April 21, 2020- Jack Willis Reynolds & Mary Louise Reynolds Revocable Trust Agreement v. Stephen D. Landau, No. A-1-CA-37135

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Opinion Number: Filed 4/21/2020 11:11 AM

Filing Date: Apnil 21, 2020 A. we [— ,
ark Reynolds

No. A-1-CA-37135 M

JACK WILLIS REYNOLDS AND

MARY LOUISE REYNOLDS

REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT,
Plaintiff-A ppellee,

Vv.

STEPHEN D. LANDAU,
Defendant- Appellant,

and

DOUG BISHOP and B.E.[. INC.,
Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MCKINLEY COUNTY
Robert A. Aragon, District Judge

Mason & Isaacson, P.A.
Patnick T. Mason
Gallup, NM

for Appellee

Stephen D, Landau
Santa Fe, NM

Pro Se Appellant

OPINION	1
MEDINA, Judge.	2
{1} 	This case arises out of an action to foreclose on a mortgage that predated the	3
purchase of the property by a third party in a tax deed sale. The purchaser of the	4
property, Stephen Landau, appeals the district court’s judgment on the merits and	5
order for foreclosure sale in favor of the mortgagee, the Jack Willis Reynolds and	6
Mary Louise Reynolds Revocable Trust Agreement (the Trust). Landau, appealing	7
pro se, raises the following issues: (1) the Trust should not be able to foreclose on a	8
mortgage ten years after the mortgagor had its corporate status administratively	9
cancelled; (2) the Trust’s foreclosure action was barred by the statute of limitations;	10
(3) the Trust’s agreement to extend the mortgage and corresponding promissory note	11
discharged the mortgagor’s debt; (4) the district court’s findings were not supported	12
by substantial evidence; (5) the district court abused its discretion in setting trial less	13
than a month after the close of discovery, as well as striking Landau’s motion for	14
summary judgment as untimely; (6) the district court erroneously based its judgment	15
on issues of equity relating to the rental income Landau made off of the property;	16
and (7) cumulative error deprived Landau of a fair trial. We affirm.	17

2
BACKGROUND	1
{2} 	On June 7, 2007, B.E.I., Inc. (BEI), a business corporation wholly owned and	2
controlled by Doug Bishop,1 executed a promissory note (the Note) in the principal	3
sum of $115,000 made payable to the Trust. The Note required monthly payments	4
of $1,200, with the remaining balance of $71,800 plus interest due on June 25, 2010.	5
On June 25, 2007, BEI executed a mortgage (the Mortgage) on a parcel of land (the	6
Property) it owned in McKinley County in favor of the Trust to secure the Note—	7
including any extensions of the Note. The Note and the Mortgage were recorded	8
together in the McKinley County Clerk’s Office on June 28, 2007.	9
{3} 	Approximately one year before BEI executed the Note and Mortgage, the	10
Office of the Public Regulation Commission (the Commission) sent BEI a notice	11
informing it of its failure to file its annual corporate report required by the Corporate	12
Reports Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 53-5-1 to -9 (1959, as amended through 2018). On	13
July 21, 	2007—approximately one 	month 	after 	BEI 	executed 	the 	Note 	and	14
Mortgage—the Commission cancelled BEI’s certificate of incorporation for failure	15
to file the required corporate reports.2 See § 53-5-7(A) (providing, in relevant part,	16
1 Although the record is silent as to who owned BEI, the parties do not dispute
that Bishop was BEI’s sole shareholder.
2 BEI never applied for reinstatement of its corporate status. See NMSA 1978,
§ 53-11-12(B) (2003) (providing that a “corporation administratively revoked” for
failure to file corporate reports required pursuant to Section 53-5-2 may apply for
reinstatement within two years of revocation).

3
that a corporation “shall have its certificate of incorporation canceled” for failure to	1
file annual corporate report within sixty days of receiving notice that report is past	2
due).	3
{4} 	On March 3, 2008, Bishop executed a personal guaranty to further secure	4
BEI’s obligations under the Note and Mortgage. Bishop made some payments on	5
the Note but failed to pay off the remaining balance before the Note matured on June	6
25, 2010. Bishop also failed to pay the property taxes on the Property, resulting in	7
the attachment of a tax lien on January 1, 2011.	8
{5} 	On March 3, 2011, the Trust sent Bishop a letter (the First Extension Letter)	9
stating, “Pursuant to our several telecons, by copy of this letter I am informing [the	10
escrow agent hired to collect payments due under the Note] to extend our Promissory	11
Note [and] Mortgage to October 25, 2011.” On August 20, 2011, the Trust sent	12
Bishop a second letter (the Second Extension Letter) stating, “Pursuant to our	13
telephone conversation on August 17, 2011[,] we agreed to again extend our	14
Promissory Note [and] Mortgage to October 25, 2012.” Unlike the First Extension	15
Letter, Bishop signed the Second Extension Letter, indicating his agreement to the	16
extension.	17
{6} 	Bishop continued to make sporadic payments after agreeing to the extension	18
but did not pay off the remaining balance of the Note, which had accrued to	19
approximately $90,000 by 2016. On July 22, 2016, the New Mexico Department of	20

4
Taxation and Revenue (the Department) sold the Property for approximately $6,000	1
at public auction to Landau—a third party. Following the sale, the Department	2
delivered to Landau a deed to the Property “convey[ing] . . . all of the former	3
property owner’s interest in the . . . [P]roperty . . .as of the date the [S]tate’s lien for	4
real property taxes arose . . . subject only to perfected interests in the real property	5
existing before the date the property tax lien arose[.]”	6
{7} 	On August 18, 2016, Landau succeeded in a quiet title action against BEI and	7
Bishop. The Trust filed the instant action on March 13, 2017 against BEI, Bishop,	8
and Landau, seeking to collect the remaining balance of the Note and to foreclose	9
on the Mortgage. Only Landau, acting pro se,3 responded to the suit. The district	10
court held a Rule 1-016 NMRA scheduling conference on August 29, 2017, and	11
scheduled a bench trial for November 8, 2017. The court also initially set the	12
discovery deadline for October 1, 2017, but extended the deadline to October 15	13
upon Landau’s request. The court did not set any other deadlines or enter a	14
scheduling order.	15
{8} 	Landau filed a motion for summary judgment on November 3, 2017, arguing	16
the Trust could not foreclose on the Mortgage because: (1) BEI’s corporate status	17
was cancelled almost ten years prior to the suit, and thus the survival period to bring	18
3 Other than retaining counsel to represent him at trial, Landau was pro se
throughout the case.

5
suit against the corporation had expired; (2) Bishop discharged BEI’s debt by	1
agreeing to the extensions on behalf of himself personally; and (3) the six-year	2
statute of limitations for foreclosing on the Mortgage had run and the extension	3
letters were insufficient to revive the limitations period because neither was	4
notarized or recorded, as required by NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-16 (1957).	5
{9} 	The Trust moved to strike Landau’s motion as untimely. On November 8,	6
2017, the district court granted the Trust’s motion to strike, and the case proceeded	7
to trial as scheduled. The only witnesses to testify were Landau and Brad Reynolds,	8
the successor trustee to the Trust, neither of whom had any first-hand knowledge of	9
the Trust’s dealings with BEI and Bishop.	10
{10} 	The district court ruled from the bench in the Trust’s favor “as a matter of law	11
and equity,” ordered foreclosure and sale of the Property, and asked the Trust to	12
prepare an order reflecting the court’s judgment. On November 17, 2017, Landau	13
filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 1-052	14
NMRA, which included his proposed findings and conclusions. The district court	15
did not rule on Landau’s request but approved the form of order submitted by the	16
Trust three days later, which included findings of fact and conclusions of law.4 The	17
4 It does not appear the Trust submitted any separate proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law, only the final form of order. The Trust does not dispute
Landau’s assertion that the district court’s findings and conclusions are identical to
the findings of fact and conclusions of law included in the Trust’s final form of order,
we therefore assume the court adopted the findings and conclusions verbatim.

6
court’s findings and conclusions did not include any of the ones submitted by	1
Landau. On November 20, 2017, the district court as relevant to this appeal,	2
concluded that the Trust was not barred from suing BEI for foreclosure because New	3
Mexico’s survival statute for business corporations, NMSA 1978, § 53-16-24	4
(1967), did not contain an express time limit for filing suit against a dissolved	5
corporation.	6
{11} 	The court further concluded that the Trust’s foreclosure action was timely	7
because: (1) Bishop and BEI entered into a “valid agreement in writing to defer the	8
payment of the full amount due under the Mortgage and Note to October 25, 2012,	9
thus tolling the statute of limitations[, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-3(A)	10
(2015);]” and (2) the continued payments on the Note revived the statute of	11
limitations pursuant to Section 37-1-16. The court ordered the Mortgage foreclosed	12
and appointed a special master to conduct a foreclosure sale of the Property to pay	13
off the remaining balance of the Note, reserving jurisdiction to render a deficiency	14
judgment against Bishop and BEI. The court denied Landau’s motion to reconsider,	15
[2 RP 274] and this appeal followed.	16
DISCUSSION	17
{12} 	Before we address Landau’s arguments, a brief background on the tax deed	18
sale process is useful. New Mexico’s Property Tax Code (the Code) provides that,	19
with certain exceptions not applicable to this case, “taxes on real property are a lien	20

7
against the real property from January 1 of the tax year for which the taxes are	1
imposed . . . [and] . . . continues until the taxes and any penalty and interest are paid.”	2
NMSA 1978, § 7-38-48 (2003). The Department may seize and sell real property to	3
satisfy a tax delinquency on the property three years following the date the taxes first	4
became delinquent. See NMSA 1978, § 7-38-65(A) (2013). In order to do this, the	5
Department must first satisfy certain notice requirements and list the property at a	6
public auction. See NMSA 1978, § 7-38-66 (2018) (identifying notice requirements);	7
NMSA 1978, § 7-38-67(C) (2005) (requiring property to be sold at a public auction).	8
{13} 	Prior to the auction, the Department must set a minimum purchase price,	9
which it determines by considering “the value of the property owner’s interest in the	10
real property, the amount of all delinquent taxes, penalties and interest for which it	11
is being sold and the costs.” Section 7-38-67(E). Often times, the minimum purchase	12
price is set significantly below the property’s fair market value. See, e.g., Cochrell	13
v. Mitchell, 2003-NMCA-094, ¶¶ 3, 5, 134 N.M. 180, 75 P.3d 396 (setting minimum	14
bid at $4,000 on property worth between $100,000 and $144,000); 	see also	15
Valenzuela v. Snyder, 2014-NMCA-061, ¶ 17, 326 P.3d 1120 (setting minimum bid	16
at $215 on property worth $25,000). One of the reasons for this is that “the purchaser	17
at the tax sale buys, knowing the uncertainty of the title which is reflected in the	18
purchaser’s 	offer.” 	Valenzuela, 	2014-NMCA-061, 	¶ 	23 	(alterations, 	internal	19
quotation marks, and citation omitted).	20

8
{14} 	Once a property is purchased at auction, and the purchaser timely pays the	1
amount due, the Department shall execute and deliver a deed to the purchaser.	2
NMSA 1978, § 7-38-70(A) (1982). Historically, the sale of real property to satisfy a	3
tax lien in New Mexico was said to provide a “paramount title cutting off all prior	4
liens, [e]ncumbrances and interests of every character.” Alamogordo Improvement	5
Co. v. Hennessee, 1936-NMSC-018, ¶ 6, 40 N.M. 162, 56 P.2d 1127. However, the	6
Code now provides:	7
If the real property was sold substantially in accordance with the . . .	8
Code, the deed [delivered to the tax deed sale purchaser] conveys all of	9
the former property owner’s interest in the real property as of the date	10
the state’s lien for real property taxes arose . . . , subject only to	11
perfected interests in the real property existing before the date the	12
property tax lien arose.	13
Section 7-38-70(B) (emphasis added).	14
{15} 	As relevant to this case, a mortgage constitutes an interest in real property and	15
may be perfected by filing it for record “in the office of the county clerk of the county	16
or counties in which the real estate affected thereby is situated.” NMSA 1978, § 14-	17
9-1 	(1991); 	see 	NMSA 	1978, 	§ 	14-9-2 	(1886-87) 	(providing 	that 	recorded	18
instruments “shall be notice to all the world of the existence and contents of the	19
instruments”); Connelly v. Wertz, 1993-NMCA-090, ¶ 15, 115 N.M. 803, 858 P.2d	20
1282 (“An instrument such as a deed or mortgage is said to become perfect or	21
perfected when recorded (or registered) or filed for record, because it then becomes	22
good as to all the world.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), overruled	23

9
on other grounds by Sw. Land Inv., Inc. v. Hubbart, 1993-NMSC-072, ¶ 7, 116 N.M.	1
742, 867 P.2d 412.	2
{16} 	Because perfected mortgages are discoverable by a search of the county	3
clerk’s records, it is incumbent on tax deed buyers to perform a title search and	4
diligently investigate the existence and status of any such mortgage prior to	5
purchasing the property. See F & S Co. v. Gentry, 1985-NMSC-065, ¶ 8, 103 N.M.	6
54, 702 P.2d 999 (stating that “[a]nything discoverable from a reasonably prudent	7
search of . . . records [maintained by the county clerk] would serve as constructive	8
notice”); see also Camino Real Enters., Inc. v. Ortega, 1988-NMSC-061, ¶ 3, 107	9
N.M. 387, 758 P.2d 801 (“[W]here the facts brought to the knowledge of the	10
intending purchaser are such that in the exercise of ordinary care he ought to inquire,	11
but does not, and his failure to do so amounts to gross or culpable negligence, he	12
will be charged with a knowledge of all the facts which the inquiry, pursued with	13
reasonable diligence, would have revealed.” (internal quotation marks and citation	14
omitted)).	15
{17} 	Although Landau claims he did not have actual knowledge of the Mortgage	16
at the time he purchased the Property in the tax deed sale, he does not dispute that	17
the Mortgage was properly recorded in accordance with Section 14-9-1 before the	18
property tax lien arose. Thus, the underlying question of whether Landau’s interest	19
in the Property he received from the tax deed sale was subject to the Mortgage does	20

10
not appear to be in dispute, only the Trust’s ability to foreclose on the Mortgage.	1
With this in mind, we proceed to address Landau’s arguments.	2
Standard of Review	3
{18} 	Landau raises both factual and legal questions. Challenges to a district court’s	4
factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal so long as they are supported by	5
substantial evidence. Segal v. Goodman, 1993-NMSC-018, ¶ 15, 115 N.M. 349, 851	6
P.2d 471. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind	7
would find adequate to support a conclusion.” Robey v. Parnell, 2017-NMCA-038,	8
¶ 10, 392 P.3d 642 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In reviewing a	9
claim of insufficient evidence, we resolve all disputes of facts in favor of the	10
successful party and indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the prevailing	11
party.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “[T]his court	12
will not reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.”	13
Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). While this standard is	14
generally deferential, we may relax our usual deference when the district court	15
adopts verbatim the prevailing party’s extensive requested findings and conclusions.	16
See Los Vigiles Land Grant v. Rebar Haygood Ranch, LLC, 2014-NMCA-017, ¶ 2,	17
317 P.3d 842.	18
{19} 	We review de novo challenges to a district court’s conclusions of law. Robey,	19
2017-NMCA-038, ¶ 11. To the extent addressing these issues requires us to engage	20

11
in statutory interpretation, “our charge is to determine and give effect to the	1
Legislature’s intent.” Little v. Jacobs, 2014-NMCA-105, ¶ 7, 336 P.3d 398 (internal	2
quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to do this, we look first to the plain	3
language of the statute. See Cook v. Anding, 2008-NMSC-035, ¶ 7, 144 N.M. 400,	4
188 	P.3d 	1151. 	“[W]hen 	a 	statute 	contains 	language 	which 	is 	clear 	and	5
unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory	6
interpretation.” Bank of New York v. Romero, 2014-NMSC-007, ¶ 40, 320 P.3d 1	7
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court “will not read into a	8
statute language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written.” State	9
ex rel. Duran v. Anaya, 1985-NMSC-044, ¶ 10, 102 N.M. 609, 698 P.2d 882.	10
I. 	BEI’s Administrative Cancellation Does Not Bar the Trust’s Suit	11
{20} 	Landau argues the Trust should be barred from foreclosing on the Mortgage	12
because BEI had its corporate status administratively cancelled almost ten years	13
before the Trust brought suit. “At common law, a corporation ceased to exist on the	14
date it was dissolved, and all actions pending against it abated.” Quintana v. Los	15
Alamos Med. Ctr., Inc., 1994-NMCA-162, ¶ 5, 119 N.M. 312, 889 P.2d 1234. In	16
order to ameliorate the harsh results of the rule on those who sought to bring suit	17
against dissolved corporations, New Mexico, like other states, enacted a corporate	18
survival statute to extend the period 	for settling 	claims 	against 	a dissolved	19
corporation. See Smith v. Halliburton Co., 1994-NMCA-055, ¶ 12, 118 N.M. 179,	20

12
879 P.2d 1198 (“In order to ease that harsh effect [of the common law rule], a	1
number of states have enacted corporate survival statutes to extend the period for	2
settling claims against a dissolved corporation.”); see also Quintana, 1994-NMCA-	3
162, ¶ 6 (noting that all states have adopted survival statutes). “Once the survival	4
period has ended, the corporation ceases to exist and can no longer be sued.”	5
Quintana, 1994-NMCA-162, ¶ 6. New Mexico’s survival statute applicable to	6
business corporations provides:	7
The dissolution of a corporation does not take away or impair any	8
remedy available to or against the corporation, its directors, officers or	9
shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred,	10
prior to the dissolution and any such action or proceeding by or against	11
the corporation may be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its	12
corporate name. The shareholders, directors and officers may take such	13
corporate or other action as appropriate to protect the remedy, right or	14
claim.	15
Section 53-16-24.	16
{21} 	In 	this 	case, 	we 	note 	that 	BEI’s 	certificate 	of 	incorporation 	was	17
administratively “cancelled” pursuant to Section 53-5-7, rather than voluntarily or	18
involuntarily “dissolved,” pursuant to NMSA 1978, Sections 53-16-1 to -3, -13	19
(1967, as amended through 2003). Because the parties do not dispute that these terms	20
have any meaningful difference, and because the Legislature has not enacted a	21
separate survival statute for administratively cancelled corporations, we treat BEI’s	22
administrative cancellation as having the same effect as a dissolution for purposes	23
of our discussion. See § 53-5-7.1 (“A domestic corporation whose certificate of	24

13
incorporation has been canceled . . . pursuant to Section 53-5-7 . . . shall be stricken	1
from the files of the [C]ommission . . . without further proceedings.”); G. Van Ingen,	2
Annotation, Power of Corporation After Expiration or Forfeiture of its Charter;	3
Effects of Dissolution, 97 A.L.R. 477 (1935) (“The dissolution of a corporation is	4
the termination of its corporate existence in any manner, whether by the expiration	5
of its charter, a decree of the court, an act of the legislature, a governmental decree,	6
or the voluntary act of its members.”).	7
{22} 	Although Landau recognizes that Section 53-16-24 does not contain an	8
express 	time 	limit 	on 	the 	survival 	of 	remedies 	against 	dissolved 	business	9
corporations, he contends this Court should establish such a limit. In support of this	10
argument, Landau points out that the majority of states have adopted an express time	11
limit on the survival of remedies against dissolved corporations. See Smith, 1994-	12
NMCA-055, ¶ 12 (noting that the majority of survival statutes specify a time in	13
which a suit can be brought against a dissolved corporation). Landau also points out	14
that New Mexico provides express survival periods for non-profit corporations,	15
limited liability companies, and limited partnerships. See NMSA 1978, § 53-8-63	16
(1975) (providing a two-year survival period for non-profit corporations), NMSA	17
1978, § 53-19-46(C) (1995) (providing a three-year survival period for limited	18
liability companies), NMSA 1978, § 54-2A-807(C) (2007) (providing a five-year	19
survival period for limited partnerships).	20

14
{23} 	Landau’s reliance on these authorities is misplaced. First, Landau cannot point	1
to a single state that has judicially enacted a survival period—as Landau now	2
requests from this Court. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M.	3
764, 676 P.2d 1329 (stating that when a party fails to cite authority for an argument,	4
we may assume none exists). Second, that our Legislature has enacted express	5
survival periods for other legal entities but not business corporations cuts against	6
Landau’s argument. “When there are provisions in analogous statutes that a party	7
contends should be present in the statute at issue in the case, we utilize the process	8
of negative inference to reason that the absence of such provisions in the statute at	9
issue is intentional.” State v. Lucero, 1992-NMCA-103, ¶ 6, 114 N.M. 460, 840 P.2d	10
607. Hence, these enactments demonstrate that the Legislature knows how to create	11
an express survival period for business corporations if it intends to do so, and through	12
negative inference we assume the absence of an express survival period in Section	13
53-16-24 is intentional. Cf. Patterson v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 1984-NMCA-076,	14
¶ 10, 101 N.M. 541, 685 P.2d 396 (observing that the defendant’s citation to other	15
statutes providing a private right of action demonstrates, by negative inference, that	16
the lack of a provision for a private action under the Unfair Insurance Practices Act	17
was 	intentional), 	recognized 	on 	other 	grounds 	as 	stated 	in 	Starko, 	Inc. 	v.	18
Presbyterian Health Plan, Inc., 2012-NMCA-053, 276 P.3d 252.	19

15
{24} 	Though Landau may debate the merits of the Legislature’s decision not to	1
provide a limitation period in Section 53-16-24, our role is to construe statutes as	2
written, not to second-guess the Legislature’s policy decisions. See State v. Maestas,	3
2007-NMSC-001, ¶ 14, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933 (“We adhere to the principle	4
that a statute must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as	5
the court may think it should be or would have been written if the Legislature had	6
envisaged all the problems and complications which might arise in the course of its	7
administration.” 	(alteration, 	internal 	quotation 	marks, 	and 	citation 	omitted)).	8
Accordingly, we decline to read into Section 53-16-24 a limitation period. Because	9
BEI executed the Note and Mortgage prior to its administrative cancellation, the	10
Trust is not barred from foreclosing on the Mortgage. See § 53-16-24.	11
{25} 	Landau alternatively argues that allowing the Trust to foreclose on the	12
Property would be inequitable because BEI had a duty to liquidate its assets and	13
wind up its affairs after having its corporate status cancelled, and Bishop should not	14
be 	permitted 	to 	“benefit 	from 	the 	corporate 	veil 	of 	his 	long-ago 	dissolved	15
corporation[] and avoid[] judgment personally for . . . failing in his obligation to the	16
Trust.” However, Landau provides no authority for the proposition that the district	17
court could invoke its equitable jurisdiction to prevent the foreclosure in light of	18
Section 53-16-24’s indefinite survival period. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-	19
NMSC-024, ¶ 2 (stating that when a party fails to cite authority for an argument, we	20

16
may assume none exists); Gzaskow v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 2017-NMCA-064, ¶ 39,	1
403 P.3d 694 (“That a court may not exercise an equitable remedy to accomplish a	2
goal that a statute has foreclosed is well recognized by courts throughout the United	3
States.”).	4
{26} 	Moreover, even if the district court could exercise its equitable jurisdiction in	5
the manner Landau requests, his argument rests on the faulty premise that Bishop	6
avoided the consequences of his actions. To the contrary, Bishop—apparently BEI’s	7
sole shareholder—was the de facto owner of the Property being foreclosed upon.	8
See McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 1986-NMCA-065, ¶ 48, 104 N.M. 523,	9
724 P.2d 232 (“It is fundamental, of course, that the corporation has a personality	10
distinct 	from 	that 	of 	its shareholders, 	and 	that 	the 	latter 	neither 	own 	the	11
corporate property nor 	the 	corporate 	earnings. 	The shareholder simply 	has 	an	12
expectancy in each, and he becomes the owner of a portion of each only when	13
the corporation is liquidated[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).	14
Additionally, the district court found Bishop personally liable for any deficiency	15
owed to the Trust should the Property sale not cover the amounts owing under the	16
Note. We therefore decline to further consider this argument.	17
II. 	The Extension Letters Tolled the Statute of Limitations	18
{27} 	Landau argues that the Trust was barred by the statute of limitations from	19
foreclosing on the Mortgage because the Trust failed to revive the statutory period	20

17
pursuant to Section 37-1-16. The limitations period applicable to actions founded	1
upon contractual obligations contained in promissory notes (such as the foreclosure	2
action in this case) is six years. See § 37-1-3(A). Generally, the limitations period	3
begins to run on the promissory note’s maturity date. See Joslin v. Gregory, 2003-	4
NMCA-133, ¶ 9, 134 N.M. 527, 80 P.3d 464 (observing that the statute of limitations	5
normally begins to run for the entire balance of a promissory note on the date of	6
maturity). 	However, 	the 	limitations 	period 	for 	promissory 	notes 	requiring	7
installment payments begins to run only with respect to each installment when due.	8
See LSF9 Master Participation Tr. v. Sanchez, 2019-NMCA-055, ¶¶ 12-13, 450 P.3d	9
413 (construing a note promising periodic payments as an installment contract and	10
holding that the statute of limitations began to run with respect to each installment	11
when due).	12
{28} 	In this case, the statute of limitations began to run with respect to each	13
monthly installment when due and with respect to the remaining balance of the Note	14
on June 25, 2010, the date the Note matured. Thus, the Trust had until June 25, 2016,	15
at the latest, to bring an action to foreclose on the Mortgage in satisfaction of the	16
Note’s debt unless the limitations period was tolled or revived. See § 31-1-3(A). The	17
district court held that the statute of limitations was both tolled and revived,	18
concluding: (1) the extension letters tolled the statute of limitations pursuant to	19

18
Section 37-1-3(A) and (2) the continued payments on the Note revived the statute of	1
limitations pursuant to Section 37-1-16.	2
{29} 	Because we agree that the extension letters tolled the statute of limitations	3
under Section 37-1-3(A) long enough for the Trust to bring this foreclosure action	4
within the six-year limitations period, we need not address whether the payments	5
also revived the statute of limitations under Section 37-1-16. See In re Estates of	6
Brown v. Dickinson, 2000-NMCA-030, ¶ 18, 128 N.M. 825, 999 P.2d 1057 (“We	7
may affirm the district court on an alternate ground where it has reached the correct	8
result and where reliance on an alternate ground would not be unfair to the	9
appellant.”). We explain. Section 37-1-3(A) provides, in relevant part:	10
If the payee of any . . . promissory note . . . enters into any contract or	11
agreement in writing to defer the payment thereof, or contracts or	12
agrees not to assert any claim against the payor or against the assets of	13
the payor until the happening of some contingency, the time during the	14
period from the execution of the contract or agreement and the	15
happening of the contingency shall not be included in computing the	16
six-year period of limitation[.]	17
Hence, “the time elapsing between the making of the contract [made pursuant to	18
Section 37-1-3(A)] and the happening of the condition when performance became	19
due should not be counted [when calculating the six-year limitation period].” Harp	20
v. Gourley, 1961-NMSC-026, ¶ 29, 68 N.M. 162, 359 P.2d 942.	21
{30} 	In this case, the Trust sent Bishop two extension letters: the First Extension	22
Letter on March 3, 2011, extending the Note and Mortgage to October 25, 2011, and	23

19
the Second Extension Letter on August 20, 2011, extending the Note and Mortgage	1
to October 25, 2012. These letters were sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for	2
collecting on the Note and foreclosing on the Mortgage because they constituted an	3
“agreement in writing to defer the payment” on the Note and Mortgage.5 Section 37-	4
1-3(A). Thus, the time between March 3, 2011 (the date of the First Extension Letter)	5
and October 25, 2012 (the date to which the Second Extension Letter extended the	6
Note and Mortgage)—one year, seven months, and twenty-two days—should not be	7
included in computing the six-year limitation period. Id. Subtracting this period from	8
the period between the Note’s original maturity date and the date the Trust filed its	9
foreclosure action—six years, eight months, and sixteen days would bring the	10
Trust’s action within the six-year limitations period.6
11
5 Landau summarily argues that the extension letters did not “defer the
payment of the debt” because they only extended the Note’s maturity date and
provided that “regular payments must continue to be made according to the original
terms of the Note.” As Landau does not develop an argument as to how an extension
of the Note’s maturity date does not “defer the payment of the debt,” we decline to
address this contention. See Titus v. City of Albuquerque, 2011-NMCA-038, ¶ 30,
149 N.M. 556, 252 P.3d 780 (“This Court has no duty to review an argument that is
not 	adequately developed.”); 	Date, 	Black’s 	Law 	Dictionary 	(11th 	ed. 	2019)
(defining “maturity date” as “[t]he date when a debt falls due, such as a debt on a
promissory note or bond”).
6 We note that, even taking the tolled period into account, some of the
uncollected monthly payments due prior to the Note’s original maturity date may
have been barred by the statute of limitations. See LSF9 Master Participation Tr.,
2019-NMCA-055, ¶¶ 12-13 (holding that the statute of limitations began to run with
respect to each installment when due). However, it is unclear what payments Bishop
made before the Note’s original maturity date. Given the unclear record, and given
that Landau does not raise this issue on appeal, we decline to address this issue. See

20
{31} 	Landau’s argument focuses on the district court’s conclusion that Bishop and	1
BEI’s continued payments on the Note and Mortgage revived the statute of	2
limitations pursuant to Section 37-1-16, which provides:	3
Causes of action founded upon contract shall be revived by the making	4
of any partial or installment payment thereon or by an admission that	5
the debt is unpaid, as well as by a new promise to pay the same; but	6
such admission or new promise must be in writing, signed by the party	7
to be charged therewith. . . . Provided, that no admission that the debt	8
is unpaid or new promise to pay the same shall be effective to extend	9
the lien of any mortgage upon real estate or any interest therein given	10
to secure the original indebtedness, unless the payment is accompanied	11
by an admission or promise and unless such admission that the debt is	12
unpaid or new promise to pay the same, signed by the party to be	13
charged therewith and acknowledged by such party in the form	14
prescribed by law for the acknowledgments of instruments affecting	15
real estate, shall be filed for record in the office of the county clerk	16
where said original mortgage is of record, prior to the date when any	17
action to foreclose said mortgage lien would otherwise be barred under	18
existing law[.]	19
(Emphasis added.) In light of the emphasized language, Landau argues that the	20
statute of limitations for foreclosing on the Mortgage was not revived because	21
Bishop did not sign the First Extension Letter and the Trust failed to have the Second	22
Extension Letter notarized and recorded.7 Thus, Landau argues, any action to	23
foreclose on the Mortgage was untimely.	24
Corona v. Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 28, 329 P.3d 701 (“This Court has no duty
to review an argument that is not adequately developed.”).
7 Landau also argues that the extensions were insufficient to revive the statute
of limitations for foreclosing on the Mortgage because Bishop signed the Second
Extension Letter on behalf of himself personally, and not on behalf of BEI—the

21
{32} 	Landau’s reliance on Section 37-1-16 is misplaced. Even if the payments were	1
insufficient to revive the statute of limitations for foreclosing on the Mortgage	2
without a notarized and recorded agreement in accordance with Section 37-1-16, the	3
extension letters satisfied Section 37-1-3(A)’s tolling provision, bringing the action	4
within the applicable limitations period. As it was not necessary for the extension	5
letters to meet the requirements of the revival statute, any examination of this issue	6
would be an exercise of futility. See Sheraden v. Black, 1988-NMCA-016, ¶ 10, 107	7
N.M. 76, 752 P.2d 791 (“It is well settled in New Mexico that the function of a	8
reviewing court on appeal is to correct erroneous results, not to correct errors that,	9
even if corrected, would not change the result.”). We therefore hold that the Trust	10
was not barred by the statute of limitations from foreclosing on the Mortgage.	11
III. 	The Trust’s Mortgage Was Not Discharged by the Extension Letters	12
{33} 	Landau argues that Bishop’s agreement to extend the Note and Mortgage	13
discharged BEI’s debt and extinguished the Mortgage. In support of this argument,	14
Landau cites Farmington Nat’l Bank v. Basin Plastics, Inc., 1980-NMSC-092, ¶ 7,	15
94 N.M. 668, 615 P.2d 985, in which our Supreme Court observed, “It has been held	16
that an agreement between a payee and maker of a note to extend the time of payment	17
of the note discharges any co-maker who has not consented to the extension.”	18
mortgagor. As we discuss later, there was substantial evidence that Bishop agreed to
the extensions on behalf of BEI.

22
Landau’s argument rests on the assumption that Bishop agreed to the extensions on	1
behalf of himself and not BEI. However, as we discuss below, there is substantial	2
evidence that Bishop entered into the extension agreement on behalf of BEI.	3
Accordingly, Landau’s argument fails.	4
IV. 	Substantial Evidence Supports All Material Findings of Fact	5
{34} 	Plaintiff challenges several of the district court’s findings of fact, claiming	6
that they are not supported by substantial evidence. We address each challenge in	7
turn.	8
A. 	Verbatim Adoption of the Trust’s Findings and Conclusions	9
{35} 	Landau contends that the district court abdicated its judicial responsibility by	10
adopting all of the Trust’s findings and conclusions included in its final form of	11
order. He argues that we should remand for the district court to enter its own findings	12
and conclusions. We agree “the [district] court is required to exercise independent	13
judgment in arriving at its decision and should generally avoid verbatim adoption of	14
all of the findings and conclusions submitted by a party.” Pollock v. Ramirez, 1994-	15
NMCA-011, ¶ 28, 117 N.M. 187, 870 P.2d 149. “This practice can all too often result	16
in unsupported, ambiguous, inconsistent, overreaching, or unnecessary findings and	17
conclusions.” Los Vigiles Land Grant, 2014-NMCA-017, ¶ 2. For this reason, we	18
caution the district court to avoid the wholesale verbatim adoption of the prevailing	19
party’s proposed findings and conclusions, as was done in this case.	20

23
{36} 	Nonetheless, a district court’s verbatim adoption of proposed findings is not	1
error so long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Gila Res.	2
Info. Project v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm’n, 2018-NMSC-025, ¶ 40, 417	3
P.3d 369. As we discuss below, substantial evidence supports the findings of fact	4
material to this appeal. Consequently, we decline to remand to the district court.	5
B. 	Bishop Agreed to Extend the Note and Mortgage on Behalf of BEI	6
{37} 	Landau challenges the district court’s finding that the Trust granted two	7
extensions of the Note and Mortgage to BEI, which the court concluded constituted	8
“a valid agreement in writing to defer the payment of the full amount due under the	9
Mortgage and Note to October 25, 2012, thus tolling the statute of limitations.”	10
Specifically, Landau argues that the extension letters were insufficient to toll the	11
statute of limitations for foreclosing on the Mortgage because BEI—the mortgagor	12
and record holder of title to the Property—did not agree to the extension. Rather,	13
Landau claims Bishop agreed to the extension on behalf of himself personally	14
because both extension letters were addressed to Bishop without mentioning BEI,	15
and the Second Extension Letter was signed by Bishop without any notation that he	16
was signing on behalf of BEI.	17
{38} 	In support of his argument, Landau cites NMSA 1978, Section 55-3-402(b)(1)	18
(1992), which provides, “If the form of the signature shows unambiguously that the	19
signature is made on behalf of the represented person who is identified in the	20

24
instrument, the representative is not liable on the instrument.” That a representative	1
may be personally liable on an instrument such as a promissory note when the form	2
of the signature is ambiguous does not necessarily mean that the form of the	3
signature must be clear in order to bind the person or entity being represented.	4
Indeed, Section 55-3-402(a) provides:	5
If a person acting, or purporting to act, as a representative signs an	6
instrument by signing either the name of the represented person or the	7
name of the signer, the represented person is bound by the signature to	8
the same extent the represented person would be bound if the signature	9
were on a simple contract. If the represented person is bound, the	10
signature of the representative is the “authorized signature of the	11
represented person” 	and the represented person is liable on the	12
instrument, whether or not identified in the instrument.	13
(Emphases added.); see also § 55-3-402 cmt. 1 (“Subsection (a) states when the	14
represented person is bound on an instrument if the instrument is signed by a	15
representative. If under the law of agency the represented person would be bound by	16
the act of the representative in signing either the name of the represented person or	17
that of the representative, the signature is the authorized signature of the represented	18
person.”). Thus, Landau’s reliance on Section 55-3-402(b) is misplaced.	19
{39} 	While neither letter was explicitly directed to Bishop in his capacity as a	20
representative for BEI, and Bishop did not indicate the capacity in which he signed	21
the Second Extension Letter, we conclude there was sufficient evidence that Bishop	22
agreed to the extension on behalf of BEI. First, both letters mention BEI in the	23
reference line indicating the escrow account the Trust set up to receive payments on	24

