Arnold v. St. John Books

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Thomas Arnold,       
Respondent,

v.

St. John Books; David L. Crowell and Patricia Dunn-O'Connell,       
Defendants,

Of Whom David L. Crowell is the       
Appellant.

Appeal From Beaufort County

Thomas Kemmerlin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-238

Submitted January 29, 2003 – Filed April 1, 2003

AFFIRMED

Terry A. Finger, of Hilton Head Island, for Appellant.

Drew A. Laughlin, of Hilton Head Island, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: A Massachusetts court entered
default judgment against David Crowell on behalf of Thomas Arnold.    Arnold
sought to enforce the judgment in South Carolina, where Crowell currently resides. 
Crowell argued that Massachusetts lacked personal jurisdiction over him, and
thus the default judgment was unenforceable.  Judge Kemmerlin enforced the judgment,
and we affirm [1] pursuant to
Rule 220, SCACR, and the following authorities:  Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958) (holding that out-of-state individuals may be subject to the
personal jurisdiction of another state by purposely availing themselves of the
“privilege of conduction of activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws”); PYA/Monarch, Inc. v. Sowell’s
Meats & Servs., Inc., 327 S.C. 469, 473, 486 S.E.2d 766, 768 (Ct. App.
1997) (requiring the court to look at the law of the state rendering the judgment
to determine a judgment’s validity and effect); United Elec. Radio &
Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080 (1992) (stating
that Massachusetts can exercise personal jurisdiction over a party to a contract
if that party’s activities in the Commonwealth are instrumental in the formation
of the contract); Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Hoover Treated Wood Prods.,
638 N.E.2d 942 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (explaining that in order for Massachusetts
to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have minimum
contacts with the Commonwealth such that the assertion of jurisdiction would
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-35-940(A) (Supp. 2002) (allowing a judgment debtor to “file a motion
for relief from, or notice of defense to, a foreign judgment on the grounds
that the foreign judgment has been appealed from, that enforcement has been
stayed by the court which rendered it, or on any other ground for which relief
from a judgment of this State is allowed”) ; S.C. Code Ann. §  15-35-940(B)
(“[T]he judgment creditor has the burden of proving that the foreign judgment
is entitled to full faith and credit.”); Mass. Gen. Law 223A § 3 et seq.
(defining the long-arm statute of Massachusetts).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and SHULER, JJ., concur.

[1]   We affirm this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.