Robert Schmidt v. Rhode Island Division of Taxation

Supreme Court

No. 2024-134-M.P.
(A.A. 22-213)

(Dissent begins on Page 22)

Robert Schmidt et al. :

v. :

Rhode Island Division of Taxation. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2024-134-M.P.
(A.A. 22-213)

(Dissent begins on Page 22)

Robert Schmidt et al. :

v. :

Rhode Island Division of Taxation. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. This case comes before the Court on a

writ of certiorari. The petitioner, the Rhode Island Division of Taxation (the

division), seeks review of a final judgment entered by the District Court in favor of

the respondents, Robert and Mary Schmidt (collectively, the taxpayers). The sole

issue is one of statutory interpretation—namely, whether the three-year refund

period prescribed in G.L. 1956 § 44-30-87(a), which limits the amount that a

taxpayer can recover for an overpayment of income taxes, refers to the three years

following a taxpayer’s filing of a tax return or the three years prior to a taxpayer’s

claim for a refund.

At the administrative level, both the division and the tax administrator denied

the taxpayers’ claim for a refund or credit for overpayment, finding they were

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ineligible to recover any amount under the terms of the statute. The taxpayers

appealed to the District Court, where a hearing judge resolved the dispute on

cross-motions for summary judgment, finding in favor of the taxpayers. Before this

Court, the division argues that the hearing judge improperly construed the statute,

effectively rewriting its terms and distorting its plain and ordinary meaning. For the

reasons set forth herein, we quash the judgment of the District Court.

I

Facts and Travel

The underlying facts of this case are undisputed. On or about July 14, 2020,1

the taxpayers filed a joint 2017 Rhode Island personal income tax return, claiming

an overpayment of $5,672.93 in the 2017 tax year.2 The division processed the

return on August 6, 2020, and on November 23, 2020, the division sent the taxpayers

a notice denying their request for a refund or credit, stating that under the applicable

statute, § 44-30-87, their claim “was not filed within the allowable time period,

1
In her decision, the hearing officer noted that “[t]he [t]axpayers filed their 2017
Rhode Island return on July 14, 2020.” In their papers, the taxpayers also assert that
their return was filed on July 14, 2020; however, in a footnote, they cite the date on
their tax form as July 15, 2020. The division states in its brief that the return was
filed on July 15, 2020, and the signature line of the form itself bears the date July
15, 2020. This discrepancy is not pertinent to the issue before this Court.
2
The taxpayers’ initial 2017 return claimed an overpayment of $3,449 in
withholding based solely on one of the taxpayers, Mary Schmidt’s, wages.
However, $2,223.93 of wage withholding from Robert Schmidt was unintentionally
omitted from the first filing. The District Court found that the division consented to
the change in the amount claimed.

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and/or no amount of tax was paid within the allowable time period * * *.” Exercising

their statutory right for further review under § 44-30-89, the taxpayers requested an

administrative hearing. A hearing was held on August 31, 2022, and in a written

decision dated September 14, 2022, the hearing officer concluded that the taxpayers

were not entitled to their claimed refund for the 2017 tax year. The hearing officer

recommended that the division had properly denied the taxpayers’ claim, and

thereafter the tax administrator adopted the decision and recommendation of the

hearing officer.

In her decision, the hearing officer addressed the two time periods set forth in

§ 44-30-87(a) in which a taxpayer may claim a refund or credit for overpayment.

The hearing officer determined that, to qualify for a refund under the two-year

period, a taxpayer must file a claim within two years from the time the tax was paid.

The time that a tax is deemed paid is also delineated by statute. Pursuant to

§ 44-30-87(i):

“[A]ny income tax withheld from the taxpayer during any
calendar year and any amount paid as estimated income
tax for a taxable year is deemed to have been paid by the
taxpayer on the fifteenth day of the fourth month following
the close of his or her taxable year with respect to which
the amount constitutes credit or payment.”

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The hearing officer found that the taxpayers’ 2017 tax was deemed paid on its

due date, April 17, 2018.3 To be eligible for a refund under the three-year period,

she noted that the taxpayer must file a claim within three years of the filing of a tax

return. She further found that the taxpayers filed their 2017 tax return on July 14,

2020.

The hearing officer noted that the taxpayers were outside of the two-year

period; however, they were within the three-year period to claim a refund.

Nevertheless, she determined that they were not eligible to recover a refund because

the statute specifically limits the amount of a refund for taxpayers filing a claim in

the three-year period to the portion of the tax paid “within the three (3) year period,”

and the taxpayers paid no tax from July 14, 2020, to the time of the decision.

