State v. Jones

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

James Patrick Jones,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County

Daniel F. Pieper, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-046

Submitted November 20, 2002 – Filed
January 15, 2003

AFFIRMED

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia,
for appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Chief of the State Grand Jury Robert E. Bogan and
Assistant Attorney General Jennifer D. Evans, all of Columbia;  and Solicitor
Ralph E. Hoisington, of N. Charleston, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Decided
pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities: Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970) (“Sentencing judges are vested with
wide discretion in the exceedingly difficult task of determining the appropriate
punishment in the countless variety of situations that appear.”); State v.
Goodall, 221 S.C. 175, 177, 69 S.E.2d 915, 916 (1952) (holding to determine
whether this Court should “interfere with the exercise of the discretion of
the trial judge in the imposition of sentence upon a defendant[,] . . . [t]he
controlling question . . . is whether the facts show manifest abuse of discretion”);
State v. Barton, 325 S.C. 522, 531, 481 S.E.2d 439, 444 (Ct. App. 1997)
(holding “[a]bsent partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to disturb a sentence that is within the limit prescribed
by statute”); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-35-370(e)(1)(a)(1) (2002) (providing a term
of imprisonment of between one and ten years and fine of $10,000 for trafficking
in marijuana more than ten but less than one hundred pounds); see Goodall,
221 S.C. at 177, 69 S.E.2d at 916 (indicating the facts of this case “disclose
nothing [requiring us] to evoke the rare jurisdiction of this [C]ourt to interfere
with the exercise of the discretion of the trial judge in the imposition of
sentence upon a defendant”); cf. State v. Higgenbottom, 344 S.C.
11, 15, 542 S.E.2d 718, 720 (2001) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969)) (holding “‘whenever a judge imposes a more severe
sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so
must affirmatively appear [on the record]’” (emphasis added)).

AFFIRMED. [1]

CONNOR, STILWELL, and HOWARD, JJ., concur.

[1] Because oral argument would not aid the Court in resolving
any issue on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.