State v. Caprio

This decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
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generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Supreme Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Filing Date: July 2, 2025

No. S-1-SC-40577

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ALBERTO VILLANUEVA CAPRIO,

Defendant-Appellant.

CERTIFICATION FROM THE NEW MEXICO COURT OF APPEALS
Cindy Leos, District Judge

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Meryl Francolini, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

DECISION

VARGAS, Justice.

{1} Defendant Alberto Villanueva Caprio was indicted on three counts of second-
degree criminal sexual penetration of a minor, one count of sexual exploitation of
children (manufacturing), two counts of child abuse (no death or great bodily harm), and
two counts of bribery or intimidation of a witness (threats). After two days of trial by jury
in the district court, we stayed the criminal prosecution pending consideration of a
related Rule 12-504 NMRA petition for writ of superintending control. The district court
declared a mistrial and subsequently determined the mistrial was occasioned by
manifest necessity. As he did below, Defendant asserts on appeal that because no
manifest necessity was shown his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy
bars retrial.

{2} We exercise our discretion to affirm the district court by nonprecedential decision
and thus limit our discussion to the law and the facts necessary to decide the merits of
this appeal. See Rule 12-405(B) NMRA; State v. Gonzales, 1990-NMCA-040, ¶ 48, 110
N.M. 218, 794 P.2d 361 (explaining nonprecedential decisions “are written solely for the
benefit of the parties,” who “know the details of the case”).

I. BACKGROUND

{3} While preparing for his criminal trial, Defendant learned the alleged victim had
applied for a so-called T-Visa. Under federal law, T-Visas give victims of severe human
trafficking who are in the United States because of that trafficking the ability to lawfully
reside here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T). Citing impeachment purposes, Defendant
moved to compel disclosure of “any and all information” regarding the alleged victim’s
application for a T-Visa and “any related materials, communications or information.” The
district court granted Defendant’s motion to compel disclosure of all materials related to
the alleged victim’s application for immigration relief.

{4} At the time the alleged victim applied for a T-Visa, she was represented by the
New Mexico Immigration Law Center (NMILC), which the district court ordered “to
produce to defense counsel and the State all materials in [its] possession pertaining to
any immigration relief” the alleged victim sought. NMILC filed a Motion to Quash
Subpoena Duces Tecum and to Vacate Order Granting Motion to Compel Immigration
Information. NMILC asserted it should not be compelled to produce the T-Visa
application and related materials because they were confidential under federal law and
were also protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district court decided to review
the T-Visa application in camera and set the issue for a hearing in the event it
determined the material could be disclosed.

{5} NMILC filed a Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative Stay. It asked the
district court to reconsider its decision ordering NMILC to provide visa documents for in
camera review or to stay its decision on NMILC’s motion to quash until this Court
decided a then pending emergency petition for writ of superintending control in Ramirez
v. Marsh, which raised similar issues concerning the discoverability of visa-application
materials in a criminal proceeding See ___-NMSC-___, ¶ 1, ___ P.3d ___ (S-1-SC-
39966, May 15, 2025). During oral argument on NMILC’s reconsideration motion and in
recognition of the pending emergency writ petition in Marsh, the district court
acknowledged the disclosure of immigration application information was “an issue that
obviously the Supreme Court wants to bring some resolution to.” But the district court
concluded the best course of action remained in camera review due to a then looming
trial date of October 10, 2023, and what the court saw as “potentially very relevant
information based on the charges and based on . . . some of the issues that were
outlined within the defendant's notice of relevancy.” For these reasons, the district court
denied NMILC’s Motion to Quash and its Motion to Reconsider.

{6} One week after the district court denied its motions, NMILC filed in this Court a
Petition for Emergency Writ of Superintending Control and Request for Stay
(Emergency Writ Petition). NMILC pointed out its Emergency Writ Petition raised issues
similar to those pending before this Court in Marsh and asserted it would be efficient
and beneficial for the Court to consider the issues raised in this case simultaneously
with those raised in Marsh.

{7} Trial preparation continued in the wake of NMILC’s Emergency Writ Petition.
Defendant moved to enforce the district court’s order to produce the T-Visa application
materials and in response the district court extended the scheduled trial date and
directed NMILC to provide the T-Visa records for in camera review. In doing so, the
district court acknowledged the pendency in this Court of NMILC’s Emergency Writ
Petition but noted its order to compel disclosure of the victim’s T-Visa application
materials was still in place and no stay had been issued.

