March 03, 2014 – Phillip G. Ramirez, Jr. v. State of New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dpartment, Dorian Dodson, in her individual and official capacities, Ron West, in his individual and official capacities, Barbara Auten, in her individual and official capacities, Roger Gillespie, in his individual and official capacities, Ted Lovato, in his individual and official capacities, Tim Holesinger, in his individual and official capacities, Daniel Berg, in his individual and official capacities, No. 31,820

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:
Filing Date: 	MARCH 3, 2014
NO. 31,820
PHILLIP G. RAMIREZ, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. CHILDREN,
YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT,
DORIAN DODSON, in her individual and official capacities,
RON WEST, in his individual and official capacities,
BARBARA AUTEN, in her individual and official capacities,
ROGER GILLESPIE, in his individual and official capacities,
TED LOVATO, in his individual and official capacities,
TIM HOLESINGER, in his individual and official capacities, and
DANIEL BERG, in his individual and official capacities,
Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF McKINLEY COUNTY
Camille Martinez-Olguin, District Judge
Vega Lynn Law Offices, LLC
Rosario D. Vega Lynn
Albuquerque, NM

Lorenz Law
Alice T. Lorenz
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, L.L.P.
Ellen S. Casey
Jaclyn M. McLean
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellants/Cross-Appellees
The Reserve Officers Association of America
Samuel F. Wright
Washington, D.C.
Law Office of Thomas G. Jarrard, PLLC
Thomas G. Jarrard
Spokane, WA
Struebel Kochersberger Mortimer LLC
David A. Streubel
Albuquerque, NM
for Amicus Curiae The Reserve Officers Association of America
Legal Panel Member, ACLU-NM
Matthew L. Garcia
Albuquerque, NM
for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union
Damon Martinez, United States Attorney
Manuel Lucero, Assistant U.S. Attorney
Albuquerque, NM

Office of the Solicitor
M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor
Washington, D.C.
Department of Justice/Appellate Section
Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General
Nathaniel S. Pollock
Jessica Dunsay Silver
Washington, D.C.
for Amicus Curiae United States

OPINION
FRY, Judge.
{1} 	Plaintiff, a member of the New Mexico National Guard, filed suit pursuant to
the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38
U.S.C. §§ 4301 to 4335 (1994, as amended through 2011), against his former
employer, the New Mexico Children, Youth, and Families Department (CYFD),
following his termination. The issue presented by this appeal is whether CYFD, as
an arm of the State, is entitled to constitutional state sovereign immunity in regard to
Plaintiff’s claim. 	Because we determine that Congress cannot override a state’s
sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its war powers and because the New
Mexico Legislature has not waived the State’s sovereign immunity for USERRA suits,
we conclude that CYFD is immune from Plaintiff’s claim and accordingly reverse the
district court’s contrary determination.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	Plaintiff began working for CYFD as a community support officer in 1997. At
that time, Plaintiff had been a member of the New Mexico National Guard for
approximately six years. Plaintiff continued his military service throughout his term
of employment with CYFD and, in 2005, Plaintiff was deployed to Iraq.

2
{3} 	By all accounts, Plaintiff served admirably while deployed. Upon his return
from active duty, Plaintiff was re-employed by CYFD in his previous position.
Plaintiff testified that soon after his return, his new supervisors began harassing him.
His allegations of harassment included claims that supervisors placed unrealistic goals
on his employment responsibilities, initiated unnecessary disciplinary action against
him, and leveled unfounded charges of insubordination. 	Plaintiff voiced his
complaints of harassment with both his supervisors and those higher in the CYFD
chain of command. However, Plaintiff’s working relationship with his supervisors
continued to deteriorate, and he was placed on administrative leave and subsequently
terminated in the spring of 2008.
{4} 	Plaintiff brought suit against CYFD alleging, in part, that he was discriminated
against and wrongfully terminated because of his military service, in contravention of
USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4311. CYFD argued on multiple occasions throughout the
proceedings that, as a state agency, it was immune to USERRA claims by private
individuals. The district court rejected CYFD’s argument, and the case proceeded to
trial, where Plaintiff succeeded in his USERRA claim and was awarded damages.
CYFD now appeals.

