December 12, 2013 – New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions and New Mexico State Personnel Office v. Sandra Perez, No. 32,330 & 32,321 (consolidated)

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: ___________
Filing Date: December 12, 2013
NOS. 32,330 and 32,321 (consolidated)
NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS and
NEW MEXICO STATE PERSONNEL
OFFICE,
Respondents-Appellants,
v.
SANDRA PEREZ,
Petitioner-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Valerie A. Huling, District Judge
N.M. Department of Workforce Solutions
Office of General Counsel
Marshall J. Ray
Rudolph P. Arnold
Albuquerque, NM
for N.M. Department of Workforce Solutions
Morrissey * Lewis, LLC
Jason J. Lewis
Albuquerque, NM

for N.M. State Personnel Office
Youtz & Valdez, P.C.
Stephen Curtice
Shane Youtz
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee

OPINION
SUTIN, Judge.
{1} 	Terminated from her position as personnel director under New Mexico’s
Personnel Act, Sandra Perez sought unemployment compensation. The district court
determined that Ms. Perez was entitled to compensation, reversing administrative
decisions to the contrary. The crux of the issue in the proceedings and on appeal is
whether the personnel director position was designated pursuant to state law as a
major nontenured advisory position. If so, compensation was properly denied. We
hold that compensation was properly denied and reverse the district court.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	Whether Ms. Perez as personnel director has a right to unemployment
compensation is governed by the definition of “employment” under NMSA 1978,
Section 51-1-44(A) (1978) of New Mexico’s Unemployment Compensation Law. In
relevant part, Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a) reads as follows:
For purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Law:
A. 	“employment” means service performed by an individual
in the employ of a governmental entity unless such service is performed
by an individual in the exercise of his duties:
. . .

2
(5) 	in a position which, under or pursuant to state law, is
designated as:
(a) 	a major nontenured [policymaking] or advisory
position[.]
{3} 	In analyzing whether Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a) applies to a state personnel
director, the determinative factor is the state law that establishes the position of state
personnel director. 	The Personnel Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 10-9-1 to -25 (1961, as
amended through 2009), establishes a “personnel board” and a “personnel director.”
Section 10-9-3(A), (B); see §§ 10-9-8 to -12. The personnel board is appointed by the
governor. Section 10-9-8. One of the duties of the personnel board is to hire, with the
approval of the governor, a personnel director. Section 10-9-10(C). The designated
statutory duties of the personnel director position are the following:
The director shall:
A. 	supervise 	all 	administrative 	and 	technical 	personnel
activities of the state;
B. 	act as secretary to the board;
C. 	establish, maintain[,] and publish annually a roster of all
employees of the state, showing for each employee his division, title, pay
rate[,] and other pertinent data;
D. 	make annual reports to the board;
E. 	recommend to the board rules he considers necessary or
desirable to effectuate the Personnel Act; and

3
F. 	supervise all tests and prepare lists of persons passing them
to submit to prospective employers.
Section 10-9-12; see 1.7.1.8(A) NMAC (6/15/2010) (“Pursuant to the provision of
. . . Section 10-9-12(A)[,] the director shall supervise all administrative and technical
personnel activities of the state.”). The personnel director’s service is covered by the
Personnel Act unless the personnel board determines that the position of director is
one of policymaking. Sections 10-9-3(C), -4(N). Nothing in the record indicates that
the 	personnel 	board 	has 	determined 	that 	the 	position 	of 	director 	is 	one 	of
policymaking, and the parties do not argue one way or the other in that regard.
{4} 	The New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions (the Department) initially
denied Ms. Perez’s unemployment benefits through the administrative process. After
appealing the decisions of the Department, the Appeals Tribunal and the Board of
Review (the Board) also held against Ms. Perez. 	The Board adopted the Appeals
Tribunal’s findings and conclusions in reaching its decision. The pertinent findings
and conclusions were as follows.
FINDINGS OF FACT
4. 	[Ms. Perez] was nominated to the position of director by the (then)
governor along with two other candidates also nominated by the
governor. The State Personnel Board . . . appointed [Ms. Perez]
as director in July 2004 and her appointment was approved by the
governor.

