Cooper v. Wal-Mart

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Kay Cooper,       
Appellant,

v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,       
Respondent.

Appeal From Pickens County

Larry R. Patterson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-159

Submitted January 10, 2003 – Filed February
25, 2003 

AFFIRMED

Samuel Darryl Harms, of Greenville; for Appellant.

Laura W. H. Teer, Dana C. Mitchell, III, of Greenville;
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  The trial
court directed a verdict in favor Wal-Mart in Kay Cooper’s premises liability
action.  Cooper appeals arguing the trial court erred (1) in failing to find
that Wal-Mart created a hazardous condition by over-stocking display shelves
and (2) in failing to find that the Wal-Mart did not reasonably inspect the
area for dangerous conditions.  We affirm
[1] pursuant to Rule 220(c) and the following authorities:  Garvin v.
Bi-Lo, Inc., 343 S.C. 625, 541 S.E.2d 831 (2001) (A merchant is not an insurer
of the customer’s safety and owes only the duty of exercising ordinary care
to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition.  Absent evidence that the
display was stacked in a defective manner by the merchant, or that the
merchant was on notice that the display had become unsafe, there is no evidence
from which a jury could find the dangerous condition was created by the merchant.)
(emphasis added);  Adams v. Creel, 320 S.C. 274, 277, 465 S.E.2d 84,
85 (1995) (stating that on appeal from an order granting a directed verdict,
this court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence
in a light most favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict was
granted and if the evidence as a whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable
inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should have been denied);
Anderson v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., 296 S.C. 204, 205, 371 S.E.2d 530,
531 (1988) (citation omitted) (“In order for a party to recover damages for
injuries caused by a defective or dangerous condition on a merchant’s premises,
the party must show either (1) that the injury was caused by a specific act
of the merchant which created the dangerous condition, or (2) that the merchant
had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and failed to
remedy it.”).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and SHULER,
JJ., concur.  

[1] We affirm this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.