December 6, 2022- Maria Varela-Burciaga v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, No. A-1-CA-39799

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication
with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly
in Odyssey.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
Opinion Number: _____________	2
Filing Date: December 6, 2022	3
No. A-1-CA-39014 and No. A-1-CA-39799	4
(consolidated for purpose of opinion)	5
GRACIELA CONTRERAS,	6
Plaintiff-Appellant,	7
v.	8
FRED LOYA INSURANCE COMPANY	9
d/b/a YOUNG AMERICA INSURANCE	10
COMPANY,	11
Defendant-Appellee.	12
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY	13
Joshua A. Allison, District Judge	14
and	15
MARIA VARELA-BURCIAGA,	16
Plaintiff-Appellant,	17
v.	18
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE	19
INSURANCE COMPANY,	20
Defendant-Appellee.	21
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY	22
Erin B. O’Connell, District Judge	23
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 12/6/2022 10:39 AM

Ferrance Law, P.C.	1
David A. Ferrance	2
Albuquerque, NM	3
for Appellant Graciela Contreras	4
O’Brien & Padilla, P.C.	5
Alicia M. Santos	6
Albuquerque, NM	7
for Appellee Fred Loya Insurance Company	8
Jarmie & Rogers, P.C.	9
Mark D. Standridge	10
Las Cruces, NM	11
for Amicus Curiae NM Defense Lawyers Association (No. A-1-CA-39014)	12
Law Office of Robert J. Andreotti	13
Robert J. Andreotti	14
Santa Fe, NM	15
for Appellant Maria Varela-Burciaga	16
Stiff, Garcia & Associates, LLC	17
John S. Stiff	18
Edward F. Snow	19
Albuquerque, NM	20
for Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company	21

OPINION	1
BOGARDUS, Judge.	2
{1} 	In these consolidated cases, 1 Plaintiff Graciela Contreras and Plaintiff Maria	3
Varela-Burciaga (collectively, Plaintiffs) each appeal from a district court order	4
granting summary judgment in favor of, in Contreras’s case, Defendant Fred Loya	5
Insurance Company and, in Varela-Burciaga’s case, Defendant State Farm Mutual	6
Automobile Insurance Company (collectively, Defendants) on Plaintiffs’ claims	7
arising from Defendants’ denial of uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM)	8
benefits. Plaintiffs each argue that the district court erred by granting summary	9
judgment based on the erroneous conclusion that the respective insurance company	10
obtained from each of them a valid rejection of UM/UIM coverage. In addition,	11
Plaintiff Contreras argues that the district court erred in dismissing her claims,	12
alleging violations of the Unfair Practices Act (the UPA), NMSA 1978, §§ 57-12-1	13
to -26 (1967, as amended through 2019). We reverse in Contreras v. Fred Loya	14
Insurance Co., No. A-1-CA-39014, and affirm in Varela-Burciaga v. State Farm	15
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, No. A-1-CA-39799.	16
1 Because these appeals raise substantially similar issues, we exercise our
discretion to consolidate them for decision. See Rule 12-317(B) NMRA.

2
BACKGROUND	1
{2} 	These cases arise out of car accidents involving underinsured drivers. At issue	2
in both cases is whether each insurance company obtained a valid rejection of	3
UM/UIM coverage from the respective Plaintiff. We view the facts of each case in	4
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, against whom summary judgment was granted.	5
See Haygood v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 2019-NMCA-074, ¶ 7, 453 P.3d	6
1235.	7
A. 	Contreras v. Fred Loya Insurance Co.	8
{3} 	Contreras, whose primary language is Spanish and whose understanding of	9
English is limited to common greetings or phrases, purchased an automobile	10
insurance policy from Fred Loya Insurance Company (Loya) through a Spanish-	11
speaking representative. The representative provided Contreras an English-language	12
form for the selection or rejection of UM/UIM coverage. The selection/rejection	13
form stated that the insured had the right to purchase or reject UM/UIM coverage,	14
offered UM/UIM coverage up to the insured’s liability limits, and provided the	15
premium costs for UM/UIM coverage up to the insured’s liability limits. Contreras	16
signed the selection/rejection form under a heading stating, “REJECTION OF	17
UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED 	MOTORISTS 	COVERAGE.” 	The 	policy’s	18
declarations page stated that UM/UIM coverage had been “OFFERED AND	19
REJECTED.” Contreras attested that the “agency’s representative had to fill out	20

3
[her] application for insurance for [her], because it was in English,” and that the	1
representative told her where to sign and initial the forms. Contreras also attested	2
that no one discussed UIM insurance with her, or offered her this coverage or	3
discussed her rejection of this coverage. Loya disputed this point, attesting that,	4
when assisting Spanish-speaking customers, its procedures call for explaining	5
UM/UIM coverage to the customer and verbally offering UM/UIM coverage up to	6
the customer’s liability limits.	7
{4} 	Contreras was later involved in a car accident with an underinsured driver and	8
filed a claim for UM/UIM benefits, which Loya denied. Contreras sued Loya,	9
seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to UM/UIM benefits and	10
alleging various claims based on Loya’s denial of these benefits, including breach	11
of contract, insurance bad faith, and unfair and unconscionable trade practices	12
under the UPA. The district court denied Contreras’s claim for a declaratory	13
judgment that she was entitled to UM/UIM benefits, relying on the four	14
requirements that insurers must satisfy to obtain a valid rejection of UM/UIM	15
coverage under Jordan v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2010-NMSC-051, ¶ 22, 149	16
N.M. 162, 245 P.3d 1214. The 	district court reasoned, “If [Jordan’s four	17
requirements] are met, as they were here, the [c]ourt must conclude that the rejection	18
of UM/UIM coverage was valid.” Concluding that Loya had obtained a valid	19

4
rejection, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Loya on all	1
claims.	2
B. 	Varela-Burciaga v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.	3
{5} 	Varela-Burciaga, whose primary language is Spanish and who does not speak	4
English, purchased an automobile insurance policy from State Farm Mutual	5
Automobile 	Insurance 	Company 	(State 	Farm) 	through 	a 	Spanish-speaking	6
representative. Varela-Burciaga was provided an English-language form for the	7
rejection of UM/UIM coverage, which included a list of premium costs for different	8
levels of UM/UIM coverage. The rejection form stated, “I acknowledge and agree	9
that I have been offered [UM/UIM c]overage with limits equal to my [l]iability	10
[c]overage limits,” and then provided check-mark boxes where the insured could	11
indicate whether he or she wished to reject UM/UIM coverage equal to his or her	12
liability limits or in its entirety. Varela-Burciaga checked the box for “reject	13
[UM/UIM c]overage in its entirety” and signed the rejection form. The policy’s	14
declaration page stated, in relevant part, “YOU HAVE REJECTED THE OFFER	15
OF [UM/UIM] COVERAGE.” Varela-Burciaga does not dispute that an agent	16
“explained the coverages in Spanish,” and “explained to her in Spanish that by	17
signing the UM rejection form, that ‘means you will not have coverage under	18
the [UM/UIM c]overage under your policy.’”	19

5
{6} 	Varela-Burciaga was later involved in a car accident with an underinsured	1
driver and filed a claim for UM/UIM benefits, which State Farm denied. Varela-	2
Burciaga sued State Farm, seeking a declaratory judgment that her policy be	3
reformed to include UM/UIM coverage and asserting a claim for breach of contract.	4
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm, reasoning	5
that State Farm “was not required by law to provide a rejection of [UM/UIM]	6
coverage to [Varela-Burciaga] in Spanish.”	7
DISCUSSION	8
I. 	Standard of Review	9
{7} 	Our resolution of these cases requires us to interpret NMSA 1978, Section 66-	10
5-301 (1983) and 13.12.3.9 NMAC to determine whether each insurance company	11
obtained a valid rejection of UM/UIM coverage. See Jordan, 2010-NMSC-051,	12
¶ 14. Accordingly, these cases present questions of law, which we review de novo.	13
See Marckstadt v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 13, 147 N.M. 678,	14
228 P.3d 462.	15
{8} 	“This Court’s primary goal when interpreting statutes is to further legislative	16
intent.” Jordan, 2010-NMSC-051, ¶ 15. When construing the legislative intent	17
behind our UM/UIM statute, this Court has long applied a “qualitatively different	18
analysis” than we use when construing many other types of statutes and insurance	19
policies. Padilla v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 1990-NMSC-025, ¶ 10, 109 N.M. 555, 787	20