4
5. 	[Ms. 	Perez’s] 	duties 	as 	State 	Personnel 	Director 	include
“recommend to the board rules [she] considers necessary or
desirable to effectuate the Personnel Act.” (Section 10-9-12(E)
NMSA 1978).
6. 	Per Section 1.7.1.8(A) NMAC (“Approval Authority”), [Ms.
Perez] as director “shall supervise all administrative and technical
personnel activities of the state.”
7. 	[Ms. Perez] initiated, recommended[,] and drafted proposed
regulations to the New Mexico Administrative Code for adoption
by the Board and for subsequent public comment. 	She also
provided advice, guidance[,] and direction to the Secretaries of
various state government agencies and the governor regarding the
administration of the State Personnel Act.
CONCLUSION
Here, the evidence establishes that [Ms. Perez] regularly acted in an
advisory capacity to the State Personnel Board and to other state
agencies in her position as State Personnel Director. While [Ms. Perez]
correctly notes that final rules and regulations affecting the State
Personnel Act were promulgated by the Board and not by the Director,
[Ms. Perez’s] function in initiating, drafting[,] and recommending such
regulations that “[she] consider[ed] necessary or desirable to effectuate
the Personnel Act” clearly indicate she acted in an advisory position as
contemplated by [Section] 51-1-44(A)(5)(a). Therefore, as [Ms. Perez]
acted in an advisory position in the exercise of her duties, her wages do
not constitute wages in covered employment.
{5} 	The foregoing conclusional paragraph is instructive of how the administrative
decision-makers viewed the evidence upon which they relied for their determinations.
Their denial of Ms. Perez’s “employment” coverage under Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a)

5
was based both on Ms. Perez’s actual activity, that is, having “regularly acted in an
advisory capacity[,]” and on the statutorily designated duties of the state personnel
director, for example, the duty to “recommend to the board rules . . . necessary or
desirable to effectuate the Personnel Act.” Section 10-9-12(E). As we discuss later
in this Opinion, however, a position-holder’s actual activities are irrelevant and should
be considered a non-factor by future administrative decision-makers faced with the
question whether to apply Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a). Nevertheless, the administrative
decision-makers were correct in considering the statutorily designated duties of a
personnel director, and their decision to deny Ms. Perez’s employment benefits claim
was proper.
{6} 	In this case, the administrative decision-makers focused on whether Ms. Perez’s
position as personnel director was advisory and did not consider whether it was
policymaking. 	See § 10-9-12(A), (E); § 51-1-44(A)(5)(a). 	There was no issue
concerning whether Ms. Perez was a nontenured employee. 	The district court,
therefore, based its decision on whether the position was a major advisory one.
Accordingly, in this Opinion, we limit our review to the question whether the position
of personnel director is “major” and “advisory” as those terms are used in Section 51-
1-44(A)(5)(a).

6
{7} 	The primary rationale for the district court’s rejection of an advisory
designation followed from the court’s comparison of the position of personnel director
with the positions of department secretaries under NMSA 1978, Section 9-1-3(B)(1)
(1977) and NMSA 1978, Section 9-1-5(B)(11) (1977) found in the New Mexico
Executive Reorganization Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 9-1-1 to -13 (1977, as amended
through 1983). 	The Executive Reorganization Act creates an executive cabinet
headed by the governor and a cabinet department structure. Sections 9-1-3, -4. The
principal unit of the executive branch is a “cabinet department” headed by a
“secretary” who is appointed by the governor. Sections 9-1-2, -3(A), (B)(1). Among
several express duties of the secretaries, who are executive cabinet members, are the
specific duties to “advise the governor on problems of state government[,]” to
“recommend methods of interagency cooperation[,]” and to “assist the governor in
defining policies and programs to make the government responsive to the needs of the
people.” Section 9-1-3(A), (B)(1), (4), (7). The governor is required to call meetings
of the executive cabinet and “seek the advice of the cabinet members.” Section 9-1-
3(C).
{8} 	Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary, (5th ed. 1979), the district court found that
“recommending” and “advising” were synonyms. 	Thus, the court implicitly
acknowledged that the position of personnel director is an “advisory” one. “Even so,”

