Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island Department of Education; Cumberland School Committee v. Rhode Island Council on Elementary and Secondary Education

Supreme Court

(Dissent begins on Page 12)

Newport School Committee : No. 2021-37-M.P.
(PC 19-4024)
v. :

Rhode Island Department of :
Education et al.

Cumberland School Committee : No. 2021-38-M.P.
(PC 20-31)
v. :

Rhode Island Council on Elementary :
and Secondary Education et al.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

(Dissent begins on Page 12)

Newport School Committee : No. 2021-37-M.P.
(PC 19-4024)
v. :

Rhode Island Department of :
Education et al.

Cumberland School Committee : No. 2021-38-M.P.
(PC 20-31)
v. :

Rhode Island Council on Elementary :
and Secondary Education et al.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. These consolidated cases came before

the Supreme Court pursuant to a writ of certiorari issued upon petitions by the

defendant, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), seeking

review of a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Newport School

Committee (Newport) and Cumberland School Committee (Cumberland)

(collectively, plaintiffs). The matter was previously before this Court on the full

argument calendar, resulting in an opinion resolving the first of two issues that were

presented. See Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island Department of

Education, 316 A.3d 1159, 1164 (R.I. 2024). These cases arise out of the plaintiffs’

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decision not to reimburse DCYF at the “per-pupil special-education” rate for the cost

of educating children who were placed in residential treatment programs by DCYF,

but who were not receiving special education services.

In our opinion dated June 28, 2024, we identified that there were two issues

presented by DCYF’s petition: (1) “whether the trial justice erred in finding that the

statute did not require the municipalities to pay the per-pupil special-education rate

regardless of whether the children received special-education services” and (2)

“whether the trial justice erred in finding that the statute obligated the municipalities

to pay the per-pupil general-education rate even though the reference to general

education was removed from the statute.” Newport School Committee, 316 A.3d at

1164. In resolving the first issue, we held that “[p]ursuant to the clear and

unambiguous language of [G.L. 1956] §§ 16-64-1.1 and 16-64-1.2, municipalities

are not required to reimburse DCYF at the per-pupil special-education rate when

there were no special education services rendered and thus, no special education

costs incurred.” Id. We then “direct[ed] the parties to file supplemental briefs” on

the remaining issue now before us: “[W]hether the trial justice erred in finding that

the statute obligated the municipalities to pay the per-pupil general-education rate

even though the reference to general education was removed from the statute.” Id.

For the reasons set forth herein, we quash the decision of the Superior Court.

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Facts and Travel

Although the facts of this case were laid out in this Court’s first opinion in

this matter, we reiterate those necessary for context of the remaining issue. In 2018,

the Family Court placed two children, A. Doe and M. Doe, in the temporary custody

of DCYF. 1 The Family Court designated Newport and Cumberland, respectively,

as the residences of the children’s custodial parents for the purpose of determining

the municipalities’ financial responsibility for the children’s education. DCYF

subsequently placed A. Doe at Harmony Hill School and M. Doe at Meadowridge

Academy. Neither student received special education services in their respective

placements.

These consolidated cases began when DCYF filed two “Request[s] for an

Order for Residency Determination and Designation of Party Responsible for the

Education of a Youth Residing in a Residential Facility” with the Commissioner of

Elementary and Secondary Education (the commissioner), arguing that the

municipalities were required to pay the per-pupil special-education rate pursuant to

the unambiguous language of §§ 16-64-1.1 and 16-64-1.2. The commissioner

agreed with DCYF in each case, issuing two decisions that ordered Newport and

Cumberland to reimburse DCYF for the cost of educational services provided to the

1
A. Doe and M. Doe were minors during the Family Court proceedings. We use
pseudonyms to respect their privacy.

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children at the special-education rate. After the Council on Elementary and

Secondary Education denied Newport’s and Cumberland’s independent appeals of

the commissioner’s decisions, the municipalities appealed to the Superior Court

pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 35 of title 42.

A justice of the Superior Court consolidated the two cases and issued a written

decision, determining that the clear and unambiguous language of § 16-64-1.1(c)

required the designated city or town to pay “its share of the cost of educational

services to DCYF” rather than the higher, per-pupil special-education rate.

(Emphasis omitted) (quoting § 16-64-1.1(c)). The trial justice determined that

§ 16-64-1.1(c) was devoid of language that obligated the municipalities to pay “more

than its share at a rate inconsistent with the educational services provided to the

child.” She further rejected Cumberland’s argument that the statute did not require

it to pay any of the cost of education, reasoning that “there is no support in either

statute for [that] position * * *.”

The trial justice determined that, even if the statute were ambiguous, the

outcome would not differ because requiring the municipalities to pay almost two and

a half times the cost of the children’s education would be absurd. She therefore

granted the appeals, concluding that Newport and Cumberland were responsible for

the per-pupil general-education costs and ordered each municipality to reimburse

DCYF in the amounts due. Judgment was entered in favor of Newport and

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Cumberland, and DCYF filed, and we granted, a petition for writ of certiorari in each

case.

This Court issued an opinion resolving the first of two issues. See Newport

School Committee, 316 A.3d at 1164. Quoting the relevant statutory language, this

Court stated:

“Section 16-64-1.1(c) provides that the ‘city or town
determined to be responsible to DCYF for a per-pupil
special-education cost pursuant to § 16-64-1.2 shall pay its
share of the cost of educational services to DCYF * * *.’
Section 16-64-1.1(c) (emphasis added). Section 16-64-1.2
provides that, in circumstances where the parents’
residency is not determined by the Family Court, the
department of elementary and secondary education ‘shall
designate the city or town to be responsible for the
per-pupil special education cost of education to be paid to
DCYF * * *.’ (Emphasis added.)” Id. at 1163-64.

We then concluded that “[t]he term ‘cost’ refers to ‘the amount or equivalent paid

or given or charged * * * for anything bought or taken in barter or for service

rendered.’” Id. at 1164 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 515

(1971)).

Accordingly, we determined that “when the statute authorizes the department

of elementary and secondary education to designate a municipality to be responsible

for the ‘per-pupil special education cost,’ it is not authorizing DCYF to charge the

per-pupil special-education rate regardless of whether there were special-education

costs actually incurred.” Newport School Committee, 316 A.3d at 1164. Therefore,

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as noted supra, “[p]ursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of §§ 16-64-1.1

and 16-64-1.2, municipalities are not required to reimburse DCYF at the per-pupil

special-education rate when there were no special education services rendered and

thus, no special education costs incurred.” Id. The Court then directed the parties to

provide supplemental briefing on the second issue, “whether the trial justice erred in

finding that the statute obligated the municipalities to pay the per-pupil

general-education rate even though the reference to general education was removed

from the statute,” id., which is now before us. We answer in the affirmative.

Standard of Review

“This Court is the ‘final arbiter on questions of statutory construction.’”

Newport School Committee, 316 A.3d at 1163 (deletion omitted) (quoting Ryan v.

City of Providence, 11 A.3d 68, 70 (R.I. 2011)). “Therefore, ‘although this Court

affords the factual findings of an administrative agency great deference, questions

of law—including statutory interpretation—are reviewed de novo.’” Id. (brackets

omitted) (quoting Iselin v. Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement System of

Rhode Island, 943 A.2d 1045, 1049 (R.I. 2008)).

Discussion

We previously indicated our inclination “to determine that the General

Assembly intended to remove the obligation to reimburse DCYF in such

circumstances” when “the notion of a contribution based upon the average per-pupil

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cost for general education” was removed from the statute in 2001. Newport School

Committee, 316 A.3d at 1164. After supplemental briefing and oral argument, we

conclude that § 16-64-1.1 does not obligate municipalities to reimburse DCYF for

the cost of general education for students placed in residential treatment programs

by DCYF, but who were not receiving special education services.

“[I]t is well settled that the plain statutory language is the best indicator of the

General Assembly’s intent.” Twenty Eleven, LLC v. Botelho, 127 A.3d 897, 900 (R.I.

2015) (quoting Zambarano v. Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement

System of Rhode Island, 61 A.3d 432, 436 (R.I. 2013)). “If a statute is clear and

unambiguous, we must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the

statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Newport School Committee, 316 A.3d at

1163 (quoting Athena Providence Place v. Pare, 262 A.3d 679, 681 (R.I. 2021)).

“[W]hen a statute expresses a clear and unambiguous meaning, the task of

interpretation is at an end and this Court will apply the plain and ordinary meaning

of the words set forth in the statute.” Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement

System of State v. DiPrete, 845 A.2d 270, 297 (R.I. 2004) (brackets omitted)

(quoting State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I. 1996)).

DCYF argues that designated municipalities are required to pay their “share”

of education costs, which differs depending on whether the facility renders special

or general education services to children in its care. According to DCYF, the 2001

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amendment to § 16-64-1.1 does not evidence an intent to eliminate municipalities’

obligation to pay the general-education costs of students in DCYF care, but rather

requires municipalities to pay a share of general-education costs. In support of this

argument, DCYF points to § 16-64-1.1(d) which, in its view, identifies the only time

DCYF bears the entire cost of a student’s education, and contends that municipalities

are still responsible for education costs of any student whose placement falls outside

of § 16-64-1.1(d), whether they receive general or special educational services.2

Newport and Cumberland contend that without a clear designation that the

municipalities must pay the general-education rate for students in placements with

onsite educational services, they cannot be deemed responsible for those costs. In

support of their argument, Newport and Cumberland assert that, because the statute

only references special-education costs, they are not required to pay for

2
General Laws 1956 § 16-64-1.1(d) reads:

“Children placed by DCYF in group homes, child-caring
facilities, community residences, or other residential
facilities shall have the entire cost of their education paid
for by DCYF if:
“(1) The facility is operated by the state of Rhode Island
or the facility has a contract with DCYF to fund a pre-
determined number of placements or part of the facility’s
program;
“(2) The facility is state licensed; and
“(3) The facility operates an approved, on-grounds
educational program, whether or not the child attends the
on-grounds program.”

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general-education costs, and are only required to reimburse DCYF for students

receiving special education services in residential placements providing onsite

educational services.3

We begin by looking at the plain language of the statute. Section 16-64-1.1(c)

reads:

“Children placed by DCYF in a residential-treatment
program, group home, or other residential facility, whether
or not located in the state of Rhode Island, which includes
the delivery of educational services provided by that
facility (excluding facilities where students are taught on
grounds for periods of time by teaching staff provided by
the school district in which the facility is located), shall
have the cost of their education paid for as provided for in
subsection (d) and § 16-64-1.2. The city or town
determined to be responsible to DCYF for a per-pupil
special-education cost pursuant to § 16-64-1.2 shall pay
its share of the cost of educational services to DCYF or to
the facility providing educational services.” (Emphasis
added.)

In relevant part, § 16-64-1.2(b) reads:

“If no factual determination and designation of the
residence of the parent(s) of a child placed in the care and
custody of the state is made by the family court pursuant
to § 16-64-1.2(a), then the department of elementary and
secondary education shall designate the city or town to be
responsible for the per-pupil special education cost of
education to be paid to DCYF or to the facility providing
educational services for children in state care pursuant to
§ 16-64-1.1(c).” (Emphasis added.)

3
Newport and Cumberland requested affirmative relief in the form of reimbursement
for costs paid for the children at issue. Because neither municipality filed a petition
for writ of certiorari, we decline to address their request for relief.

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Here, the General Assembly used the words “per-pupil special-education cost” in

both §§ 16-64-1.1 and 16-64-1.2 to refer to the share due to DCYF from the

designated towns. Section 16-64-1.1(c) does not address what reimbursement, if

any, DCYF should receive from designated towns when children in DCYF care are

placed in residential treatment centers that provide general educational services but

do not fall within subsection (d). However, “we are mindful of the oft-quoted maxim

‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ (‘the expression of one thing is the exclusion

of another’).” Ryan, 11 A.3d at 75 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1830 (9th ed.

2009)). In both sections, the General Assembly refers only to “the per-pupil special-

education cost” with no reference whatsoever to general-education costs. Our de

novo review reveals that there is nothing in §§ 16-64-1.1 or 16-64-1.2 that obligates

a municipality to pay the cost of general education for children in DCYF care placed

in residential treatment programs providing general educational services.

When the General Assembly amended the statutory scheme in 2001, it

removed the reference to general-education costs, indicating the General Assembly’s

intent to eliminate reimbursement of those costs. “We presume that the drafters

‘intended each word or provision of a statute to express a significant meaning, and

the Court will give effect to every word, clause, or sentence, whenever possible.’”

Prew v. Employee Retirement System of City of Providence, 139 A.3d 556, 561 (R.I.

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2019) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 571 (R.I. 2009)).

Prior to the amendment, § 16-64-1.1 read:

“All other children placed by DCYF in group homes, child
caring facilities, community residences, or other
residential facilities, whether or not located in the state of
Rhode Island, shall have the cost of their education paid
for by DCYF or, if the child is enrolled in a public school
in Rhode Island, by the city or town in which the
residential facility is located, and the city, town or DCYF,
shall receive a contribution from the city or town in which
the child’s parent(s) or guardian live as determined by
section 16-64-1.2. Such contribution shall be at least the
amount of the average per pupil cost for general or special
education of the city or town making the contribution.”
Public Laws 2001, ch. 77, art. 22, § 3 (emphasis added).

Previously, the statute referenced reimbursement for “at least” the average per-pupil

general or special education costs. See id. The amendment removed any reference

to general-education costs. Id. Accordingly, “[u]nless there are compelling reasons

for us to do so, we should not by implication read into the statute what the

[L]egislature has not expressed.” Commerce Park Associates 1, LLC v. Houle, 87

A.3d 1061, 1067 (R.I. 2014) (brackets omitted) (quoting Woods v. Safeway System,

Inc., 102 R.I. 493, 495, 232 A.2d 121, 122 (1967)).

The statute, as amended, is devoid of any mention or any reference to general-

education costs. Thus, if the General Assembly intended the designated

municipalities to pay their share of general-education costs for children in residential

facilities receiving general education services, the General Assembly would have

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drafted the statute to say so. However, it is not our role to read words into a statute

where they do not exist, particularly words that were removed from the prior version.

The plain and unambiguous language of the statute does not include reimbursement

for general-education costs. Therefore, the trial justice erred in finding that the

statute obligated municipalities to pay the per-pupil general-education rate even

though the reference to general education was removed from the statute.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we quash the decision of the trial justice. The

record may be returned to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed therein.

Justice Long did not participate.

Chief Justice Suttell, dissenting. Because I disagree with the majority’s

conclusion that “[t]he plain and unambiguous language of the statute does not

include reimbursement for general-education costs[,]” I respectfully dissent.1

The statutory section at issue, G.L. 1956 § 16-64-1.1(c) provides:

“Children placed by DCYF in a residential-treatment
program, group home, or other residential facility, whether
or not located in the state of Rhode Island, which includes
the delivery of educational services provided by that
facility (excluding facilities where students are taught on

1
I do, however, agree with the majority’s decision to decline to address plaintiffs’
requested relief because they did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in this matter.

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grounds for periods of time by teaching staff provided by
the school district in which the facility is located), shall
have the cost of their education paid for as provided for in
subsection (d) of this section and § 16-64-1.2. The city or
town determined to be responsible to DCYF for a
per-pupil special-education cost pursuant to § 16-64-1.2
shall pay its share of the cost of educational services to
DCYF or to the facility providing educational services.”
(Emphasis added.)

The last sentence is the operative language at the core of this dispute. Therefore,

additionally relevant is § 16-64-1.2, entitled “[d]esignation of residency of children

in state care for purposes of financial responsibility under § 16-64-1.1(c),” which,

this Court has previously stated “proceeds to outline the methods of designating the

parents’ residence for the purpose of determining a municipality’s financial

responsibility pursuant to § 16-64-1.1.” Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island

Department of Education, 316 A.3d 1159, 1162 (R.I. 2024). In that opinion, this

Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on the question of “whether

the trial justice erred in finding that the statute obligated the municipalities to pay

the per-pupil general-education rate even though the reference to general education

was removed from the statute.” Id. at 1164.

Before this Court on supplemental briefing, DCYF argues that “the school

districts are required to make a payment to DCYF or directly to the residential

treatment facility, not at a per-pupil general education rate or special education rate,

but, rather, their ‘share’ of the residential treatment facility’s ‘cost of educational

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services.’” Relying on this Court’s earlier opinion in the matter, DCYF further

submits that plaintiffs “misapply § 1.2 and misconstrue [§] 1.1(c).” In response,

plaintiffs contend that § 16-64-1.1(c) obligates municipalities to reimburse DCYF

for special-education costs only, meaning that they have no obligation under the

statute to reimburse for general education.

“If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must interpret the statute literally

and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Newport

School Committee, 316 A.3d at 1163 (quoting Athena Providence Place v. Pare, 262

A.3d 679, 681 (R.I. 2021)). In so doing, I am of the opinion that plaintiffs are

required to pay their “share of the cost of educational services to DCYF or to the

facility providing educational services.” Section 16-64-1.1(c).

Indeed, I read the operative sentence of § 16-64-1.1(c) as consisting of two

parts: (1) “[t]he city or town determined to be responsible to DCYF for a per-pupil

special-education cost pursuant to § 16-64-1.2” and (2) “shall pay its share of the

cost of educational services to DCYF or to the facility providing educational

services.” By its plain meaning, “[t]he city or town determined to be responsible to

DCYF for a per-pupil special-education cost pursuant to § 16-64-1.2” identifies who,

meaning which municipality’s school district, must pay. Section 16-64-1.1(c); see

Newport School Committee, 316 A.3d at 1162 (“Section 16-64-1.2 * * * outline[s]

the methods of designating the parents’ residence for the purpose of determining a

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municipality’s financial responsibility pursuant to § 16-64-1.1.”). I agree with the

trial justice that “[t]he reference to ‘per-pupil special education cost’ clearly relates

to the provision in § 16-64-1.2 that identifies how a city or town is to be designated

as the financially responsible municipality. It does not determine how the designee’s

financial obligation is to be calculated.”

Turning to the predicate language, “shall pay its share of the cost of

educational services to DCYF or to the facility providing educational services”

identifies what must be paid: the cost of educational services. Section 16-64-1.1(c).

This Court determined that “[t]he term ‘cost’ [is] ‘the amount or equivalent paid or

given or charged for anything bought or taken in barter or for service rendered[,]’”

Newport School Committee, 316 A.3d at 1164 (deletion omitted) (quoting Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary 515 (1971)), which I take to mean the actual

amount paid for educational services, rather than a special-education or

general-education rate. Furthermore, I agree with DCYF that there is nothing in

§ 16-64-1.1(c) that would limit plaintiffs’ “‘share of the cost of educational services’

only to educational services provided to special education children.”

Not only did the trial justice make this determination but, in its initial brief on

the matter to this Court, Cumberland argued the position that DCYF is now arguing,

specifically that “[t]he text of G.L. 1956 § 16-64-1.1 requires a municipality to pay

‘its share of the cost of educational services’; it does not define ‘share’ to mean a

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‘per-pupil special education cost’ without regard to the services the student actually

receives.” Cumberland went on to state:

“Grammatically, the sentence has two parts – the who (the
subject) and the what (the verb/predicate):

“• Who must pay: ‘The city or town determined to be
responsible to D[CY]F for a per-pupil
special-education cost pursuant to § 16-64-1.2
* * *’
“• What it must pay: ‘* * * shall pay its share of the
cost of educational services to DCYF or to the
facility providing educational services.’

“Like in the other subsections, ‘the cost of educational
services’ is not a special education cost devoid of any
connection to the child or services provided. It is the cost
to that city or town to educate the child and not more. * * *

“The only reference to ‘special education’ in § 16-64-1.1
is ‘pursuant to’ the responsibility determination in
§ 16-64-1.2. Section 16-64-1.2 does not establish or
define the amount of payment; it only provides the
procedure to determine which city or town may be
required to make a payment under § 16-64-1.1(c).”

Newport also took a stance opposite to what it now argues. In its initial brief,

Newport submitted that the statutory obligation under § 16-64-1.1 “requires

Newport to pay ‘its share of the cost of educational services to DCYF’. * * * The

only result that makes sense in this case is affirming the decision of the Superior

Court, because it follows the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language.”

It is also noteworthy that A. Doe and M. Doe do not fall into any other

subcategory of § 16-64-1.1, including the only subsection under which DCYF is

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obligated to pay the full cost. Section 16-64-1.1(d) is the only subsection under

which DCYF is fully responsible for the cost of a child’s education. By interpreting

§ 16-64-1.1(c) to exclude children receiving general education who are placed by

DCYF in a residential treatment program, whether or not located in the State of

Rhode Island, which includes the delivery of educational services provided by that

facility leaves a hole in the statute, meaning that there is no guidance on who would

pay in this particular situation.

Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the trial justice did not err in finding that

the statute obligated the municipalities to pay the per-pupil general-education cost

of A. Doe’s education while in residence at Harmony Hill School and M. Doe’s

education while in residence at Meadowridge Academy, and I would affirm her

decision on the matter. For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island
Department of Education et al.
Title of Case
Cumberland School Committee v. Rhode Island
Council on Elementary and Secondary Education et
al.
No. 2021-37-M.P. (PC 19-4024)
Case Number
No. 2021-38-M.P. (PC 20-31)

Date Opinion Filed February 3, 2026

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel

For Plaintiffs:

William J. Conley, Jr., Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal Stephen Adams, Esq.
For Defendants:

Lauren E. Jones, Esq.