6
P.2d 835. “In a consistent line of cases, [the appellate courts have] liberally	1
interpreted Section 66-5-301 and its implementing regulation, . . . 13.12.3.9 NMAC,	2
for their remedial purposes. The provision of the maximum possible amount of	3
UM/UIM coverage in every insurance policy is the default rule, and any exception	4
to that rule must be construed strictly to protect the insured.” Jordan, 2010-NMSC-	5
051, ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).	6
II. 	Legal Background	7
{9} 	Plaintiffs argue that the district court in each case erred by granting summary	8
judgment based on its conclusion that the insurance company obtained a valid	9
rejection of UM/UIM coverage from each of them. Section 66-5-301 governs	10
UM/UIM coverage in New Mexico. Subsections (A) and (B) of the statute require	11
insurance companies to “include in automobile policies UM/UIM coverage ranging	12
from the minimum statutory limits . . . up to the limits of liability coverage contained	13
in a policy.” Arias v. Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co., 2009-NMCA-100, ¶ 7, 147 N.M. 14,	14
216 P.3d 264 (citation omitted). The purpose of this requirement “is to put the	15
insured in the same position he or she would have been in if the tortfeasor had	16
liability coverage equal to the UM/UIM protection as provided by the insured’s	17
policy.” Id. The requirement thus “embodies a strong public policy to expand	18
insurance coverage and to protect individual members of the public against the	19
hazard of culpable uninsured and underinsured motorists.” Id. (alteration, internal	20

7
quotation 	marks, 	and 	citation 	omitted). 	Consistent 	with 	this 	public 	policy,	1
Subsection (C) allows an insured to reject the UM/UIM coverage described in	2
Subsections (A) and (B) only if the rejection “satisf[ies] the regulations promulgated	3
by the superintendent of insurance.” Id. ¶ 8.	4
{10} 	Interpreting Section 66-5-301 and the applicable insurance regulation, and	5
recognizing that “an insured’s decision to reject UM/UIM coverage must be	6
knowing and intelligent in order to effectuate New Mexico’s public policy,” our	7
Supreme Court has held that a rejection of UM/UIM coverage is valid only if certain	8
requirements are met. See Jordan, 2010-NMSC-051, ¶¶ 14-22; accord Marckstadt,	9
2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 16 (“[I]n order for the offer and rejection requirements of	10
Section 66-5-301 to effectuate the policy of expanding UM/UIM coverage, the	11
insurer is required to meaningfully offer such coverage and the insured must	12
knowingly and intelligently act to reject it before it can be excluded from a policy.”	13
(emphases omitted)). Thus, in Jordan, our Supreme Court stated that an insurer	14
must:	15
(1) offer the insured UM/UIM coverage equal to his or her liability	16
limits, (2) inform the insured about premium costs corresponding to the	17
available levels of coverage, (3) obtain a written rejection of UM/UIM	18
coverage equal to the liability limits, and (4) incorporate that rejection	19
into the policy in a way that affords the insured a fair opportunity to	20
reconsider the decision to reject.	21