On October 17, 2022, the taxpayers filed an appeal in the District Court

challenging the hearing officer’s decision. Soon after, the division filed a motion to

dismiss. The taxpayers, who heretofore had represented themselves, retained

counsel; and, after both parties conferenced with the court, the hearing judge entered

an order denying the division’s motion to dismiss. Shortly thereafter, the parties

submitted the case for a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment.

3
The hearing officer noted that the due date for 2017 personal tax returns was April
17, 2018, rather than April 15, “because of the weekend and Emancipation Day in
Washington D.C.”

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The hearing judge began his analysis by indicating that some portions of the

tax code are clear. For instance, he pointed to the language of § 44-30-87(a)

explaining the limit placed on a refund or credit claimed within two years from the

time the tax was paid, noting that the refund “shall not exceed the portion of the tax

paid within the two (2) years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.” The

hearing judge stated that this “type of precise language” is not included in the portion

of the statute limiting refunds under the three-year period, as the language simply

states that the limit placed on a “credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the

tax paid within the three (3) year period.” He described the reason why the

“three-year period” was not written with more linguistic precision as “a matter of

conjecture,” which he attributed to “likely just an oversight.”

The hearing judge further found that the court could not look to the section’s

prior reference to the three-year time period, defined as within the three years “from

the time the return was filed,” because that reference involved an indefinite time

period, and this would seem “to allow a taxpayer to wait an unlimited time before

filing a return.” The hearing judge determined that the statute was ambiguous, and

he ultimately concluded that the only reasonable interpretation was to say that “the

limit imposed by the statute under the three year part of this section refers to taxes

paid during the three years immediately preceding the refund request.”

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The hearing judge rested his decision on two statutory canons of construction.

First, he stated that “the court must discern the objective of this part of the tax law.”

To this end, he concluded that the statute “must be interpreted in a way that is

consistent with the goal of furnishing taxpayers with a procedure for securing a tax

credit or refund, and placing a cap on the amount of the award.” Second, he noted

that the court will not interpret a statute in a manner that would lead to an

unreasonable or absurd result. In addressing this, he cited the taxpayers’ contention

that in more than fifty years of enforcement “there has NEVER been a successful

claim for a credit or refund under the three-year provision of § 44-30-87(a).”

Accordingly, the hearing judge found that the division erred in denying the

taxpayers’ claim by reading the three-year period limiting the amount of recovery to

the three years after the filing of their tax return.

Judgment entered in favor of the taxpayers on April 25, 2024, and the hearing

judge remanded the case to the Division of Taxation for further proceedings

consistent with the statutory interpretation set forth in his decision. The division

filed a petition for writ of certiorari on May 16, 2024, which this Court granted.

II

Standard of Review

“The General Assembly has directed that each appeal of a final decision of

the tax administrator shall be an original, independent proceeding in the nature of a

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suit in equity to set aside such final decision and shall be tried de novo and without

a jury in the District Court.” Apex Oil Company, Inc. v. State by and through Division

of Taxation, 297 A.3d 96, 107 (R.I. 2023) (quoting Dart Industries, Inc. v. Clark,

696 A.2d 306, 309 (R.I. 1997)). “A party aggrieved by a final judgment of the

District Court in a tax proceeding may petition this Court for a writ of certiorari to

review any questions of law involved.” Id. (quoting Dart Industries, Inc., 696 A.2d

at 309).

“It is well settled that this Court’s review of a case on certiorari is limited to

an examination of the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.”

Barnes v. Hodys, 307 A.3d 173, 179-80 (R.I. 2024) (quoting State ex rel. Coventry

Police Department v. Charlwood, 224 A.3d 467, 469-70 (R.I. 2020)). “Although

this Court affords the factual findings of an administrative agency great deference,

questions of law—including statutory interpretation—are reviewed de novo.”

Verizon New England Inc. v. Savage, 337 A.3d 689, 693 (R.I. 2025) (quoting Iselin

v. Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 943 A.2d

1045, 1049 (R.I. 2008)). Moreover, “[t]his Court reviews de novo a hearing justice’s

decision granting summary judgment.” Roman v. City of Providence, 333 A.3d 74,

79 (R.I. 2025) (quoting Bronhard v. Thayer Street District Management Authority,

326 A.3d 178, 183 (R.I. 2024)).

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III

Discussion

We begin our analysis with an overview of the statute in question. In its

entirety, § 44-30-87(a) states:

“General. Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment
of tax shall be filed by the taxpayer within three (3) years
from the time the return was filed or two (2) years from
the time the tax was paid, whichever of these periods
expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer,
within two (2) years from the time the tax was paid. If the
claim is filed within the three (3) year period, the amount
of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the
tax paid within the three (3) year period. If the claim is not
filed within the three (3) year period, but is filed within the
two (2) year period, the amount of the credit or refund shall
not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the two (2)
years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.
Except as otherwise provided in this section, if no claim is
filed, the amount of a credit or refund shall not exceed the
amount which would be allowable if a claim has been filed
on the date the credit or refund is allowed.”

It is clear that the Legislature intended for two separate time periods during which a

claim for a credit or refund for overpayment of tax is permitted. See § 44-30-87(a).

The statute provides that the taxpayer shall file a claim within three years from the

time the return was filed, or, two years from the time that the tax was paid. Id.

Immediately following the designation of these two time periods, the statute sets

forth a limit on the amount of credit or refund that a taxpayer can recover for each

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period. Id. It is with respect to the meaning of this provision that the present dispute

lies.

Under the statute, if the claim is filed within the two-year period, i.e., the time

from when the tax is deemed paid, then “the amount of the credit or refund shall not

exceed the portion of the tax paid during the two (2) years immediately preceding

the filing of the claim.” Section 44-30-87(a). If the claim is filed within the

three-year period, the time from when the return is filed, “the amount of the credit

or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the three (3) year

period.” Id. (emphasis added). The precise point of contention is the meaning given

to the latter insertion of the phrase—“within the three (3) year period.”

Before this Court, the division argues that the statute plainly mandates that, if

a claim for a credit or refund is filed within three years from the time the return was

filed, the taxpayer cannot recover any amount exceeding the portion of the tax paid

within the three years from the time the return was filed. The division submits that

the three-year period in question—the three years that serve as the timeframe

capping a taxpayer’s refund amount—holds the same meaning as the first sentence:

three years “from the time a return was filed.” It points to the distinction in wording

from the two-year period, where the statute explicitly designates the timeframe that

caps a taxpayer’s refund amount as the two years “immediately preceding the filing

of the claim.” The division contends that “[i]f the General Assembly wanted the (3)

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three years to be counted backwards from the filing of the claim, the plain language

would have read ‘immediately preceding the three (3) year period,’ instead of ‘within

the three (3) year period.’” (Emphasis in original.)

Conversely, the taxpayers submit that the natural reading of the statute says

something different entirely. In fact, they argue that the three-year period capping a

taxpayer’s refund amount “runs backward from the date of the refund claim[,] not

forward from the return filing date.” They contend that the ordinary meaning of the

word “within” is inside, and it is not synonymous with “from,” which signifies a

starting point moving forward. In the taxpayers’ view, this reading of the statute is

grammatically sound, avoids rendering any of the language meaningless, and gives

full effect to its structure.

It is the well settled practice of this Court that “[w]hen a statute is clear and

unambiguous we are bound to ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning of the words

of the statute and our inquiry is at an end.” Unistrut Corporation v. State Department

of Labor and Training, 922 A.2d 93, 98 (R.I. 2007). When examining an

unambiguous statute, “there is no room for statutory construction and we must apply

the statute as written.” Miller v. Saunders, 80 A.3d 44, 50 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Morel

v. Napolitano, 64 A.3d 1176, 1179 (R.I. 2013)). The plain meaning approach,

however, “is not the equivalent of myopic literalism, and it is entirely proper for us

to look to the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context.” State v. Davis,

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295 A.3d 65, 67 (R.I. 2023) (quoting State v. Wray, 101 A.3d 884, 886-87 (R.I.

2014)).

“Therefore we must consider the entire statute as a whole; individual sections

must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each

section were independent of all other sections.” 5750 Post Road Medical Offices,

LLC v. East Greenwich Fire District, 138 A.3d 163, 167 (R.I. 2016) (quoting

Western Reserve Life Insurance Co. of Ohio v. ADM Associates, LLC, 116 A.3d 794,

798 (R.I. 2015)). “It is generally presumed that the General Assembly intended

every word of a statute to have a useful purpose and to have some force and effect.”

Id. (deletion omitted) (quoting Peloquin v. Haven Health Center of Greenville, LLC,

61 A.3d 419, 425 (R.I. 2013)). “However, under no circumstances will this Court

construe a statute to reach an absurd result.” Id. (quoting ADM Associates, LLC, 116

A.3d at 798).

It is our opinion that the statute is devoid of any ambiguity that would require

this Court to conduct a review beyond the plain meaning of the words. “When

interpreting a statute, our ultimate goal is to give effect to the General Assembly’s

intent. * * * The best evidence of such intent can be found in the plain language used

in the statute. Thus, a clear and unambiguous statute will be literally construed.”

Martone v. Johnston School Committee, 824 A.2d 426, 431 (R.I. 2003). As written,

the plain language of the statute makes a clear distinction between the two- and

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three-year periods in which a taxpayer may claim a credit or refund for overpayment.

The cap on the amount of a refund within the three-year period is designated as “the

portion of the tax paid within the three (3) year period.” Section 44-30-87(a).

Explicitly different, the cap on a refund within the two-year period is designated as

“the portion of the tax paid during the two (2) years immediately preceding the filing

of the claim.” Id.

It is clear to us that the disputed phrase “within the three (3) year period” is

meant to be read in conjunction with the three-year period set forth previously, that

being three years from when the tax return was filed. Further, we are of the opinion

that it would be contradictory to accept the taxpayers’ urged interpretation of “within

the three (3) year period” only with regard to the contested phrase, while maintaining

that the phrase, when used several times elsewhere in the statute, means something

else. To read the exact same phrase as having separate meanings would render the

statute internally inconsistent, and seemingly defeat the purpose of using separate

and distinct language to denote a different time period when intended, as is done in

reference to the two-year period. “When the Legislature has spoken clearly, this

Court will not infer a contrary result.” ADM Associates, LLC, 116 A.3d at 802

(quoting Pierce v. Pierce, 770 A.2d 867, 872 (R.I. 2001)). To hold that the

Legislature’s intended meaning of the phrase “within the three (3) year period” is

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synonymous not with its usage elsewhere in the section, but instead with the phrase

“immediately preceding the filing of the claim,” would do just that.

The taxpayers also argue that the division’s interpretation of the statute leads

to an absurd result. The taxpayers contend that the division’s interpretation “creates

absurd results by excluding taxpayers who timely prepay taxes through withholding

or estimated payments, from the benefit of the full (3) year refund provision.”

Further, they claim that the division’s interpretation renders the statute “internally

inconsistent by allowing a two (2) year lookback for claims filed under the two- (2)

year rule (explicitly tied to the filing of the claim), while applying a far narrower

rule to the three (3) year provision by tying it instead to the taxes paid after the filing

of the tax return.” The taxpayers add that their position is further buttressed by the

fact that the statute explicitly provides that a claim may be filed in whichever of

these periods expires later.

In arguing that its reading of the statute is not absurd, the division contends

that a forward-looking view of the three-year limit “allow[s] the State to account for

repayments through its budgetary process upon receipt of the return.” Further, the

division takes issue with the taxpayers’ argument, and the District Court’s assertion,

that there could never be a successful claim for a refund sought within the three-year

timeframe because the overpayment must have been made prior to the filing of the

return. The division proffers two scenarios, one literal and one seemingly

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hypothetical, to refute this conclusion. First, the division points to an administrative

order where taxpayers filed their 2010 tax return in December 2011 with a tax

payment and late penalty. In August 2013, they filed an amended 2010 return and

requested a refund. In that instance, the division found that they were entitled to a

partial refund under the three-year timeframe for the tax they paid during the

three-year period of December 2011 to December 2014. Another viable scenario,

the division claims, is where a taxpayer is issued an assessment for additional tax

due after the return is filed. If the return is amended, it contends that a potential

refund would fall within the three-year period after the return is filed.

The taxpayers’ argument is rooted in the notion that the cap periods must be

identical and consistent; however, this argument ignores several other apparent

distinctions set forth in the statute. The statutory language creates two separate time

periods for refunds, two years and three years. See § 44-30-87(a). The statute further

designates two different points of significance from which the clock on a taxpayer’s

ability to claim a refund starts: the time the tax was deemed paid and the time the

tax return was filed. See id. While it may be viewed as incongruous to set one of the

timeframes for capping refund amounts as preceding the filing of a claim (backward

looking) and the other as following the filing of a tax return (forward looking), in

considering both the division’s tendered scenarios permitting a refund under the

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three-year period as well as the several other express differences between the two

periods set forth in the statute, we cannot say that it is absurd.

Next, the division argues that the District Court violated the

separation-of-powers doctrine by “filling” an alleged gap in the statutory language,

thereby assuming a function of the Legislature. The division contends that the

omission of the phrase “immediately preceding” in reference to the three-year period

was intended by the Legislature and there was no gap to be filled in the language.

The taxpayers argue, however, that the District Court’s reading of “within the three

(3) year period” as looking backward from the time the claim was filed

“appropriately interprets” as opposed to altering the text of the statute. The

taxpayers aver that, while a court is bound by the chosen words of the Legislature,

where the language is unclear or presents a gap, the court has “both the authority and

the responsibility to construe the law in a way that cures legislative defects and

effectuates its evident purpose.” When read together with the two-year timeframe

cap, the taxpayers submit, the District Court’s interpretation of the statute was sound.

As the taxpayers point out, this Court has remarked that “[a] court need not

lie supine in the face of legislative silence or ambiguity.” Kaya v. Partington, 681

A.2d 256, 262 (R.I. 1996). In fact, the taxpayers cite to two cases, Kaya and

Capobianco v. United Wire & Supply Corp., 77 R.I. 474, 77 A.2d 534 (1950), in

which they assert that we “interpret[ed] a statute to fill in missing elements necessary

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to effectuate its intent.” While the principle expounded in these cases is sound, it

has no application to the case at bar.

In Kaya, this Court read an exclusivity provision into G.L. 1956 § 45-19-1, a

statute establishing injured-on-duty (IOD) benefits for police officers who suffered

work-related injuries or illnesses. Kaya, 681 A.2d at 260. In that case, an injured

police officer who already recovered IOD benefits sought to bring an action in tort

against the City of Providence and his supervising officers. Id. at 258. The Court

compared § 45-19-1 to a like statute, the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA),

noting that the statutes had noticeable similarities and were ultimately intended to

achieve similar goals. Id. at 261. However, unlike § 45-19-1, the WCA explicitly

contained an exclusivity provision, barring an injured employee from exercising

common-law rights against their employer or its employees. Id. at 259. In attempting

to harmonize these statutes, the Court determined that it would create a result not

intended by the Legislature if officers could sue their employers in addition to

receiving benefits under § 45-19-1, and, thus, held that § 45-19-1 was “the exclusive

remedy for police officers injured in the line of duty with respect to their employers.”

Id. at 260-61.

In Capobianco, this Court similarly read a provision into the then-existing

WCA to remedy an “unintended gap in the statutory provision * * *.” Capobianco,

77 R.I. at 482, 77 A.2d at 538. There, the relevant statute provided an appeal to the

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Superior Court for an agreement approved by the director of labor later alleged to be

procured by fraud, coercion, or mutual mistake of fact. Id. at 477, 77 A.2d at 535.

While the statutory language did not expressly provide that the director make a

determination of whether fraud or coercion had occurred prior to an appeal to the

Superior Court, the Court determined that “[u]nless in the first instance there was

such a determination possible within the office of the director of labor there would

be nothing by which either party to the agreement could claim to be aggrieved so as

to support a claim of appeal.” Id. at 479-80, 77 A.2d at 537. The Court found that

such a procedure was implicit in the word appeal, for it “presupposes an original

proceeding from the result of which the party claiming to be aggrieved appeals to a

higher tribunal.” Id. at 480-81, 77 A.2d at 537.

In both Kaya and Capobianco, this Court was confronted with legislative

silence that created an unintended gap in the statute, permitting this Court to read in

provisions in order to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. In our view, there is

neither silence nor ambiguity in the present case that would justify a like result.

Instead, the taxpayers ask us to change the wording of the statute, to essentially

delete the written words and insert a phrase with an entirely different meaning in

order to remedy what they have characterized as legislative oversight. This result is

squarely outside of the province of this Court. See Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1, 10

(R.I. 2015) (noting that we “simply apply the plain meaning of the statute; it is not

- 17 -
within our power to read language into a statute which the General Assembly chose

not to put there”); see also State v. Oliveira, 882 A.2d 1097, 1117 (R.I. 2005)

(“Unfortunately, neither the trial justice nor this court has any authority to

supplement or to amend a statute enacted by the General Assembly.” (quoting State

v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I. 1996))); Sindelar v. Leguia, 750 A.2d 967, 972

(R.I. 2000) (stating that this Court’s “assigned task is simply to interpret the Act, not

to redraft it”).

As this Court has previously observed,

“[W]hen legislative silence is confronted, the temptation
is omnipresent for judges to label any interpretation of that
silence that embodies policies with which they disagree as
absurd or creating a result not intended by the Legislature,
thereby freeing the court to intrude its own preferred
policies into the law under the euphemistic banner of
filling in a legislative gap or interstitial lawmaking.”
Heritage Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Marques, 14 A.3d
932, 938 n.13 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Kaya, 681 A.2d at
267-68).

Had the General Assembly intended for the three-year cap period to be backward

looking, it surely would have included the phrase “immediately preceding the filing

of the claim,” as it explicitly did in reference to the two-year cap period. We decline

to read the lack of such inclusion as legislative silence.

Further, the division submits that it has consistently applied the statute in

accordance with its view for the last fifty years and that “the long-standing

application of the statute by the Tax Division coupled with the lack of action by the

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General Assembly” is compelling evidence of conformity with legislative intent.

The taxpayers assert that this Court is not bound to defer to an administrative

agency’s interpretation of a statute when it is unreasonable or contrary to law, which

they wholeheartedly contend is the division’s interpretation here. While we maintain

that the statute is not ambiguous, we also observe that “it is a well-recognized

principle that a longstanding, practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of

doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any

interference by the Legislature should be accepted as evidence that such a

construction conforms to the legislative intent.” Verizon New England Inc., 337 A.3d

at 695 (quoting Trice v. City of Cranston, 110 R.I. 724, 730, 297 A.2d 649, 652

(1972)).

Lastly, the taxpayers point us to a different section in the tax code to support

their reading of the statute. They argue that under § 44-30-6, the language of

§ 44-30-87(a) must be read in conformity with federal tax law. Section 44-30-6

states:

“Any term used in the Rhode Island personal income tax
law shall have the same meaning as when used in a
comparable context in the laws of the United States
relating to federal income taxes, unless a different
meaning is clearly required. Any reference to the laws of
the United States means the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, and amendments thereto, and
other provisions of the laws of the United States relating
to federal income taxes for the same taxable year, except
that if this reference should ever be declared

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unconstitutional then to the provisions that existed on
January 1, 1972.”

The taxpayers contend that “[t]his statutory directive reflects the Legislature’s intent

to harmonize state income tax administration with the federal framework, promoting

consistency and predictability for taxpayers.” The comparable federal income tax

law that the taxpayers reference also creates a two- and three-year period to file a

refund claim for overpayment of taxes. See 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). Further, the federal

law includes the language “immediately preceding the filing of the claim” in

reference to the three-year period. Section 6511(b)(2)(A). The taxpayers argue that

because of the “materially identical language” between the statutes, and without a

clear legislative indication to the contrary, the Rhode Island and federal laws must

be read consistently under § 44-30-6.

In response, the division contends that there is a clear difference between the

two statutes, the omission of the language in the state statute and its inclusion in the

federal law. The division argues that there is “no term” in the Rhode Island law that

the division is interpreting differently from the federal one. Rather, the division

asserts, there is a phrase that is wholly missing, and as such, a different meaning is

clearly required.

The taxpayers’ reliance on § 44-30-6 is misguided. As previously mentioned,

the section states that any term used shall have the same meaning in the federal

context. See § 44-30-6. However, as we have maintained throughout this opinion,

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§ 44-30-87(a) does not contain an ambiguous term. To read “within the three (3)

year period” as meaning “immediately preceding the filing of the claim” is to simply

erase and insert a new phrase, and with it, an entirely different meaning into the

statute. Thus, § 44-30-6 lends no support to the taxpayers’ argument.

We are cognizant of the fact that there are valid policy concerns underlying

the taxpayers’ interpretation of this statute; however, we maintain that the reasoning

behind the General Assembly’s choice of language is its own, and it “is not the

function of this Court to act as a super legislative body and rewrite or amend statutes

already enacted by the General Assembly.” Powers v. Warwick Public Schools, 204

A.3d 1078, 1088 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Willis v. Omar, 954 A.2d 126, 132 (R.I.

2008)); see State v. LeFebvre, 198 A.3d 521, 527 (R.I. 2019) (“‘How to effectuate

policy—the adaption of means to legitimately sought ends—is one of the most

intractable of legislative problems.’ * * * It is not for this Court to determine whether

a statute enacted by the General Assembly ‘comports with our own ideas of justice,

expediency or sound public policy.’”) (brackets omitted) (first quoting Oliveira, 882

A.2d at 1117, then quoting State v. Distefano, 764 A.2d 1156, 1160 (R.I. 2000)).

Rather, we must simply apply the law as written. In doing so, this Court is bound

- 21 -
by the Legislature’s choice to omit the phrase “immediately preceding the filing of

the claim” in reference to the three-year cap period.4

Accordingly, although we appreciate the hearing judge’s careful analysis, we

cannot agree that the language in § 44-30-87(a) is ambiguous. The temporal

limitation of the phrase “within the three (3) year period” clearly refers to the

antecedent phrase “within three (3) years from the time the return was filed.” We

hold that the hearing judge erred in finding in favor of the taxpayers’ motion for

summary judgment.

IV

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we quash the judgment of the District Court. The

record shall be returned to the District Court with our decision endorsed thereon.

Justice Robinson, dissenting. I dissent. I do so respectfully, but also with

no small degree of astonishment that I am alone in concluding that G.L. 1956

4
For the reasons discussed in this opinion, this Court is constrained to give effect to
the enactments of the General Assembly. However, insofar as policy or practicality
may favor a differing result, we urge the General Assembly, as the body properly
vested with such power, to revisit this language. See State v. Duggan, 15 R.I. 403,
409, 6 A. 787, 788 (1886) (“The remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation, but
in amendment or repeal.”).

- 22 -
§ 44-30-87(a) unambiguously entitles the taxpayers in this case to receive either a

credit or a refund for the amount that they overpaid.

It is clear to me that, by filing on or about July 14, 2020 their claim relative to

an overpayment of $5,672.93 in the 2017 tax year, the taxpayers thereby complied

with the requirement in § 44-30-87(a) that a “[c]laim for credit or refund of an

overpayment of tax shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the return was

filed * * *.” I frankly do not understand why this case is before us. I see no

ambiguity in § 44-30-87(a) to the extent that it relates to the instant taxpayers.

The majority opinion correctly states that “[t]he underlying facts of this case

are undisputed.” It then goes on to correctly summarize as follows the dates that are

at the nub of the issue concerning which we disagree: “On or about July 14, 2020,

the taxpayers filed a joint 2017 Rhode Island personal income tax return, claiming

an overpayment of $5,672.93 in the 2017 tax year.” (Footnotes omitted.) I next turn

to the legal issue that this case requires us to resolve—namely, whether the Division

of Taxation (the Division) should look to the three years prior to the filing of the

return or the three years that follow that filing when it is the Division’s responsibility

to calculate that amount of overpayment to be credited or refunded to the taxpayer(s).

In my judgment, the first two sentences of § 44-30-87(a) are dispositive of the

issue presented by this case. Those sentences read as follows:

“Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of tax shall
be filed by the taxpayer within three (3) years from the

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time the return was filed or two (2) years from the time the
tax was paid * * *. If the claim is filed within the three (3)
year period, the amount of the credit or refund shall not
exceed the portion of the tax paid within the three (3) year
period.” Section 44-30-87(a).1

It having been established that the taxpayers’ claim was timely filed in

accordance with the clear language of § 44-30-87(a), all that remains is to pinpoint

the three-year period of time within which overpayments were made that should

qualify for a credit or refund to the taxpayers. In other words, the real question

before this Court is how should the Division calculate the amount to be credited or

refunded to the taxpayers. Should it look backwards to the three-year period before

the timely filing of the claim or should it look forward to the time year period after

that filing?

To my mind, the first two sentences of the statute unambiguously answer that

question. The key word in the quoted portion of the statute is “within.” To me, that

simple English word indicates that any timely claim for credit or refund of an

overpayment triggers the rather ministerial process of calculating the amount of said

credit or refund by examining the amounts paid within the three-year period prior to

that timely filing of the claim.

1
The entirety of G.L. 1956 § 44-30-87(a) is printed at the beginning of Part III
(“Discussion”) of the majority opinion.

- 24 -
It is noteworthy that one of the definitions of the word “within” in the most

recent edition of The American Heritage Dictionary reads as follows: “Used to

indicate a range to be covered or an amount necessary before something can

happen.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1990 (5th ed.

2011) (emphasis added).

Assuming, as I do, that that definition contained in a highly respected

dictionary of recent vintage is accurate, the use of the word “within” in the quoted

language from § 44-30-87(a) means that the taxpayers were granted three years to

file their claim before “something can happen”—viz., their claim would not be

honored. For that reason, it is clear to me that the calculation of the overpayment

must involve scrutinizing what occurred in the three-year period before the filing of

the claim for credit or refund.

In my view, the majority errs in construing the statute as directing that the

Division should look in a forward direction—i.e., looking at the three-year period

after the filing of the claim. Completely apart from the clear meaning of the word

“within” in the statute, it strikes me that it is illogical to conclude that the General

Assembly instructed the Division to look forward to the three-year period in which

taxes had not yet been paid rather than to look back to the three-year period

preceding the claim as to which the exact amount of the overpayment would be

easily ascertainable. In that regard, it is significant that the first sentence of

- 25 -
§ 44-30-87(a) uses the word “overpayment.” To me that word clearly indicates that

a payment has been made, but it is a payment that is over what was due. Both logic

and the clear statutory language dictate that the Division’s attention should be

directed to the previous three-year period in which the overpayment occurred.