{8} NMILC then filed an Emergency Motion for Stay in this Court, seeking a stay of
the district court proceedings against Defendant. To avoid sanctions, however, NMILC
provided the T-Visa application and materials to the district court for in camera review.
After its in camera review and one week before trial, the district court provided the
parties with a redacted version of the alleged victim’s T-Visa documents.

{9} With no resolution of NMILC’s Emergency Writ Petition or its Emergency Motion
for Stay, Defendant’s case proceeded to trial on November 20, 2023. After the jury was
empaneled and two days of trial were completed—during which the State presented all
but one of its witnesses—we granted NMILC’s request for a stay and provided
Defendant and the State fifteen calendar days in which to file a response to NMILC’s
pending Emergency Writ Petition. The district court immediately declared a mistrial on
November 22, 2023, explaining to the parties it had been instructed to do so by this
Court and that it did not know how long the stay would remain in effect.

{10} Both the State and Defendant objected to the declaration of a mistrial. Defendant
additionally filed a Motion to Dismiss and Bar Retrial. The district court then
memorialized its decision to declare a mistrial in a written order. It declined to rule at
that time on whether the case could be retried without running afoul of double jeopardy
principles and instead gave the parties the opportunity to research and brief that issue.

{11} In the meantime, and within several weeks of the district court’s declaration of a
mistrial, Defendant and the State each timely filed a response to the Emergency Writ
Petition and Emergency Stay Motion. On February 15, 2024, we issued an order
establishing a briefing schedule in NMILC’s writ proceeding. Briefing on the Emergency
Writ Petition was completed on March 11, 2024, almost four months after the mistrial
was declared. We then consolidated NMILC’s Emergency Writ Petition with the
emergency writ petition in Marsh, which, as indicated, raised similar issues.
{12} On May 7, 2024, more than five months after the district court declared the
mistrial, we granted NMILC’s Emergency Writ Petition to the extent it sought to prohibit
the production of the alleged victim’s T-Visa application and related materials, and we
lifted the stay. We also issued a writ of superintending control directing the district court
“to reconsider and grant Petitioner’s motion to quash subpoena duces tecum compelling
production of the T-Visa nonimmigrant status application and related materials, to
compel the return or destruction of any T-Visa materials previously produced, to prohibit
the further production or use of any such related materials in this matter, and to
otherwise proceed . . . in accordance with the order issued contemporaneously with this
writ.”

{13} After we lifted the stay and issued the writ, briefing resumed in the district court
on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Bar Retrial. The district court held a hearing,
determined manifest necessity had compelled the mistrial, and denied Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss and Bar Retrial. Defendant filed an application for interlocutory
appeal. The Court of Appeals on its own motion certified the matter to us under NMSA
1978, Section 34-5-14(C) (1972) and Rule 12-606 NMRA and we accepted certification
and granted the application for interlocutory review.

II. DISCUSSION

{14} The federal constitution and our state constitution protect a criminal defendant
from being “twice put in jeopardy” for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V; Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (holding the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment applies to defendants in state prosecutions); N.M. Const. art. II, § 15; State
v. Saavedra, 1988-NMSC-100, ¶ 6, 108 N.M. 38, 766 P.2d 298 (prohibiting the state
from “twice subjecting a person to criminal prosecution for the same offense”). Indeed,
in some instances, the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal defendant from retrial even
when the criminal proceeding is not completed, but is stopped short of a final judgment.
Id. ¶ 7. In those circumstances when the district court declares a mistrial over the
objection of the defendant, the defendant cannot be retried unless the mistrial was
declared for reasons of manifest necessity. Id. Defendant objected to the mistrial in this
case. Thus, the question before the district court was whether the mistrial was due to
manifest necessity.1

{15} We review the district court’s manifest necessity determination for abuse of
discretion. State v. Gutierrez, 2014-NMSC-031, ¶ 21, 333 P.3d 247. In addressing this
question, we are mindful that “[t]he subordination of a constitutionally protected interest
. . . is not to be lightly undertaken.” Saavedra, 1988-NMSC-100, ¶ 9. But as the term
manifest necessity implies, protection against retrial is not absolute when the trial

1Defendant does not argue the New Mexico Constitution should be interpreted differently than the federal
Constitution for purposes of manifest necessity. Thus, we rely on our established caselaw and do not
engage in interstitial analysis. See Saavedra, 1988-NMSC-100, ¶ 6 n.1 (construing a defendant’s double
jeopardy protection under the New Mexico Constitution identically to that provided under the federal
Constitution when reviewing whether manifest necessity supported a mistrial declaration); see also State
v. Mares, 2024-NMSC-002, ¶ 29, 543 P.3d 1198 (reiterating “that state constitutional claims must be
properly preserved at the trial level if litigants wish those claims to be considered on appeal”).
process is stopped short of a final judgment. Id. ¶ 8. When a matter is not tried to
conclusion, the “defendant’s valued right to have his or her case heard by the jury
already impaneled is sometimes in conflict with the public interest in allowing the
prosecutor a full and fair opportunity to present the case.” Id.