8
2010-NMSC-051, ¶ 22. If the insurer fails to comply with one or more of these	1
requirements, the insured’s rejection of coverage is invalid, and “the policy will be	2
reformed to provide UM/UIM coverage equal to the liability limits.” Id.	3
{11} 	Plaintiffs do not dispute that they were provided English-language forms for	4
the selection/rejection of UM/UIM coverage, or that they indicated in writing their	5
rejection of UM/UIM coverage. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that, because of their	6
English-language limitations, the forms did not constitute meaningful offers of	7
UM/UIM coverage, and Plaintiffs did not knowingly or intelligently act to reject this	8
coverage. As a result, Plaintiffs contend, the district court in each case erred by	9
determining, as a matter of law, that they had validly rejected UM/UIM coverage.	10
We examine each case in turn.	11
III. 	Contreras’s Case: 	Jordan 	Did Not Foreclose the Possibility That a	12
Rejection 	of 	UM/UIM 	Coverage 	May 	Be 	Invalid 	Under 	the	13
Circumstances of This Case	14
{12} 	In Contreras’s case, the district court relied on the requirements as set out in	15
Jordan to determine that her rejection was valid, concluding, “If [Jordan’s four	16
requirements] are met, as they were here, the [c]ourt must conclude that the rejection	17
of UM/UIM coverage was valid.” Contreras does not dispute that the English-	18
language forms she was provided comport with Jordan but contends, in particular,	19
that her rejection was invalid because Loya provided her information it knew she	20
could not understand. Loya responds that Jordan’s requirements are exclusive and,	21

9
according to Loya, previously have been applied as such by this Court. Loya	1
contends that this interpretation is supported by Jordan’s goal of establishing a	2
workable framework for objectively assessing the validity of rejections to minimize	3
litigation.	4
{13} 	In Contreras’s case, we are presented with an issue that was not directly	5
addressed in Jordan. Nevertheless, as we explain, the concepts found in Jordan and	6
in Marckstadt support the conclusion we reach here.	7
{14} 	Contreras attested that the only language she speaks fluently is Spanish and	8
that her understanding of English is limited to common greetings or phrases. She	9
also attested that when she purchased the insurance policy, she and a representative	10
only spoke in Spanish, that she has not learned to read or write English other than a	11
few basic words, and that she could not read the English-language UM/UIM	12
selection/rejection form. Finally, Contreras attested that the agency’s representative	13
had to fill out the insurance application for her because it was in English and that	14
she signed and initialed where the representative told her to do so. Accordingly, there	15
is, at the very least, a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Contreras can	16
communicate in English.	17
{15} 	The plaintiffs in Jordan, by contrast, never attested that they could not	18
communicate in English. See generally 2010-NMSC-051. Jordan simply does not	19
speak to the scenario we address here because it did not deal with non-English-	20

10
speaking insureds. See Fernandez v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 1993-NMSC-035,	1
¶ 15, 115 N.M. 622, 857 P.2d 22 (“The general rule is that cases are not authority	2
for propositions not considered.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));	3
State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, ¶ 39, 148 N.M. 1, 229 P.3d 474 (“[N]either case	4
expressly considered the waiver issue, and thus neither can be relied on as authority	5
for the [s]tate’s argument.”).	6
{16} 	We agree that, in general, insurers can obtain a valid UM/UIM rejection by	7
following the requirements listed in Jordan. See 2010-NMSC-051, ¶¶ 30-36; Ullman	8
v. Safeway Ins. Co., 2017-NMCA-071, ¶¶ 39-55, 404 P.3d 434. Nevertheless, we	9
conclude that Jordan does not require, under the circumstances present in this case,	10
a determination as a matter of law that Contreras’s apparent rejection of UM/UIM	11
coverage was valid simply because it complied with the requirements set forth in	12
Jordan.	13
{17} 	This conclusion is consistent with the guiding principle behind Jordan’s	14
prescription of its four requirements: “[I]n order for the offer and rejection	15
requirements of [the UM/UIM statute] to effectuate the policy of expanding	16
UM/UIM coverage, the insurer is required to meaningfully offer such coverage and	17
the insured must knowingly and intelligently act to reject it before it can be excluded	18
from a policy.” Marckstadt, 2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 16; see Jordan, 2010-NMSC-051,	19
¶¶ 18, 	20 	(citing 	Marckstadt, 	2010-NMSC-001, 	¶¶ 	16-17). 	Jordan’s 	four	20

