State v. Jaythan Hang

Supreme Court

No. 2023-236-C.A.
(P1/19-6260BG)

State :

v. :

Jaythan Hang. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
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Supreme Court

No. 2023-236-C.A.
(P1/19-6260BG)

State :

v. :

Jaythan Hang. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Long, for the Court. The defendant, Jaythan Hang (defendant or Mr.

Hang), appeals from a Superior Court judgment of conviction following a trial at

which the jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree, conspiracy, two counts

of felony assault, three counts of discharge of a firearm when committing a crime of

violence, and two other firearms offenses. Before this Court, the defendant asserts

that the trial justice abused her discretion (1) in denying a pretrial motion for

severance; (2) in erroneously admitting evidence of prior bad acts and crime in the

community under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; (3) in

erroneously admitting two statements as statements against interest pursuant to Rule

804(b)(3) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; and (4) in allowing improper lay

opinion testimony pursuant to Rule 701 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; and

that the trial justice clearly erred (5) in denying a motion for a new trial on the

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conspiracy count. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the

Superior Court.

Facts and Procedural History

In the early morning hours of Tuesday, June 26, 2018, David Page was shot

and killed. Mr. Page was picking up a group of his acquaintances at 100 Lowell

Avenue when shots were fired toward his Cadillac sedan (Cadillac).

The Providence Police Department (PPD) responded to the scene after

receiving the first broadcast for shots fired at approximately 12:15 a.m. on June 26,

2018. Lieutenant Matthew Jennette, one of the initial responding officers to the

scene, observed an unresponsive Mr. Page in the driver’s seat of a Cadillac parked

in front of the residence at 100 Lowell Avenue. In securing the crime scene, several

shell casings from a .22 caliber Smith & Wesson firearm were found strewn about

near the decedent’s vehicle and the residence at 100 Lowell Avenue. Sergeant

Jonathan Primiano (Sgt. Primiano), an officer with experience in digital forensic

examination, continued investigating later that day and extracted surveillance

footage from three different locations near the scene of the shooting. The footage

captured Mr. Page’s Cadillac driving near Plainfield Street before turning onto

Lowell Avenue at approximately 12:11 a.m. Around the same time, a black vehicle

was also observed cruising the streets in the vicinity of the shooting. The black

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vehicle then turned onto Lowell Avenue just seconds after Mr. Page’s Cadillac

turned onto Lowell Avenue.

Unrelatedly, on July 2, 2018, the PPD and the state police responded to 59

Mink Road (Mink Road property) and 156 Hanover Street (Hanover Street property)

in Providence to follow up on two separate financial fraud and narcotics

investigations into an individual named Kennedy Terrero (Mr. Terrero). Lawful

search warrants were executed on both properties and officers seized a key to an

Audi at the Hanover Street property, but noted that there were no Audi vehicles

parked at the property. Mr. Terrero was subsequently arrested and charged with

crimes including felony motor vehicle theft, possession of cocaine with intent to

deliver, and possession of a firearm.

Also during the search of the properties, Sergeant Alex Kanelopoulos (Sgt.

Kanelopoulos) of the PPD spoke with Mr. Terrero’s then-girlfriend, Leslie Pereira

(Ms. Pereira). He inquired about her knowledge of the Audi key recovered in the

search and a stolen vehicle involved in the narcotics investigation of Mr. Terrero.

Ms. Pereira provided Sgt. Kanelopoulos the location for the stolen vehicle in

question, stating that it could be found at a parking lot at the intersection of Stamford

Avenue and Bissell Street. Upon arriving at that location, Sgt. Kanelopoulos

observed a black Audi with Virginia license plates sitting in the parking lot. Sergeant

Kanelopoulos then used the Audi key seized from the Hanover Street property to

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unlock the black Audi located in the parking lot, confirming that the key belonged

to the black Audi. The black Audi was subsequently returned to its rightful owner,

an individual named Henry Desantez (Mr. Desantez). 1

Meanwhile, in continuing the investigation into the shooting, Detective

Michael Otrando (Det. Otrando) reviewed the video surveillance footage extracted

by Sgt. Primiano from multiple locations near the Lowell Avenue shooting. After

conferring with other officers and examining details in the footage, Det. Otrando

came to the belief that the black vehicle captured in the surveillance footage was an

Audi. On July 6, 2018, Det. Otrando advised his sergeant of that belief, after which

the sergeant directed him to run a search in the PPD’s police report database for

stolen black Audis. From this search, Det. Otrando learned of a black Audi that had

been stolen on June 21, 2018, from Mr. Desantez. In an effort to locate the black

Audi, Det. Otrando learned that the vehicle had been returned to Mr. Desantez and

responded to the residence associated with the vehicle registration. Upon arrival at

the residence, he observed, idle in the driveway, a black Audi with tinted windows

and features similar to the black vehicle observed in the surveillance footage.

1
Throughout the trial, Mr. Terrero referred to this individual as “Henry Desantez,”
and the state’s counsel referred to him as “Henry Betances.” We use “Desantez” in
this opinion because Mr. Terrero was the first person to mention the name on the
record.
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Detective Otrando seized the vehicle and had it towed for processing by the Bureau

of Criminal Investigation.

Also on July 6, 2018, Det. Otrando again reviewed the police report for the

stolen black Audi and noticed a narcotics-investigation narrative denoting names of

individuals involved in that investigation, including Mr. Terrero and Ms. Pereira.

Detective Otrando then initiated an interview with Ms. Pereira, who offered to “wear

a wire” at a coming prison visit with Mr. Terrero. She did so on July 12, 2018, but

the wire did not audibly capture the conversation between them.

Detective Otrando thereafter began discussions with Mr. Terrero and his

attorney regarding whether he wanted to provide the state with information about

the shooting of Mr. Page. During these discussions, Mr. Terrero consented to a

search of his cell phone and gave an account of his knowledge of the events relating

to the shooting of Mr. Page. The discussions also revealed several text message

conversations between Mr. Terrero and an individual named Chandanoeuth Hay

(Mr. Hay). Detective Theodore Michael (Det. Michael) subsequently obtained a

search warrant for the contents of Mr. Terrero’s phone and examined the records.

