March 5, 2019-State of New Mexico v. Ronald Julian Fuentes, No. A-1-CA-35508

1 	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
3 	Plaintiff-Appellee,
4 v. 	No. A-1-CA-35508
5 RONALD JULIAN FUENTES,
6 	Defendant-Appellant.
7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY
8 Freddie J. Romero, District Judge
9 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
10 Santa Fe, NM
11 	John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General
12 Albuquerque, NM
13 	for Appellee
14 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
15 	Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender
16 Santa Fe, NM
17 for Appellant
18 	MEMORANDUM OPINION
19 VARGAS, Judge.
20 	{t} 	Defendant Ronald Julian Fuentes appeals the district court's determination
21 	that he was incompetent to stand trial and dangerous, pursuant to NMSA 1978,
22 Section 31-9-l.2(B), (C) (1999). He raises two issues: (1) the district court erred by
23 	failing to sua sponte order a hearing to determine whether Defendant was mentally
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 3/5/2019 11:08 AM
Mark Reynolds

1 retarded as defined in NMSA 1978, Section 31-9-1.6(E) (1999); and (2) that defense
2 counsel was ineffective for failing to request such a hearing. 	We previously
3 remanded this matter for a determination of whether Defendant is mentally retarded,
4 and whether a civil commitment should have been ordered. On remand, and after
5 conducting 	an 	evidentiary hearing, 	the 	district 	entered an 	order 	finding 	that
6 Defendant was not mentally retarded. We dismiss Defendant's appeal as moot.
7 	BACKGROUND
8 {2} 	In the approximate two-year period between March 2013 and May 2015,
9 Defendant's competence was evaluated four times. In 2016 the district court entered
10 a decision and order (order) on Defendant's competency, pursuant to NMSA 1978,
11 	Section 31-9-1.5 ( 1999). Based on the pleadings, exhibits, evaluations, testimony of
12 witnesses and arguments of counsel, and notwithstanding that the parties had twice
13 	stipulated that Defendant was incompetent and dangerous pursuant to Section 31-9-
14 	l.2(B), (C), the district court "independently" found by clear and convincing
15 	evidence that Defendant was incompetent and dangerous. Based on its findings, the
16 district court committed Defendant to the New Mexico Behavioral Health Institute
17 for a period of twelve years, with hearings to be conducted every two years on the
.18 	issues 	of trial competency and criminal dangerousness. This appeal followed.
19 Defendant's 	appeal 	initially 	challenged 	only 	the 	district 	court's 	ruling 	on
20 dangerousness.
2

1 {3} 	During the summary calendar process, on March 21, 201 7, this Court filed a
2 second notice of proposed summary disposition in which we remanded for "a
3 determination of whether Defendant is mentally retarded, and whether a civil
4 commitment should have been ordered in this case." Thereafter, and upon an oral
5 motion by Defendant, the district court entered an ex parte order for a confidential
6 forensic evaluation, directing the Department of Health to evaluate Defendant, to
7 address "[i]ssues regarding competency to stand trial and for issues regarding mental
8 retardation." Following evaluations by two separate experts and after an evidentiary
9 hearing, the parties agreed that a third evaluation would be done. The third expert
10 evaluated Defendant and issued a report stating that Defendant did not meet the
11 	definition of mentally retarded set out in Section 31-9- l .6(E). The parties stipulated
12 to the findings in the report and defense counsel stipulated that the defense would be
13 	unable to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant fit the
14 definition. The district court entered an order setting forth the above findings and
15 	concluding that "Defendant does not meet the definition set forth in [Section] 31-9-
16 	l .6(E) for a finding of mental retardation." The district court further concluded that
17 "Defendant's appeal is now moot and this matter shall proceed in [d]istrict [c]ourt
l 8 pending final resolution." Defendant nonetheless argues that we should consider the
19 issue raised in his appeal because it is "on[ e] of substantial importance that may
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1 affect defendants around the [s]tate whose cases are evading the [Section 31-9-1.6]
2 procedure."
3 {4} 	As a general rule, appellate courts do not decide moot cases. Republican Party
4 ofN.M v. N.M Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 2012-NMSC-026, i110, 283 P.3d 853.
5 However, New Mexico courts recognize two exceptions to the rule that moot cases
6 should be dismissed: cases presenting an issue of substantial public interest, and
7 cases that are 	capable 	of repetition, 	yet evade 	review. 	See 	id. 	(explaining 	a
8 substantial public interest involves a constitutional question or affects a fundamental
9 right, and capable of repetition refers to an issue likely to arise in a future lawsuit
10 regardless of the identity of the parties). "The [appellate c]ourt's review of moot
11 	cases that either raise an issue of substantial public interest or are capable of
12 repetition yet evading review is discretionary." Id. Defendant contends that just as
13 	the trial court in this case failed to follow the procedures in the New Mexico Mental
14 Illness and Competency Code, other cases like his "may be avoiding review because
15 	they were not appealed." Thus, he argues, we should exercise our discretion to give
16 trial courts guidance on proper procedure in cases where a defendant is found
17 incompetent and his incompetence may be attributable to mental retardation, rather
18 than mental illness. We note that Section 31-9-1.6 sets out a procedure to obtain a
19 ruling to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded. See § 31-9-1.6(A)
20 ("Upon motion of the defense requesting a ruling, the court shall hold a hearing to
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1 determine whether the defendant has mental retardation."). To the extent Defendant
2 asks us to expand the statute to require district courts to order a hearing sua sponte
3 to make a determination of mental retardation, we decline to do so. Defendant points
4 to no facts or legal authority to suggest the district courts are in need of guidance
5 beyond that which has already been statutorily provided, and we have found none.
6 See ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1998-NMCA-078, 110,
7 	125 N.M. 244, 959 P.2d 969. (concluding this Court will not consider propositions
8 that are unsupported by citation to authority.) We decline to exercise our discretion
9 to address a moot argument.
10 	{5}
{6}
11
12
Defendant's appeal is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
13 	WE CONCUR:
14 	~~a.u.~·15 L 	VANZI, Judge
16 	/&ho-~17 KRI INA BOGARDUS, Judge
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