7
the court reasoned, in comparing the position of personnel director with the executive
cabinet positions, “what and to whom [Ms. Perez] advises do not make her position
‘major.’ ” The court noted that unlike members of the executive cabinet, Ms. Perez
“[did] not advise on ‘problems of state government’ or ‘assist the governor in defining
policies and programs to make the government responsive to the needs of the
people.’ ” The court reasoned further that “this comparison demonstrate[s] that [Ms.
Perez’s] position was not ‘major,’ but it also show[ed] that when the [L]egislature felt
it appropriate to use the word ‘advise,’ it did.”
{9} 	Considering the Legislature’s use of the term “major” in Section 51-1-
44(A)(5)(a) and continuing to contrast the positions of personnel director and cabinet
members, the court observed that “[t]here is no doubt that advising the [g]overnor[]
is ‘major.’ ” The court supported this observation by noting that cabinet secretaries
are required to post a twenty-five-thousand-dollar bond, yet the personnel board and
director are not required to post any bond, “most probably because they do not
directly advise the [g]overnor and are therefore not thought of as occupying ‘major’
or critical positions.” 	See § 9-1-5(B)(11) (setting out the bond amounts for
department secretaries). Further, the court noted that the various “principal unit[s]”
of the executive branch and the heads of those units were set out in Section 9-1-4(A)
of the Executive Reorganization Act, but that nothing in this section depicted boards

8
and their directors. See id. (stating that “the principal unit of the executive branch is
a ‘department,’ headed by a ‘secretary’ ”; “the principal unit of a ‘department’ is a
‘division,’ headed by a ‘director’ ”; “the principal unit of a division is a ‘bureau,’
headed by a ‘chief’ ”; and “the principal unit of a bureau is a ‘section,’ headed by a
supervisor’ ”). 	And, finally, the court noted the “limited number of cabinet
secretaries” in comparison with the “over one hundred . . . statutorily created boards
and 	commissions, 	. 	. 	. 	each 	with 	any 	number 	of 	employees 	[who 	make]
recommendations to them.” From this observation, the court concluded that were it
to read Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a) as the Board of Review read it, all employees that
make recommendations to their respective boards and commissions would hold major
advisory positions, disentitling them to unemployment compensation, rendering
meaningless the Legislature’s “intentional use of the word ‘major’ ” in Section 51-1-
44(A)(5)(a).
{10} 	In conclusion, the district court stated that:
Rather than explore [Ms. Perez’s] statutory duties, the Board of
Review based its decision on the statements of an individual who knew
that on occasion [Ms. Perez] may have exceeded her duties. Section 51-
1-44(A)(5)(a), however, requires an examination of the employee’s
position pursuant to statute. Based on that examination, [Ms. Perez] did
not occupy a major policy-making position. 	She advised a board on
rules, but she did not advise the governor on problems of state
government. The entity she advised was not a member of the cabinet,

9
and its only direct contact with the governor was through presentation of
an annual report at the end of each year. . . . [Section] 10-9-10(F)[.]
Consequently, the district court reversed the Board’s decision and ordered that Ms.
Perez was entitled to unemployment benefits.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{11} 	We focus on the administrative decision-makers’ rulings and rationales. Our
standard of review is the same as that required of the district court. 	See San Pedro
Neighborhood Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Santa Fe Cnty., 2009-NMCA-045,
¶ 11, 146 N.M. 106, 206 P.3d 1011 (“We will conduct the same review of an
administrative order as the district court sitting in its appellate capacity, while at the
same time determining whether the district court erred in the first appeal.” (alteration,
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); see also NMSA 1978, § 51-1-8(N)
(2004, amended 2013) (relating to decisions by the secretary or board of review
appealable to the district court); NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1 (1999) (relating to final
decisions by state agencies appealable to the district court); Rule 1-074(A), (R)
NMRA (relating to statutory review by district court of administrative decisions or
orders); Rule 1-077(J) NMRA (relating to appeals pursuant to unemployment
compensation laws).

10
{12} 	We review whether the administrative decision-makers acted fraudulently,
arbitrarily, 	or 	capriciously; 	whether, 	based 	upon 	a 	whole-record 	review, 	the
administrative decisions were supported by substantial evidence; whether the
decision-makers abused their discretion by acting outside the scope of authority; and
whether the administrative decisions were otherwise not in accordance with law. San
Pedro Neighborhood Ass’n, 2009-NMCA-045, ¶¶ 10-11. “The decision of the agency
will be affirmed if it is supported by the applicable law and by substantial evidence
in the record as a whole.” Fitzhugh v. N.M. Dep’t of Labor, 1996-NMSC-044, ¶ 24,
122 N.M. 173, 922 P.2d 555. In the case now before us, we review only whether the
administrative decisions were in accordance with law.
{13} 	On appeal to this Court, the parties discuss the evidence in relation to both a
policymaking and an advisory position. 	As we have indicated, however, we see
nothing in the administrative decisions that indicates any determination relating to a
policymaking position. The sole issue on review is whether state law designates the
position of personnel director to be a major advisory position.
DISCUSSION
{14} 	As we have noted, Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a) states that an employee is not
eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if she is “in a position which, under
or pursuant to state law, is designated as . . . a major . . . advisory position[.]”

11
Analysis of whether the position of personnel director is “a position which, under or
pursuant to state law, is designated as . . . a major . . . advisory position[,]” requires
the interpretation of three key terms used in Section 51-1-44(A)(5). Specifically, we
must consider what the Legislature intended to convey by its inclusion of the terms
“designated,” “major,” and “advisory position” in the context of Section 51-1-
44(A)(5). We turn first to the Legislature’s use of the term “designated.”
Interpretation of “Designated”
{15} 	It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature’s use of the term “designated” in
the phrase “designated as a . . . major . . . advisory position” was in part intended to
create a standard by which to measure whether a potential employee would, by
reading the statutorily prescribed duties of a position, be placed on notice that his or
her position was not covered employment for the purposes of unemployment
compensation. 	This 	purpose 	was 	explained 	in 	Conroy 	v. 	Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 693 A.2d 254, 256-57 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
The logic of the [l]aw . . . is plain. The exclusion imposes ineligibility
on the basis that any occupant of such a position can anticipate the
possibility of job termination upon a change of administration, so that
unemployment in such circumstances cannot be regarded as sudden and
unexpected. The required official designation hence provides a basis for
that expectation; when the nature of the position is designated by law,
there is thus an official signpost which informs the jobholder, upon
assuming the position, of what can be expected.

12
(Omission in original.) (Alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted.)
We conclude that in the phrase “designated as . . . a major . . . advisory position[,]” the
concept of designation is a reference to the statutorily described job duties, which,
when read by a prospective employee should alert her to the nature of the position,
including whether the position is “major” and “advisory.”
{16} 	Nothing in Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a) indicates that the Legislature intended
“designated” to mean the position-holder’s actual activities in carrying out the duties
of the position. See Zerbe v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 681 A.2d 740, 743-
44 (Pa. 1996) (stating that “[n]othing in the language of [the unemployment
compensation statute] require[d] a factual determination as to whether the . . . claimant
actually performed major policymaking or advisory functions” and stating further that
“[c]learly, our legislature has decided that it is the designation which is controlling as
to whether a government employee is eligible for unemployment compensation
benefits upon loss of employment”); Odato v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review,
805 A.2d 660, 662 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (stating that the claimant’s “actual job
activities [were] immaterial to the determination of whether he [was] entitled to
unemployment benefits”). 	Nor do we believe that our Legislature intended the
compensation determination to be made on the basis of the extent to which and
manner in which an employee engaged in activities.

13
Interpretation of “Advisory”
{17} 	Ms. Perez argues that state law must specifically name the position in question,
that of personnel director for example, to be a major advisory position. She further
argues that the designation must include the word “advisory.” We disagree. Instead,
we read “designated” to include advisory duties and responsibilities necessarily
implied from the designation. Cf. Odato, 805 A.2d at 663 (reversing the denial of the
employee’s unemployment benefits because the statute, which “set[] forth only a
functional 	description 	of 	job 	duties” 	did 	not 	“reveal 	any 	responsibility 	for
[policymaking] or service in an advisory role” and therefore failed to inform the
employee what he could expect upon taking the position); Conroy, 693 A.2d at 256
(“It is not necessary that the designation contain the precise words ‘major’ or
‘policymaking’ or ‘advisory,’ although it can be done that way.” (citation omitted)).
Nevertheless, “[i]t must, at a minimum, be a written statement of policy which has the
clear and intended effect of establishing the . . . employment status attached to the
position.” Id. at 257.
{18} 	We now turn to the question whether, under or pursuant to Section 10-9-12(A),
(E), and (F), the designation of the personnel director position is one of an advisory
position and gives notice to a prospective personnel director that the particular duties
and responsibilities enumerated in Section 10-9-12 come within the intended meaning

14
of “advisory position.” 	Although the administrative decision-makers made their
determinations based on actual activities, their decisions were apparently governed by
Subsection (A)’s generally stated duty to “supervise all administrative and technical
personnel activities of the state” and Subsection (E)’s generally stated duty to
“recommend to the board rules [that she] considers necessary or desirable to effectuate
the Personnel Act[.]” Section 10-9-12(A), (E). 	We observe that the Appeals
Tribunal’s 	administrative 	findings 	quoted 	Section 	10-9-12(E) 	and 	Regulation
1.7.1.8(A) NMAC, which mimics Section 10-9-12(A).
{19} 	We do not believe that the Legislature’s omission of the term “advisory” from
Section 10-9-12 is indicative of the Legislature’s intent to exclude the position of
personnel director from the purview of Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a). It is noteworthy that
“supervise” is synonymous with direct, manage, govern, regulate, oversee, and guide.
Roget’s Int’l Thesaurus ¶¶ 693.2, .4, .5, at 481-82 (7th printing 1951); see also
http://thesaurus.com/browse/supervise (describing “supervise” being synonymous
with, among other things, administer, be in charge, be responsible for, control, direct,
oversee, preside over, and superintend). 	Synonyms for “advise” are “admonish,
caution, counsel, consult, forewarn, inform, notify, [and] recommend[.]” 	The New
Int’l Webster’s Pocket Thesaurus of the English Language (hereinafter Webster’s) 16
(1997). “Advice” means “[g]uidance offered by one person . . . to another.” Black’s

15
Law Dictionary 63 (9th ed. 2009); see also Webster’s, supra, 16 (stating that “advice”
is synonymous with “counsel, guidance, lesson, [and] suggestion”). “Recommend”
can mean “advise or counsel.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1436 (Rev. 4th 1968); see also
http://thesaurus.com/browse/recommend (describing “recommend” being synonymous
with, among other things, acclaim, advance, advocate, counsel, justify, propose, steer,
suggest, and urge); Webster’s, supra, 247 (stating that “recommend” is synonymous
with “commend, praise, endorse, suggest, prescribe, urge, [and] advise”).
{20} 	A reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the personnel director’s statutorily
designated statewide duties is that they necessarily include advising the board and all
government employees and agencies that come within the Personnel Act in regard to
personnel matters. In particular, by its use of the terms “supervise” and “recommend”
in the context of Section 10-9-12(A) and (E), the Legislature expressed its intent that
the personnel director was expected, if not required, to advise state agencies covered
under the Personnel Act in regard to any number of “problems” and issues that may
arise throughout state government with respect to employees. Likewise, by requiring
the personnel director to “recommend” rules to the board, we believe the Legislature
contemplated that the personnel director would advise the board regarding the
adoption of personnel-related rules affecting all state employees covered by the
Personnel Act. 	Thus, notwithstanding the Legislature’s omission of the term

16
“advisory” from Section 10-9-12, its use of synonyms thereof evoke a clear sense of
the “advisory” nature of the position of personnel director such that a prospective
candidate for the position would expect that position to come within the purview of
“advisory” in Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a). See Conroy, 693 A.2d at 256-57 (explaining
the purpose behind designating positions as major policymaking or advisory).
Turning to dictionary definitions and synonyms is one method of attempting to
understand what the Legislature intended by words that it uses. 	See, e.g., Tri-State
Generation Transmission Ass’n v. D’Antonio, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶¶ 18-20, 289 P.3d
1232 (recognizing that the dictionary is a useful tool in the analysis of legislative
intent because it provides the ordinary meaning of the Legislature’s chosen terms);
State ex rel. Gaming Control Bd. v. Ten Gaming Devices, 2005-NMCA-117, ¶ 12, 138
N.M. 426, 120 P.3d 848 (relying on synonyms and dictionary definitions to determine
legislative intent). Dictionary definitions and synonyms do not end the discussion.
But as the statute reads and under the circumstances here, we conclude that our
approach in understanding legislative intent is reasonable and practical and that any
narrowing or detailing of meaning should be left to the Legislature.
Interpretation of “Major”
{21} 	The final question and the more difficult one is whether the advisory aspect of
the position reaches the status of “major.” The analysis in regard to what constitutes

17
“major” finds little, if any, guidance in the language of Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a). The
word “major” has several dictionary meanings. Closest for the purpose of this case
are “greater in number, extent, or importance” and “notable or conspicuous in effect
or scope[.]” 	The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 296 (2005). Synonyms of the term
“major” include “important, significant, main, [and] principal.” 	Webster’s, supra,
194. In our view, the personnel director’s statewide personnel supervisory duty and
the personnel director’s role of recommending rules relating to administration of the
Personnel Act constitute duties that are notable, conspicuous in effect and scope,
important, and significant. 	As such, the statutory duties of the personnel director
come within the meaning of “major.”
{22} 	Ms. Perez fails to point to any place in the record where she provided to the
administrative decision-makers or to the district court any instances in which any
positions in government other than those of executive cabinet secretaries carried
express policy or advisory designations under or pursuant to state law at all
comparable to those in Section 10-9-12. The dissent points to none. Further, although
not critical to our decision, on the issue of whether Section 51-1-44(A)(5) should
pertain solely to persons who can be appointed or whose positions can be terminated
only by the governor or perhaps another member of the executive cabinet, it is
important to note that the governor has substantial control over the decision as to who

18
will be hired to the position of personnel director. 	As discussed earlier in this
Opinion, the personnel board, which is appointed by the governor, is tasked with
hiring a personnel director, and final say as to the hiring decision rests with the
governor. See §§ 10-9-8, 10-9-10(C). Further, and nowhere contested by Ms. Perez,
the Appeals Tribunal entered the following findings of fact.
4. 	The claimant was nominated to the position of director by the
(then) governor along with two other candidates also nominated
by the governor. 	The State Personnel Board . . . appointed the
claimant as director in July 2004 and her appointment was
approved by the governor.
. . . .
9. 	The claimant filed for unemployment benefits . . . . 	In the
claimant’s statement . . . she indicated “As an exempt employee
in an at will status, I work at the pleasure of the governor and the
governor found another State Personnel Director.”
Thus, to the extent that the exclusion in Section 51-1-44(A)(5) is grounded in electoral
politics and permits new administrations to “pick their own” to hold major nontenured
advisory positions, we see little distinction to be drawn between the governor’s direct
appointment of cabinet secretaries and the governor’s recommendation of an up or
down vote as to who may be hired as personnel director, particularly when the
candidate is selected by the governor’s hand-picked personnel board members, not to