Detective Otrando reviewed those records and ultimately determined that the

cell-phone extraction data corroborated Mr. Terrero’s account. The PPD obtained

and executed additional search warrants and seized cell phones belonging to

defendant and Mr. Hay. A cell-site location analysis of the phones by Det. Michael

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revealed that both phones could be traced to the area encompassing Bissell Street

and Elmwood Avenue at 12:22 a.m. and 12:28 a.m. on June 26, 2018. Furthermore,

processing of the black Audi seized from Mr. Desantez’s residence revealed no DNA

profiles for either defendant or Mr. Hay.

Mr. Terrero entered into a cooperation agreement with the state for leniency

in sentencing on his unrelated charges in exchange for his trial testimony against

defendant and Mr. Hay.

On December 9, 2019, a grand jury charged defendant and Mr. Hay in a single

indictment with murder, conspiracy to commit an assault with a dangerous weapon,

two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, three counts of discharge of a

firearm while in the commission of a crime of violence, discharge of a firearm from

a motor vehicle in a manner that created substantial risk of death or serious personal

injury, and carrying a firearm without a license. On July 31, 2020, the trial justice

set bail for defendant in the amount of a $100,000 surety.

A trial on the charges commenced on September 12, 2022, and continued

through October 6, 2022. Fourteen witnesses testified at trial for the state, and one

of those witnesses was called back to testify in defendant’s case-in-chief. The

testimony pertinent to this appeal is derived from the following witnesses: Eddie Lee

(Mr. Lee), Mr. Terrero, Ms. Pereira, and Sgt. Primiano.

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Mr. Lee, one of Mr. Page’s acquaintances who was present when Mr. Page

was fatally shot, testified as the sole eyewitness to the shooting. He testified that,

around the time of the shooting, he occasionally stayed with his sister at the residence

located at 100 Lowell Avenue. Mr. Lee explained that, although he ducked down in

fear when shots were fired at Mr. Page’s Cadillac, “it seemed like a car drove by

shooting” and that the car appeared to be “[d]ark-colored.”

Mr. Terrero testified next about his past experiences as a youth involved with

gangs in Providence, his current affiliation with a Providence gang called “864,” and

that he came to know defendant and Mr. Hay through their shared connection to 864.

He explained that, in the “street,” Mr. Hay went by the name of “Big Kay” and

defendant was known as “Ah Jay.” Mr. Terrero also testified about the January 2018

murder of his friend, Jamal Contreras, who was associated with 864, and expressed

that he had discussed the murder with members of 864 because things had become

“tense” for the gang as a result. Before testifying about the shooting in question,

Mr. Terrero stated that he, defendant, and Mr. Hay had driven down Lowell Avenue

earlier in June and that defendant indicated that “the Trini kid lives right here,”

referring to a rival gang called the Trinitarios.

Mr. Terrero also recounted his version of events on the night of June 25, 2018,

and the early morning hours of June 26, 2018. What follows summarizes his

testimony as it pertains to this appeal. According to Mr. Terrero, during the late

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evening hours of June 25, defendant, Mr. Hay, Mr. Terrero, and Ms. Pereira met in

the Washington Park area of Providence and smoked marijuana together in Mr.

Terrero’s admittedly stolen white Acura. During this meeting, Mr. Hay asked Mr.

Terrero to “take a ride,” which Mr. Terrero believed meant to go look for “enemies.”

Although Mr. Hay was the “head” of 864, Mr. Terrero declined his request. Mr.

Hay responded that he “needed his grip back” in reference to a .22 caliber Smith &

Wesson “community gun” that members of 864 had access to. Mr. Terrero told Mr.

Hay to follow him back to the Mink Road property to retrieve the gun. Mr. Hay and

defendant then followed Mr. Terrero to the Mink Road property in the black Audi

that the three men stole weeks earlier from Mr. Desantez. During the ride to Mink

Road, Mr. Hay texted Mr. Terrero stating, “I need my grip” for a second time at

10:45 p.m. Once they arrived at the Mink Road property, Mr. Terrero went inside

to retrieve the gun, returned a few moments later to the black Audi parked outside,

and handed the gun to defendant. Mr. Hay and defendant drove off afterwards and

Mr. Terrero asked Ms. Pereira to drop him off near the Hanover Street property so

that he could take a shower; she obliged. After getting out of the shower, Mr. Terrero

noticed that he had received several text messages and missed calls from Mr. Hay.

Between approximately 12:33 a.m. and 12:38 a.m., Mr. Hay texted Mr. Terrero a

series of messages telling him to look out for “ops,” which Mr. Terrero believed

meant that something was going on relating to enemy gang members and that he

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should be careful. Mr. Terrero then texted Mr. Hay asking if he needed ammunition

for the .22 caliber Smith & Wesson given to defendant earlier that night and Mr. Hay

responded that he had already “put it away.” At 12:45 a.m., Mr. Terrero asked Mr.

Hay who he was with and Mr. Hay responded that Ms. Pereira had picked “us” up.

Mr. Hay then sent Mr. Terrero a series of text messages telling him to hurry up and

that he and defendant were waiting near Hanover Street for him. Once Mr. Terrero

came outside and made contact with Mr. Hay, Ms. Pereira, and defendant, Mr. Hay

informed him that they had seen a “funny car” and “somebody with a hoodie.” Mr.

Hay also allegedly stated “Ah Jay had no aim,” to which defendant did not respond.

Later in the day on June 26, Mr. Terrero, Mr. Hay, and defendant returned to

the parking lot near Stamford Avenue and Bissell Street to clean the black Audi that

defendant and Mr. Hay were initially driving the prior evening. They used Clorox

wipes to clean the interior of the black Audi and Mr. Terrero changed the license

plate to one from Virginia. Also on June 26, Mr. Terrero and Mr. Hay exchanged

text messages discussing “stripping” the white Acura that Mr. Terrero and Ms.

Pereira were using the prior evening. Mr. Hay stated that he and defendant wanted

to strip the white Acura, while Mr. Terrero wanted to strip the black Audi that Mr.

Hay and defendant had been driving the prior evening. Mr. Hay texted that “[we]

ain’t all agreeing” and “it’s three people,” indicating to Mr. Terrero that they were

“supposed to all agree” as to which vehicle would be stripped. The defendant

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responded the following day that “Bro we got to all agree” and that certain vehicles

were distinctly reserved for taking a ride to look for enemies.

On cross-examination, Mr. Terrero’s testimony revealed discrepancies

regarding certain aspects of his recall of the events in question. For example, Mr.

Terrero admitted that he lied to Sgt. Kanelopoulos during the execution of search

warrants on Mr. Terrero’s properties when he stated that the recovered vehicle key

belonged to a silver Audi, when, in fact, he knew that the vehicle key belonged to

the later-seized black Audi. Cross-examination of Mr. Terrero additionally

highlighted his lengthy criminal history and his potential bias as a witness resulting

from the cooperation agreement he signed with the state.

Ms. Pereira also testified as a state’s witness. Contrary to Mr. Terrero’s recall

of the events leading up to the shooting of Mr. Page, Ms. Pereira testified that only

she, Mr. Hay, and Mr. Terrero were present for the group’s meet-up in Washington

Park, and she could not recall the content of their conversations. Her testimony was

silent as to whether Mr. Terrero handed the .22 caliber Smith & Wesson to defendant

after they left the Washington Park area and returned to the Mink Road property.

Ms. Pereira testified that, when she arrived to pick up defendant and Mr. Hay from

the parking lot on Stamford Avenue and Bissell Street, Mr. Hay exited the black

Audi and asked her if she had any Clorox wipes. Ms. Pereira stated that she did not

and gave Mr. Hay a T-shirt instead, which he took with him and walked back over

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to the black Audi where defendant was. She stated that she dropped off Mr. Terrero,

Mr. Hay, and defendant elsewhere afterwards, and that she did not recall any

conversations during the car ride. Ms. Pereira also testified disparagingly about her

relationship with Mr. Terrero and his character in general. She testified that Mr.

Terrero always carried a gun on his person, that she felt “used” by Mr. Terrero, and

that she wanted to get him in trouble when she told the PPD about the black Audi

parked on Stamford Avenue and Bissell Street. Ms. Pereira further testified that she

became a witness for the state by way of a subpoena but that she did not want to be

in court testifying.

Sergeant Primiano, another witness for the state, testified about the

surveillance footage he extracted and analyzed during the initial investigation into

the shooting. The footage was played for the jury during his testimony. Sergeant

Primiano testified that, based on his analysis and relevant experience, he believed

the dark-colored vehicle in the surveillance video was consistent with that of an

Audi. He recounted the specific physical details that he analyzed on the dark-colored

vehicle in the surveillance video to come to his conclusion: “taillights, shape of

windows, location of license plates, height of the vehicle, size of the vehicle.”

Sergeant Primiano added that he reviewed Internet images of Audis and compared

those images to the suspect vehicle in the surveillance video.

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The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts on October 6, 2022. The

defendant thereafter filed a timely motion for a new trial, challenging both the

sufficiency and weight of the evidence. The trial justice issued a bench decision

denying the motion for a new trial on November 1, 2022, and defendant’s valid,

albeit premature, notice of appeal followed.

On February 13, 2023, the trial justice sentenced defendant to two consecutive

life sentences for murder and discharging a firearm when committing a crime of

violence resulting in death; she also imposed several concurrent sentences for the

remaining guilty counts. The judgment of conviction entered on June 13, 2023.

Additional facts and aspects of the procedural history in this case appear in the

discussion of the issues.

Discussion

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial justice (1) abused her discretion in

denying his motion for severance; (2) abused her discretion in admitting testimony

regarding prior bad acts and crime in the community; (3) abused her discretion in

erroneously admitting two statements as statements against interest pursuant to Rule

804(b)(3) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; (4) abused her discretion in

permitting Sergeant Primiano to offer his lay opinion, under Rule 701 of the Rhode

Island Rules of Evidence, regarding the make of the shooter’s vehicle; and (5) clearly

erred in denying his motion for a new trial, which challenged both the weight and

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sufficiency of the evidence before the jury on the conspiracy count. We address

each of defendant’s alleged errors in turn.

A. Motion for Severance

Rule 14 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure governs motions

for severance and provides in pertinent part:

“If it appears that a defendant or the State is prejudiced by
a joinder of offenses or of defendants * * * for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials
of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide
whatever other relief justice requires.”

We have explained that the rule “protects defendants from prosecutorial

harassment and unfair advantage, while at the same time balancing the public’s

interest in avoiding the cost of repetitive trials.” State v. Pereira, 973 A.2d 19, 27

(R.I. 2009). This Court will not disturb a decision denying severance unless there is

a “clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Brown, 88 A.3d 1101, 1113 (R.I. 2014). The

burden on a defendant is high; they must demonstrate prejudice “to such a degree

that [they were] denied a fair trial.” Id. (quoting State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d 302, 309

(R.I. 2011)). The defendant argues that he meets that burden because the trial justice

admitted significant “spill-over” evidence about the codefendant, Mr. Hay, that

would not have been admissible against defendant at a separate trial. We are not

persuaded that defendant has met this high burden.

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“As a general rule, alleged coconspirators and the substantive offenses they

allegedly conspired to commit may be tried jointly.” State v. Parente, 460 A.2d 430,

437 (R.I. 1983). Here, the state joined defendant and Mr. Hay in a single, ten-count

indictment, charging both individuals with nine of the ten counts: conspiracy to

commit an assault with a dangerous weapon, murder, two counts of assault with a

dangerous weapon, three counts of discharge of a firearm while in the commission

of a crime of violence, discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle in a manner that

created substantial risk of death or serious personal injury, and carrying a firearm

without a license. The indictment also charged Mr. Hay with possession of a firearm

after a conviction of a crime of violence, namely breaking and entering, in violation

of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-5.

The defendant sought severance after a multi-day bail hearing, at the

conclusion of which the trial justice set bail and, according to defendant, stated that

she was “not satisfied that the State has offered evidence that the proof of this

defendant’s guilt is evident and the presumption great, that he conspired to commit

an assault with a dangerous weapon, the natural and probable result of which was

the murder of David Page.” In support of the motion for severance, defendant

initially contended that certain statements by Mr. Hay created mutually antagonistic

or inconsistent defenses; and defendant also invoked the Bruton doctrine, suggesting

that the admission of statements by Mr. Hay would violate defendant’s Sixth

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Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. See Bruton v. United States,

391 U.S. 123 (1968). 2 Additionally, defendant asserted that he would suffer

prejudice from the spillover effect of the admission of evidence that implicated only

Mr. Hay.

In pressing the motion for severance at a pretrial hearing, defendant conceded

that he was not likely to prevail on the Bruton doctrine argument and instead focused

on the risk of substantial prejudice from the admission of several statements

attributed to Mr. Hay, but that were intended to be used against defendant.

The trial justice denied the motion for severance without prejudice. She

reasoned that, in cases involving a joint conspiracy, a claim of prejudice is

insupportable if evidence would be admissible against each defendant had separate

trials been conducted. She also found nothing to indicate either antagonistic

defenses between defendant and Mr. Hay, or that the proposed evidence would be

so prejudicial as to be inadmissible against defendant at a separate trial. Finally, the

trial justice noted the expectation of a lengthy trial and concluded that the interests

of judicial efficiency warranted a joint trial.

2
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the United States Supreme Court
evaluated the constitutionality of admitting a nontestifying codefendant’s confession
at his and the defendant’s joint trial, which inculpated the defendant as a participant
in the crime. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 123-24, 126. The Court held that admitting such a
statement violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses
against him. Id. at 126, 136-37.
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The defendant did not renew his motion for severance at trial but argues on

appeal that the denial of his pretrial motion was an abuse of discretion. He contends

that certain spillover evidence—specifically, Mr. Terrero’s testimony about certain

verbal and text-message statements by Mr. Hay, as well as testimony about Mr.

Hay’s prior bad acts—would not have been admissible at a separate trial of defendant

alone. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the denial of defendant’s motion for

severance.

“Solely because a defendant has a limited role to play in the conspiracy, and

the evidence introduced against his coconspirator is prejudicial to him and is more

damaging than the evidence against him, does not entitle him to a severance.”

Parente, 460 A.2d at 438. The state charged defendant and Mr. Hay with having

conspired with one another to commit assault with a dangerous weapon. The state

introduced and relied upon testimony from Mr. Terrero about both codefendants’

roles in the alleged conspiracy. Furthermore, the state joined defendant and Mr. Hay

in charging each with nine of the ten counts, the tenth of which was charged solely

against Mr. Hay as a person who was previously convicted of breaking and entering.

The defendant’s citation to United States v. Martinez, 994 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2021), is

therefore readily distinguishable: In Martinez, the United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit considered whether the denial of the defendant’s repeated

motions for severance was an abuse of discretion and determined that it was.

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Martinez, 994 F.3d at 6, 16. However, unlike the instant matter, the jury in Martinez

was exposed to days of detailed direct evidence regarding the alleged corrupt

schemes perpetrated by a codefendant, which evidence was admitted to show the

codefendant’s intent to commit a crime that differed from the crime with which the

defendant was charged. 3 Id. at 14. The single count charged against Mr. Hay—

possession of a firearm after a conviction of a crime of violence in violation of

§ 11-47-5—required, in addition to proof that both Mr. Hay and defendant possessed

a firearm, that Mr. Hay had a prior conviction of breaking and entering. Proof of

this discrete additional element was, unlike the evidence presented in Martinez, not

highly prejudicial to defendant.

Our review of the record satisfies us that the trial justice appropriately

considered defendant’s concerns about prejudice and weighed them against the

possible lengthy duration of the trial and the reluctance of witnesses who would be

called to testify. Her decision denying the motion for severance was not a clear

abuse of discretion.

3
Also noteworthy is that, in United States v. Martinez, 994 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2021),
the court acknowledged the significant “hurdle that faces a defendant seeking
severance from a codefendant with whom [he] has been charged with conspiring *
* *.” Martinez, 994 F.3d at 13; see United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 36 (1st
Cir. 1998) (“[I]n the context of conspiracy, severance will rarely, if ever, be
required.”) (quoting United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 325 (1st Cir.
1995)).
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B. Testimony Regarding Prior Bad Acts and Crime in the Community

The trial justice admitted evidence regarding seven violent or criminal acts

that took place in Providence on various occasions in 2017 and 2018. Specifically,

Mr. Terrero testified (1) that in May 2017, defendant got out of a truck that Mr.

Terrero had been driving on Gallup Street and, at Mr. Hay’s direction, fired a couple

of shots at a burgundy Toyota Avalon that had been following their truck (2017

Gallup Street shooting); (2) that Mr. Hay fired multiple shots at a Honda Odyssey

while Mr. Terrero drove Mr. Hay and some women in the vicinity of the Cranston

Street Armory, also in May 2017 (2017 Cranston Street shooting); (3) that Mr.

Terrero’s friend Jamal Contreras was murdered on January 23, 2018, leading to a

tense situation for members of the 864 gang; (4) that in late May 2018, Mr. Terrero

was at a grocery store at the intersection of Academy Avenue and Chalkstone

Avenue when he encountered Mr. Hay, his girlfriend, defendant, and defendant’s

girlfriend, who was bleeding; according to what Mr. Hay told Mr. Terrero, the

vehicle that Mr. Hay and the three others were riding in had just been shot at (May

2018 shooting); (5) that on June 4, 2018, when Mr. Terrero was living at 156

Hanover Street, he was awakened by the sound of more than twenty gunshots, went

outside, and found bullets on the sidewalk near the driveway of his apartment; and

he subsequently contacted Mr. Hay, who told Mr. Terrero that he had also been shot

at while reversing in a car in the driveway at 156 Hanover Street (Hanover Street

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shooting); (6) that sometime in June of 2018, Mr. Terrero and defendant stole a black

Audi and marijuana from Mr. Desantez (Desantez robbery); and (7) that Mr. Terrero

stole other vehicles in the summer of 2018, including a white Acura, and that Mr.