25
the Note and Mortgage. Moreover, the Second Extension Letter that Bishop signed	1
stated, “Pursuant to our telephone conversation on August 17th, 2011[,] we agreed	2
again [to] extend our Promissory Note and Mortgage to October 25, 2012.” It is	3
reasonable to infer that both Bishop and the Trust understood Bishop could only	4
extend the Mortgage if he did so on behalf of BEI.8 In light of the foregoing, we	5
conclude there was substantial evidence that Bishop agreed to extend the Note and	6
Mortgage to October 25, 2012, on behalf of BEI.	7
C. 	The Note and Mortgage Were Not Void Ab Initio	8
{40} 	Next, Landau argues that the Note and the Mortgage—which were both	9
signed by Bishop on behalf of BEI—were void ab initio because there was	10
insufficient evidence that Bishop had authority to contract on behalf of BEI and	11
pledge the Property as collateral. Specifically, Landau takes issue with the Trust’s	12
failure to introduce evidence of any documented formal proceedings in which BEI	13
gave 	Bishop 	such authority. 	Without 	such 	proof, 	Landau 	argues, there 	was	14
insufficient evidence for the district court to conclude Bishop had authority. We	15
disagree.	16
8 Neither party disputes that Bishop had the power to agree to the extension on
behalf of BEI despite its cancelled certificate of incorporation. See § 53-16-24 (“The
dissolution of a corporation does not take away or impair any remedy available . . .
against the corporation . . . for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred,
prior to the dissolution . . . . The shareholders, directors and officers may take such
corporate or other action as appropriate to protect the remedy, right or claim.”
(emphasis added)).

26
{41} 	Although the district court did not specifically find that Bishop had authority	1
to contract on behalf of BEI and pledge the Property as collateral, it found that	2
Bishop and BEI executed the Mortgage and Note. Implicit in this finding is that	3
Bishop had authority to contract on behalf of BEI and pledge the Property as	4
collateral. Support for this conclusion comes from BEI’s articles of incorporation,	5
which listed Bishop as the sole incorporator and initial director. See NMSA 1978, §	6
53-11-35(A) (1987) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under authority	7
of, and the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed under the direction	8
of, a board of directors except as may be otherwise provided in the Business	9
Corporation Act or the articles of incorporation.”).	10
{42} 	Landau argues that this evidence was insufficient to prove that Bishop had	11
authority to sign the Note and Mortgage in 2007 because BEI’s articles of	12
incorporation were filed over sixteen years prior to Bishop’s signing of the Note and	13
Mortgage. However, Landau failed to present any evidence calling into question	14
Bishop’s authority to sign the Note and Mortgage on behalf of BEI. Without any	15
evidence to the contrary, it was reasonable for the district court to infer from the	16
articles of incorporation that Bishop, being the sole director of record, vested himself	17
with authority to contract on behalf of BEI and pledge the Property as collateral. See	18
Robey, 2017-NMCA-038, ¶ 10 (“In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we	19

27
. . . indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the prevailing party.” (alteration,	1
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).	2
D. 	Remaining Challenges	3
{43} 	Landau additionally challenges three other findings. First, Landau appears to	4
challenge the finding that “[Bishop] and [BEI] executed a Promissory Mortgage and	5
Note” because he reads it to erroneously imply that: (1) the Note and Mortgage were	6
one document and (2) Bishop executed the Note and Mortgage on behalf of himself	7
in addition to BEI. Second, Landau challenges the finding that Bishop and BEI made	8
sporadic payments on the Note up until 2017 because it was unclear who actually	9
made the payments. Lastly, Landau challenges the finding that Bishop validly	10
executed a personal guaranty to secure payment on the Note because the guaranty	11
lacked consideration. However, Landau does not explain, and we fail to see, how	12
any of these challenges (if successful) would change the district court’s ultimate	13
holding for which Landau seeks reversal (i.e., foreclosure of the Mortgage).	14
{44} 	In regard to the first argument, we fail to see how the district court’s	15
purportedly mistaken finding that the Mortgage and Note were one document and	16
that Bishop also executed the Note and Mortgage on behalf of himself in addition to	17
BEI would affect the validity of the Mortgage. As to the second argument, whether	18
BEI or Bishop continued to make payments (or not) is of no import because, as	19
discussed above, the Trust and BEI entered into an agreement in writing to defer the	20

28
payment on the Note pursuant to Section 37-1-3(A), which tolled the statute of	1
limitations. Consequently, evidence of continued payments was not necessary to	2
revive the limitations period for foreclosing on the Mortgage pursuant to Section 37-	3
1-16.	4
{45} 	In regard to the last argument, Bishop’s personal guaranty only affects	5
whether the Trust could go after him personally and does not affect the validity of	6
the Mortgage. See Guaranty, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining	7
“guaranty” as “[a] promise to answer for the payment of some debt, or the	8
performance of some duty, in case of the failure of another who is liable in the first	9
instance”). Accordingly, we fail to see how this finding is relevant to Landau’s	10
appeal. Given the foregoing, we need not address these arguments further. See	11
Sheraden, 1988-NMCA-016, ¶ 10 (“It is well settled in New Mexico that the	12
function of a reviewing court on appeal is to correct erroneous results, not to correct	13
errors that, even if corrected, would not change the result.”).	14
V. 	Issues Relating to Scheduling	15
{46} 	Landau raises two related arguments against the propriety of the district	16
court’s scheduling. We review the district court’s management of its docket for an	17
abuse of discretion. See Grassie v. Roswell Hosp. Corp., 2011-NMCA-024, ¶ 88,	18
150 N.M. 283, 258 P.3d 1075.	19

29
{47} 	First, Landau argues the district court abused its discretion in setting trial less	1
than a month after the discovery deadline because it did not give Landau sufficient	2
time to request additional discovery, file dispositive motions, or prepare for trial. Yet	3
Landau agreed to the district court’s deadlines set at the scheduling conference and	4
failed to request a continuance before trial. See Sandoval v. Baker Hughes Oilfield	5
Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 791 (“In order to	6
preserve an issue for appeal, [a party] must have made a timely and specific objection	7
that apprised the district court of the nature of the claimed error and that allows the	8
district court to make an intelligent ruling thereon.”).	9
{48} 	Recognizing this lack of preservation, Landau points out that he was pro se at	10
the time of the scheduling conference, and that the attorney he hired to represent him	11
at trial did not comply with Landau’s request to move for a continuance. In support	12
of his latter contention, Landau points to an e-mail attached to his reply in support	13
of his post-judgment motion to reconsider in which Landau asked his attorney if it	14
was too late to seek a continuance on October 17, 2017.	15
{49} 	Landau’s arguments fail for two reasons. First, “[p]ro se litigants must comply	16
with the rules and orders of the court and will not be treated differently than litigants	17
with counsel.” Woodhull v. Meinel, 2009-NMCA-015, ¶ 30, 145 N.M. 533, 202 P.3d	18
126. Second, a party is bound by his attorney’s actions unless he can demonstrate	19
personal diligence that was thwarted by gross negligence of his attorney. See Adams	20

30
v. Para-Chem S., Inc., 1998-NMCA-161, ¶ 15, 126 N.M. 189, 967 P.2d 864. Landau	1
has not demonstrated that his attorney’s failure to request a continuance twenty-two	2
days before trial was grossly negligent. Indeed, Landau stated in his reply in support	3
of his motion to reconsider that his attorney did not request a continuance because	4
he believed “that there was not enough time, that the [district c]ourt would not look	5
favorably upon any such action and it appeared the [c]ourt was set against allowing	6
any further time.” Landau also stated that his attorney attempted to reach an	7
agreement for a continuance with the Trust. Under these circumstances, we fail to	8
see how Landau’s attorney’s actions were grossly negligent. Accordingly, Landau	9
is bound by his attorney’s failure to request a continuance, and consequently, his	10
failure to preserve Landau’s argument regarding the district court’s scheduling.	11
{50} 	Next, Landau argues the district court abused its discretion in failing to set a	12
pretrial deadline for dispositive motions and then striking Landau’s motion for	13
summary judgment as untimely. However, the district court was not required to set	14
a deadline for dispositive motions. See Rule 1-016(B)(2) (providing that “a judge	15
may . . . enter a scheduling order that limits the time . . . to file and hear motions”	16
(emphasis added)). Moreover, the district court properly struck Landau’s motion for	17
summary judgment—filed five days before trial—as untimely because it did not	18
provide sufficient time for the Trust to respond, nor did it provide the district court	19
with reasonable time to dispose of the motion. See Rule 1-056(D)(1) NMRA	20

31
(“Motions for summary judgment will not be considered unless filed within a	1
reasonable time prior to the date of trial to allow sufficient time for the opposing	2
party to file a response and affidavits, depositions or other documentary evidence	3
and to permit the court reasonable time to dispose of the motion.”). Although we	4
understand there was little time between the discovery deadline and the trial, as	5
explained above, it was incumbent on Landau to timely raise this issue. He failed to	6
do so. Accordingly, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the lack of a pretrial	7
deadline for dispositive motions and the striking of Landau’s motion for summary	8
judgment.	9
VI. 	Equitable Issues Relating to Landau’s Income From the Property	10
{51} 	Landau argues the district court erroneously based its judgment on equitable	11
grounds relating to the rental income he made off of the Property after he purchased	12
it. Initially, we note it is unclear if the district court based its judgment on any	13
equitable ground relating to Landau’s rental income. While the court noted the	14
purchase price and rental income of the Property in its findings, and ordered the	15
Mortgage “foreclosed as a matter of law and equity[,]” it did not mention Landau’s	16
income anywhere else in its findings or conclusions.	17
{52} 	Even if the district court did take the rental income into account, and even if	18
this was improper (as Landau contends), Landau fails to demonstrate how the district	19
court’s ultimate ruling in favor of the Trust would have been different absent this	20

32
consideration. As the district court concluded, the Trust timely brought its action to	1
foreclose on a mortgage perfected prior to the date the tax lien on the Property arose.	2
See § 7-38-70(B). Thus, Landau asks us to correct a purported error that, even if	3
corrected, would not change the result of this case. This we will not do. See	4
Sheraden, 1988-NMCA-016, ¶ 10 (“It is well settled in New Mexico that the	5
function of a reviewing court on appeal is to correct erroneous results, not to correct	6
errors that, even if corrected, would not change the result.”). We therefore decline to	7
address Landau’s contention that the district court improperly considered his rental	8
income in rendering its judgment.	9
VII. 	Cumulative Error	10
{53} 	Finally, Landau claims that the district court’s scheduling and failure to	11
consider Landau’s proposed findings and conclusions deprived him of a fair trial	12
such that reversal is required, even if each alleged error is not reversible on its own.	13
See Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999-NMSC-013, ¶ 57, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d	14
999 (“Reversal may be required when the cumulative impact of errors during a trial	15
is so prejudicial that a party was denied a fair trial.”). As already stated, Landau	16
failed to preserve the alleged errors relating to the district court’s scheduling.	17
Further, Landau’s claim that the district court failed to consider his proposed	18
findings and conclusions is without support in the record. Although the district court	19

33
adopted verbatim the findings and conclusions included in the Trust’s form of order,	1
it did so only after Landau submitted his proposed findings and conclusions.	2
{54} 	Without any evidence that the district court actually failed to consider	3
Landau’s proposed findings and conclusions—as opposed to considering and	4
rejecting 	them—we 	presume 	the 	latter. 	See 	Farmers, 	Inc. 	v. 	Dal 	Mach. 	&	5
Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100, ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6, 800 P.2d 1063 (stating that the	6
appellate court presumes that the district court is correct, and the burden is on the	7
appellant to clearly demonstrate that the district court erred). For these reasons, we	8
find no cumulative error. See Coates, 1999-NMSC-013, ¶ 57 (“[S]ince no prejudicial	9
errors or irregularities exist in the points raised on appeal, no errors exist to cumulate	10
in denial of a fair trial.”).	11
CONCLUSION	12
{55} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.	13
{56} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	14
______________________________	15
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge	16

1
WE CONCUR:
Fundar wany
2 3
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
4 5
Briana Primera
BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Judge
34