19
mention Ms. Perez’s own statement that she worked at the pleasure of the governor
and the governor replaced her.
In Sum
{23} 	As the statute reads, courts are to address positions as they are designated under
or pursuant to state law. The only designations before the administrative decision-
makers, the district court, and this Court were that of personnel director and those of
the executive cabinet members. The record was not developed in a manner that can
permit even speculation in regard to designations of positions of persons employed
or appointed by various boards or commissions or executive functionaries in the state.
There exists no basis for wonder about other jobs that have no designations. Other
than those of executive cabinet members, none were presented for comparison or
contrast. The personnel director has statutorily designated duties. Although Section
10-9-12 does not expressly and specifically state that any duty is “advisory,”
embedded in the personnel director’s broad supervisory duties and duty to recommend
rules is obviously a duty and responsibility to advise state government officials,
employees, and agencies at all levels of state government in regard to personnel
matters within the purview of the Personnel Act and to assist the board in considering
rules and regulations for statewide administration of the Personnel Act. Considering
the critical importance of personnel in and throughout state government, these duties

20
and responsibilities can be considered major ones. The dissent’s assertion that the
personnel director is to oversee a system designed to treat the ill of mass employment
change upon changes in administration does not, in our view, constitute a rational
basis on which to read the position out of the Section 51-1-44(A)(5) exclusion.
{24} 	On a final note, in regard to the Legislature’s use of the term “major” in Section
51-1-44(A)(5)(a), for the benefit of future tribunals faced with the interpretation of
this section, we reject the reasoning employed by the district court. 	The district
court’s analysis is that “major” under Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a) should necessarily be
limited to cabinet members because of their advisory duties vis-a-vis the governor and
perhaps also to possible advisory duties of the lower executive branch employees
mentioned in Section 9-1-4(A) who do not have a close advisory position in regard
to the governor. We cannot accept this rationale. We see no reason why a personnel
director cannot be considered to hold a major advisory position when (1) she is the
administrative director of a governmental office in charge of Personnel Act matters
throughout the entirety of state government; (2) she must supervise and advise other
employees, 	agencies, 	departments, 	divisions, 	bureaus, 	sections, 	boards, 	and
commissions in regard to personnel issues and problems; and (3) she must recommend
and advise the entity responsible for adopting rules for administration of the Personnel
Act. Furthermore, we cannot accept a rationale that the personnel director should be

21
entitled to unemployment compensation, yet, as implied in the district court’s
decision, such compensation should be denied to a director of a division, a chief of a
bureau, and a supervisor of a section simply because these units of government are
named in Section 9-1-4(A) of the Executive Reorganization Act and may consist of
a considerably fewer number of employees than exist in the world of boards and
commissions. The application of “major” to an advisory position requires a case-by-
case, position-by-position, designation-by-designation analysis.
{25} 	We hold that advisory duties and responsibilities stemming from the express
duties found in Section 10-9-12 fairly come within the language “designated as” in
Section 51-1-44(A)(5). 	We further hold that the personnel director’s broadly
designated duties to supervise and recommend along with the director’s advisory
responsibilities can be considered major because they are notable, conspicuous in
effect and scope, important, significant, and a major part and aspect of the personnel
director’s full gamut of duty. 	Thus, the administrative decision-maker’s ruling
denying Ms. Perez’s unemployment benefits pursuant to Section 51-1-44(A)(5)(a) was
in accordance with the law and is hereby affirmed. See Fitzhugh, 1996-NMSC-044,
¶ 24 (stating that the administrative decision-maker’s determination will be affirmed
if it is supported by the applicable law).
CONCLUSION

22
{26} 	The 	administrative 	decision-makers 	did 	not 	err 	in 	denying 	Ms. 	Perez
unemployment 	compensation. 	We 	reverse 	the 	district 	court 	and 	affirm 	the
determination of the Appeals Tribunal adopted by the Board of Review.
{27} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
I CONCUR:
___________________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge (dissenting).