{16} As we consider whether Defendant’s right to have the original jury resolve his
case or the public’s interest in a fair trial that results in a just judgment prevails here, we
recognize there is no mechanical rule for resolving the tension between these
competing interests. See Saavedra, 1988-NMSC-100, ¶ 8; State v. Messier, 1984-
NMCA-085, ¶ 11, 101 N.M. 582, 686 P.2d 272 (“No mechanical rule exists for
determining the existence of manifest necessity.”). “‘Manifest’ necessity has been
interpreted as a ‘high degree’ of necessity.” Saavedra, ¶ 9 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). However, the district court should be afforded broad discretion whether
to declare a mistrial when the underlying issue involves possible jury bias. Id. In
instances involving issues other than possible jury bias2, we refrain from overruling a
district court’s finding of manifest necessity absent a clear indication that it failed to
engage in a “scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion.” Id. ¶ 14 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). As a reviewing court, we may affirm a district court’s finding
of manifest necessity when a sufficient basis for the mistrial appears in the record. Id. ¶
13.

{17} New Mexico case precedent provides that when the district court, acting sua
sponte, declares a mistrial, it must be held to a strict standard of necessity in
terminating the trial and requiring the defendant to start over. See State v. Yazzie, 2010-
NMCA-028, ¶ 9, 147 N.M. 768, 228 P.3d 1188 (citing, inter alia, State v. Litteral, 1990-
NMSC-059, ¶ 13, 110 N.M. 138, 793 P.2d 268 (recognizing that “courts should be most
reluctant to declare a mistrial when the defendant is not the movant”)). In this context
and consistent with Saavedra, we determine (1) whether the circumstances
necessitating the mistrial were sufficiently extraordinary to override Defendant’s double
jeopardy interests and (2) whether there were alternative measures less drastic than a
mistrial that could have alleviated the problem so the trial could continue to an impartial
verdict. Yazzie, 2010-NMCA-028, ¶ 13.

{18} In evaluating whether manifest necessity requires a mistrial, we consider the
circumstances at the time the mistrial was declared that were identified by the district
court and that are supported by the record proper. See State v. Smith, ___-NMSC-___,
¶ 15, ___P.3d___ (S-1-SC-39989, March 27, 2025) (“review[ing] the district court’s
decision to resume deliberations [rather than declaring a mistrial] based on the
circumstances as presented at the time of the court’s decision, not in hindsight”). 3 The

2In Saavedra, we noted that substantial deference should also be given to the district court’s ruling when
the underlying issue involves a deadlocked jury; however, jury deadlock is not at issue here. 1988-NMSC-
100, ¶ 9.
3Defendant asserts the district court declared a mistrial based solely on an off-the-record directive from
this Court and objects to the district court’s reliance on any such off-the-record directive for its manifest
necessity determination. We reject this characterization and argument as it ignores the district court’s
independent consideration of other circumstances, which were clearly part of the record and which
supported its finding of manifest necessity.
district court here identified two circumstances that supported a mistrial due to manifest
necessity. First, there likely would be an indefinite and lengthy delay before the pending
Emergency Writ Petition would be resolved. Second, there was potential juror bias
concerning a key evidentiary issue in Defendant’s case. As detailed below, we hold
these concerns justified the district court’s determination that the mistrial resulted from
manifest necessity.

A. Extraordinary Circumstances Supported the District Court’s Mistrial
Declaration and Manifest Necessity Determination

{19} New Mexico courts have long recognized that trial delay and potential juror bias
can each satisfy the extraordinary circumstances required to support a district court’s
finding of manifest necessity. See Yazzie, 2010-NMCA-028, ¶ 13 (recognizing that the
“circumstances necessitating the mistrial must be extraordinary ones sufficient to
override the defendant’s double jeopardy interest”). In Saavedra, the trial judge sua
sponte declared a mistrial based primarily on delays caused by the combination of
defense counsel’s unexpected chicken-pox infection and the prosecutor’s long-planned
back surgery. 1988-NMSC-100, ¶¶ 2, 3, 5. We confirmed that these circumstances
constituted manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. Id. ¶¶ 5, 14, 17. In State v. Litteral,
the district court determined that defense counsel’s attempt to elicit inadmissible
testimony from the State’s key witness in a first-degree murder trial implicated the issue
of juror bias, 1990-NMSC-059, ¶¶ 1, 12, 110 N.M. 128, 793 P.2d 268, and we affirmed
the district court’s finding of manifest necessity based on that possible juror bias. Id. ¶¶
10-12, 25.

