January 9, 2019- State of New Mexico v. Clarissa Long, No. A-1-CA-36321

1 	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
3 	Plaintiff-Appellee,
4 v. 	No. A-1-CA-36321
5 CLARISSA LONG,
6 	Defendant-Appellant.
7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
8 Alisa Hart, District Judge
9 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
10 	Santa Fe, NM
11 	for Appellee
12 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
13 	Santa Fe, NM
14 Josephine H. Ford; Assistant Public Defender
15 	Albuquerque, NM
16 for Appellant
17 	MEMORANDUM OPINION
18 	VANZI, Chief Judge.
19 {I} 	Defendant Clarissa Long appeals from the district court's affirmance of her
20 conviction after a jury trial in metropolitan court for harassment. This Court issued
21 	a calendar notice proposing to adopt the district court's memorandum and, to the
22, extent Defendant raised new issues in this Court, specifically that the language of
23 	NMSA 1978, Section 30-3A-2 ( 1997) is unconstitutionally vague, proposed to affirm
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 1/9/2019 1:11 PM
Mark Reynolds

1 due to the 	failure 	to 	raise 	the issue in the district court. 	Defendant filed 	a
2 memorandum in opposition, following which this Court issued a second calendar
3 notice still relying on the district court's memorandum opinion with respect to
4 Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but addressing Defendant's
5 void-for-vagueness argument and proposing to affirm. Defendant has now filed a
6 second memorandum in opposition. Having given due consideration to Defendant's
7 second memorandum in opposition, we affirm.
8 	{2} 	Defendant maintains that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and that
9 there was insufficient evidence to support that Defendant either intended for her
10 conduct to annoy or harass or that her conduct created substantial emotional distress.
11 	Defendant's arguments remain largely the same, and to that extent we rely on the
12 reasoning found in the district court's memorandum opinion and this Court's second
13 	notice of proposed disposition. To the extent Defendant continues to maintain that
14 "the language of the statute is insufficient to warn individuals when it is unlawful to
15 	insist on speaking with a former boyfriend" and that "[t]he general public could not
16 be expected to understand what was wrong with wanting to speak with someone when
17 the specific intent is not to harm the alleged victim, but to persuade him to accept
18 responsibility[,]" [MIO 4] we are not persuaded. Rather, we believe the general public
19 would understand that following a person around a grocery store loudly saying
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1 degrading things; following a person to his car and not allowing him to get in;
2 banging, hitting, and kicking the vehicle; jumping in front of the car as the person
3 tries to leave; showing up at the person's home and hitting and kicking doors and
4 windows when the person will not speak to you; and engaging in this conduct
5 regularly, resulting in multiple reports to the police, does not fall within the ambit of
6 "the right to communicate to another in a reasonable manner." State v. Stephens,
7 1991-NMCA-019, ,r 12, 111 N.M. 543, 807 P.2d 241. Thus, we conclude that
8 Defendant should have been aware from the language of the statute that her conduct
9 was unlawful.
10 	{3} 	Accordingly, we affirm.
11 	{4} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
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15 	WE CONCUR:
18 	ft. lll!fil1c: udge
19 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
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