While I believe that the language from the statute that I have quoted is crystal

clear and should be dispositive, it is also my view that, even if I were to concede

arguendo that the statute is ambiguous, the taxpayers should still prevail. That

should be the result because, viewed in its entirety, the overall purpose2 of this

statutory provision is unquestionably remedial. And it is a basic principle that

remedial statutes are to be liberally construed. See, e.g., Ricci v. Rhode Island

Commerce Corporation, 276 A.3d 903, 906 (R.I. 2022) (“[I]t is important to be

2
See, e.g., Ryan v. City of Providence, 11 A.3d 68, 70-71 (R.I. 2011) (“When
we construe a statute or ordinance, our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose
of the act as intended by the Legislature.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Such
v. State, 950 A.2d 1150, 1155-56 (R.I. 2008) (“When construing statutes, this
Court’s role is to determine and effectuate the Legislature’s intent and to attribute to
the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001)
(“In matters of statutory interpretation our ultimate goal is to give effect to the
purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.”); Narragansett Electric Co. v.
Harsch, 117 R.I. 395, 402, 368 A.2d 1194, 1199 (1977) (stating that, when
confronted with a statute that “is not entirely clear,” the Court’s duty is to attempt
“to ascertain the legislative intention from a consideration of the legislation in its
entirety, viewing the language used therein in the light, nature, and purpose of the
enactment thereof”); see also State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013); Alessi
v. Bowen Court Condominium, 44 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I. 2012); DeMarco v. Travelers
Insurance Company, 26 A.3d 585, 616 (R.I. 2011).

- 26 -
mindful of the principle that remedial statutes are to be liberally interpreted.”); In re

Tavares, 885 A.2d 139, 146 (R.I. 2005) (“[W]hen construing a statute that is

remedial in nature, * * * we will construe the statute liberally to effectuate its

purposes.”); Weybosset Hill Investments, LLC v. Rossi, 857 A.2d 231, 239 (R.I.

2004); Ayers-Schaffner v. Solomon, 461 A.2d 396, 399 (R.I. 1983) (“[W]here the

statute is remedial, one which affords a remedy, or improves or facilitates remedies

already existing for the enforcement of rights [or] redress of wrongs, it is to be

construed liberally.”). In the instant case, it is clear that, in enacting the statute at

issue, the obvious mindset of the General Assembly was one of benignity—to give

relief to taxpayers who have come to realize that they have overpaid in the past.

Of equal (if not greater) importance is the fact that we are dealing with a

revenue statute; and it is well settled that, when there is doubt as to the meaning of

such statutes, the doubt should be resolved in the taxpayer’s favor. See, e.g., Balmuth

v. Dolce, 182 A.3d 576, 585 (R.I. 2018) (“[T]axing statutes are to be strictly

construed with doubts resolved in favor of the taxpayer.”) (quoting Maggiacomo v.

DiVincenzo, 122 R.I. 615, 618, 410 A.2d 1332, 1333 (1980)); deZahara v. Weiss,

516 A.2d 879, 880 (R.I. 1986) (“[A]ny doubt about the meaning or scope of [all

revenue statutes] must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing

authority.”); Norberg v. Feist, 495 A.2d 687, 689 (R.I. 1985) (stating that “all

revenue statutes, must be construed strictly, with doubts about its meaning and scope

- 27 -
resolved in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing authority”); Newport Gas

Light Company v. Norberg, 114 R.I. 696, 699, 338 A.2d 536, 538 (1975) (“[D]oubts

as to the scope and meaning of a tax law are to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer

* * *.”).3

For these several reasons, I believe that the taxpayers in this case should have

prevailed. Accordingly, I respectfully but unreservedly dissent.

3
In view of my conviction that the statutory language is clear, I would give
little weight to the fact that the Division of Taxation has interpreted § 44-30-87(a)
differently and in a manner that is unfavorable to the taxpayers in the instant case.
While that agency’s interpretation should be considered (and I have done so), I
remain absolutely unconvinced by that interpretation—an interpretation that
undoubtedly prevents an outflow of a small amount of revenue from the state’s
coffers but that is contrary to the letter and spirit of the statute. In this regard, I note
that we have quite recently stated: “[I]n no case may blind deference be paid to the
construction given by any official, agency, or board, as this Court is the final arbiter
with respect to questions of statutory construction.” City of Woonsocket v. RISE Prep
Mayoral Academy, 251 A.3d 495, 502 (R.I. 2021) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted); see generally Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159 (R.I.
2017).

- 28 -
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Robert Schmidt et al. v. Rhode Island Division of
Title of Case
Taxation.
No. 2024-134-M.P.
Case Number
(A.A. 22-213)

Date Opinion Filed March 19, 2026

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Sixth Division District Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Walter Gorman

For Petitioner:

Marc DeSisto, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Respondent:

Thomas P. Quinn, Esq.