State v. Frierson

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Michael
Frierson,        Appellant.

Appeal From
Marion County

John M.
Milling, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished
Opinion No.  2003-UP-135

Submitted January 13, 2003 – Filed February 19, 2003

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Attorney Joseph L. Savitz,
III, of Columbia,for appellant. 

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster,
Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney
General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Attorney General William Edgar
Salter, III, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, III, of
Florence; for respondent. 

PER CURIAM:  Michael Frierson appeals his convictions for three counts
of murder, two counts and assault and battery with intent to kill, first degree
burglary, conspiracy, and possession of a weapon during the commission of
a violent crime, arguing the trial court erred in explaining to the jury that
the law requires references to a defendant in a jointly-tried co-defendant’s
statement be redacted when the co-defendant does not testify. 

We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities: 
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972) (“The mere finding of
a violation of the Bruton rule . . . does not automatically require
reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction.  In some cases the properly admitted
evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the co-defendant’s
admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that the improper use of the admission was harmless error.”); Cruz
v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1987) (“[W]here a nontestifying codefendant’s
confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against
the defendant . . . the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint
trial. . . .  Of course, the defendant’s confession may be considered at trial
in assessing whether his codefendant’s statements are supported by sufficient
‘indicia of reliability’ to be directly admissible against him . . . despite
the lack of opportunity for cross-examination, and may be considered on appeal
in assessing whether any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless.”) (internal
citations omitted); State v. Howard, 295 S.C. 462, 468, 369 S.E.2d
132, 135-36 (1988) (“We quote extensively here [from Cruz] to emphasize
that the United States Supreme Court has not condemned admission of a co‑defendant’s
confession but has merely shifted the focus of analysis.  Such a statement
will no longer be considered reliable simply because some of the facts it
contains ‘interlock’ with the defendant’s own statement.  The presumption
of unreliability that applies to a co-defendant’s statement will be overcome
only if those portions of the statement concerning the defendant’s participation
are ‘thoroughly substantiated’ by the defendant’s own confession.  Even when
this analysis is not applied at trial to determine the statement’s admissibility,
on appeal the same analysis is appropriate to determine whether any Confrontation
Clause violation was harmless.  Appellants’ statements mutually and completely
substantiated each other.  We hold any Confrontation Clause violation to either
appellant was harmless.”) (internal citations omitted). 

AFFIRMED. 

GOOLSBY, HUFF, and SHULER, JJ., concur.