23
Bustamante, Judge (dissenting)
{28} 	I respectfully dissent. In my view the majority Opinion does not sufficiently
honor the policy considerations that underlie the exclusion.
{29} 	Though the majority is correct that the focus should be on the “designated”
nature of the position itself, the Opinion does not carry the analysis far enough. As
the majority notes, the designation of a position should be sufficiently clear to place
an employee on notice that the position is “not covered employment for the purposes
of unemployment compensation.” See Majority Opinion ¶ 15. The Opinion does not
delve into the policy reasons that would support excluding a position from coverage.
{30} 	The best, most historically and administratively grounded explanation for
exclusion from coverage I have found comes from Gahres v. Commonwealth, 433
A.2d 152, 154 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1981). The Gahres court stated:
The logic of such a requirement is plain. The exclusion imposes
ineligibility on the basis that any occupant of such a position can
anticipate 	the 	possibility 	of 	job 	termination 	upon 	a 	change 	of
administration, so that unemployment in such circumstances cannot be
regarded as sudden and unexpected. The required official designation
hence provides a basis for that expectation; when the nature of the
position is designated by law, there is thus an official signpost which
informs the jobholder, upon assuming the position, of what can be
expected.
433 A.2d at 154.

24
{31} 	The passage’s emphasis on job termination tied to a “change of administration”
grounds the exclusion in electoral politics. Administrations have the right to ensure
that their policymakers and advisors carry out the goals of that administration. As
such, they should be able to pick “their own” to hold those positions. In turn, people
holding such positions should be aware that they can be replaced at any time and
should expect to be replaced with changes in administration. 	This rationale for
exclusion from unemployment compensation makes sense and provides a guide for
assessing whether a position’s designation gives sufficient notice to an employee.
{32} 	As 	the 	district 	court 	noted, 	positions 	such 	as 	cabinet 	secretaries 	are
obviously—almost inherently—political in nature and the Legislature rather clearly
labeled them as such. The difficulty arises when one considers positions—such as
Ms. Perez’s—which are not so obviously political. 	How are the courts to decide
whether they should be subject to exclusion from coverage? 	I submit that courts
should err on the side of caution and limit the number and type of positions subject
to the political winds.
{33} 	In my view the majority Opinion is not appropriately cautious in its policy
choice. Section10-9-12 describes an important position in state government but there
is nothing in the description which obviously indicates that the holder of the position
should be subject to change as a consequence of election results. The Opinion goes

25
astray with its emphasis on dictionary definitions of “advice” and “recommend.”
Rhetorically speaking, what position of any consequence does not involve giving
advice and making recommendations? 	Are all such jobs to be subjected to the
exclusion simply because they include those functions? The question answers itself.
{34} 	A better approach to the problem is to be found in the Conroy case that the
majority 	cites 	with 	approval. 	Conroy 	involved 	a 	claim 	for 	unemployment
compensation by a former borough police chief. 	The former chief wrote, and the
borough counsel adopted, the manual of policy and procedures for the police
department. 693 A.2d at 255. The manual included a description of the police chief’s
position which explicitly included policymaking and advisory duties. Id. There, as
here, the employer argued that the position description as adopted by the borough
constituted a designation of a major policymaking and advisory position. Id. at 256.
The court in Conroy disagreed, finding the borough’s “analysis insufficient, as it does
not consider the underlying purpose of the [l]aw.” Id. Relying on and quoting from
Gahres, the Conroy court concluded that to come within the exclusion the designation
would have to be more than a functional description of the job. Id. at 257. It would
have to clearly relate to job security and establish job terms and employment status
as it relates to a change in administration. 	Id. 	Applying the approach followed in
Conroy leads to affirmance of the district court.

26
{35} 	The purpose of the Personnel Act is to “establish for New Mexico a system of
personnel administration based solely on qualification and ability[.]” Section 10-9-2.
The aim of the Personnel Act was to limit to the extent possible the practice of
wholesale changes in state employment after elections. Persons of a certain age will
recall the difficulties attendant to government employment ruled by patronage and the
old “spoils” system. The personnel director’s job is to oversee the system that put a
stop to those difficulties. 	It seems to me eminently good policy not to subject the
position to even the restrained version of political influence that necessarily persists.
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge