of Waterway, the circuit court released
Waterway’s attached funds prior to hearing Babb’s motion to pierce Waterway’s
corporate veil.  Babb appeals, arguing the circuit court erred by releasing
the attached funds prior to hearing his motion.  Babb also argues he is entitled
to post-judgment interest from the time he was first awarded a judgment, even
though this court reversed the original judgment and granted a new trial absolute
in a prior appeal.  We conclude Babb’s first argument is abandoned, and his
post-judgment interest argument is without merit.  Therefore, we affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from Babb’s attempt to collect
a judgment against Thompson.  Babb filed a breach of contract action against
Thompson, and on June 17, 1993, a jury awarded Babb $5.00. Babb moved for a
new trial absolute, which the circuit court denied.  Babb appealed, arguing
the circuit court erred by denying his motion for a new trial absolute.  This
Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial absolute.
[1]  

On remand, on January 6, 1998, the parties stipulated
to liability, and the only remaining issue was the amount of damages.  The matter
was referred to the master-in-equity.  Subsequently, the master granted Babb
a default judgment on two claims for a total of $63,000. 

Thompson filed a motion to set aside the default
judgment pursuant to Rules 60(b)(1) and (b)(4), which the circuit court denied.   
Thompson appealed, and this Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.
[2]   

During Thompson’s appeal, Thompson died.  Babb
filed a motion for temporary injunction, requesting attachment of Waterway’s
property.  The circuit court granted the motion. 

Waterway filed a rule to show cause, requesting that the
circuit court release the attached property. Babb responded with a motion to
pierce Waterway’s corporate veil.  On November 8, 2001, the circuit court ordered
the immediate release of Waterway’s attached property, ruling Babb lacked a
judgment against Waterway, and Babb had not pierced Waterway’s corporate veil. 
Babb moved for reconsideration pursuant to South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 59(e), arguing the circuit court erred by releasing Waterway’s attached
funds without first hearing his motion to pierce Waterway’s corporate veil and
by only applying post-judgment interest from January 6, 1998, rather than from
June 17, 1993, the date of the original judgment.  Babb appeals the denial of
this motion.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I.       Release
of Funds

Babb first argues the circuit court erred
by releasing Waterway’s attached funds before hearing his motion to pierce Waterway’s
corporate veil.  Although Babb asserts this ruling “took away a right afforded
him by the South Carolina Code of Laws,” he cites to no specific statute in
his argument.  The only citation to authority in connection with this argument
is Flagstaff Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 332 S.C. 182, 503 S.E.2d 497
(Ct. App. 1998), reversed by, 341 S.C. 68, 533 S.E.2d 331 (2000), noted
by Babb for the proposition that an order affecting a mode of trial must be
immediately appealed. 

We fail to see how the citation to Flagstaff
has any relevance, and we will not peruse the South Carolina Code of Laws to
create a legal foundation for his assertions.  We find no citation to authority
in his argument, and thus, we deem this issue abandoned on appeal.  See
First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994)
(holding where “[a]ppellant fails to provide . . . supporting authority for
his assertion” issue is deemed abandoned on appeal).

II.      Post-Judgment
Interest

 Babb next argues the circuit court erred by only
applying post-judgment interest from January 6, 1998, the date of the final
judgment, rather than June 16, 1993, the date of the original order.  We disagree.

South Carolina Code Annotated section 34-31-20(B)
(1987) requires, “All money decrees and judgments of courts enrolled or entered
shall draw interest according to law.  The legal interest is at the rate of
fourteen percent per annum.”  However, “[g]enerally     speaking . . . an order
for a new trial vacates the proceedings including the verdict . . . The order
for a new trial leaves the case as though no trial had been had, it returns
the parties to the position they occupied before the trial.”  66 C.J.S. New
Trial § 283 (1998) (internal citations omitted); see Folkens v.
Hunt, 300 S.C. 251, 254, 387 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1990) (holding when a new
trial absolute is granted, “[t]he effect is the same as if the jury failed to
reach a verdict.  The judge as the thirteenth juror ‘hangs’ the jury.”).

On June 16, 1993, a jury awarded Babb $5.00.  Babb
moved for a new trial absolute, which was denied.  Babb appealed, and this Court
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial absolute, placing the parties
in the position they occupied prior to trial.  Consequently, post-judgment interest
began to run on January 6, 1998, the date the master entered the default judgment. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the
circuit court is

AFFIRMED.

STILWELL, HOWARD, and KITTREDGE, JJ., concurring.

[1] See Babb v. Thompson, 95-UP-195, filed June 28, 1995. 

[2] See Babb v. Thompson, 2002-UP-026,
filed January 16, 2002.