Coley v. Hamilton

Mable Dobson appeals the order of the master-in-equity setting aside a
tax sale and denying her claims for damages against the

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Ruth P. Coley, n/k/a, Ruth P. Fulmer,       
Plaintiff,

v.

Barbara K. Hamilton, Tax Collector for the City of Aiken, and Mable Dobson,       
Defendants.

__________________________Regions Bank,       
Plaintiff,

v.

Barbara K. Hamilton, In her capacity as Tax Collector for the City of
Aiken, Mable Dobson, Mavis Q. Coley, Jr., Ruth F. Coley n/k/a Ruth P.
Fulmer a/k/a Ruth P. Coley,        Defendants,

__________________________Of Whom Ruth P. Coley, n/k/a Ruth P. Fulmer,
Barbara K. Hamilton, Tax Collector of the City of Aiken and Regions Bank
are the        Respondents,

And Mable Dobson is the       
Appellant.

Appeal From Aiken County

Robert A. Smoak, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-402

Submitted April 18, 2003 – Filed June
17, 2003

AFFIRMED

Mable Dobson, of Aiken, for Appellant.

James M. Holly, Michael L. Hatch, Ralph Emerson Hanna, III,
Richard L, Pearce, all of Aiken;  Jean Perrin Derrick, of Lexington and Ray
L. Derrick, of Irmo, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Mable Dobson appeals the order
of the master-in-equity setting aside a tax sale and denying her claims for
damages against the owners of the property, Mavis Q. Coley, Jr. and Ruth P.
Coley, n/k/a Ruth P. Fulmer (Owners), and the City of Aiken.  We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Dobson was the successful bidder at a
delinquent tax sale of property that was owned by the Owners.  After she purchased
the property, Dobson made numerous repairs and improvements.  She then rented
the house to tenants for $500-$550 a month.  After contacting one of the tenants,
the Owners informed Dobson that she was renting property owned by them. 

The Owners brought an action to set aside the tax
deed, asserting they were not provided with the requisite statutory notice. 
They also sought an accounting from Dobson for the rents she had collected from
the property.  Dobson denied their claims and asserted counterclaims against
them for tortious interference with contractual relations, negligence, gross
negligence, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment.  She also asserted a cross-claim
against Barbara K. Hamilton as Tax Collector for the City of Aiken seeking indemnification,
actual damages, and attorney’s fees. 

The action was referred to the master. 
At the hearing, Hamilton acknowledged that all notices had been sent to the
former owner of the property and not to the Owners.  The master held the tax
deed unto Dobson was null and void.  The master denied all of Dobson’s claims
against the owners and her claim against Hamilton.  He subsequently denied Dobson’s
motion for reconsideration.  This appeal follows. 

DISCUSSION

South Carolina statutes set forth the
procedures for the collection of delinquent property taxes and the notice the
delinquent tax collector must provide the grantee of the property.  After the
county treasurer issues his execution against a defaulting taxpayer, the tax
collector must mail a notice of delinquent property taxes to the grantee of
record at the best address available.  S.C. Code Ann.§ 12-51-40 (Supp. 2002). 
If the taxes remain unpaid after thirty days, the tax collector must take exclusive
possession of the property by mailing the grantee notice by “certified mail,
return receipt requested-restricted delivery.”  Id.  If the certified
mail notice is returned, the tax collector must post a notice on the property. 
Id.  The property must be advertised for sale at public auction with
the advertisement including, among other things, the delinquent taxpayer’s name. 
Id.  The defaulting taxpayer has twelve months from the date of the sale
to redeem the property.  S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-90 (Supp. 2002).  The tax collector
must mail a notice of redemption to the defaulting taxpayer neither more than
forty-five days nor less than twenty days prior to the end of the redemption
period.  S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-120 (Supp. 2002). 

The appellate courts of this state have “consistently
held the enforcing agencies of government to strict compliance with all the
legal requirements surrounding tax sales.”  Dibble v. Bryant, 274 S.C.
481, 483, 265 S.E.2d, 673, 675 (1980); Rives v. Bulsa, 325 S.C. 287,
292, 478 S.E.2d 878, 881 (Ct. App. 1996).  The sound view is that all requirements
of the law leading up to tax sales which are intended for the protection of
the taxpayer against surprise or the sacrifice of his property are to be regarded
mandatory, and are to be strictly enforced.  Dibble, 274 S.C. at 484,
265 S.E.2d at 675.  The failure to give required notice is a fundamental defect
in the tax proceeding, which renders the proceedings absolutely void.  Donahue
v.Ward, 298 S.C. 75, 83, 378 S.E.2d 261, 266 (Ct. App. 1989).  “[W]here
a statute requires as a condition precedent to foreclosing a taxpayer’s rights
in property sold for taxes that he be given notice of his right to redeem, such
a requirement is ‘generally regarded as jurisdictional, and therefore, the owner’s
right of redemption cannot be cut off unless the required notice is given.’” 
Good v. Kennedy, 291 S.C. 204, 207, 352 S.E.2d 708, 711 (Ct.App.1987)
(quoting 72 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation § 1010 (1974)).  A taxing
authority’s failure to give the required notice is not excused regardless of
whether the taxpayer received actual notice.  Manji v. Blackwell, 323
S.C. 91, 93, 473 S.E.2d 837, 838 (Ct. App. 1996).  

In the present case, the delinquent tax
collector failed to provide the Owners, who were the true grantees of record
at the time, with the requisite statutory notice.  It is irrelevant that the
notice was posted on the property or that Regions Bank, which held a mortgage
on the property, had received notice.  Accordingly, we find the master did not
err in declaring the tax deed to Dobson null and void. 

Dobson’s remaining arguments are conclusory,
and therefore deemed abandoned.  See Muir v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,
336 S.C. 266, 298,519 S.E.2d 583, 600 (Ct. App. 1999) (issue is deemed abandoned
on appeal if it is argued in a short, conclusory statement without supporting
authority).   

AFFIRMED.

CURETON, ANDERSON, and HUFF, JJ., concur.