11
requirements were thus intended to further the remedial purposes of the UM/UIM	1
statute, including “a legislative purpose to provide for the inclusion of uninsured	2
motorist coverage in every automobile liability policy unless the insured has	3
knowingly and intelligently waived such coverage.” Romero v. Dairyland Ins. Co.,	4
1990-NMSC-111, ¶ 9, 111 N.M. 154, 803 P.2d 243; see Jordan, 2010-NMSC-051,	5
¶ 15 (citing Romero, 1990-NMSC-111, ¶ 6). Under the circumstances present in	6
Contreras’s case, we cannot say that simply providing otherwise valid English-	7
language forms satisfied, as a matter of law, Loya’s burden to “meaningfully offer	8
[UM/UIM] coverage” so that Contreras could “knowingly and intelligently act to	9
reject it.” See Marckstadt, 2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 16. This conclusion is also consistent	10
with our mandate to interpret the UM/UIM statute liberally to implement its remedial	11
purpose and strictly construe any exceptions to protect the insured. See id. ¶ 14 (“[I]n	12
light of the purpose of New Mexico’s UM/UIM statute to expand coverage to protect	13
members of the public against uninsured motorists, the statute is interpreted liberally	14
to implement that remedial purpose, and any exception will be strictly construed.”	15
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Jordan, 2010-NMSC-	16
051, ¶ 15 (stating that the “primary goal when interpreting statutes is to further	17
legislative intent” and that, “[w]hen construing the legislative intent behind our	18
UM/UIM statute, our [Supreme] Court has long applied a qualitatively different	19
analysis” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).	20

12
{18} 	Loya, however, points to principles of contract law—that an individual who	1
signs a contract is bound by it, regardless of whether he or she read the terms. Loya	2
argues 	that, 	if 	Contreras 	did 	not 	understand 	something 	in 	the 	UM/UIM	3
selection/rejection form, it was her burden “to ask for help and to inquire further	4
before executing the form.” However, i n cases involving UM/UIM coverage, where	5
we apply a “qualitatively different analysis than we use when construing many other	6
types of statutes and insurance policies,” Jordan, 2010-NMSC-051, ¶ 15 (internal	7
quotation marks and citation omitted), accepting these arguments would shift the	8
insurer’s burden to the insured. Before Loya could exclude UM/UIM coverage from	9
Contreras’ policy, Loya had the burden to “meaningfully offer such coverage” such	10
that Contreras could “knowingly and intelligently act to reject it.” See Marckstadt,	11
2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 16. Otherwise, Loya could not secure a valid rejection. 2 See	12
2To the extent that Loya contends that insurers are not responsible for ensuring
subjective understanding of UM/UIM coverage, we agree. See Vigil v. Rio Grande
Ins. of Santa Fe, 1997-NMCA-124, ¶¶ 10, 21-22, 124 N.M. 324, 950 P.2d 297
(stating that an insurer “had no duty to inform [the p]laintiffs of the significance of
UM[/UIM] coverage” or “the ramifications of [the purchasers’] decision” to reject
such coverage, and that “[n]othing in the applicable statute requires an insurer to
make a purchaser aware of the importance of UM[/UIM] coverage before accepting
a rejection of such coverage”). Our conclusion does not require that Loya ensure
such subjective understanding to secure a valid rejection, and is consistent with our
case law requiring that an insured “be appropriately informed that he or she has
rejected the coverage.” Id. ¶ 10; cf. Crutcher v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2022-NMSC-
001, ¶ 22, 501 P.3d 433 (concluding that “the Legislature intended to place the
burden on the policyholders to determine how much [UM/UIM] protection they
want and are willing to pay for,” and the policyholders’ responsibility is premised
on their awareness of what they are purchasing).

13
Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz. v. Chen, 2010-NMCA-031, ¶ 27, 148 N.M. 151, 231 P.3d	1
607 (explaining that “[w]here a valid rejection of UM/UIM coverage has not been	2
obtained by the insurer, New Mexico law requires UM/UIM coverage to be read into	3
the policy at the liability limits, regardless of the intent of the parties or the fact that	4
a premium has not been paid”).	5
{19} 	In sum, under the circumstances present in Contreras’s case, the district court	6
erred by concluding that that there was a valid rejection of UM/UIM coverage simply	7
because Contreras’s apparent rejection complied with the requirements set forth in	8
Jordan. Having so concluded, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary	9
judgment on Contreras’s declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims. We	10
additionally vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Contreras’s	11
remaining claims because the resolution of those claims depended at least in part on	12
the district court’s determination that there was a valid rejection of UM/UIM	13
coverage, which we have reversed. Accordingly, we do not address Contreras’s	14
additional arguments that the district court erred by dismissing her UPA claims.	15
{20} 	Based on the foregoing, we remand Contreras’s case to the district court. See	16
Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 1997-NMSC-041, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 752, 945 P.2d 970	17
(“[O]n appeal, when the [district] court’s grant of summary judgment is grounded	18
upon an error of law, the case may be remanded so that the issues may be determined	19
under the correct principles of law.”). In determining whether Loya obtained a valid	20

14
rejection of UM/UIM coverage on remand, the district court should consider the	1
guiding principle behind Jordan’s four requirements: “[I]n order for the offer and	2
rejection requirements of [the UM/UIM statute] to effectuate the policy of expanding	3
UM/UIM coverage, the insurer is required to meaningfully offer such coverage and	4
the insured must knowingly and intelligently act to reject it before it can be excluded	5
from a policy.” Marckstadt, 2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 16; see Jordan, 2010-NMSC-051,	6
¶¶ 18, 	20 	(citing 	Marckstadt, 	2010-NMSC-001, 	¶¶ 	16-17). 	In 	making 	this	7
determination, we emphasize, as we discuss below, that a UM/UIM rejection is not	8
invalid as a matter of law simply because the selection/rejection form is not in the	9
insured’s primary or preferred language. 3 Instead, consistent with the only other	10
jurisdiction we found to have repeatedly addressed this issue, the district court	11
should consider, for example, the insured’s ability to communicate in English,	12
whether an individual’s inability to communicate in English was known or should	13
have been known to the insurer, and whether the individual was offered assistance	14
or information in a language he or she could understand in assessing whether the	15
3 Loya argues adopting “[Contreras’s] argument that a valid rejection by a
Spanish[-]speaking individual can only be accomplished by making the UM/UIM
selection form available in Spanish would ultimately run afoul of the UM[/UIM]
statute because it would lead to a whole class of people being unable to ever reject
UM[/UIM] coverage.” Contreras, however, does not argue that insurers are required
to make UM/UIM selection/rejection forms available in Spanish, and this opinion does
not preclude individuals who cannot communicate in English from validly rejecting
UM/UIM coverage when provided English-language forms.

15
insurer meaningfully offered UM/UIM coverage so that the insured could knowingly	1
and intelligently act to reject it. Compare Ponce v. Welch, 15-669, pp. 3, 8 (La. App.	2
5 Cir. 3/16/16); 191 So. 3d 73, 75, 77-78 (concluding that an insurer obtained a valid	3
rejection from a Spanish-speaking insured in part because the insured had lived in	4
the United States for thirty-two years, could converse in English, and did not dispute	5
that the insurance agent had explained to her that she was rejecting UM/UIM	6
coverage), and Garay-Lara v. Cornerstone Nat’l Ins. Co., 2013-2016, p. 6 (La. App.	7
1 Cir. 5/2/14); 145 So. 3d 423, 426 (concluding that an insurer obtained a valid	8
UM/UIM rejection from a Spanish-speaking insured where the agent explained the	9
details of the available coverage in Spanish), with Duong v. Salas, 38,613, pp. 5, 9	10
(La. App. 2 Cir. 6/23/04); 877 So. 2d 269, 272, 274 (concluding that the insurer had	11
failed to obtain a valid rejection from a non-English-speaking insured where the	12
insured had arrived in the United States less than six months before signing the UM	13
rejection, and the district court could have concluded based on the evidence that the	14
insured had no capacity to communicate in English or to understand the UM waiver,	15
that no one explained the waiver to him, and that his incapacity was known or should	16
have been known to the insurer).	17
IV. 	Varela-Burciaga’s Case: Spanish-Language Forms Are Not Required	18
Under the UM/UIM Statute and Regulations	19
{21} 	We turn now to Varela-Burciaga’s case. Varela-Burciaga and State Farm	20
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. At the hearing on these motions, the	21

16
parties agreed that these motions raised the sole legal issue of “whether a failure	1
to provide the UM/UIM waiver form in Spanish violates New Mexico’s	2
requirements for obtaining a valid waiver” of UM/UIM coverage. The district	3
court concluded that State Farm “was not required by law to provide a rejection	4
of [UM/UIM] coverage to [Varela-Burciaga] in Spanish.” On appeal, Varela-	5
Burciaga contends, in particular, that the English-language UM/UIM rejection form	6
was ineffective to a Spanish speaking insured, such as herself.4 We agree with the	7
district court.	8
{22} 	State Farm presents a reasoned statutory construction argument in its answer	9
brief as to why no such Spanish-translation requirement exists in the UM/UIM	10
statute, and Varela-Burciaga largely fails to address this argument in her reply brief.	11
Indeed, nothing in Section 66-5-301, 13.12.3.9 NMAC, or our case law interpreting	12
these provisions requires an insurer to provide UM/UIM selection/rejection forms in	13
an insured’s primary or preferred language. “The Legislature knows how to include	14
language in a statute if it so desires,” Cordova v. Cline, 2021-NMCA-022, ¶ 9, 489	15
P.3d 957 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and could have included	16
such language had it chosen to do so. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 50-15-5(C) (2005)	17
(requiring notice in English and Spanish); NMSA 1978, § 50-17-6(B) (2021) (same);	18
4We limit our analysis in the Varela-Burciaga case to the particular issue
addressed by the district court and the parties.

17
NMSA 1978, § 27-6-17(A)(1) (1993) (same); cf. Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque	1
Tribal Police Dep’t, 2013-NMSC-013, ¶ 36, 484 P.3d 954 (“[W]hen the Legislature	2
includes a particular word in one portion of a statute and omits it from another	3
portion of that statute, such omission is presumed to be intentional.” (internal	4
quotation marks and citation omitted)). We therefore decline to read this requirement	5
into Section 66-5-301 or 13.12.3.9 NMAC. See High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v.	6
City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599 (“The court	7
will not read into a statute or ordinance language which is not there, particularly if	8
it makes sense as written.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).	9
{23} 	To the extent Varela-Burciaga argues that, in the absence of a Spanish-	10
language form, she was not afforded a fair opportunity to reconsider her rejection,	11
this argument does not persuade us to infer a statutory requirement that is not there.	12
See Dominguez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 1997-NMCA-065, ¶ 8, 123 N.M. 448, 942	13
P.2d 191 (“Although the uninsured motorist statute is remedial and the statute should	14
be liberally interpreted to further its objectives, a policy of liberal interpretation,	15
absent a clear statutory provision to the contrary, may not negate reasonable and	16
unambiguous policy limitations.”).	17
{24} 	Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that State Farm was	18
not 	required 	to 	provide 	Varela-Burciaga 	Spanish-language 	UM/UIM	19
selection/rejection forms and granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm.	20

18
Having so concluded, we do not reach Varela-Burciaga’s additional arguments	1
related to stacking.	2
CONCLUSION	3
{25} 	In Contreras v. Fred Loya Insurance Co., we reverse the district court’s grant	4
of summary judgment on Contreras’s declaratory judgment and breach of contract	5
claims. We additionally vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on	6
Contreras’s remaining claims. We affirm in Varela-Burciaga v. State Farm Mutual	7
Automobile Insurance Co.	8
{26} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	9
____________________________	10
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	11
WE CONCUR:	12
______________________________	13
J. MILES HANISEE, Chief Judge	14
______________________________	15
JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge	16