Noah Gabriel v. Jeffrey M. Willis

Supreme Court

No. 2023-349-Appeal.
(WC 23-179)

Noah Gabriel :

v. :

Jeffrey M. Willis et al. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
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Supreme Court

No. 2023-349-Appeal.
(WC 23-179)

Noah Gabriel :

v. :

Jeffrey M. Willis et al. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The plaintiff, Noah Gabriel, who is

self-represented, appeals from an order granting a temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction in favor of the defendants, Jeffrey M. Willis in his official

capacity as Executive Director of the Coastal Resources Management Council and

the Coastal Resources Management Council (collectively CRMC), which ordered

the plaintiff to “cease and desist all activities on [the p]laintiff’s property” in

Narragansett, Rhode Island. The plaintiff raises several arguments on appeal and

contends that CRMC did not have the authority to institute an enforcement action

against him, as his property is not a “wetland.” This case came before the Supreme

Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the

issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the

parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that

cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing

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or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order of the

Superior Court.

I

Facts and Travel

The plaintiff owns an undeveloped parcel of real estate on Daytona Avenue

in Narragansett, identified as Assessor’s Plat No. Y-3, lot No. 186 (the property).

On April 27, 2022, CRMC received notification from the Narragansett building

official of potential wetland violations on the property. This notification caused

CRMC Enforcement Department staff to investigate the property for potential

violations of wetland regulations. The CRMC investigation revealed that the

property had been altered through four actions: (1) clearing of vegetation; (2)

application of fill soil to the property; (3) installation of a culvert; and (4) installation

and expansion of a driveway.

Following the investigation of the property, CRMC determined that wetland

regulations had been violated by plaintiff and issued a cease-and-desist order on May

4, 2022. Subsequently, plaintiff engaged the services of Ecosystem Solutions, Inc.,

to delineate the wetland on the property. The parties were unable to reach a

resolution concerning the extent of the wetland; and, in an email dated January 1,

2023, plaintiff asserted that the entire lot was not within CRMC jurisdiction.

Thereafter, on March 27, 2023, CRMC issued an order to restore, requiring plaintiff

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to submit a plan to CRMC for complete restoration of his property by a qualified

professional on or before April 30, 2023, and to restore the property by May 15,

2023. In response to this order, plaintiff filed the case at bar in Washington County

Superior Court on April 25, 2023.

In his complaint, plaintiff asserted numerous claims, including that CRMC

lacked jurisdiction over the property; CRMC conducted illegal digging on the

property; CRMC personnel illegally trespassed on the land; his property was

illegally flooded; and CRMC made false statements and falsified records. In

response, CRMC filed an answer and counterclaim seeking injunctive relief and a

declaratory judgment that it had the right to enforce the wetland regulations on the

property. Additionally, CRMC filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and

a preliminary injunction to preclude plaintiff from making any further alterations to

his property.

The plaintiff objected to this motion, asserting that it was “unlawful” with

respect to his property rights. He cited the Clean Water Act (chapter 26 of title 33

of the United States Code) and Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, 598

U.S. 651 (2023), in his objection.1 A hearing on CRMC’s motion for a temporary

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In his objection, plaintiff included a conclusory statement claiming that CRMC’s
motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was an
“unlawful motion according to the constitutional rights to property governed by
United States federal law.” In the same objection, plaintiff asserted, with no
explanation, that the applicable federal laws include Section 404 of the Clean Water

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restraining order and preliminary injunction was then held before a justice of the

Superior Court on August 25, 2023.

At the hearing, CRMC staff member Devon Robinson, an environmental

scientist responsible for enforcement of CRMC regulations, testified that she

observed alterations to the wetland on plaintiff’s property, precipitating the issuance

of the cease-and-desist order. She also testified that plaintiff’s property is in fact a

“contiguous freshwater wetland * * *.” She further testified that plaintiff ultimately

did not comply with the cease-and-desist order, causing CRMC to issue an order to

restore. According to Robinson, plaintiff then violated the order to restore by

performing additional alterations to his property. She also testified that continued

alteration of plaintiff’s property would immediately put the environment at risk. On

cross-examination, plaintiff acknowledged that he made several alterations to his

property after the issuance of the cease-and-desist order and the order to restore.

The hearing justice rendered a decision on CRMC’s motion for a temporary

restraining order, citing Iggy’s Doughboys, Inc. v. Giroux, 729 A.2d 701 (R.I. 1999),

as setting forth the applicable standard of review. The hearing justice stated that,

Act relating to “illegal flooding” and Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency,
598 U.S. 651 (2023), as it “defines a wetland[,]” pursuant to the Clean Water Act
(chapter 26 of title 33 of the United States Code). Sackett, 598 U.S. at 671-78.
CRMC’s enforcement actions against plaintiff were not brought pursuant to the
Clean Water Act; rather, CRMC cited plaintiff for violating state CRMC regulations
promulgated pursuant to state statutory authority.

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pursuant to Iggy’s Doughboys, “The moving party must establish a reasonable

likelihood of success on the merits; the party must also demonstrate they suffer

irreparable harm; the balance of the equities tips in their favor; and the issuance of

the temporary restraining order protects the status quo.” After applying these factors

to the facts of the case at bar, the hearing justice ultimately granted CRMC’s motion

for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. An order to that

effect entered on September 21, 2023. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on

September 27, 2023.

II

Standard of Review

“Although the grant of a preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order, a

direct appeal to this Court is permissible pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-24-7.”

Gianfrancesco v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc., 112 A.3d 703, 708 (R.I. 2015); see also Iggy’s

Doughboys, 729 A.2d at 705. “When reviewing a hearing justice’s decision to grant

a preliminary injunction, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard of

review.” Finnimore & Fisher Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham, 291 A.3d 977, 982-83

(R.I. 2023) (quoting Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 708). “If the party requesting the

preliminary injunction has established a prima facie case warranting preliminary

injunctive relief, this Court will not find an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 983 (quoting

Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 708).

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“Under such a limited scope of review, this Court need not reach nor resolve

the underlying substantive issues as it would after the imposition of a permanent

injunction. * * * Instead, our role is limited to determining whether the hearing

justice considered and resolved each of the appropriate preliminary injunction

factors without abusing his or her discretion.” Finnimore & Fisher Inc., 291 A.3d at

983 (quoting Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 708). These preliminary injunction factors

include

“whether the moving party (1) has a reasonable likelihood
of success on the merits, (2) will suffer irreparable harm
without the requested injunctive relief, (3) has the balance
of the equities, including the possible hardships to each
party and to the public interest, tip in its favor, and (4) has
shown that the issuance of a preliminary injunction will
preserve the status quo.” Id. (quoting Gianfrancesco, 112
A.3d at 708).

III

Discussion

On appeal, plaintiff lists several arguments that appear to relate to substantive

underlying issues of the instant case, including: “Sacketts vs. The EPA [sic]

(Definition of a Wetland)”; “Property Rights and the Constitution”; “Property as the

foundation of all rights and our most fundamental right”; “Property rights under the

promise of Common Law and the Constitution”; “Property rights protecting sole

dominion and quiet enjoyment”; “Property rights under the RI State Constitution”;

“Property rights under the Supreme Court Decision Sacketts vs. The EPA [sic]”;

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“Property rights preventing flooding and encroachment onto other private

properties”; “CRMC Illegalities and Ethics Violations”; “Section 404 Clean Water

Act (Army Core [sic] of Engineers)”; and “Right to a Healthy Environment.”

The plaintiff, however, filed a notice of appeal from the Superior Court’s grant

of the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction in favor of CRMC.

Accordingly, the sole issue before this Court is whether the hearing justice abused

her discretion in granting such an order.

CRMC argues that the Superior Court properly analyzed the facts of the case

through the preliminary injunction factors set forth in Iggy’s Doughboys.

Furthermore, CRMC asserts that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in

ultimately granting the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction

based upon this analysis. We agree.

The first factor to be considered when deciding whether to grant a preliminary

injunction is “whether the moving party [] has a reasonable likelihood of success on

the merits[.]” Finnimore & Fisher Inc., 291 A.3d at 983. Before the Superior Court,

CRMC argued that it “will succeed on the merits of its case because the evidence

tends to show that wetland violations have occurred on [plaintiff]’s property, and

that those violations have continued despite the Cease and Desist Order and the

Order to Restore.” The hearing justice relied on the testimony of Robinson and of

plaintiff himself to determine that there had been violations of wetland regulations

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on the property after the issuance of the cease-and-desist order and the order to

restore. Furthermore, the hearing justice noted that plaintiff does not dispute the fact

that he made several alterations to his property in violation of the CRMC orders.

These findings are sufficient to establish that the hearing justice did not abuse her

discretion in determining that CRMC has a reasonable likelihood of success on the

merits.

The second factor to consider is “whether or not the moving party * * * will

suffer irreparable harm without the requested injunctive relief[.]” Finnimore &

Fisher Inc., 291 A.3d at 983 (quoting Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 708). As CRMC

argued, its purpose and legislative mandate is to protect the environment, which it

achieves through the promulgation and enforcement of regulations. Before the

Superior Court, CRMC asserted that it “cannot protect the coastal resources of the

state if land owners do not abide by the agency’s enabling statute and legally

promulgated rules.” The hearing justice relied on plaintiff’s testimony that he had

taken down a tree, planted grass, and made other alterations to the property after the

cease-and-desist order was issued in May of 2022. This testimony led the hearing

justice to decide that “[CRMC] will suffer irreparable harm because of the plaintiff’s

flagrant disregard of the orders of [CRMC]. He continues, through his actions, to

harm the environment.” The hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in finding

that CRMC would face irreparable harm without injunctive relief.

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Next, it must be determined “whether the moving party * * * has the balance

of the equities, including the possible hardships to each party and to the public

interest, tip in its favor[.]” Finnimore & Fisher Inc., 291 A.3d at 983 (quoting

Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 708). Before the Superior Court, CRMC asserted, “If a

[temporary restraining order] is not granted the development of [plaintiff]’s property

likely will continue. The continued development of [plaintiff]’s property, unbound

by CRMC regulations, cripples CRMC’s ability to protect the environment.”

Further comparing the parties’ equities, CRMC argued, “[T]he potential

environmental harm outweighs any potential financial hardship. Therefore, the

balance of equities favors CRMC, and thus, the TRO should be granted.” The

hearing justice agreed and determined that “[t]he balance of the equities weighs in

favor of CRMC because of the environmental harm that continues.” There is nothing

in the record to dispute CRMC’s prima facie showing that there has been harm done

to the environment, and therefore the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in

determining that the balance of the equities favors CRMC.

Finally, it must be determined “whether the moving party * * * has shown

that the issuance of a preliminary injunction will preserve the status quo.” Finnimore

& Fisher Inc., 291 A.3d at 983 (quoting Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 708). Before

the Superior Court, CRMC argued that “the issuance of a temporary restraining order

serves to protect the status quo ante, and * * * by preventing [plaintiff] from

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continuing operations on his property, it will preserve the wetland, even though it

has already been altered, and the wetland was what existed prior to the beginning of

this matter.” The hearing justice agreed, finding that “[t]he issuance of the

temporary restraining order protects that status quo because it preserves the

wetland.” We perceive no abuse of discretion in her conclusion that issuing a

preliminary injunction would preserve the wetland in the state the property was in at

the time of the decision.

Accordingly, our review of the record reveals that the hearing justice was

acting well within her discretionary authority in granting the temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction ordering the plaintiff to “cease and desist all

activities” on the property.

IV

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. The

papers in this case may be remanded to that tribunal.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Noah Gabriel v. Jeffrey M. Willis et al.

No. 2023-349-Appeal.
Case Number
(WC 23-179)

Date Opinion Filed November 27, 2024

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Washington County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter

For Plaintiff:

Noah Gabriel, pro se
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendants:

Mark E. Hartmann, Esq.