{20} Viewing both of these factors in tandem here, we conclude they constitute
extraordinary circumstances sufficient to satisfy the “’high degree’ of necessity” or the
“strict standard of necessity” required to justify a mistrial based on manifest necessity.
See Saavedra, 1988-NMSC-100, ¶ 9; Yazzie, 2010-NMCA-028, ¶ 9 (citations omitted).

1. Indefinite delay

{21} When informing the parties of the stay issued by this Court, the district court
immediately raised the issue of manifest necessity and a colloquy ensued between the
district court and respective counsel on the double jeopardy consequences of declaring
a mistrial. During that exchange, the district court stated it did not know how long the
stay would be in effect. The district court later explained in its written order declaring a
mistrial that the delay would last a minimum of two weeks to allow Defendant and the
State to respond to NMILC’s Emergency Writ Petition, followed by full briefing in this
Court.

{22} The district court also knew when it declared a mistrial that the related Marsh
emergency writ petition had been pending for several months in this Court without
resolution. The district court was alerted to these circumstances early on, as NMILC
advised it before trial that the Marsh emergency writ petition was pending and raised a
similar issue about the disclosure of immigration materials. NMILC also provided the
district court with a copy of the Marsh emergency writ petition. Referring to the Marsh
petition, the district court set about developing a very clear record of the information
defense counsel was looking for in the T-Visa application, “especially since [the issue is]
up on a writ right now.”

{23} Based on the information available to the district court at the time it declared a
mistrial, we cannot say its stated concern about an indefinite and likely lengthy delay
before trial could resume with the empaneled jury was a failure to engage in a
“scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion.” Saavedra, 1988-NMSC-100, ¶¶ 14, 16
(declining to view the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial due to scheduling issues as a
failure to engage in a “scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion”). Here, the unexpected
circumstances were more extenuating than those in Saavedra. In Saavedra, the district
court dealt only with its own calendar concerns and scheduling issues caused by trial
counsels’ respective physical ailments. 1988-NMSC-100, ¶ 5. In the matter at bar, the
scheduling issues arose because there were two emergency writ petitions pending in
this Court. The district court below had no control over how or when we scheduled or
resolved those petitions, one of which had already been pending for months, and it
could not have made any reasonable estimate on the potential duration of our stay for
purposes of keeping the jury empaneled.

{24} Were the trial to have been indefinitely postponed, the normal restrictions on an
empaneled jury would have had to remain in effect. These would have included a ban
on the jurors communicating anything about the case in any manner to anyone,
including family and friends, until a verdict was rendered and the case ended. Even
more significantly, the jurors would each have had to remain available for an indefinite
period to resume jury duty, which would prevent them from scheduling family, work,
vacation, or any other plans for an extended, unknown period of time. An indefinite
postponement of trial would also have implicated the availability and scheduling of
witnesses and the district court’s ability to manage its own calendar.

{25} Given these considerations, the indefinite delay caused by the stay provided the
extraordinary circumstances required to support the district court’s manifest necessity
determination. Yazzie, 2010-NMCA-028, ¶13.

2. Juror bias

{26} As set forth in the district court’s order memorializing its mistrial declaration, the
court was “concerned that improper evidence may have been presented to the jury.”
Our stay of the proceedings was issued after a redacted version of the T-Visa
application was provided to the parties and after defense counsel had been permitted to
cross-examine the alleged victim about it. The district court was thus faced with the real
possibility that its ruling allowing discovery of the T-Visa application would be reversed
in the NMILC writ proceeding. If this had happened, the empaneled jury would have
been exposed to improper impeachment evidence through defense counsel’s cross-
examination of the State’s key witness about the written declaration she made in
support of her T-Visa application, implicating the issue of potential juror bias. See
Litteral, 1990-NMSC-059, ¶¶ 2, 12 (reasoning that improper impeachment of a key
witness raised the issue of juror bias and affirming on those grounds the district court’s
manifest necessity determination).

{27} As indicated above, we generally afford substantial deference to a trial court’s
declaration of a mistrial based on juror bias. Litteral, 1990-NMSC-059, ¶ 12; see also
Saavedra, 1988-NMSC-100, ¶ 9. The district court in this case was thoroughly versed in
the evidentiary issues raised by the T-Visa application materials. The discoverability and
use at trial of those materials was the subject of numerous motions, hearings, and
bench conferences, as well as voir dire of the alleged victim before she testified in front
of the jury. The district court itself characterized the T-Visa application materials as
“potentially very relevant information.” This history provided a solid foundation for the
district court’s concern that improper impeachment evidence may have been presented
to the jury and that merely postponing the trial was unlikely to cure and remedy the
improper disclosure of T-Visa application information.

{28} On appeal, Defendant attempts to minimize the importance of the T-Visa
application evidence. He alleges that references to the T-Visa documentation during
defense counsel’s cross-examination of the alleged victim were “minimal”; the visa
documents “played little to no role at trial”; there was no prejudice to the State’s
interests; and “there was no or extremely minimal evidence presented that implicated
the document production issues being litigated in this Court.” But the record
demonstrates that broad discovery of the T-Visa application to impeach the alleged
victim was clearly important to the defense, and Defendant’s attempts to minimize its
importance are unavailing.

{29} Defendant steadfastly sought discovery of the T-Visa application because it
might contain statements about what was alleged to have occurred between Defendant
and the alleged victim and, as Defendant maintained, was “relevant information at the
very core of this case.” Defense counsel explained to the jury during opening
statements that “most importantly,” the alleged victim might have a strong motive to
fabricate a story because the inculpatory allegations against Defendant supported her
visa request. Defense counsel then cross-examined the alleged victim based on the
written declaration she signed as part of her T-Visa application. Perhaps most tellingly,
after the district court raised the issues of mistrial and manifest necessity, defense
counsel opposed the mistrial on the ground the T-Visa issue was the “centerpiece of our
defense” and the concern that a different order relating to the T-Visa issue would
necessarily dictate a change in Defendant’s trial strategy.

{30} Given the importance Defendant himself placed on the T-Visa application
materials to his trial and the prejudice the State could have incurred from improper
impeachment of its key witness, we conclude potential juror bias was an extraordinary
circumstance supporting the district court’s manifest necessity determination. See
Litteral, 1990-NMSC-059, ¶ 12 (holding the district court properly concluded the State
had been prejudiced “because improper impeachment evidence concerned the State’s
main witness”); Yazzie, 2010-NMCA-028, ¶ 13 (explaining defendant’s double jeopardy
interests are overridden only when a mistrial is necessitated by extraordinary
circumstances).
B. The District Court Considered Whether There Were Alternative Measures
That Could Have Alleviated the Problem and Allowed the Trial To Continue
To an Impartial Verdict

{31} Defendant hypothesizes that any problems caused by our stay pending
resolution of NMILC’s Extraordinary Writ Petition did not require the district court to
declare a mistrial because (1) “the district court could have apprised this Court of the
facts on the ground and requested the stay be lifted, with assurances the T-visa
documentation would remain confidential” or (2) “[t]his Court could have allowed the trial
to proceed while still allowing for the eventual writ remedy ordering the parties to
destroy all remaining evidence.” As will be shown, these disjunctive arguments are
strained and unpersuasive.

{32} As an alternative to a mistrial, it was not within the province of the district court to
question the propriety of the stay this Court had just issued or to speculate about how
we might have responded to any such questioning. To the contrary, the district court
was obligated to comply with our stay order. See State v. Mares, 2024-NMSC-002, ¶
33, 543 P.3d 1198 (“It is axiomatic that our justice system requires strict adherence to
vertical stare decisis, which is the principle that lower courts are bound by the precedent
of reviewing courts.”); see also State v. Sedillo, 1974-NMSC-053, ¶ 3, 86 N.M. 382, 524
P.2d 998 (noting the Court of Appeals lacks authority to determine if Supreme Court
orders are erroneous). It follows that compliance with our stay order does not indicate
any abuse of discretion by the district court in determining manifest necessity.

{33} Defendant further argues that any potential juror bias was minimal and could
have been cured by a limiting instruction. But the district court specifically determined
that any remedial actions, such as instructions to the jury or postponing the trial, were
unlikely to cure or remedy any possible improper disclosure of T-Visa information. As
previously discussed, when the underlying issue involves possible juror bias, we
generally afford substantial deference to a trial court’s mistrial ruling. Litteral, 1990-
NMSC-059, ¶ 12. We also note that the district court considered at length the
evidentiary issues surrounding disclosure of T-Visa application material; immediately
raised appropriate double jeopardy concerns and the question of manifest necessity;
withheld ruling on the manifest necessity issue until we resolved the Extraordinary Writ
Petition and lifted the stay; provided the parties with a full opportunity to brief and argue
the issue; and explained in written orders the bases for the court’s mistrial declaration
and its ruling on manifest necessity. By doing so, the district court did not act
“irrationally, irresponsibly or precipitately in . . . sua sponte order[ing] a mistrial.” Cf.
Callaway v. State, 1990-NMSC-010, ¶ 7, 109 N.M. 416, 785 P.2d 1035 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, the court “demonstrated a sensitivity to
the double jeopardy concerns by exercising careful consideration of the [juror bias]
issue in a calm, reflective, and thoughtful manner.” Litteral, 1990-NMSC-059, ¶ 14.

{34} For the reasons stated, we cannot say the district court’s assessment that other
alternatives less drastic than a mistrial would be unavailing lacked thoughtful
consideration or was unsupported by the record below. Yazzie, 2010-NMCA-28, ¶ 13;
see also County of Los Alamos v. Tapia, 1990-NMSC-038, ¶ 23, 109 N.M. 736, 790
P.2d 1017 (stating that a trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial “will be accorded
respect and the defendant will be required to undergo reprosecution . . . where there
was a serious likelihood of juror bias engendered by improper comments to the jury”),
overruled on other grounds by City of Santa Fe v. Marquez, 2012-NMSC-031, ¶ 25, 285
P.3d 637; Litteral, 1990-NMSC-059, ¶ 12 (holding the district court properly concluded
the state had been prejudiced to the point where an admonition or curative instruction
would not have cured the harm when the defense referenced an inadmissible prior
conviction to impeach the state’s main witness).

C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding Manifest
Necessity

{35} Holding the district court to a strict standard of necessity for its sua sponte
declaration of a mistrial, we conclude the circumstances necessitating the mistrial were
extraordinary and that there were no alternative measures less drastic than a mistrial
that would have allowed the trial to continue to an impartial verdict. See Yazzie, 2010-
NMCA-028, ¶¶ 9, 13. There was no governmental oppression or manipulation, and the
district court not only had good reasons for declaring a mistrial but was practically
compelled to do so by the circumstances. Tapia, 1990-NMSC-038, ¶ 23. When this is
the case, the public interest in fair trials prevails over Defendant’s double jeopardy
interests. Cf. id. ¶ 24 (recognizing that “where the government has not been responsible
for the [trial] error and has not sought termination of the trial, the defendant’s interest in
ridding himself or herself of the evils attendant upon another trial may be subordinated
to society’s interest in the correct application of its laws”). Accordingly, we discern no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s manifest necessity determination as its ruling
was neither clearly untenable nor unjustified by reason. See State v. Sanchez, 2020-
NMSC-017, ¶ 21, 476 P.3d 889.4

{36} Before closing, we briefly touch on one final matter. Giving proper effect to this
Court’s recent holding in the related consolidated writ proceedings creating “an
evidentiary privilege that prohibits compelled disclosure of . . . T-Visa applications from
victims,” Marsh, ___-NMSC-___, ¶¶ 22, 25-26, 47, (consolidated with NMILC v. Leos,
S-1-SC-40114), we direct that all T-Visa application materials be removed from the
record proper in this case.

4Federal courts have upheld manifest necessity determinations in similar circumstances. The United
States Supreme Court explained almost fifty years ago that “[t]here are compelling institutional
considerations militating in favor of appellate deference to the trial judge’s evaluation of the significance of
possible juror bias.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 513 (1978). Noting the trial judge’s familiarity
with the jurors, the evidence, and the tone of argument, the Supreme Court concluded the trial judge “is
far more conversant with the factors relevant to the determination than any reviewing court possibly can
be.” Id. at 514. More recently, the First Circuit held the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined a mistrial was occasioned by manifest necessity due to a possible continuance of
indeterminate length which would exceed seven to ten days. United States v. Dennison, 73 F.4th 70, 80,
81 (1st Cir. 2023).
III. CONCLUSION

{37} For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the mistrial ordered by the
district court was due to manifest necessity and thus affirm the district court’s denial of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Bar Retrial.

{38} IT IS SO ORDERED.

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

WE CONCUR:

DAVID K. THOMSON, Chief Justice

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice