March 13, 2019- Pacific Dental Services, Inc. v. New Mexico Board of Dental Health Care, No. A-1-CA-36235

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Court of Appeals of New Mexico

PACIFIC DENTAL SERVICES, INC., Filed 3/13/2019 9:13 AM
Plaintiff-Appellant, AL nm Le . L
Mark Reynolds .
Vv. No. A-1-CA-36235
NEW MEXICO BOARD OF DENTAL

HEALTH CARE,
Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM NEW MEXICO BOARD OF DENTAL HEALTH CARE
Dr. Charles Schumacher, DDS, Presiding Officer

Montgomery & Andrews, P.A.
Seth C. McMillan

Kari E. Olson

Stephen S. Hamilton

Matthew A. Zidovsky

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Lori Chavez, Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION

VANZI, Judge.
{1} Pacific Dental Services, LLC (Plaintiff), the managing member of a limited

liability company licensed as a non-dentist owner of several dentistry practices in

1 New 	Mexico, 	appeals 	the 	adoption 	of 	three 	regulatory 	amendments 	(the
2 amendments) to the occupational and professional licensing regulations by the New
3 Mexico Board of Dental Health Care (the Board). We affirm.
4 BACKGROUND
5 	{2} 	The Board held three separate meetings on January 27, 2017: an initial hearing
6 to take public comment on proposed regulatory amendments, a committee meeting
7 to consider the impact of the proposed amendments on dental hygienists, and a
8 regular meeting for the Board to discuss and vote on the proposed amendments.
9 Plaintiff, through its counsel, was present at the initial public hearing, along with
10 several other members of the professional dental community. Because this is a
11 	memorandum 	opinion and the parties 	are 	familiar with the 	case, 	we 	briefly
12 summarize the relevant portions of the three meetings as they relate to each of the
13 	challenged amendments and reserve further discussion of the facts for our analysis
14 of the issues on appeal.
15 	{3} 	The Board first proposed amending 16.5.1.24 NMAC to require non-dentist
16 owners to comply with the existing general record-keeping requirements applicable
17 to dentists, which require patient records to be kept for six years after a dentist retires
18 	or stops practicing. Plaintiff commented that requiring non-dentist owners to comply
19 with the general record-keeping requirements would be redundant because there is
20 already a regulation that requires non-dentist owners to maintain patient records for
2

1 six years. See 16.5.9.S(L) NMAC. Additionally, Plaintiff argued that the amendment
2 would be confusing because non-dentist owners do not "practice[]" or "retire[]."
3 After the initial public hearing, the dental hygienist committee met and voted
4 unanimously to recommend adoption of the amendment without comment. At the
5 regular meeting following the committee meeting, the Board noted the dental
6 hygienist committee's approval and voted unanimously to adopt the amendment
7 without further discussion.
8 {4} 	The 	Board 	also 	proposed 	amending 	16.5 .9 .8(K) 	NMAC, 	a 	regulation
9 applicable only to non-dentist owners, which requires that "no person other than a
10 New Mexico licensed dentist shall have direct control or interfere with the dentist's
11 	or dental hygienist's clinical judgment and treatment[.]" The amendment added the
12 language "including referrals or prescription 	of laboratory services." Plaintiff
13 	commented that the proposed amendment would be confusing and redundant in light
14 	of existing regulations and statutes that prohibit anyone from interfering with a
15 	dentist's clinical judgment. The presiding member of the Board asked how the
16 amendment would affect Plaintiff. Plaintiff responded that while it already complied
17 with the existing statutes and regulations, it was concerned that the amendment was
18 targeting non-dentist owners. Plaintiff believed the Board was targeting non-dentist
19 owners by amending the regulation specifically applicable to non-dentist owners
20 instead 	of 	adopting 	a 	generally 	applicable 	regulation. 	The 	dental 	hygienist
3

1 committee 	subsequently 	voted 	unanimously · to 	recommend 	adoption 	of 	the
2 amendment. During the regular meeting, the Board noted the committee's approval
3 and voted unanimously to adopt the amendment without any further discussion.
4 	{5} 	Finally, the Board proposed amending 16.5.16.10(B)(4) NMAC, one of the
5 guidelines 	that 	the 	Board 	considers 	when 	imposing 	disciplinary 	action 	for
6 unprofessional conduct. Section 16.5.16.10(B)(4) defined "unprofessional conduct"
7 to include "failure to seek consultation whenever the welfare of the patient would be
8 safeguarded or advanced by referral to individuals with special skills, knowledge,
9 and experience[.]" The proposed amendment added the following subsections to
10 	16.5.16.10(B)(4) as specific examples of this type of unprofessional conduct:
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(a) 	an 	owner 	dentist 	or 	supervisor 	causing 	an 	employee
dentist to make a referral for dental treatment based on contractual
obligations when, in the judgment of the treating dentist, the welfare of
the patient would be safeguarded or advanced by referral to another
practitioner, and/or failure to notify the patient of such contractual
obligations for referrals;
(b) 	an 	owner 	dentist 	or 	supervisor causing 	an 	employee
dentist to use a dental laboratory due to contractual obligations when,
in the judgment of the treating dentist, the welfare of the patient would
be safeguarded or advanced by the use of another dental laboratory.
21 	Plaintiff voice_d concern that the amendment would create uncertainty for licensees
, 22 in terms of knowing whether their conduct is sanctionable. Plaintiff also asserted
23 	that current regulations and statutes already prohibit the conduct proscribed by the
24 amendment. 	The 	dental 	hygienist 	committee 	did not discuss 	or vote 	on 	the
4

1 amendment. During the regular meeting, the Board voted unanimously to adopt the
2 amendment 	after 	briefly considering tabling 	it to 	consider its possible 	legal
3 ramifications.
4 	{6} 	Plaintiff subsequently brought this appeal pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section
5 61-1-31(A) (1981).
6 DISCUSSION
7 Plaintiff Has Standing to Appeal
8 {7} 	At the outset, we address the Board's argument that Plaintiff lacks statutory
9 standing to appeal the Board's adoption of the amendments. "Whether a party has
10 standing to litigate a particular issue is a question oflaw, which we review de novo."
11 	Nass-Romero v. 	Visa US.A. Inc., 2012-NMCA-058, 1 6, 279 P.3d 772 (internal
12 quotation marks and citation omitted). "[S]tanding is a jurisdictional prerequisite
13 	where an action is created by statute and the statute specifies that only a limited class
14 	of plaintiffs who satisfy certain conditions may sue." Phoenix Funding, LLC v.
15 Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 2017-NMSC-010, 1 19, 390 P.3d 174. In determining
16 whether a party has standing under a statute, "we must look to the Legislature's
17 	intent as expressed in the [a]ct or other relevant authority." Key v. Chrysler Motors
18 	Corp., 	1996-NMSC-038, 1 	11, 	121 	N.M. 	764, 918 P.2d 350. "To determine
19 	legislative intent we look first to the plain language of the statute." Draper v.
20 Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 1994-NMSC-002, 14, 116 N.M. 775,867 P.2d 1157.
5

1 "[W]hen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give
2 effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." Truong v.
3 Allstate Ins. 	Co., 2010-NMSC-009, 1 37, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 	(internal
4 quotation marks and citation omitted).
5 	{8} 	Section 61-1-31 (A) provides: "Any person who is or may be affected by a
6 regulation adopted by the [B]oard may appeal to the court of appeals for relief." The
7 Board argues that, in light of Plaintiffs assertions that it already complies with the
8 law and that all of the regulation amendments are "redundant," there is no harm for
9 which this Court may grant relief. In support of its argument, the Board cites Kerr-
l O McGee Nuclear Corp. v. New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board, 1981-
11 	NMCA-044, 1 43, 97 N.M. 88, 637 P.2d 38, where we stated, " 'For relief means
12 that when a board adopts a regulation, which, when applied, leads to an unfavorable
13 	result to any 'person,' that 'person' can appeal to this Court to challenge the validity
14 of the regulation." (Emphasis added.) The Board's reliance on Kerr-McGee Nuclear
15 	Corp. 	is misplaced. When read in context, it is clear this Court intended this
16 statement to express the broad nature of the language "person" rather than express a
17 limitation on standing to appeal based on the harm to the Plaintiff as a result of the
18 	adopted regulation. See id. 1143-44. Similarly, the term "for relief," in the context
19 	of Section 61-l-31(A), refers to the remedy that this Court may grant the Plaintiff,
20 which is the review and potential invalidation of regulations adopted by the Board.
6

1 See Black's Law Dictionary 1482 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "relief' as "[t]he redress
2 or benefit ... that a party asks of a court").
3 	{9} 	The plain language of Section 61-1-31(A) is broad as it grants to any person
4 who "is or may be affected by a regulation adopted by the [B]oard" the right to appeal
5 the Board's decision to this 	Court. 	(Emphasis added.) Unlike 	other statutory
6 provisions that expressly limit standing to those adversely affected by a regulation,
7 Section 61-1-31 (A) grants standing without regard to the nature of any existing
8 effect on the plaintiff. Compare id. with NMSA 1978, § 74-6-7 ( 1993) ("[A] person
9 who is adversely affected by a regulation adopted by the commission ... may appeal
10 to the court of appeals for further relief." (emphasis added)). We believe the failure
11 	to express a similar limitation in Section 61-1-31 indicates the Legislature's intent
12 to grant all persons the right to appeal if they "[are] or may be affected by the
13 	regulation," whether or not they can demonstrate an adverse effect. Cf State v.
14 	Chavez, 1992-NMCA-037, 19, 115 N.M. 248, 849 P.2d 1071 ("We believe that if
15 	the [L ]egislature intended such a result, it would have clearly said so.").
'
16 {10} 	The Board does not dispute that Plaintiff is subject to 16.5.1.24 NMAC and
17 	16.5.9.8(K) NMAC as a non-dentist owner, and therefore, may be affected by the
18 	amendments to those sections. However, the Board asserts that 16.5.16.10(B)(4)
19 ·NMAC "only applies to owner dentists or supervisors, not non-dentist owners." Yet
20 	16.5.16.2 NMAC provides that "[t]he provisions of 16.5.16 NMAC apply to all
7

1 active license holders and applicants for licensure[,]" and the Board does not dispute
2 that Plaintiff is an active license holder. (Emphasis added.) Thus, even though
3 	16.5.16.10(B)(4) 	NMAC 	only 	mentions 	owner 	dentists 	and 	supervisors, 	the
4 provision applies to Plaintiff. As an active license holder subject to these regulations,
5 Plaintiff "may be affected" by the Board's decision to adopt the three amendments.
6 See Section 61-1-3 l(A). Plaintiff has standing to appeal the Board's decisions, and
7 consequently this Court has jurisdiction.
8 The Board Provided an Adequate Statement of Reasons for Its Adoption of the
9 Amendments
10 	{11} 	Having concluded that Plaintiff has standing, we tum to Plaintiffs arguments
11 	on appeal. "[I]n adopting regulations, administrative [boards] must give some
12 indication of their reasoning and of the basis upon which the regulations were
13 	adopted in order for the courts to be able to perform their reviewing function." NM
14 Mun. League, Inc. v. NM Envtl. Improvement Bd., 1975-NMCA-083, ,-r 16, 88 N.M.
15 	201, 539 P.2d 221. However, "[f]ormal findings are not required." Pharm. Mfrs.
16 Ass 'n v. NM Bd. ofPharmacy, 1974-NMCA-038, 117, 86 N.M. 571,525 P.2d 931.
17 Nor does the Board need to state its reasons for adopting each provision or address
18 	every concern raised in testimony, as "[s]uch a requirement would be unduly
19 onerous ... and unnecessary for the purposes of appellate review." The Regents of
20 	Univ. of Cal. v. NM Water Quality Control Comm 'n, 2004-NMCA-073, ,-r 13, 136
21 	N.M. 45, 94 P.3d 788. Rather, "[t]he only requirements are that the public and the
8