3
DISCUSSION
{5} 	The primary issue in this appeal is whether constitutional state sovereign
immunity, as recognized by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida and its progeny,
precludes Plaintiff’s USERRA claim against CYFD. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that
Congress cannot subject non-consenting states to suit in federal court when acting
under its Article I powers); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that
Congress cannot use its Article I powers to subject non-consenting states to suit in
state court). This determination rests on two inquiries: (1) whether Congress has the
authority to subject a state to a USERRA suit by a private individual in the state’s own
courts and, (2) if not, whether New Mexico has waived sovereign immunity for
USERRA claims and therefore consented to suit. We address these issues in turn.
Standard of Review
{6} 	“We review de novo the validity of a claim of sovereign immunity.” State ex
rel. San Miguel Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Williams, 2007-NMCA-036, ¶ 20, 141 N.M.
356, 155 P.3d 761. Furthermore, to the extent that issues in this case require us to
interpret statutory language, interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo. Morgan Keegan Mortg. Co. v. Candelaria, 1998-NMCA-008, ¶ 5,
124 N.M. 405, 951 P.2d 1066.

4
Congress Does Not Have the Authority to Subordinate State Sovereign Immunity
Under the War Powers Clause
{7} 	Our Supreme Court has previously discussed the United States Supreme Court’s
controversial recognition of constitutional state sovereign immunity and the impact
of the Seminole Tribe line of cases on Congress’s authority to permit private suits for
damages against non-consenting states. See State ex rel. Hanosh v. State ex rel. King,
2009-NMSC-047, ¶ 6, 147 N.M. 87, 217 P.3d 100 (“As a principle of federalism,
constitutional sovereign immunity circumscribes the power of the U.S. Congress to
create statutory rights and enforce them against the states absent their consent.”
(emphasis omitted)); Gill v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. of Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass’n. of N.M.,
2004-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 5-6, 135 N.M. 472, 90 P.3d 491 (discussing the principles of
federalism underlying the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe);
see also Cockrell v. Bd. of Regents, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶¶ 4-8, 132 N.M. 156, 45 P.3d
876. Rather than reiterate the development of the constitutional sovereign immunity
doctrine, we begin instead by discussing the history of USERRA in relation to the
evolution of this jurisprudence.
{8} 	USERRA was enacted by Congress with the stated purpose of “encourag[ing]
noncareer service in the uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the
disadvantages to civilian careers and employment which can result from such service.”
38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1). In addition to “providing for the prompt reemployment of

1The current version of USERRA does provide for federal court jurisdiction
over suits brought by the United States against a state on behalf of an individual. 	38
U.S.C. 4323(a)(1). It appears from the record that the United States denied Plaintiff’s
request to undertake his case.
5
[service members] upon their completion of such service,” USERRA aims to fulfill
its goal by “prohibit[ing] discrimination against persons because of their service in the
uniformed services.” Section 4301(a)(2), (3). Because the purpose of USERRA is to
encourage military service, it is generally accepted—and undisputed by the parties in
this case—that it was enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the United
States Constitution, also known as the War Powers Clause. 	See Bedrossian v. Nw.
Mem’l Hosp., 409 F.3d 840, 843-44 (7th Cir. 2005).
{9} 	USERRA originally provided for federal court jurisdiction over suits brought
by private individuals against state employers. See USERRA, Pub. L. No. 103-353,
§ 2(a)(c)(1)(A) 108 Stat. 3149, 3165 (1994) (current version at 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(1)
(2008)) (providing that “[t]he district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction” over all USERRA actions, including suits against a state employer).
However, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe cast
significant doubt on Congress’s authority to subject states to USERRA suits by private
individuals in federal court.1 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 45 (“The Eleventh
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used
to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”); see

6
Palmatier v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 981 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.D. Mich. 1997)
(“Applying the lesson of Seminole Tribe, it necessarily follows that Congress, acting
under Article I, could not effectively abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity in USERRA [as originally enacted].”). Congress, therefore, in an apparent
attempt to provide an alternative avenue of relief for private individuals seeking to
enforce rights under USERRA against state employers, amended USERRA in 1998
to provide that “[i]n the case of an action against a [s]tate (as an employer) by a
person, the action may be brought in a [s]tate court of competent jurisdiction in
accordance with the laws of the [s]tate.” 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(2).
{10} 	Soon after USERRA was amended to purportedly vest jurisdiction in state
courts for private suits against state employers, the United States Supreme Court, in
Alden, extended its holding in Seminole Tribe when it addressed the corollary question
of whether Congress could subject non-consenting states to suit in state court. The
Court held that it could not. 	Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (“We hold that the powers
delegated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include
the power to subject non[-]consenting [s]tates to private suits for damages in state
courts.”). In framing the issue, the Court examined whether there was “compelling
evidence” that “Congress may subject the [s]tates to private suits in their own courts”

7
pursuant to its Article I powers by virtue of “constitutional design.” 	Id. at 730-31
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court stated:
[A]s the Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative
interpretations by this Court make clear, the [s]tates’ immunity from suit
is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the [s]tates enjoyed
before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain
today . . . except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain
constitutional Amendments.
Id. at 713. 	The Court ultimately concluded that “[i]n light of history, practice,
precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the [s]tates retain
immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional
power to abrogate by Article I legislation.” Id. at 754. Following Alden, it therefore
appeared settled that Congress could not override a state’s constitutional sovereign
immunity when acting under its Article I powers. See, e.g., Manning v. N.M. Energy,
Minerals & Natural Res. Dep’t, 2006-NMSC-027, ¶ 24, 140 N.M. 528, 144 P.3d 87
(“Alden and its progeny stand for the proposition that state constitutional sovereign
immunity bars individual claims for damages that are based on legislation passed by
Congress pursuant to its Article I powers.”). 	Thus, Alden invalidated Congress’s
attempt to sidestep Seminole Tribe by amending USERRA to provide for state court
jurisdiction over private suits against state employers.
{11} 	However, the apparent clarity of Seminole Tribe and Alden was soon shaken by
the Court’s opinion in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356

8
(2006). In Katz, the Court held that sovereign immunity did not bar an adversary
proceeding in bankruptcy court to set aside the bankruptcy petitioner’s alleged
preferential transfers to the state. 	Id. at 359. 	In a seeming retreat from the more
definitive language of Seminole Tribe and Alden, the Court characterized as an
“erroneous” assumption the notion that Seminole Tribe’s holding would apply to the
Article I Bankruptcy Clause. Katz, 546 U.S. at 363; see U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4
(providing that Congress shall have the power to establish “uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). While the Court was careful
to note that in rem jurisdiction and proceedings ancillary to a bankruptcy court’s
exercise of its in rem jurisdiction do not generally interfere with a state’s sovereign
immunity, Katz, 546 U.S. at 369-73, it further stated that to the extent such
jurisdiction does interfere with a state’s sovereign immunity, the “States agreed in the
plan of the Convention not to assert that immunity.” 	Id. at 373; see id. at 362-63
(“The history of the Bankruptcy Clause, the reasons it was inserted in the
Constitution, and the legislation both proposed and enacted under its auspices
immediately following ratification of the Constitution demonstrate that it was intended
not just as a grant of legislative authority to Congress, but also to authorize limited
subordination of state sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy arena.”). In ruling that
at least one Article I power can provide a basis for subjecting states to suit despite

2Amicus briefs in support of Plaintiff were filed by both the Department of
Justice and the Reserve Officers Association of America in partnership with the
American Civil Liberties Union. For convenience, references to Plaintiff’s arguments
may include those arguments made by Amici on behalf of Plaintiff.
9
statements in Seminole Tribe and Alden to the contrary, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Katz has raised questions as to whether, in the “plan of the Convention,” the states
may have agreed to waive sovereign immunity in the context of other Article I
powers. Katz, 546 U.S. at 373; see Joseph M. Pellicciotti & Michael J. Pellicciotti,
Sovereign Immunity & Congressionally Authorized Private Party Actions Against the
States for Violation of Federal Law: A Consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Decades Long Decisional Trek, 1996-2006, 59 Baylor L. Rev. 623, 642 (2007) (“The
Court did not overrule Seminole Tribe in the Katz decision. . . . [However,] it remains
to be seen if the Court would undertake a similar course of study and reflection and,
as it did in Katz end up refusing to follow its Seminole Tribe ‘dicta’ in future Article
I case settings.”).
{12} 	It is within the ambiguity created by Katz that Plaintiff roots his argument that
Congress has authority pursuant to the War Powers Clause to subject states to suit
under USERRA.2 Plaintiff directs us to various sources establishing the unique and
exclusive nature of Congress’s war powers and, using this historical context, seeks to
analogize to the historical evidence of the exclusivity of Congress’s bankruptcy
powers that the Court so heavily relied on in Katz. 	See Katz, 546 U.S. at 364-370

3Because Plaintiff primarily argues that the states never exercised or retained
sovereignty in regard to war powers, we do not address the parties’ arguments
10
(discussing the “difficulties posed by [the] patchwork of insolvency and bankruptcy
laws . . . peculiar to the American experience” and the need to establish a uniform
federal response embodied by the Bankruptcy Clause). Important to an understanding
of the historical context of Congress’s war powers, Plaintiff posits, is the recognition
by the Founders that, while sovereign immunity is a key attribute of sovereignty, the
Founders envisioned that state sovereignty could be surrendered by an exclusive
delegation of power to the federal government, taking with it a state’s immunity to
suit. See The Federalist No. 81, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed. 2001) (“It
is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent. . . . Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the
plan of the convention, it will remain with the states[.]” (emphasis omitted)); The
Federalist No. 32, at 155 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed. 2001) (“[A]s the plan of
the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the state governments
would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which
were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.” (emphasis omitted)).
Thus, Plaintiff argues, because the Constitution delegated exclusive war powers
authority to the national government, the states never exercised, much less retained,
sovereignty in this arena and, therefore, they enjoy no corresponding immunity.3 See

concerning whether USERRA contains an explicit attempt by Congress to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. If the states never exercised or retained sovereignty in this
arena, as Plaintiff argues, then there would be no sovereign immunity to abrogate.
11
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 781 (1948) (“[T]he power has been expressly
given to Congress to prosecute war, and to pass all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying that power into execution.”).
{13} 	We do not agree with Plaintiff’s argument. As explained below, there are key
differences between the War Powers Clause and both the subject matter of the
Bankruptcy Clause and the historical evidence underlying the Court’s decision in
Katz. We therefore conclude that the War Powers Clause does not authorize Congress
to subject the State to private USERRA suits for damages in our state courts, absent
the State’s consent.
{14} 	Principal 	among 	these 	differences 	is 	the 	unique 	nature 	of 	bankruptcy
jurisdiction in relation to state sovereign immunity, as discussed in Katz. The Court
explained that “[b]ankruptcy jurisdiction, as understood today and at the time of the
framing, is principally in rem jurisdiction” and, “[a]s such, its exercise does not, in the
usual case, interfere with state sovereignty even when [s]tates’ interests are affected.”
Katz, 546 U.S. at 369-70. 	Thus, unlike other Article I powers, “the Bankruptcy
Clause . . . simply [does] not contravene the norms [the U.S. Supreme Court] has
understood the Eleventh Amendment to exemplify.” Id. at 375; see id. at 378 (“The

12
scope of this consent was limited; the jurisdiction exercised in bankruptcy proceedings
was chiefly in rem—a narrow jurisdiction that does not implicate state sovereignty to
nearly the same degree as other kinds of jurisdiction.”). 	This difference alone
counsels against extending the Court’s rationale in Katz to recognize congressional
authority to override state sovereign immunity under other Article I powers, such as
the War Powers Clause. See Anstadt v. Bd. Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 693 S.E.2d
868, 871 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (refusing to extend the rationale of Katz to recognize
congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the War Powers
Clause); Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633
F.3d 1297, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that Katz’s rationale should be
extended to the Copyright and Patent Clause in stating, “[t]he holding in Katz is
carefully circumscribed to the bankruptcy context; its analysis is based upon the
history of bankruptcy jurisdiction”).
{15} 	Furthermore, Plaintiff’s argument—that an exclusive delegation of war powers
to the national government is sufficient to recognize a waiver of state sovereign
immunity by constitutional design—is unpersuasive for two additional reasons. First,
Plaintiff’s argument essentially revives a prior understanding of the nature of
congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity, which was overruled
in Seminole Tribe. See Pa. v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (“Because the

13
Commerce Clause withholds power from the [s]tates at the same time as it confers it
on Congress, and because the congressional power thus conferred would be
incomplete without the authority to render [the s]tates liable in damages, it must be
that, to the extent that the [s]tates gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce,
they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in
exercising this authority, to render them liable.”) overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. 44. In Seminole Tribe, the Court explicitly rejected the idea that a delegation of
power, by itself, was sufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity:
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background
principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the
suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the
exclusive 	control 	of 	the 	Federal 	Government. 	Even 	when 	the
Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a
particular 	area, 	the 	Eleventh 	Amendment 	prevents 	congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting [s]tates.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. Katz did not purport to overrule Seminole Tribe, and
the Court’s holding in Seminole Tribe strongly undercuts Plaintiff’s argument.
{16} 	Second, while Katz’s analysis began with the recognition that the states agreed
to an exclusive delegation of power to Congress to legislate in the arena of
bankruptcy, this was not the definitive point of the Court’s analysis. 	Instead, the
states’ recognition in the “plan of the Convention” that this entailed a subordination
of their sovereignty led the Court to the “ineluctable conclusion” that the states agreed

14
not to assert the defense of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings. See Katz,
546 U.S. at 377 (“[T]he power to enact bankruptcy legislation was understood to carry
with it the power to subordinate state sovereignty, albeit within a limited sphere.”).
It was therefore not the exclusive delegation of power to Congress itself that justified
a limited subordination of state sovereignty, but rather an understanding among the
states, as evidenced by the history of bankruptcy jurisdiction, that an exclusive
delegation of this power to Congress inherently included a subordination of their
sovereignty to accomplish its purposes. Id. at 377-78 (“[T]he Framers, in adopting the
Bankruptcy Clause, plainly intended to give Congress the power to redress the
rampant injustice resulting from [the s]tates’ refusal to respect one another’s discharge
orders. . . . 	In ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause, the [s]tates acquiesced in a
subordination of whatever sovereign immunity they might otherwise have asserted in
proceedings necessary to effectuate the in rem jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.”).
{17} 	In our view, this same justification does not exist in the context of Congress’s
war powers. 	While it is clear that the centralization of war powers in the national
government served important interests, it is unlikely that the states, in ratifying the
Constitution, would have considered that these powers would be effectuated by a
subordination of their sovereign immunity to the extent of permitting private suits for
damages against the states. 	Cf. Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 393 (7th Cir.

15
1998) (“Even if it is true that the states did not surrender their war powers to the
federal government in the Constitution because they didn’t have such powers . . . it
doesn’t follow that they surrendered any part of their sovereign immunity from a suit
seeking money from the state treasury. That immunity is an independent attribute of
sovereignty rather than an incident of the war power[.]”). And, without evidence that
the states would have considered the delegation of war powers to the national
government to inherently include their amenability to private suits for damages, we
are reticent to conclude that the states acquiesced in the plan of the Convention to a
subordination of their sovereign immunity under this Article I power. See Katz, 546
U.S. at 362-63 (stating that the Bankruptcy Clause was intended “not just as a grant
of legislative authority to Congress, but also to authorize limited subordination of state
sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy arena”).
{18} 	In sum, while the Supreme Court appeared to backtrack in Katz on earlier dicta
that no Article I power could provide a valid basis to override state sovereign
immunity, it did so on a narrow basis justified by the unique history of bankruptcy
jurisdiction. See Risner v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 577 F. Supp. 2d 953, 963
(N.D. Ohio 2008) (“Although the Supreme Court determined in Katz that the states
waived sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings by ratifying Congress’[s]
Article I powers, the Court stressed that the exception for bankruptcy cases is a narrow

16
one.”). The Supreme Court has thus far not recognized any Article I authority that
permits the subordination of state sovereign immunity for private suits for damages
against states. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1333 (2012)
(“A foundational premise of the federal system is that [the s]tates, as sovereigns, are
immune from suits for damages[.] . . . As an exception to this principle, Congress
may abrogate the [s]tates’ immunity from suit pursuant to its powers under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)). More importantly, in the context of a
purported subordination of state sovereign immunity in state court pursuant to a
federal cause of action, the Supreme Court’s decision in Alden forecloses such a
possibility, Katz notwithstanding. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 739-40 (“[T]he Constitution
reserves to the [s]tates a constitutional immunity from private suits in their own courts
which cannot be abrogated by Congress.”); Manning, 2006-NMSC-027, ¶ 24
(restating in the wake of Katz that constitutional sovereign immunity bars private suits
for damages based on legislation pursuant to Congress’s Article I powers).
The State has Not Consented to Private USERRA Suits for Damages
{19} 	Because we have determined that Congress did not have the authority to subject
the State to a private USERRA suit for damages by virtue of constitutional design, we
now address Plaintiff’s argument that the New Mexico Legislature has consented to
such suits through the enactment of various statutes regarding the military and service

17
member rights. 	See Alden, 527 U.S. at 737 (noting the “general proposition that a
[s]tate may waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit”); 	Cockrell, 2002-
NMSC-009, ¶ 13 (“[I]t is within the sole province of the Legislature to waive the
[s]tate’s constitutional sovereign immunity.”). Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, we
conclude that the statutes relied on by Plaintiff do not meet the requisite specificity
required to determine that the Legislature has intended to waive the State’s
constitutional sovereign immunity to private USERRA suits for damages.
{20} 	A 	state’s 	waiver 	of 	its 	constitutional 	sovereign 	immunity 	must 	be
“unequivocally expressed.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 99 (1984); see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“[W]e will find
waiver only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming
implications from the text as (will) leave no room for any other reasonable
construction.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Our Supreme Court
has previously expressed a reluctance to infer a waiver of constitutional sovereign
immunity due to the “vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system.” 	Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Therefore, “any waiver of the [s]tate’s constitutional sovereign immunity
must be clear and unambiguous.” Id. ¶ 24.

4Minnesota provides an example of an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity
for USERRA claims. 	See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 1.05(5) (West 2012) (“An
employee . . . of the state who is aggrieved by the state’s violation of [USERRA], may
bring a civil action against the state in federal court or another court of competent
jurisdiction for legal or equitable relief that will effectuate the purposes of that act.”).
18
{21} 	Plaintiff implicitly recognizes that none of the statutes he relies upon explicitly
waive sovereign immunity for USERRA claims.4 Instead, he argues that the several
statutes, when read together, evidence the Legislature’s intent to incorporate the
benefits and protections of USERRA and provide a remedy for New Mexico service
members when those rights are violated, including when the State itself is guilty of the
violation. Although Plaintiff essentially argues for a constructive waiver of sovereign
immunity, which is generally insufficient, we nevertheless examine these statutes to
determine whether the “overwhelming implications from the text . . . leave no room
for any other reasonable construction.” See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 (citing Murray
v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)). We do this while bearing in mind
the United States Supreme Court’s caveat that “[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine
commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights.” Edelman, 415 U.S.
at 673.
{22} 	Plaintiff directs most of his attention to NMSA 1978, Section 20-4-7.1(B)
(2004), which provides that “[t]he rights, benefits[,] and protections of the federal
[USERRA] of 1994 shall apply to a member of the national guard ordered to federal

19
or state active duty for a period of thirty or more consecutive days.” The purpose of
this 	statute 	was 	to 	ensure 	that 	the 	rights, 	benefits, 	and 	protections 	of
USERRA—which seemingly only applies to service members called to federal active
duty—extended to national guard members ordered into state active duty. 	See 38
U.S.C. § 4303(16); 38 U.S.C. § 4312(c)(4)(E). However, as we determined above,
subjecting unconsenting states to suit is not among the rights, benefits, or protections
of USERRA, regardless of whether the national guard member was on state or federal
active duty. 	Thus, there is no overwhelming implication from the text that by
extending USERRA to national guard members called into state active duty, the
Legislature intended to also waive the State’s sovereign immunity to these suits.
{23} 	We are also unpersuaded that NMSA 1978, Sections 28-15-1 to -3 (1941, as
amended through 1971) (reemployment of persons in armed forces) constitutes a
waiver of state sovereign immunity for Plaintiff’s USERRA claim. Plaintiff pursued
a 	private 	suit 	for 	damages 	under 	USERRA 	against 	the 	State 	for 	allegedly
discriminatory treatment by the State due to his military service. While Section 28-
15-1 does grant service members a right to reemployment enforceable against State
employers, it does not recognize a private suit for damages for alleged discrimination
due to military service. We will not construe a state statute to act as the implied basis

20
for a new claim arising from an expansive federal scheme when it would not have
provided Plaintiff with a valid state claim for the original wrong actually suffered.
{24} 	Furthermore, it is likely that a service member seeking to enforce his or her
rights under this statute against the State would be required to seek representation by
a district attorney, not private counsel. 	See § 28-15-3 (“Upon application to the
district attorney for the pertinent district by any person claiming to be entitled to the
benefits of such provisions, such district attorney. . . shall appear and act as attorney
for such person in the amicable adjustment of the claim or in the filing of any motion,
petition or other appropriate pleading and the prosecution thereof to specifically
require the compliance with such provisions[.]”). Thus, to the extent that this statute
does recognize a waiver of sovereign immunity—for rights to reemployment and lost
wages—it does so in a very limited procedural context. See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-
009, ¶ 28 (“Nothing in Alden suggests that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be
absolute, unconditional and applicable in all situations.” (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of
Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002) (“[W]ith respect to suits against a state sovereign in
its own courts, we have explained that a [s]tate may prescribe the terms and conditions
on which its consents to be sued[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

21
{25} 	Finally, neither NMSA 1978, Section 20-1-2 (1987), nor NMSA 1978, Section
20-4-6 (1987) provides any basis for finding a waiver of sovereign immunity. Section
20-1-2 provides that the intent of the New Mexico Military Code is to conform New
Mexico law on military matters to federal law on the same subject. However, as we
have already determined, USERRA cannot validly override state sovereign immunity
and, therefore, the Legislature’s intention to mirror federal law does not evidence a
waiver 	of 	sovereign 	immunity. 	Similarly, 	Section 	20-4-6, 	which 	prohibits
discrimination in employment of service members, neither defines the State as an
employer subject to the statute nor creates a private civil cause of action. See § 20-4-6
(stating that “violation of this section shall be a misdemeanor”). Thus, these statutes,
when read either individually or collectively, do not meet the exacting “clear and
unambiguous” standards necessary for finding waiver of sovereign immunity for
Plaintiff’s USERRA claim.
Policy Considerations
{26} 	Although we conclude that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by state sovereign
immunity, we take a moment to emphasize the responsibility of the State to comply
with federal law. See Gill, 2004-NMSC-016, ¶ 10 (“[U]nder the federalist compact,
the obligation of states to respect federal law and rights created thereunder is an
essential corollary of state sovereignty.”). This case does not present the first time our

22
courts have grappled with the discord between rights afforded under a federal statute
and a state agency’s actions in contravention of that law. See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-
009, ¶ 27 (“We recognize the incongruity of the [s]tate’s obligation to pay overtime
wages in accordance with the FLSA without a concomitant method of enforcement
for [its] employees.”). As did the Court in Cockrell, we stress that “[o]ur holding in
this case is certainly not intended to legitimize political defiance of valid federal law.”
Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 	However, we also
recognize that at a time when many of our veterans are returning home to an often
uncertain economic climate, such pronouncements by our courts ring hollow to a
veteran wronged by the very government he or she served to protect. We recognize
that our Legislature is the appropriate branch of government to consider responding
to the void created by Alden by unequivocally ensuring that our service members have
the opportunity to vindicate their rights against public and private employers alike.
See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Cline, 2006-NMSC-033, ¶ 8, 140 N.M. 16, 139 P.3d 176
(“The predominant voice behind the declaration of public policy of the state must
come from the legislature[.]”).
CONCLUSION

23
{27} 	For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that CYFD is immune from suit and
accordingly reverse the district court. Because of our decision in this case, we do not
reach the issues in Plaintiff’s cross-appeal regarding post-judgment interest.
{28} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge
I CONCUR:
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge (dissenting).

24
Bustamante, Judge (dissenting).
{29} 	Respectfully, I disagree with the conclusion that the War Powers Clause does
not provide Congress a font of power sufficient to subject the states to suit under
USERRA. 	Before Katz, it seemed that the Supreme Court had foreclosed any
argument that Article I could be a source of power sufficient to overcome state
sovereignty claims. But the majority in Katz made clear that the Court’s broad “dicta”
in Seminole Tribe and Alden was just that: dicta. While Katz did not signal a full
retreat from recent orthodoxy, it did make room for debate—at least as to those
provisions of Article I, such as the War Powers Clause, which have not been
addressed before.
{30} 	The first task is to frame the debate. What should the courts take into account
in deciding the potential reach of Congress under a given Article? The list of germane
topics will vary with the provisions under consideration. As such, it is not surprising
that Katz is not helpful here when it discusses the nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction
and practice. But there are general topics that cut across the Articles. Katz is relevant
when it discusses the need for national uniformity with regard to bankruptcy laws. In
doing so, Katz revived uniformity as a valid topic of consideration in Article I
jurisprudence.

25
{31 } 	Uniformity and concentration of authority loom large in the area of national
defense—the subject of the War Powers Clause. As the United States in its amicus
brief notes, the Clause both delegates war powers to the national government
exclusively and prohibits the states from making war, absent consent of the Congress.
(U.S. Amicus Brief 16, 20). It seems obvious that national defense and foreign affairs
are areas in which the country must speak as one.
{32} 	Intertwined with uniformity in this context are the nature and source of the
power addressed by the War Powers Clause. By “nature” I mean to encompass the
whole of the subject—including sending our armed forces to battle and the interest of
the nation in protecting our service members in all ways possible when they return to
civilian life. 	It cannot be gainsaid that the two are part of a spectrum of interests
encompassed by the War Powers Clause. 	By “source” I refer to the oft-repeated
observation that the individual states did not possess war powers at the time of the
Constitutional Convention. The states had no sovereign interest to protect or cede
when they approved the War Powers Clause. The lack of state sovereignty in this area
then must have some effect on measuring the strength of the claim of immunity now.
{33} 	Comparing the interests and history at work in Katz with those at work here
leads me to conclude that the War Powers Clause presents the more compelling case.
The commercial interests addressed by the Bankruptcy Clause are important. 	But

26
national defense stands on higher ground and provides a stronger basis to disallow
state interference with Congress’ will than that found in Katz.
{34} 	Similarly, the state’s historical lack of sovereignty over the conduct of war
argues against its resurrection here. In asserting this, I am not ignoring the difference
between the power to conduct war and the power to refuse to allow suits seeking
monetary compensation. But the distance between the two is not so vast that it cannot
be spanned. The Court in Katz faced the same issue—as the dissent in Katz points
out—yet found it necessary to resolve it in favor of Congressional power. The points
made by the dissent in Katz simply cannot be made with equal force in connection
with the War Powers Act.
{35} 	To a great degree, the Majority and I are simply prognosticating. A full debate
with regard to the War Powers Clause as a source of power for USERRA has not yet
been held before the United States Supreme Court. When it is, I believe the Court will
hold that this is another Article I provision which should not be controlled by the dicta
in Seminole Tribe and Alden. The matter is hardly without doubt. But I believe that
Appellant’s arguments and those of the United States in its amicus brief are closer to
the mark.
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge