November 2, 2021- Kevin Rawlings v. Michelle Rawlings, No. A-1-CA-37662

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 11/2/2021 12:19 PM

Filing Date: November 2, 2021 }
a
No. A-1-CA-37662 Mark Reynoliis

KEVIN RAWLINGS,

Petitioner-Appellee,

V.

MICHELLE RAWLINGS,
Respondent-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY
Angie K. Schneider, District Judge

Law Office of Jane B. Yohalem
Jane B. Yohalem
Santa Fe, NM

Erinna M. Atkins
Alamogordo, NM

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.
Jocelyn Drennan
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

Durham, Pittard & Spalding, L.L.P.
Caren I. Friedman
Santa Fe, NM

—

2

4

Egolf + Ferlic + Martinez + Harwood LLC
Kristina Martinez
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

OPINION	1
DUFFY, Judge.	2
{1} 	The dispute in this appeal centers on the nature of the review required by Rule	3
1-053.2(H)(1)(b) NMRA, which states that “[i]f a party files timely, specific	4
objections to the recommendations [of a domestic relations hearing officer], the	5
court shall conduct a hearing appropriate and sufficient to resolve the objections.	6
The hearing shall consist of a review of the record unless the court determines that	7
additional evidence will aid in the resolution of the objections.” Michelle Rawlings	8
(Mother) argues that the district court erred in failing to hold a hearing on her	9
objections to the domestic relations hearing officer’s recommendations before	10
entering the final decree of dissolution of marriage and division of assets, debts, and	11
custody. We agree and reverse.	12
BACKGROUND	13
{2} 	In 2016, Kevin Rawlings (Father) filed a petition for the dissolution of his	14
marriage to Mother. One of the disputed issues concerned the primary physical	15
custody of the couple’s two young children. After the parties separated in 2015,	16
Mother moved with the children to Las Vegas, Nevada, and although Father	17
apparently consented to the move, the parties dispute whether the move was intended	18
to be permanent. In the divorce and custody proceedings, Father sought to have the	19
children live with him full-time in Alamogordo.	20

2
{3} 	The district court referred the case to a domestic relations hearing officer for	1
hearing and adjudication pursuant to Rule 1-053.2. The hearing officer conducted a	2
day-long hearing on the merits and submitted his recommendations to the district	3
court. Of note, the hearing officer recommended joint legal custody, but that the	4
children should reside primarily with Father in New Mexico. Mother timely filed	5
objections to the hearing officer’s recommendations and requested a hearing on three	6
issues, including child custody. Father filed a response to Mother’s objections and	7
asked the district court to adopt the hearing officer’s recommendations.	8
{4} 	Without conducting a hearing, the district court entered a final decree that	9
adopted the hearing officer’s recommendations in full. The final decree made no	10
reference to Mother’s objections. Mother initially filed a motion to reconsider,	11
arguing that the district court violated Rule 1-053.2(H) by entering the final decree	12
without conducting a hearing and without making an independent determination of	13
Mother’s objections. Two days later, however, Mother withdrew the motion and	14
filed a notice of appeal instead. Mother also submitted an emergency motion to stay	15
enforcement of judgment pending appeal.	16
{5} 	The district court held a hearing on Mother’s emergency motion to stay	17
approximately three weeks later. The district court began the hearing by addressing	18
the issue of Mother’s objections, stating that it wanted to make a record with regard	19
to the objections. The district court stated that it viewed the hearing requirement in	20

3
Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) as discretionary and had made a determination that a hearing	1
was not necessary to resolve the objections in this case. The court stated that it	2
adopted the hearing officer’s recommendations after reviewing the record and the	3
parties’ filings.	4
{6} 	After Mother’s attorney made a brief record of why he believed a hearing was	5
required, Father’s attorney argued that the district court had, in fact, conducted a	6
hearing pursuant to Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) because the court had reviewed the record	7
and 	made 	an 	independent 	determination 	to 	adopt 	the 	hearing 	officer’s	8
recommendations. Father characterized the omission as a clerical mistake and made	9
an oral motion to amend the final decree pursuant to Rule 1-060(A) NMRA to reflect	10
that the court had reviewed the objections, made an independent review of the	11
record, and determined that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. The district	12
court agreed and granted Father’s oral motion.	13
{7} 	The district court entered an amended final decree, which differed from the	14
original decree only in that it stated the district court had “conducted an independent	15
review hearing under [Rule] 1-053.2(H)(1)(b), which included proper review of	16
[Mother’s] Objections, an independent review of the record, an independent	17
determination 	that 	an 	additional 	evidentiary 	hearing 	and 	oral 	argument 	was	18
unnecessary,” and that it “made an independent determination to approve and adopt	19

4
the Recommendations of the Hearing Officer.” The amended final decree also	1
expressly denied Mother’s objections. Mother appeals.	2
DISCUSSION	3
{8} 	The issue presented in this appeal requires us to interpret a rule of civil	4
procedure, a matter we review de novo. See Becenti v. Becenti, 2004-NMCA-091,	5
¶ 6, 136 N.M. 124, 94 P.3d 867. “We approach the interpretation of rules adopted	6
by the Supreme Court in the same way that we approach the interpretation of	7
legislative enactments, by seeking to determine the underlying intent[.]” State v.	8
Miller, 2008-NMCA-048, ¶ 11, 143 N.M. 777, 182 P.3d 158. “We first look to the	9
language of the rule, and if the rule is unambiguous, we give effect to its language	10
and refrain from further interpretation.” Rodriguez ex rel. Rodarte v. Sanchez, 2019-	11
NMCA-065, ¶ 12, 451 P.3d 105 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation	12
omitted). We also seek guidance from the rule’s history and background, see Allen	13
v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, ¶ 11, 267 P.3d 806, and when dealing with a rule	14
that has been amended, as is the case with Rule 1-053.2, “the amended language	15
must be read within the context of the previously existing language, and the old and	16
new language, taken as a whole, comprise the intent and purpose of the statute or	17
rule.” Rodriguez, 2019-NMCA-065, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation	18
omitted). “When the Supreme Court amends its rules, we presume it is aware of this	19

5
Court’s and its own existing interpretations of the rules and that it intends to change	1
or clarify existing law governing procedural practice in state courts.” Id.	2
I. 	Rule 1-053.2	3
{9} 	Rule 1-053.2 sets forth the procedure a district court must follow after	4
receiving a domestic relations hearing officer’s recommendations. The subsection	5
of the rule at issue in this appeal was added in 2006 following this Court’s decision	6
in Buffington v. McGorty, 2004-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 29-30, 136 N.M. 226, 96 P.3d 787,	7
which held that due process requires that parties be given an opportunity to submit	8
objections to a hearing officer’s report and recommendations and outlined the	9
procedure for addressing them. We begin with an overview of our holding in	10
Buffington as it informs our understanding of the subsequent amendments to the rule.	11
{10} 	Before Buffington, Rule 1-053.2 addressed only the duties and powers of	12
domestic relations hearing officers and “did not provide a means for a party who	13
disagreed with the recommendations of the hearing officer to voice those objections	14
to the judge who was to consider whether to adopt the recommendations.” Rule 1-	15
053.2 comm. cmt.; see also Buffington, 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 30 (noting that the prior	16
version of Rule 1-053.2 “contain[ed] no express provision giving the parties a right	17
to object to the report and recommendations of the hearing officer”). We took issue	18
with this aspect of the former rule, holding that “it is required that the parties be	19
given an opportunity to submit objections to a hearing officer’s report and	20

6
recommendations. This is fundamental to the due process concept of having an	1
opportunity to be heard by a judicial officer.” Buffington, 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 30.	2
{11} 	Buffington also discussed the necessity of holding “a hearing on the merits of	3
the 	issues 	before 	the 	[district] 	court, 	including 	the 	hearing 	officer’s	4
recommendations and the parties’ objections thereto.” Id. ¶ 31. While noting that the	5
nature of the hearing and review to be conducted is discretionary, Buffington stated	6
that “the record of the hearing held before the district court must demonstrate that	7
the court in fact considered the objections and established the basis for the court’s	8
decision.” Id. This process, the Court noted, “is implicit in the requirement of the	9
Rule that all orders must be signed by a district judge before the recommendations	10
of a domestic relations hearing officer become effective[,]” and serves two important	11
functions. Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). First, “the	12
parties are assured that the issues have been decided by a judge vested with judicial	13
power.” Id. (noting that “[t]he hearing officer assists the district court in determining	14
the factual and legal issues, and the core judicial function is independently	15
performed by the district judge”). Second, “an appropriate record is made to allow	16
for appellate review of the district court’s decision.” Id.	17
{12} 	The New Mexico Supreme Court subsequently amended Rule 1-053.2 and	18
codified 	the 	common 	law 	requirements 	announced 	in 	Buffington 	as 	express	19
provisions in the rule. Rule 1-053.2 now provides a comprehensive procedure for	20

7
district court proceedings after the court receives the domestic relations hearing	1
officer’s recommendations. It states:	2
[T]he court shall take the following actions:	3
(1) 	Review of recommendations.	4
(a) The court shall review the recommendations of the domestic	5
relations 	hearing 	officer 	and 	determine 	whether 	to 	adopt 	the	6
recommendations.	7
(b) 	If 	a 	party 	files 	timely, 	specific 	objections 	to 	the	8
recommendations, the court shall conduct a hearing appropriate and	9
sufficient to resolve the objections. The hearing shall consist of a review	10
of the record unless the court determines that additional evidence will	11
aid in the resolution of the objections.	12
(c) The court shall make an independent determination of the	13
objections.	14
(d) The court may adopt the recommendations, modify them,	15
reject them in whole or in part, receive further evidence, or recommit	16
them to the domestic relations hearing officer with instructions.	17
(2) 	Findings and conclusions; entry of final order. After the	18
hearing, the court shall enter a final order. When required by Rule 1-	19
052 NMRA, the court also shall enter findings and conclusions.	20
Rule 1-053.2(H) (emphases added).	21
II. 	The Hearing Requirement	22
{13} 	With this history in mind, we turn to the parties’ competing interpretations of	23
the hearing requirement in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b). Mother argues that the rule	24
plainly requires the district court to “conduct a hearing,” a term that connotes a court	25
session where the district court will hear arguments or take evidence. Father argues	26

8
that a court session is not required and states that in some circumstances, “an	1
appropriate hearing consists of a thorough review of the written record.” The parties’	2
differing views stem from the fact that they assign different meanings to Rule 1-	3
053.2(H)(1)(b)’s second sentence—construing it either as a statement that the	4
hearing need not be evidentiary, as Mother argues, or a definition of the term	5
“hearing,” as Father argues. As we explain, Mother’s interpretation is the most	6
plausible expression of the drafter’s intent, and we adopt it here.	7
{14} 	We begin by examining the language used in the in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b),	8
giving the words their ordinary meaning. See Flores v. Herrera, 2016-NMSC-033,	9
¶ 8, 384 P.3d 1070. At the outset, we note that although the phrase “conduct a	10
hearing” is ubiquitous in cases, statutes, and rules, we have found no authority	11
construing or defining what it means generally. New Mexico courts have previously	12
considered what it means to “hear” a case and have concluded that “the district court	13
is not necessarily required to conduct an adjudicatory hearing in order to ‘hear’ a	14
case, although it may if it so desires.” N.M. Transp. Dep’t v. Yazzie, 1991-NMCA-	15
098, ¶¶ 11-12, 112 N.M. 615, 817 P.2d 1257 (evaluating what “shall hear the case”	16
means according to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-112(G) (1991, amended 2015)). This	17
Court noted in Yazzie that “ ‘[h]earing’ has been defined in older New Mexico	18
decisions as every step where the judge is called upon to rule for or against any	19
party.” 1991-NMCA-098, ¶ 12. We drew the definition from State ex rel. Shufeldt	20

9
v. Armijo, 1935-NMSC-078, 39 N.M. 502, 50 P.2d 852, overruled on other grounds	1
by Gray v. Sanchez, 1974-NMSC-011, ¶ 12, 86 N.M. 146, 520 P.2d 1091, where the	2
New Mexico Supreme Court evaluated whether an affidavit seeking to disqualify a	3
district court judge was timely filed under the disqualification statute then in force.	4
The statute required the affidavit to be filed at least ten days before the beginning of	5
the court’s term, “if said case is at issue.” Id. ¶ 11 (emphasis and internal quotation	6
marks omitted). The Court had previously interpreted the quoted phrase to mean “an	7
action or proceeding to be tried or heard.” Id. ¶ 12 (emphasis added) (internal	8
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court adopted a broad definition for	9
“tried or heard,” stating:	10
A hearing is contemplated. Whether such hearing be on a motion,	11
demurrer, plea, or answer is immaterial. It is a hearing on an “issue.” In	12
a broad sense, a hearing includes every step therein where the judge is	13
called upon to rule for or against any party to the cause. It is the judicial	14
examination of the “issue” in the broad sense that is contemplated by	15
[the disqualification statute].	16
Id. ¶ 13. The Court then held that an affidavit is timely only if filed before the district	17
court has made any ruling on any litigated or contested matter whatsoever in the	18
case. Id. ¶ 14.	19
{15} 	In the few unpublished cases that have since applied this definition, none have	20
considered what it means to “conduct a hearing,” nor have they addressed a rule or	21
statute that specifically requires the district court do so. See Britton v. Off. of Att’y	22
Gen., 2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 24, 433 P.3d 320 (stating that “[t]he general rule is that	23

10
cases are not authority for propositions not considered”). We agree with Mother,	1
however, that the common understanding of the phrase is that parties are afforded	2
an opportunity to appear before the judge and present argument. That understanding	3
finds support in both the legal and the nonlegal definitions of the term “hearing.”	4
See Hearing, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “hearing” as “[a]	5
judicial session, [usually] open to the public, held for the purpose of deciding issues	6
of fact or of law, sometimes with witnesses testifying”); Hearing, Merriam-Webster	7
Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hearing (last visited Sept.	8
28, 2021) (defining “hearing” as “listening to arguments”); see also State v. Rogers,	9
1926-NMSC-028, ¶ 24, 31 N.M. 485, 247 P. 828 (noting that “Webster’s New	10
International Dictionary defines ‘hearing’ as ‘a listening to facts and evidence, for	11
the sake of adjudication’ ”); Lopez v. K. B. Kennedy Eng’g Co., 1981-NMCA-011,	12
¶ 5, 95 N.M. 507, 623 P.2d 1021 (collecting definitions of “hearing” from other	13
jurisdictions, including that “[a] hearing ordinarily is defined, in matters not	14
associated with full trials, as a proceeding in which the parties are afforded an	15
opportunity to adduce proof and to argue, in person or by counsel, as to the	16
inferences flowing from the evidence” (internal quotation marks and citation	17
omitted)).	18
{16} 	While the ordinary and usual meaning of a word or phrase is an important	19
consideration in the construction of a rule, Blue Canyon Well Ass’n v. Jevne, 2018-	20

11
NMCA-004, ¶ 9, 410 P.3d 251, we must determine whether our Supreme Court	1
intended a different meaning in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b)’s second sentence, which	2
states, “The hearing shall consist of a review of the record unless the court	3
determines that additional evidence will aid in the resolution of the objections.”	4
According to Mother, “[t]he second sentence of the rule implies that at the required	5
hearing, 	the 	district 	court 	may 	decide 	whether 	to 	take 	evidence.” 	Father	6
acknowledges the same, writing that “[t]he [r]ule establish[ed] a presumption that	7
new evidence need not be taken unless the district court finds that the particular	8
circumstances . . . demand an evidentiary hearing.” However, Father also argues that	9
“[t]he [c]ommittee [c]ommentary makes clear . . . that the ‘hearing’ referred to in	10
Buffington ‘need not always consist of oral presentations before the court.’ When	11
written objections and responses have been submitted and the nature of the	12
objections do not require either additional evidence or oral argument for their	13
resolution, an appropriate hearing consists of a thorough review of the written	14
record.”	15
{17} 	The committee commentary states:	16
Rule 	1-053.2(H)(1)(b) 	. . . 	mandates 	a 	hearing 	to 	consider 	the	17
recommendations and the objections. The Buffington [C]ourt noted that	18
the nature of the hearing and review to be conducted by the district court	19
will depend upon the nature of the objections being raised. Rule 1-	20
053.2(H)(1)(b) . . . provides this flexibility but creates a presumption	21
that the hearing will consist of a review of the record rather than a de	22
novo proceeding. However, the court has discretion in all cases to	23
determine that a different form of hearing take place, including a de	24

12
novo proceeding at which evidence is presented anew before the court,	1
or a hearing partly on the record before the hearing officer and partly	2
based on the presentation of new evidence not before the hearing	3
officer. 	The 	required 	hearing 	need 	not 	always 	consist 	of 	oral	4
presentations before the court. When appropriate and sufficient to	5
resolve the objections, the court may rely on written presentations of	6
the parties. See Nat[’]l Excess Ins[.] Co. v. Bingham, 1987-NMCA-109,	7
¶ 9, 106 N.M. 325, 742 P.2d 537 (noting that summary judgment	8
motions may be resolved without oral argument “when the opposing	9
party 	has 	had 	an 	adequate 	opportunity 	to 	respond 	to 	movant’s	10
arguments through the briefing process”).	11
Rule 1-053.2 comm. cmt. (emphases added) (alteration, internal quotation marks,	12
and citation omitted).	13
{18} 	Like the committee commentary, Father relies on National Excess as support	14
for the proposition that oral argument is not required. For several reasons, we	15
perceive a conflict in applying our holding in National Excess to interpret Rule 1-	16
053.2(H)(1)(b). See State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 10 n.1, 135 N.M. 621, 92	17
P.3d 633 (stating that “committee commentary is not binding authority” and will	18
yield to controlling authority in the event of a conflict). National Excess dealt	19
specifically with a motion for summary judgment under Rule 1-056 NMRA—a rule	20
that contains no express requirement that the district court conduct a hearing to	21
resolve the motion. Thus, our holding that “the court may, but is not required to, hold	22
an oral hearing” posed no conflict with the rule itself. Nat’l Excess Ins. Co., 1987-	23
NMCA-109, ¶ 9. And while we used the term “oral hearing,” there is nothing in our	24
holding to suggest that the district court’s review of the parties’ written submissions	25

13
somehow constituted a “hearing.” See id. On the contrary, the authority we relied	1
upon for our holding recognizes that a local federal rule “permits the trial judge to	2
dispense with a hearing at his discretion.” Nolan v. C. de Baca, 603 F.2d 810, 812	3
(10th Cir. 1979); see also Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 557 F. Supp. 549, 556	4
(D.S.D. 1983) (“[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 56(c) does not mandate a	5
hearing, 	and 	one 	was 	not 	required 	when 	the 	file 	contains 	substantial 	legal	6
memoranda and discovery matters, and when no request for a hearing was made	7
prior to the ruling.”). Consequently, our holding in National Excess does not stand	8
for the proposition that a court can “conduct a hearing” by reviewing the written	9
record; it stands for the proposition that in some circumstances, a hearing is not	10
required at all. Given these distinctions, we are not persuaded that written objections	11
filed pursuant to Rule 1-053.2(G) can or should be given the same treatment as a	12
motion for summary judgment under Rule 1-056.	13
{19} 	Our own evaluation of the rule’s language leads us to conclude that Father’s	14
interpretation would lead to an absurd result. If we were to construe the second	15
sentence of Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) to mean that a district court “conducts a hearing”	16
by “conducting a review of the record,” then the mandatory language in that	17
sentence—“The hearing shall consist of a review of the record unless the court	18
determines that additional evidence will aid in the resolution of the objections”—	19
would mean that the district court cannot conduct anything other than a record	20

14
review unless the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. This	1
limitation would prevent the court from conducting more informal types of hearings	2
where argument, but not evidence, is presented. Put differently, this interpretation	3
would 	foreclose 	parties 	from 	appearing 	before 	their 	judge 	unless 	the 	court	4
determines that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. Such an interpretation runs	5
counter to the flexibility envisioned by this Court in Buffington, and we find no	6
indication that our Supreme Court intended to curtail the district court’s discretion	7
in such a manner when it amended Rule 1-053.2(H).	8
{20} 	To be sure, interpreting Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) to always require a hearing also	9
constrains a district court’s discretion, but that interpretation better aligns with the	10
language and purpose of our holding in Buffington and the corresponding rule	11
changes. At bottom, the procedural changes articulated in Buffington were designed	12
to ensure that parties had an avenue to address objections to a hearing officer’s report	13
and recommendations with the district court. As this Court noted, hearing officers	14
assist the district court in determining the factual and legal issues presented in	15
domestic relations cases, but the core judicial function must always be performed by	16
the judge. Buffington, 2004-NMCA-092, ¶¶ 30-31. Even so, by rule, domestic	17
relations hearing officers may perform any duties assigned by the judges of the	18
district in domestic relations proceedings, see Rule 1-053.2(A), and in practice,	19
hearing officers may field all hearings in domestic relations cases, up to and	20

15
including the final merits hearing, as the two-and-a-half-year record in this case	1
demonstrates. Rule 1-053.2(C). When Buffington articulated that parties have a right	2
to raise objections to the hearing officer’s recommendations with the district court,	3
this Court also provided that the district court must conduct a hearing on the	4
objections, thus ensuring that the parties have an opportunity to appear before the	5
district judge at least once before the court reaches a final decision on contested	6
matters. This allows the parties to engage with the judge directly during the final,	7
critical stage of their case when the judge performs the “core judicial function”	8
required by Buffington. 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31. This is not inconsequential when	9
the objections involve matters of fundamental concern, such as custody of the	10
parties’ children or long-term financial obligations.	11
{21} 	Viewed in this light, construing Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) to require a hearing,	12
rather than a file review, on objections to a hearing officer’s recommendations in	13
domestic relations cases is not unreasonable. Indeed, this sort of judicial session is	14
precisely what this Court described in Buffington when we said that “[t]he district	15
court must then hold a hearing on the merits” and that “the record of the hearing	16
held before the district court must demonstrate that the court in fact considered the	17
objections and established the basis for the court’s decision”—statements that	18

16
indicate a party’s objections would be addressed on the record in a judicial	1
proceeding. 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31 (emphases added). 1
2
{22} 	Ultimately, it is for the district court to determine the nature and the extent of	3
the hearing so long as the court ensures, at a minimum, that the parties are permitted	4
to appear on the record to address the merits of the objections. Buffington, 2004-	5
NMCA-092, ¶ 31. As the committee commentary makes clear, the district court has	6
inherent discretion to determine whether it will conduct the merits hearing de novo,	7
1The dissent disagrees with this analysis, concluding that the plain language
interpretation of the term “hearing” is contrary to the intent and purpose of
Buffington and imposes a “new requirement” that will result in delay and waste of
judicial resources. On the first point, this Court in Buffington and our Supreme Court
in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) used a specific and commonly understood term to describe
the district court’s duties after receiving objections—both Courts stated that the
district court must “hold” or “conduct” a “hearing.” If either Court had intended that
a district court could rule based only on the parties’ written submissions, they could
have said so plainly using any number of other terms—such as that the district court
shall “consider,” “review,” or even “hear” a party’s objections—but they did not,
and we must give effect to the specific language chosen by our Supreme Court and
used in the rule.
The dissent’s second point—that this Court is imposing a “new” requirement
that will unduly burden the district courts’ dockets—is grounded in the premise that
district courts may not be conducting the type of proceedings described in this
opinion already. The fact is, we have no data beyond the record in this case, and we
are therefore in no position to determine whether the mandate in the current rule is
impractical for the system as a whole. In our view, that determination is best made
through the committee rulemaking process.

17
whether new evidence may be introduced, or whether the hearing will simply consist	1
of a less formal nonevidentiary, on-record proceeding.2
2
III. 	The District Court Erred by Not Conducting a Hearing	3
{23} 	Turning to the proceedings at issue in this case, the parties do not dispute that	4
the district court’s initial final decree failed to comport with the requirements of Rule	5
1-053.2. The final matter we address is Father’s contention that the October 1	6
hearing and the amended final decree corrected the problem.	7
{24} 	The October 1 hearing was noticed to address Mother’s emergency motion for	8
a stay. Before turning to that motion, the district court stated that it wanted to make	9
a 	record 	with 	regard 	to 	the 	court’s 	adoption 	of 	the 	hearing 	officer’s	10
recommendations. The district court stated first that Rule 1-053.2 did not require a	11
hearing. The court then stated that it had reviewed the record, the hearing officer’s	12
recommendations, 	Mother’s 	objections, 	and 	Father’s 	response, 	and 	“made 	a	13
determination that a hearing was not necessary . . . to resolve anything.” The district	14
court did not address the merits of Mother’s objections or discuss the basis of its	15
decision other than to say that “the objections really were a disagreement with what	16
[the] hearing officer . . . ruled” and, more generally, that the court’s review of the	17
record supported the hearing officer’s recommendations. See, e.g., Buffington, 2004-	18
2Given our holding that a hearing is required by the rule itself, we need not
address the parties’ arguments regarding whether a hearing is otherwise required by
due process considerations.

18
NMCA-092, ¶ 31 (stating that the record of the hearing must establish the basis for	1
the court’s decision). The district court allowed Mother’s attorney to make a record	2
of why he believed a hearing was necessary but did not afford him the opportunity	3
to substantively address the merits of Mother’s objections.	4
{25} 	On the whole, the October 1 hearing did not function as a hearing on the merits	5
of Mother’s objections and was thus insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule	6
1-053.2(H)(1)(b) and 	Buffington, 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31. Because the hearing	7
requirement is mandatory in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) and as a prerequisite to the	8
court’s entry of a final order, see Rule 1-053.2(H)(2) (“After the hearing, the court	9
shall enter a final order.” (emphasis added)), we reverse the district court’s entry of	10
both the initial and amended final decree.	11
{26} 	Further, because our holding on this issue is dispositive, we do not reach the	12
remaining 	issues 	raised 	in 	Mother’s 	appeal 	concerning 	the 	district 	court’s	13
jurisdiction to amend the final decree after Mother’s notice of appeal and whether	14
Mother received an adequate opportunity to object to the form of order. See, e.g.,	15
Living Cross Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. N.M. Pub. Regul. Comm’n, 2014-NMSC-036,	16
¶ 1, 338 P.3d 1258.	17

19
CONCLUSION	1
{27} 	We reverse the district court’s entry of the initial and amended final decree of	2
dissolution of marriage and division of assets, debts, and custody and remand this	3
case to the district court to conduct a hearing on the merits of Mother’s objections.	4
{28} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	5
__________________________________	6
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	7
I CONCUR:	8
__________________________________	9
SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge	10
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part)	11

20
BOGARDUS, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).	1
{29} 	Although I concur in the result of the majority opinion, I do so because I	2
believe, based on the specific facts at issue, that the district court did not comply	3
with Rule 1-053.2’s requirement that the district court consider a party’s objections	4
and independently determine them. See Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b), (c). I write separately	5
because I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the language of	6
the rule requires an in-person hearing every time a party files objections to a	7
domestic relations hearing officer’s recommendations. In my view, the majority	8
misreads the rule, gives little weight to the analysis in Buffington, 2004-NMCA-092,	9
¶¶ 31-32, and does not give sufficient consideration to a district court’s broad	10
discretion to manage its docket. The majority’s construction of the rule in this case,	11
a rule that has been in place for many years, will result in wasted judicial resources,	12
increased costs to litigants, and cause needless delay in those cases in which a party’s	13
objections can easily be disposed of with review of the record without further oral	14
argument by the parties. My opinion is also informed by the nature of domestic	15
relations cases where delay caused by the necessity for an in-person hearing can be	16
especially harmful in the context of child custody issues and may encourage	17
gamesmanship among the parties.	18

21
IV. 	Reversing and Remanding Is Appropriate in This Case	1
{30} 	As the majority’s opinion describes, the district court initially entered its order	2
adopting the hearing officer’s recommendations without comment and without	3
reference to Mother’s objections. There is no evidence in the district court’s final	4
decree that it considered and made an independent determination of Mother’s	5
objections at that time. After the hearing on Mother’s emergency motion to stay the	6
enforcement of judgment, the district court’s amended final decree acknowledged	7
Mother’s objections but did not adequately establish its reasoned basis for denying	8
the objections, because the amended final decree’s only addition was to state that it	9
complied with the requirements of Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b), without sufficiently	10
demonstrating that the district court had performed the necessary judicial function	11
of reviewing the objections, the record, and making an independent determination.	12
See Lujan ex rel. Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-NMCA-036, ¶ 19, 135 N.M. 285,	13
87 P.3d 1067 (expressing “grave concern if . . . district judges are presented with	14
stick noted orders that they automatically sign” (internal quotation marks omitted));	15
see also Buffington, 2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31 (emphasizing that a district court	16
exercises its core judicial function by considering a party’s objections to a hearing	17
officer’s recommendations and establishing the basis for its decision before signing	18
an order based on those recommendations). The district court’s actions in this case	19
provide sufficient basis for reversing and remanding for further proceedings because	20

22
the procedure followed by the district court did not comply with the applicable rule	1
nor with the intent of Buffington. See Rule 1-053.2(H); Buffington, 2004-NMCA-	2
092.	3
{31} 	The 	rule 	requires 	that 	the 	district 	court 	independently 	“review 	the	4
recommendations of the domestic relations hearing officer and determine whether	5
to adopt the recommendations.” Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(a). Although “[t]he nature of	6
the hearing and review to be conducted by the district court will depend upon the	7
nature of the objections being considered[,]” the district court must demonstrate that	8
it reviewed the objections and arrived at a reasoned basis for its decision. Buffington,	9
2004-NMCA-092, ¶ 31. Because of the district court’s failure in this regard,	10
demonstrated by its initial lack of review and its cursory review in response to	11
Mother’s motion to reconsider, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that reversing	12
and remanding for a hearing to consider Mother’s objections is appropriate.	13
V. 	Rule 1-053.2(H) Does Not Require an In-Person Hearing in Front of a	14
Judge to Resolve a Party’s Objections to Recommendations by the	15
Hearing Officer	16
{32} 	My fundamental disagreement with the majority’s view is with its analysis of	17
Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b), which, according to the majority, requires an in-person	18
hearing to resolve a party’s objections to a hearing officer’s recommendations. The	19
rule emphasizes that generally, once a party files timely and specific objections, the	20
district court has broad discretion to decide the nature of the hearing necessary to	21

23
resolve a party’s objections to a hearing officer’s recommendations. See id. (“[T]he	1
court shall conduct a hearing appropriate and sufficient to resolve the objections.”	2
(emphasis added)). The rule continues by specifying that the hearing “shall consist	3
of a review of the record[.]” Id. The plain language of these two clauses establish	4
that the hearing must be “appropriate and sufficient,” yet does not require in-person	5
attendance of the parties. Id. The rule then explains that such an appropriate and	6
sufficient hearing “shall consist of a review of the record unless the court determines	7
additional evidence will aid in the resolution.” Id.	8
{33} 	The majority contends that the rule’s language restricts the district court’s	9
discretion so that an in-person hearing, for example, to entertain further legal	10
argument, 	is 	foreclosed 	unless 	additional 	evidence 	is 	necessary 	to 	make 	its	11
determination. I disagree that the clause is so limiting, when considered with the	12
previous sentence that establishes the court’s broad discretion to fashion the	13
appropriate type of hearing necessary under the circumstances to resolve the	14
objections. In my opinion, the limitation described by the phrase “shall consist of a	15
review of the record” establishes that district court’s review is limited to the record	16
created by the hearing officer, that is, the evidence and argument on which the	17
hearing officer based the recommendations.	18
{34} 	This portion of the rule contains no language that prohibits the district court	19
from holding an in-person hearing, if it so chooses, to discuss the record before it	20

24
and to consider the parties’ arguments relating to the evidentiary record developed	1
by the hearing officer, even if the district court determines that additional evidence	2
is not necessary. This construction of Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) is also in harmony with	3
another section, Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(d), which grants the district court additional	4
discretion to accept, modify, reject some or all, receive further evidence, or send all	5
or some of the recommendations back to the hearing officer with instructions. In	6
sum, Rule 1-053.2(H)(1) is crafted to allow the district court maximum flexibility in	7
handling objections to a hearing officer’s recommendations, whether that means	8
relying solely on the parties’ written submissions, setting an in-person hearing to	9
entertain additional argument and/or obtain further evidence, modifying the hearing	10
officer’s recommendations, or by sending the recommendations back to the hearing	11
officer for further proceedings. The rule’s overall emphasis on judicial discretion is	12
consistent with my interpretation that an in-person hearing is not required.	13
{35} 	To read the rule as the majority does, that is, to require an in-person hearing	14
in 	front 	of 	the 	judge 	any 	time 	objections 	are 	raised 	to 	a 	hearing 	officer’s	15
recommendations, fails to give sufficient weight to the broad discretionary power	16
granted in the first sentence of Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) and in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)	17
generally. Such discretion is vital in domestic relations matters in particular, given	18
the reliance on hearing officers to consider and make recommendations on a number	19
of issues throughout the progression of such cases, which typically have multiple,	20

25
significant issues to decide. In this case, for example, before making the final	1
recommendations on child custody, support, and property division, the hearing	2
officer made recommendations to the court regarding a motion for bifurcation and	3
reserving legal issues for trial and regarding a dispute over summer visitation. In	4
even more complicated domestic relations cases than this one, the hearing officer’s	5
recommendations could be numerous and extensive, raising the possibility that many	6
in-person hearings will be necessary to resolve objections, which will have an impact	7
on the court’s docket and the timeliness of scheduling hearings. Construing this rule	8
as the majority does, in my view, is contrary to the intent of the rules governing civil	9
litigation. See Rule 1-001(A) NMRA (noting that the rules of civil procedure are to	10
be construed to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every	11
action”).	12
{36} 	My analysis of the rule is also consistent with the concerns raised and the	13
analysis provided in Buffington, which recognized that flexibility in application of	14
this portion of the rule is necessary when it noted that “[t]he nature of the hearing	15
and review to be conducted by the district court will depend upon the nature of the	16
objections being considered[,]” so long as the procedure used demonstrates to the	17
parties “that the issues have been decided by a judge vested with judicial power and	18
an appropriate record is made to allow for appellate review.” 2004-NMCA-092,	19
¶ 31. Interpreting Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) to require an in-person hearing every time	20

26
objections are raised is contrary to Buffington’s support for a flexible procedure that	1
should be tailored by the court to the particular situation.	2
{37} 	The majority states that “[u]ltimately, it is for the district court to determine	3
the nature and extent of the hearing, so long as the court ensures, at a minimum, that	4
the parties are permitted to appear on the record to address the merits of the	5
objections.” Maj. Op. ¶ 22. Based on this interpretation, nothing prevents a district	6
court, however, from complying with this requirement by holding a very brief	7
hearing, allowing the objecting party a minimal opportunity to state objections, and	8
then rendering its decision. In that way, the new requirement created by the majority	9
in this opinion would be satisfied, with little additional benefit to the parties, but	10
with the attendant delay, expense, and use of resources associated with the	11
requirement of holding an in-person hearing.	12
{38} 	For these reasons, I concur in the result only and respectfully dissent from the	13
majority’s analysis.	14
15
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge	16