1 reviewing courts are informed as to the reasoning behind the regulation." Pharm.
2 Mfrs. Ass 'n, 1974-NMCA-038, ,r 17.
3 	{12} 	Plaintiff contends that the Board failed to provide a statement of reasons for
4 the amendments. In response, the Board argues that its members' statements made
5 at the initial public hearing provide this Court with sufficient indications of the
6 Board's reasons for the amendments. After reviewing the record, we agree with the
7 Board. Although neither the dental hygienist committee nor the Board dedicated any
8 real substantive discussion to the three amendments at their respective meetings, the
9 Board members' comments at the initial public meeting provide us with sufficient
10 	information of the Board's reasoning to allow for meaningful review.
11 	{13} 	In regard to the record-keeping requirement of 16.5.1.24 NMAC, one of the
12 Board members pointed out that some non-dentist owners do, in fact, retire and
13 	corporate non-dentist owners occasionally close down without transferring patient
14 records to another practice. The board member also pointed out that the requirement
15 	was helpful to the Board's complaint committee in terms of having access to patient
16 records. Another Board member stated that the record-keeping requirement needed
17 to "be on file with more teeth" because some patients were having difficulty
18 	accessing their records after dental practices close down. In responding to Plaintiffs
19 concerns about redundancy, a member of the Board's rules committee responsible
20 for drafting the amendments stated that it was important to have the requirement
9

1 appear in multiple sections so licensees "would be more likely to run into it."
2 Another member 	of the Board's rules committee commented in favor 	of the
3 amendment because it would require non-dentist owners to comply with additional
4 record-keeping requirements after they retire or stop practicing.
5 {14} 	With 	respect 	to 	the 	amendment 	prohibiting 	non-dentist 	owners 	from
6 interfering with patient referrals and prescription of laboratory services, 16.5.9.S(K)
7 NMAC, a member of the rules committee commented that the regulation was
8 important to prevent non-dentist owners from questioning the clinical judgments of
9 dentists in order to increase profits. Another member of the rules committee
10 explained that the purpose of the rule was to give young dentists the authority to
11 	confront coercive superiors. In response to Plaintiffs concerns about redundancy, a
12 Board member pointed out there were only regulations in place to sanction dentist
13 	owners and supervisors for interfering with a dentist's clinical judgment; there was
14 no similar regulation applicable to non-dentist owners. As such, the Board member
15 	concluded the regulation was necessary to protect the public by ensuring that non-
16 dentist owners were subject to the same requirements as dentist owners in terms of
17 interfering with a dentist's clinical judgment.
18 	{15} 	Finally, with reference to the last amendment relating to patient referrals based
19 on contractual obligations, 16.5.16.10(B)(4) NMAC, a Board member stated that the
20 purpose of the regulation was to cover situations where the dentist's contractual
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1 obligations influenced their decision on where to refer patients, which was not
2 already proscribed by other regulations or statutes. And another Board member
3 stated that the purpose was to protect the public by requiring dentists to refer their
4 patients to whomever the dentist believed . would be best, regardless 	of their
5 contractual obligations.
6 	{16} 	Plaintiff contends that these statements are insufficient to show the basis of
7 the Board's decisions because the Board did not formally issue any findings or
8 explicitly adopt the reasoning behind them. However, the Board is not required to
9 expressly enunciate findings of fact, see Pharm. Mfrs. Ass 'n,- 1974-NMCA-038,
10 ,-r 17, or address every concern raised in testimony, see The Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
11 	2004-NMCA-073, ,-r 13. It must simply inform the public and the reviewing court of
12 the reasoning behind the regulations. See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass 'n, 1974-NMCA-038,
13 ,-r 17. We hold that the Board and rules committee members' statements satisfy this
14 requirement. See id. (holding that the comments of one board member, which were
15 	uncontradicted by the other board members, were sufficient to enable appellate
16 review).
17 The Board's Adoption of the Amendments Was Not Arbitrary, Capricious, an
18 Abuse of Discretion, or Against the Clear Weight of Substantial Evidence
19 	{17} 	Plaintiff argues that the Board's adoption of the amendments was arbitrary,
20 capricious, or an abuse of discretion, as well as against the clear weight of substantial
21 	evidence because the Board did not consider any competent evidence. See § 61-1-
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1 31 (C) (stating that this Court may set aside a regulation only if it is "( 1) arbitrary,
2 capricious, or an abuse of discretion; (2) contrary to law; or (3) against the clear
3 weight of substantial evidence of the record"). We disagree. We review the whole
4 record to determine the validity of an administrative board's decision. See Town &
5 	Country Food Stores, Inc. v. NM Regulation & Licensing Dep 't, 2012-NMCA-046,
6 ,-J 8, 277 P.3d 490. "The party challenging an [administrative board] decision bears
7 the burden on appeal of showing that [board] action falls within one of the oft-
8 mentioned grounds for reversal." See Miss. Potash, Inc. v. Lemon, 2003-NMCA-
9 014, ,-J 8, 133 N.M. 128, 61 P.3d 837 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
10 An administrative· board acts arbitrarily and capriciously when its actions "may be
11 	considered wil[l]ful and unreasonable, without consideration, and in disregard of the
12 facts and circumstances." Application ofPNM Elec. Servs., Div. ofPub. Serv. Co. of
13 N.M, 1998-NMSC-017, ,-J 24, 125 N.M. 302, 961 P.2d 147. "An abuse of discretion
14 occurs when the administrative [board] has not acted in a manner required by the
15 	law." N.M Regulation & Licensing Dep 't v. Lujan, 1999-NMCA-059, ,-J 8, 127 N.M.
16 233, 979 P.2d 744. "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable
17 person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In reviewing a substantial
18 	evidence claim, the question is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the
19 opposite result, but rather whether such evidence supports the result reached."
12

1 Wilcox v. NM Bd. of Acupuncture & Oriental Med., 2012-NMCA-106, ~ 7, 288
2 P.3d 902 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).
3 	{18} 	Our review of the record establishes that the majority of comments at the
4 public hearing were in favor of all three amendments. The only ~omments in
5 opposition 	to 	the 	record-keeping 	amendment, 	16.5 .1.24 	NMAC, 	came 	from
6 Plaintiff. On the other hand, several members of the public and the rules committee
7 commented in favor of the amendment. A member of the Board's rules committee
8 commented that, based on her experience serving on the Board for over eleven years,
9 the more times a requirement appeared in the regulations, the more likely the
10 	licensee would be aware of it. Another member of the rules committee commented
11 	in favor of making non-dentist owners subject to the regulation because it contained
12 additional record-keeping requirements. A local dentist also commented that he
13 	knew of two corporate dental practices in other states that left patients without access
14 to their records after suddenly going bankrupt. Plaintiff argues that these "anecdotes
15 	concerning activities occurring in other parts 	of the country demonstrated no
16 evidentiary nexus to any evil present in New Mexico that this rule amendment is
17 intended to rectify." Yet Plaintiff provides no authority for the argument that the
18 Board cannot consider examples of relevant events from other states, and we are
19 aware ofno such authority. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ~ 2, 100
20 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (stating that when a party fails to cite authority for an
13

1 argument, we may assume none exists). The purpose of the Board is to protect the
2 public from the improper and unprofessional practice of dentistry. See NMSA 1978,
3 § 61-5A-2(A) (2011) ("In the interest of the public health, safety and welfare and to
4 protect the public from the improper, unprofessional, incompetent and unlawful
5 practice of dentistry and dental hygiene, it is necessary to provide laws and rules
6 controlling the granting and use of the privilege to practice dentistry and dental
7 hygiene and to establish a board of dental health care and a dental hygienists
8 committee to implement and enforce those laws and rules."). Simply because the
9 dentist's illustrative examples came from other states does not mean that the Board
10 must sit idly by waiting for the harms it is trying to protect against to happen in our
11 	state.
12 	{19} 	The amendment prohibiting non-dentist owners from exercising direct control
13 	over a dentist's referrals or prescription of laboratory services, 16.5.9.8(K) NMAC,
14 also 	received 	substantial 	support during the initial public hearing. 	One rules
15 	committee member commented on the importance of protecting against non-dentist
16 owners interfering with the clinical judgments of dentists, and another explained that
17 the rule gave young dentists the ability to stand up to coercive non-dentist superiors.
18 	Two local dentists, one of whom w,as a rules committee member, stated that they
19 knew of instances where non-dentist owned practices pressured their dentists into
20 performing more procedures in order to increase profits. Additionally, the American
14

1 Association of Orthodontists submitted an email in support of the amendment.
2 Again, the only comments in opposition to the amendment came from Plaintiff.
3 	{20} 	Likewise, the majority of the comments supported 16.5.16.10(B)(4) NMAC,
4 the amendment defining the practice of referring patients to outside providers based
5 on contractual obligations as "unprofessional conduct." While Plaintiff and one rules
6 committee member voiced concerns over the amendment, the other comments were
7 in favor of the amendment. A local dentist supportive of the amendment stated that
8 he knew of three instances-two involving Albuquerque dentists-where dentists
9 referred patients to inferior providers based on contractual obligations. Another
10 dentist and rules committee member commented in favor of implementing the
11 	regulation in order to protect patients. The amendment also received support from
12 the American Association of Orthodontists.
13 	{21} 	Plaintiff would have us brush off the comments in support of the amendments.
14 	Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the comments discussed above do not constitute
15 	competent evidence because they were based on "conjecture," "unfounded opinion,"
16 and "anecdote." We disagree with the veneer Plaintiff places on the comments. "In
17 proceedings held under the Uniform Licensing Act, boards . . . may admit any
18 	evidence and may give probative effect to evidence that is of a kind commonly relied
19 on by reasonably prudent people in the conduct of serious affairs. Boards ... may in
20 their discretion exclude incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and unduly repetitious
15

1 evidence." NMSA 1978, § 61-1-1 l(A) (1981). We fail to see how the comments are
2 not "of a kind commonly relied on by reasonably prudent people in the conduct of
3 serious affairs." Id. Notably, all of the commenters, besides Plaintiffs attorney, were
4 local professionals in the field of dentistry. Some of the commenters were also
5 members of the Board's rules committee in charge of drafting the amendments.
6 Many, if not all, of their comments were based on firsthand knowledge. The root of
7 Plaintiffs argument appears to be that the Board should have given credence to
8 Plaintiffs opinions and not those of the other commenters. However, we will not
9 reweigh the evidence, nor substitute our judgment for that of the Board. Bd. of Cty.
10 	Comm 'rs ofSierra Cty. v. Harrison, 1998-NMCA-106, 17, 125 N.M. 495,964 P.2d
11 	56. Given the number of the comments in favor 	of the amendments and the
12 qualifications of those making the comments, we hold that the Board's adoption of
13 	the amendments was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or against the
14 clear weight of substantial evidence.
15 	{22} 	Plaintiff makes several additional arguments, which we briefly address.
16 Throughout its brief in chief, Plaintiff claims that the Board's adoption of the
17 amendments was arbitrary, 	capricious, 	or an abuse 	of discretion because the
18 amendments are redundant and confusing in light of existing regulations and laws.
19 Yet Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that an administrative board's
20 adoption of a regulation is improper because the regulation's purpose is separately
16

1 provided for by other regulations or statutes. Where a party cites no authority to
2 support its argument, we may assume no such authority exists. See In re Adoption of
3 Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ,-r 2. Thus, we decline to address this argument.
4 	{23} 	Plaintiff also 	asserts 	that 	the 	regulations 	violate 	equal 	protection 	and
5 "potentially conflict" with existing law. However, we also decline to opine on these
6 arguments, as Plaintiff makes no real attempt to demonstrate how the regulations are
7 unconstitutional 	or 	incompatible 	with 	existing 	law 	beyond 	these 	conclusory
8 assertions. See Elane Photography, LLC v. 	Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ,-r 70, 309
9 P.3d 53 (declining to rule on an inadequately briefed argument).
10 	{24} 	Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the Board's adoption of the amendments was error
11 	because 	"there was 	no 	rational 	connection between the 	facts 	found 	and the
12 	[amendments] adopted because no facts based on record evidence or testimony were
13 	found by the Board." However, as discussed earlier, the Board is not required to
14 enter any formal findings of fact. See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass 'n, 1974-NMCA-038, ,-r 17.
15 Nor does Plaintiff demonstrate how there is a lack of a rational connection between
16 the public comments and the Board's decision to adopt the amendments. Therefore,
17 Plaintiffs argument is unavailing.
18 	CONCLUSION
19 	{25} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board's decision to adopt the
20 amendments.
17

1 {26} IT IS SO ORDERED.
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3
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WE CONCUR:
BiancaOfmore
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BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Judge
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8 ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge
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In der Wany
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