Hay and defendant wanted to strip down the white Acura.

The defendant argues on appeal that the trial justice improperly admitted Mr.

Terrero’s testimony about the seven prior violent or criminal acts pursuant to Rule

404(b), because the testimony either did not relate to the murder of Mr. Page or did

not involve defendant. He further contends that the testimony about the seven prior

violent or criminal acts served as an “emotional appeal to garner outrage at the level

of violence in the Providence community.”

Our review of a trial justice’s decision regarding the admissibility of evidence

is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 465 (R.I. 2013) (Pona II).

Rule 404(b) states:

“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to
prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that
the fear was reasonable.” R.I. R. Evid. 404(b).

This Court has also stated that evidence of other crimes or wrongs is

admissible when it is “interwoven or in instances when introduction is necessary for

a trier of fact to hear a complete and, it is to be hoped, coherent story so as to make
- 19 -
an accurate determination of guilt or innocence.” State v. Clements, 83 A.3d 553,

561 (R.I. 2014) (quoting State v. Pona, 948 A.2d 941, 949-50 (R.I. 2008) (Pona I)).

We bear in mind, however, that the line between Rule 404(b) evidence presented to

demonstrate propensity and Rule 404(b) evidence presented for an admissible

purpose is a “fine one to draw and an even more difficult one for judges and juries

to follow.” State v. Ciresi, 45 A.3d 1201, 1211 (R.I. 2012) (quoting State v.

Rodriguez, 996 A.2d 145, 150 (R.I. 2010)). Moreover, we have explained that, as

when ruling on the admissibility of any evidence, trial justices must also consider

whether the “probative value [of the proffered evidence] is substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or

by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of

cumulative evidence.” R.I. R. Evid. 403; Pona II, 66 A.3d at 466. “[A] trial justice’s

discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403 must be used sparingly. * * * It is

only when evidence is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial that a trial

justice must exclude it.” Pona II, 66 A.3d at 466 (quoting State v. Smith, 39 A.3d

669, 675 (R.I. 2012)).

We have examined the extensive record of proceedings closely and determine

that defendant’s challenge to the admissibility of Mr. Terrero’s testimony about four

of the seven prior violent or criminal acts fails under the long-standing

raise-or-waive rule. See Ciresi, 45 A.3d at 1212. Furthermore, we determine that

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defendant’s arguments fail to persuade us that the trial justice abused her discretion

in permitting Mr. Terrero to testify about the three remaining prior incidents: the

2017 Gallup Street shooting, the 2017 Cranston Street shooting, and the May 2018

shooting.

1. Waiver

The “raise-or-waive” rule precludes a litigant from raising an issue on appeal

that she or he has not articulated at trial. Ciresi, 45 A.3d at 1212. “Our long-standing

rule is that a contemporaneous objection or at least a motion to strike” is a necessary

precondition to appellate review. Id. (quoting State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1048-

49 n.7 (R.I. 2000)).

The defendant concedes that Mr. Terrero testified about stealing vehicles in

the summer of 2018 without objection from counsel for either defendant or Mr. Hay.

His challenge to that testimony is thus clearly waived. Ciresi, 45 A.3d at 1212. The

defendant also acknowledges that his counsel did not object to Mr. Terrero’s

testimony about the murder of Jamal Contreras or the Desantez robbery, but

emphasizes that counsel for Mr. Hay did offer contemporaneous objections to the

testimony about those violent or criminal acts, as well as to testimony about the

Hanover Street shooting. Citing cases from various state and federal appellate

courts, and relying especially on State v. Bruce, 411 P.3d 300 (Haw. 2017),

defendant argues that Mr. Hay’s contemporaneous objections to the testimony about

- 21 -
those three violent or criminal acts inured to his benefit and sufficed to preserve for

appellate review the propriety of its admissibility.

In Bruce, the Supreme Court of Hawaii reasoned that the purpose of requiring

a specific objection—to put the trial justice on notice of an error—is served when a

codefendant states an objection, “regardless of whether the other defendant joins the

co-defendant’s objection or objects independently.” Bruce, 411 P.3d at 308. Bruce

identifies what we consider to be the primary purpose of the raise-or-waive rule. See

State v. Doyle, 235 A.3d 482, 495 (R.I. 2020) (“[W]e require a specific objection so

that the allegation of error can be brought to the attention of the trial justice, who

will then have an opportunity to rule on it.”) (quoting Pona II, 66 A.3d at 468).

However, the raise-or-waive rule serves other purposes as well, including to

preclude the appealing party from having a “second bite at the apple.” Konar v. PFL

Life Insurance Company, 840 A.2d 1115, 1120 (R.I. 2004) (“The taking of an appeal

does not provide the appealing party with a second bite at the apple. For example, a

party may not assert an argument on appeal that was not presented below.”); see also

Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the

Gorilla Rule, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1023, 1031 (1987) (“If no objection is made, the

adverse party may think that the [non-objecting] party agrees with the action or for

tactical reasons decides not to raise an objection.”).

- 22 -
Our examination of the record in this case reveals that defendant neither

objected to Mr. Terrero’s trial testimony regarding the murder of Jamal Contreras,

the Hanover Street shooting, or the Desantez robbery; nor did defendant oppose the

state’s pretrial motion in limine regarding those same three prior violent or criminal

acts. In fact, during the pretrial hearing on cross-motions in limine, the state

explicitly identified multiple prior violent or criminal acts that it sought to explore

through Mr. Terrero’s testimony at trial, including (1) the 2017 Gallup Street

shooting; (2) the 2017 Cranston Street shooting; (3) the murder of Jamal Contreras;

(4) the May 2018 shooting; (5) the Hanover Street shooting; and (6) the Desantez

robbery. In response, the trial justice asked counsel for defendant to clarify “exactly

what” evidence defendant sought to preclude pursuant to Rule 404(b); and counsel

for defendant identified only the 2017 Gallup Street shooting, the May 2018

shooting, and two incidents not at issue in this appeal. As such, we cannot determine

whether counsel for defendant had tactical reasons for not objecting at trial to Mr.

Terrero’s testimony about the murder of Jamal Contreras, the Hanover Street

shooting, or the Desantez robbery. We decline defendant’s invitation to craft a new

exception to the raise-or-waive rule, particularly considering the ambiguity

concerning the reasons for defendant’s lack of objections to this testimony.

The defendant’s challenge to the admissibility of Mr. Terrero’s testimony

about the murder of Jamal Contreras, the Hanover Street shooting, the Desantez

- 23 -
robbery, and stealing vehicles in the summer of 2018 is not properly preserved;

therefore, we will not evaluate the merits of his arguments related to that testimony.

2. The 2017 shootings and the May 2018 shooting

As previously discussed, the trial justice held a pretrial hearing on cross-

motions in limine regarding the 2017 Gallup Street shooting, the 2017 Cranston

Street shooting, and the May 2018 shooting. The state argued that it sought

admission of the two 2017 shootings for the purpose of demonstrating that

defendant, Mr. Hay, and Mr. Terrero (1) had a common scheme or plan to shoot rival

gang members and (2) had access to firearms. With respect to the May 2018

shooting, the state argued that testimony about the incident “would provide a

comprehensive narrative” about the crimes that defendant was accused of having

committed as well as “important context for some of the evidence in th[e] case.”

More specifically, the state argued that the May 2018 shooting was “a backdrop” for

the retaliatory nature of the shooting that occurred on June 26, 2018. The defendant,

on the other hand, opposed any testimony regarding the 2017 Gallup Street shooting

as inadmissible propensity evidence. He also opposed testimony regarding the May

2018 shooting as “completely irrelevant to this case” and violative of Rules 402 4 and

403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.

4
Rule 402 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence states:

- 24 -
In disposing of the cross-motions in limine, the trial justice found that

“all of this evidence is probative of the motive, the
opportunity, the intent of the defendant[s’] preparation,
having access to firearms, absence of mistake or accident
involving firearms continually being used. Subject to a
limiting instruction for each of these incidences, assuming
Kennedy Terrero testifies to such, I think they are
admissible under Rule 404(b) * * *.”

Mr. Terrero’s subsequent trial testimony regarding the 2017 Gallup Street

shooting was preceded by the following limiting instruction by the trial justice:

“Once again, the mere membership or affiliation with a
gang, or a group, or even friendship or association with
their members, is not evidence that Mr. Hang is of bad
character or that he necessarily is disposed to commit a
crime. Once again, any such evidence, to the extent that
you decide to consider it, is admitted for the limited
purpose as it may, in your minds, if at all, relate to Mr.
Hang’s motive, planning, intent, or knowledge with
respect to the charges for which he is presently on trial.

“Once again, ladies and gentlemen, you are the sole judges
of the facts and the evidence, and it is entirely up to you as
to what evidence to accept or to reject.”

When Mr. Terrero testified at trial about the 2017 Cranston Street shooting,

defendant joined Mr. Hay in objecting to the testimony without stating a precise

“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by the
constitution of Rhode Island, by act of congress, by the
general laws of Rhode Island, by these rules, or by other
rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.”
- 25 -
basis for the objection. The trial justice overruled the objections and gave the

following limiting instruction upon request by counsel for Mr. Hay:

“Ladies and gentlemen, to the extent that you have just
heard testimony that, on another occasion, the defendants
allegedly were involved in other misconduct, bear in mind
that neither defendant has been charged with any offense
arising out of the alleged misconduct just described by Mr.
Terrero. And from this evidence you cannot conclude that
either defendant is a bad person or that either has the
tendency or propensity to commit the crimes with which
they are each charged in the case before you now.

“Any such evidence that you just heard, to the extent that
you decide to consider it, is admitted only for the limited
purpose as it may, in your minds, relate to either
defendant’s state of mind, motive, knowledge, or intent, or
to show some common scheme, plan, preparation, or
opportunity on either defendant’s part, with respect to
conduct described by Mr. Terrero and the specific charges
for which each of the defendants is presently on trial.

“Again, you are the sole judges of the facts and the
evidence, and it is entirely up to you as to what evidence
to accept or reject.”

On this record, we cannot say that the trial justice abused her discretion in permitting

Mr. Terrero to testify about the 2017 shootings. She considered the purposes

proposed by the state in light of the pertinent charges against defendant, including

conspiracy to commit an assault with a dangerous weapon and the several firearms

charges. The trial justice determined at the hearing on the motion in limine that the

2017 shootings were admissible to demonstrate defendant’s opportunity to access

firearms as well as his and Mr. Hay’s nonaccidental or mistaken use of firearms. Cf.
- 26 -
State v. Husband, 162 A.3d 646, 657-58 (R.I. 2017) (noting as significant that

evidence of prior shooting by a codefendant who had pled prior to the defendant’s

trial had slight probative value and was cumulative against the defendant,

particularly where the “defendant’s relationship with the other coconspirators was

not disputed”). Furthermore, her lengthy limiting instructions directed the jurors to

the purposes for which they could consider the testimony, none of which were for

propensity purposes. See Hartman v. Carter, 121 R.I. 1, 5, 393 A.2d 1102, 1105

(1978) (“The term ‘discretion’ imports action taken in the light of reason as applied

to all the facts and with a view to the rights of all the parties to the action while

having regard for what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law.”).

Moreover, this case differs from State v. DeCosta, 293 A.3d 297 (R.I. 2023),

on which defendant heavily relies, both in context and in the purpose for which the

prior conduct was introduced. See DeCosta, 293 A.3d at 302 (rejecting admissibility

of evidence of the defendant’s prior assault of a third party when one of the purported

purposes of that evidence was to show the defendant’s intent towards the victim of

the crimes charged). Here, the record is clear that the state did not offer testimony

of the 2017 shootings to demonstrate an intent to shoot Mr. Page. Additionally, the

record is clear that defendant never raised any argument or concern about the use of

this testimony to demonstrate defendant’s intent to shoot Mr. Page; defendant cannot

raise this argument for the first time on appeal. See Ciresi, 45 A.3d at 1212.

- 27 -
Finally, we cannot conclude that the “evidence [was] marginally relevant and

enormously prejudicial” such that the trial justice was compelled to exclude the

testimony about the 2017 shootings pursuant to Rule 403. Pona II, 66 A.3d at 466

(quoting Smith, 39 A.3d at 675).

With respect to Mr. Terrero’s testimony about the May 2018 shooting, the

record indicates that counsel for defendant objected “for reasons previously stated,”

implicitly referring to the pretrial argument that the testimony was “completely

irrelevant.” The trial justice overruled the objection and gave another limiting

instruction after Mr. Terrero recounted seeing Mr. Hay and defendant at the

intersection of Academy Avenue and Chalkstone Avenue in late May 2018, just after

defendant’s girlfriend had reportedly been shot:

“[T]o the extent that you’ve heard additional testimony
that on another occasion both Mr. Hay and Mr. Hang were
allegedly involved in another situation involving guns or
being shot, bear in mind that, once again, neither of those
individuals have been charged with any offense arising out
of that situation. And from this evidence, you cannot
conclude that either defendant is a bad person, or that
either has the tendency or proclivity to commit the crimes
with which they are both charged here before this court.

“Any such evidence that you just heard, to the extent that
you decide to consider it, may be admitted only for the
limited purpose as it may, in your minds, relate to either
defendant’s state of mind, motive, knowledge, or intent, or
to show some common scheme, plan, preparation, or
opportunity on either defendant’s part with respect to the
conduct described by Mr. Terrero and the specific charges
for which they each are presently on trial.”
- 28 -
Neither defendant nor Mr. Hay committed the May 2018 shooting, and as

such, the testimony was not evidence of their acts offered to prove their character or

propensity within the meaning of Rule 404(b). However, the record reflects that, in

overruling defendant’s objection to this testimony as irrelevant prior to trial, the trial

justice considered whether the testimony about the May 2018 shooting was relevant

to defendant’s alleged motivation for the shooting that occurred on June 26, 2018,

and determined that it was. Additionally, as with the testimony regarding the 2017

shootings, the trial justice provided a limiting instruction to guide the jury with

respect to how they might appropriately consider the testimony.

Based on the record before us, we are satisfied that the trial justice acted

within her discretion in admitting Mr. Terrero’s testimony about the May 2018

shooting of defendant’s girlfriend as relevant to defendant’s alleged motivation for

the shooting. We are also satisfied that she did not abuse her discretion in

determining that the testimony was neither needlessly cumulative nor so highly

prejudicial as to outweigh its probative value. Pona II, 66 A.3d at 466.

C. Statements Admitted Pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3)

Mr. Terrero testified, without objection, that Mr. Hay made the following

out-of-court statements: (1) “I need my grip” and (2) “Ah Jay had no aim.” The

defendant asserts on appeal that the trial justice abused her discretion in admitting

- 29 -
these statements because “neither comment is truly against penal interest and both

are tainted by speculation.”

The defendant’s failure to object prior to the admission of these statements,

or to move to strike the testimony once given, once again triggers the raise-or-waive

rule. Ciresi, 45 A.3d at 1212. Although defendant objected to a follow-up question

about the meaning of “Ah Jay had no aim[,]” Mr. Terrero offered Mr. Hay’s

inculpatory out-of-court statement without defendant bringing it to the trial justice’s

attention. Doyle, 235 A.3d at 495. The defendant has consequently waived appellate

review of the admissibility of these out-of-court statements.

D. Lay Opinion Offered by Sergeant Primiano

The trial justice preliminarily determined that Sergeant Jonathan Primiano of

the PPD would be permitted to offer a lay opinion, subject to cross-examination, that

the dark-tinted sedan captured in surveillance video recorded on June 26, 2018, was

consistent with an Audi. 5 At trial, during Sgt. Primiano’s direct testimony, he

identified a black sedan on surveillance video footage prior to being asked what he

believed the make of that vehicle to be at the time he observed it on the footage.

Counsel for Mr. Hay renewed an objection to the testimony, and the trial justice gave

the following instruction before Sgt. Primiano answered:

5
Counsel for Mr. Hay filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the lay opinion
testimony of Sgt. Primiano regarding the make of the black sedan observed in video
surveillance from the area of the shooting.
- 30 -
“[O]rdinarily, the law does not permit a witness to testify
about his or her opinions or conclusions. An exception to
this, as I described to you, is for expert witnesses.

“***

“A further exception to this rule is when a witness has
formed an opinion that is rationally based upon the
perception of the witness, and when that opinion is helpful
to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony, or the
determination of a fact in issue.

“Detective Sergeant Primiano’s opinions that will be
expressed in just a moment is not expert in nature, but is
offered for your consideration, and is based upon his
personal observations as a police officer. It is up to you to
assess the credibility of his testimony and determine how
much weight you will give to it, in the same manner that
you consider the testimony of every other witness.”

Sergeant Primiano explained that when he observed the vehicle on the footage, he

“believed [it] to be consistent with that of an Audi.”

The defendant challenges the admission of Sgt. Primiano’s lay opinion,

arguing that it did not assist the jury because he supported his conclusions “solely

through the details of his training and experience rather than a description of an

Audi’s characteristics and how those characteristics are consistent with images of

the shooter’s car.” However, our examination of the record reveals that defendant

raises this challenge for the first time on appeal; we will not reach the merits of this

challenge as it is barred by the raise-or-waive rule. Doyle, 235 A.3d at 495.

- 31 -
E. Motion for a New Trial

The defendant argues that the trial justice committed clear error in denying

his motion for a new trial; he challenges the guilty verdict on the conspiracy count

as being against both the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence. More

specifically, defendant argues that there was no evidence to corroborate the

questionable testimony of the most percipient witnesses, Mr. Terrero and Ms.

Pereira, that defendant conspired with Mr. Hay to commit an assault with a deadly

weapon. We are unpersuaded.

This Court will not overturn a trial justice’s decision denying a motion for a

new trial based upon the weight of the evidence unless the trial justice committed

clear error or overlooked or misconceived material evidence. State v. Chez, 309 A.3d

1182, 1192 (R.I. 2024). We afford the trial justice great deference on a motion for

a new trial challenging the weight of the evidence because she or he is in an

“especially good position to evaluate the facts and to judge the credibility of the

witnesses.” Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 199 A.3d 1046, 1051 (R.I. 2019)).

We consider whether the trial justice, acting as a thirteenth juror, exercised

independent judgment in considering the evidence presented and the credibility of

witnesses. Chez, 309 A.3d at 1192. In undertaking this review as the thirteenth juror,

the trial justice must evaluate the evidence in light of the jury charge and determine

whether she or he would have reached a different result than the jury. Id. Where the

- 32 -
trial justice agrees with the verdict or determines that reasonable minds could differ,

the motion for a new trial should be denied. Id.

This Court reviews a trial justice’s decision denying a motion for a new trial

for lack of sufficiency of the evidence de novo, and we evaluate the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict that the jury returned. Chez, 309 A.3d at 1190.

Conspiracy requires “an agreement by two or more persons to commit an

unlawful act or to perform a lawful act for an unlawful purpose.” State v. Huntley,

171 A.3d 1003, 1006 (R.I. 2017) (quoting State v. Abdullah, 967 A.2d 469, 474-75

(R.I. 2009)). Importantly, “[t]he evidence presented [to establish a conspiracy] may

be solely circumstantial such that it may be ‘inferentially established by proof of the

relations, conduct, circumstances, and actions of the parties.’” Id. (quoting State v.

Disla, 874 A.2d 190, 197 (R.I. 2005)). Here, the trial justice instructed the jury to

consider whether the evidence demonstrated that defendant and Mr. Hay

“in some manner, came to a mutual understanding to try
to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, in this case,
committing an assault with a dangerous weapon. The
existence of a conspiracy may be proved by direct
evidence or entirely by circumstantial evidence or by any
combination of both direct and circumstantial evidence.”

The record further reflects that, in evaluating the evidence presented, the trial

justice recognized the circumstantial nature of the case against defendant and

acknowledged that only some of the testimony offered by Mr. Terrero and Ms.

Pereira was credible, while most of it was not. She assessed the totality of the
- 33 -
evidence before the jury, including evidence that corroborated Mr. Terrero’s

testimony: a text message that Mr. Hay sent to Mr. Terrero at 10:45 p.m., stating he

“needs his grip”; the surveillance videos depicting a dark-tinted car driving down

Lowell Avenue immediately prior to the shooting of Mr. Page; testimony from

officers of the PPD that the dark-tinted car was consistent with an Audi; evidence

that Mr. Hay placed a phone call to Ms. Pereira just minutes after the shooting;

testimony that Ms. Pereira observed defendant and Mr. Hay in the black Audi at

Stamford Avenue and Bissell Street not long after the murder; the lack of DNA

found on the stolen black Audi, which was consistent with Ms. Pereira’s testimony

that defendant and Mr. Hay wiped it down after the shooting; cell-site location data

indicating that defendant’s cell phone was in the vicinity of the lot at Stamford

Avenue and Bissell Street at 12:28 a.m.; and the text message from Mr. Hay to Mr.

Terrero indicating that Ms. Pereira had picked “us” up.

The trial justice also gave a thorough assessment of Ms. Pereira’s demeanor

while testifying and her reluctance to be involved as a witness, and ultimately

determined that Mr. Terrero’s testimony was more truthful than Ms. Pereira’s

testimony. After comprehensively reviewing the evidence, the trial justice

concluded that reasonable minds could differ and denied the motion for a new trial

accordingly.

- 34 -
The defendant nevertheless emphasizes the earlier decision of the trial justice

to set bail for defendant, particularly her determination that contradictory evidence

provided by the state’s witnesses during those proceedings failed to satisfy her that

defendant “conspired to commit an assault with a dangerous weapon, the natural and

probable result of which was the murder of David Page.” The defendant argues that

the trial justice overlooked what he characterizes as the state’s failure to prove a

connection between defendant and 100 Lowell Avenue and defendant and Mr. Lee.

The defendant therefore maintains that the evidence was not sufficient to support the

guilty verdict.

The defendant’s argument misses the mark. Our review of the evidence and

testimony presented at trial reveals that the trial justice supportably found that the

state introduced sufficient evidence to prove that defendant was guilty of conspiracy

to commit assault with a dangerous weapon. There was evidence and testimony to

show that, on the night of the murder, defendant was in the white Acura with Mr.

Hay and Mr. Terrero when Mr. Hay said he wanted to “take a ride” and asked for

his “grip”; that defendant was with Mr. Hay in the black Audi when Mr. Hay texted

Mr. Terrero that he “needed his grip”; that defendant was with Mr. Hay in the black

Audi when they arrived at the Mink Road property to retrieve the gun; that Mr.

Terrero handed the gun to defendant directly while defendant was sitting in the

passenger seat of the black Audi; that defendant had previously stated that “the Trini

- 35 -
kid lives right here,” referring to a rival gang member, while driving down Lowell

Avenue; and that the January 2018 murder of Jamal Contreras had been the subject

of conversation between Mr. Terrero, Mr. Hay, and defendant in the aftermath of his

death. Additionally, there was evidence and testimony to show that Mr. Lee was in

Mr. Page’s Cadillac, parked near 100 Lowell Avenue, when shots were fired at the

Cadillac from a dark-tinted vehicle; and that after the shooting, Mr. Hay said to

defendant, Mr. Terrero, and Ms. Pereira, “Ah Jay had no aim.” Viewing this

evidence and testimony in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, we are

satisfied that it is sufficient to establish that defendant conspired with Mr. Hay to

commit assault with a dangerous weapon. See Huntley, 171 A.3d at 1006.

In light of the findings by the trial justice on the record before us, we cannot

conclude that she clearly erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and remand

the record to the Superior Court.

- 36 -
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Jaythan Hang.

No. 2023-236-C.A.
Case Number
(P1/19-6260BG)

Date Opinion Filed July 2, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Kristin E. Rodgers

For State:

Virginia M. McGinn
Attorney(s) on Appeal Department of Attorney General
For Defendant:

J. Richard Ratcliffe, Esq.