August 31, 2026- State of New Mexico v. Stephen Pyszkowski, No. A-1-CA-42301

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OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
2
3
4
5
6
7
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Opinion Number: __________
Filing Date: August 31, 2026
No. A-1-CA-42301
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
STEPHEN PYSZKOWSKI,	8
Defendant-Appellant.	9
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY	10
Angie K. Schneider, District Court Judge	11
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General	12
Santa Fe, NM	13
Tyler Sciara, Assistant Solicitor General	14
Albuquerque, NM	15
for Appellee	16
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender	17
Santa Fe, NM	18
Mark A. Peralta-Silva, Assistant Appellate Defender	19
Albuquerque, NM	20
for Appellant	21
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 8/31/2026 1:17 PM

OPINION	1
YOHALEM, Judge.	2
{1} 	Defendant Stephen Pyszkowski appeals his convictions of:0F
1 (1) one count of	3
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), contrary to NMSA 1978,	4
Section 30-31-23(A) (2019, amended 2021); and (2) one count of possession of drug	5
paraphernalia, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-25.1(A) (2019, amended	6
2022).1F
2 Defendant claims on appeal that the district court erred in denying his	7
pretrial motion to dismiss the charges against him, pursuant to New Mexico’s	8
overdose prevention statute, a statute within the Controlled Substances Act,2F
3 NMSA	9
1978, Section 30-31-27.1(A)(1) (2007, amended 2019). In relevant part, the	10
overdose prevention statute provides immunity from arrest, charges, prosecution,	11
and other penalties for possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia if the evidence	12
supporting these charges was obtained as a result of the defendant having sought	13
medical assistance in good faith for someone experiencing a drug or alcohol	14
1 Defendant does not appeal his conviction for distribution of a controlled
substance (tramadol), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-22(A) (2021).
2 The 2022 amendment does not apply. Defendant was convicted in 2021 under
the statutory language as amended in 2019.
3 Overdose prevention statutes are referred to variously both in legal treatises
and by courts as Good Samaritan laws, medical amnesty laws, 911 immunity laws,
and overdose prevention laws. See Nicole Schill, The Fatal Shortcomings of Our
Good Samaritan Overdose Statutes and Proposed Model Statute, 25 Cardozo J.
Equal Rts. & Soc. Just. 123, 126 n.17. We use the overdose prevention language our
Legislature uses in the statute’s title.

2
overdose. See § 30-31-27.1(A). Defendant appeals the district court’s finding that	1
by not acting diligently without undue delay to seek medical assistance, he did not	2
act “in good faith” as required by the overdose prevention statute.	3
{2} 	Defendant also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the	4
methamphetamine seized by law enforcement officers from inside a notebook found	5
during the search of his home. Defendant contends that the warrant allowing the	6
search of his home failed to identify the notebook with particularity, and that opening	7
and searching the notebook exceeded the scope of the warrant. Defendant also	8
contends that he was entitled to an adverse inference instruction under State v. Ware,	9
1994-NMSC-091, 118 N.M. 319, 881 P.2d 679, based on what he alleges is officer	10
misconduct in failing to collect body camera footage of the search of his home.	11
{3} 	Not persuaded there was error on any of these grounds, we affirm the district	12
court.	13
BACKGROUND	14
Introduction	15
{4} 	On July 30, 2021, Defendant called emergency medical personnel to his home	16
because Defendant’s friend, Mary (Victim), who had been visiting him for several	17
days, was experiencing an overdose. Law enforcement officers and emergency	18
medical personnel arrived within minutes of the 911 call and found Victim	19
unresponsive. Victim was not breathing, had no pulse, and her body was cold to the	20

3
touch. Defendant was standing over Victim, but was not administering aid. Both law	1
enforcement and emergency personnel believed that Victim was dead when they	2
arrived and likely had been dead for an hour or more. They nonetheless attempted	3
to revive her pursuant to their protocol for responding to such an emergency. They	4
were unsuccessful.	5
The Search Warrant	6
{5} 	Following Victim’s death, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for	7
Defendant’s home relying, to establish probable cause for the search, on their	8
observation of drug paraphernalia in plain view when they arrived in response to the	9
911 call, as well as Defendant’s reported admission to a neighbor that he had	10
administered the drugs that led to Victim’s overdose. Law enforcement seized	11
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia during the search. This evidence was the	12
basis for the charges of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia at	13
issue in this appeal. Additional facts concerning Defendant’s challenges to the search	14
will be presented in our discussion.	15
Defendant’s Immunity Claim Under the Overdose Prevention Statute	16
{6} 	Defendant does not appear to have challenged the lawfulness of either his	17
arrest for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia or his indictment	18
for these crimes. Prior to trial, however, Defendant moved to dismiss the possession	19
of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia charges, contending he was entitled to	20

4
immunity from being charged and prosecuted under Section 30-31-27.1(A) of the	1
overdose prevention statute. Section 30-31-27.1(A) states as follows:	2
A person who, in good faith, seeks medical assistance for someone	3
experiencing 	an 	alcohol- 	or 	drug-related 	overdose 	shall 	not 	be	4
arrested, charged, prosecuted or otherwise penalized, nor shall the	5
property of the person be subject to civil forfeiture, for violating any	6
of the following if the evidence for the alleged violation was obtained	7
as a result of the need for seeking medical assistance.	8
Id.	9
“[S]eeking medical assistance” is defined by the overdose prevention statute as	10
either 	“(1) 	reporting 	an 	alcohol- 	or 	drug-related 	overdose 	or 	other 	medical	11
emergency to law enforcement, the 911 system or another emergency dispatch	12
system, a poison control center or a health care provider”; or (2) “assisting an	13
individual who is reporting an alcohol- or drug-related overdose or providing care	14
to an individual who is experiencing an alcohol- or drug-related overdose or other	15
medical emergency while awaiting the arrival of a health care provider.” Section 30-	16
31-27.1(D).	17
{7} 	Defendant’s motion to dismiss alleged that he had both called 911 and	18
provided assistance to Victim while waiting for medical personnel to arrive. The	19
State contended in response that Defendant was not entitled to immunity because the	20
evidence showed that Defendant had done nothing to either obtain or provide	21
medical assistance to Victim; Defendant had failed to call for assistance and he had	22
failed to provide care to Victim while waiting for assistance to arrive after the 911	23

5
call was placed. The State also alleged that Defendant knew Victim was already dead	1
by the time he sought assistance, suggesting Defendant was ineligible given the	2
person experiencing an overdoes must be 	then in “need for seeking medical	3
assistance.” See § 30-31-27.1(A).	4
{8} 	The district court scheduled a pretrial evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s	5
motion to dismiss. At the outset of the hearing, defense counsel argued that an	6
evidentiary hearing was required and that the burden of proof was on the State. The	7
hearing proceeded on this basis.	8
{9} 	The 	State 	presented 	testimony 	from 	a 	law 	enforcement 	officer 	and 	a	9
paramedic who had arrived at Defendant’s house in response to the 911 call. The	10
district court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the	11
evidence at the hearing. The court found that Defendant “did not make the 911 call”	12
and “was not rendering aid to [Victim] when [law enforcement] arrived” minutes	13
after the 911 call. The court also found that Victim was dead when the 911 call was	14
made and “had been dead for at least an hour.” The district court determined that	15
“[t]here was no good faith request for emergency assistance or rendering of aid to	16
[Victim] while awaiting emergency assistance on the part of . . . Defendant.”	17
{10} 	When new evidence arose subsequent to the pretrial immunity hearing	18
showing that Defendant had in fact placed the 911 call, contrary to the district court’s	19
findings at the hearing, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider. The district court	20

6
held a hearing on that motion. The court noted near the outset of the reconsideration	1
hearing, and again when Defendant objected to the introduction of hearsay evidence,	2
that the burden of proof was on Defendant on his motion to reconsider and that the	3
rules of evidence did not apply. Defendant authenticated and played for the district	4
court an audio recording of Defendant’s 911 call. The State conceded that Defendant	5
had placed the 911 call.	6
{11} 	After the introduction of the 911 call into evidence by Defendant, the State	7
questioned the law enforcement officer who had interviewed Jeffrey Vanconnett,	8
Defendant’s neighbor and Victim’s friend, and the only person apart from Defendant	9
present at the scene of the overdose when medical personnel were called and arrived.	10
The officer testified that Jeffrey had told him that Defendant came to his house on	11
July 30, 2021, the day Victim died. Defendant told Jeffrey that he had given Victim	12
some “black and white (heroin and methamphetamine)” and that she had overdosed.	13
{12} 	They went back to Defendant’s house after Jeffrey finished dressing, and	14
found Victim on a bed unresponsive and not warm. Defendant performed a few	15
ineffective pushes on Victim’s chest, then Jeffrey took over and began doing CPR.	16
Defendant told Jeffrey he would call 911, which he did at 10:05 a.m.	17
{13} 	Following 	the 	hearing 	on 	the 	motion 	to 	reconsider, 	the 	district 	court	18
reaffirmed its original decision that Defendant had not made a good faith request for	19
emergency assistance or rendered aid while awaiting emergency assistance. The	20

7
district court’s order stated that the new evidence offered at the hearing did not	1
warrant reconsideration of its prior decision.	2
Defendant’s Conviction of the Possession Charges and Acquittal of Trafficking	3
and Felony Murder	4
{14} 	In July 2022, nearly a year after Victim’s death, Defendant was indicted for	5
trafficking and first-degree murder (felony murder), as well as possession of	6
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, based on allegations that he administered	7
drugs he knew to be dangerous to Victim, intentionally causing her death. The	8
superseding grand jury indictment charging trafficking and felony murder claimed	9
that “[D]efendant did intentionally cause the death of Victim . . . , during the	10
commission or attempted commission of [t]rafficking a controlled substance (by	11
distribution), a felony offense, under circumstances or in a manner dangerous to	12
human life and [D]efendant intended to kill or knew that his acts created a strong	13
probability of death or great bodily harm, a capital offense, contrary to NMSA 1978,	14
Section 30-2-1(A)(2) (1994).” The State’s theory was that Defendant had injected	15
Victim with a mixture of narcotics early in the morning of July 30, 2021, causing	16
her to overdose. According to the State, Defendant then waited to seek medical	17
assistance out of fear of law enforcement, letting Victim die and waiting nearly an	18
hour after her death and only then going to tell Jeffrey what had happened and finally	19
returning home and calling 911. Defendant contended at trial that Victim woke up	20
during the night and ingested her own fentanyl pills while he slept. The defense	21

8
claimed he awoke in the morning and found her not breathing and cool to the touch.	1
A jury acquitted Defendant of both trafficking and felony murder, but convicted him	2
of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Defendant did not again	3
before, during, or after trial claim immunity in the district court under the overdose	4
prevention statute.	5
{15} 	We reserve additional facts for our discussion of each issue raised on appeal.	6
DISCUSSION	7
I. 	Defendant’s Claim of Immunity From Prosecution Under the Overdose	8
Prevention Statute	9
{16} 	Our research shows that this is the first time our appellate courts have been	10
asked to review a district court’s decision granting or denying immunity from	11
prosecution under our overdose prevention statute based on whether a defendant’s	12
conduct in seeking medical attention was in good faith. In order to resolve this	13
appeal, we must decide both the question of statutory interpretation raised by the	14
parties about what constitutes “good faith” when a defendant seeks assistance for	15
someone experiencing an overdose. We then must determine whether the district	16
court’s findings of fact, including the ultimate finding that Defendant did not act in	17
good faith in seeking medical assistance for Victim, are supported by substantial	18
evidence in the record.	19
{17} 	Before we reach these substantive issues on appeal, however, we must first	20
resolve the controversy between the parties as to whether our review should rely	21

9
solely on the evidence introduced at the two pretrial hearings on immunity from	1
charging and prosecution, as the State contends, or whether we must also consider	2
the evidence presented at trial, as Defendant contends.	3
A. 	When a Defendant Claims Immunity From Prosecution, This Court	4
Reviews Solely the Record of the Pretrial Evidentiary Hearing or	5
Hearings	6
{18} 	Because neither party provided a developed argument about what evidence is	7
relevant on appeal, we asked both parties for supplemental briefing on whether we	8
can consider evidence presented at trial that is not part of the record of the pretrial	9
hearings. We asked as well for briefing on which party had the burden of proof in	10
the district court on immunity under the overdose protection statute.	11
{19} 	The parties agree that Defendant bore the burden of proof and that to the extent	12
the district court placed that burden on the State, that was error. On the question of	13
what evidence we consider in reviewing the district court’s denial of the motion to	14
dismiss, 	Defendant 	argues 	in 	his 	supplemental 	brief 	that 	both 	the 	evidence	15
introduced at the original and reconsideration pretrial hearings, and the evidence	16
introduced during Defendant’s jury trial should be considered on appeal. Defendant	17
argues: (1) that he was sentenced in violation of the overdose prevention statute’s	18
grant of immunity from penalties, and that sentencing authority is jurisdictional and	19
cannot be waived, so Defendant can make his unpreserved immunity argument	20
relying on trial evidence on appeal; and, in the alternative; and (2) that we should	21

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treat a claim of immunity under the overdose prevention statute like a motion to	1
suppress evidence, where this Court reviews both the evidence at the suppression	2
hearing and the evidence at trial to determine whether constitutional limits on	3
searches and seizures were violated. We are not persuaded by either of Defendant’s	4
arguments.	5
{20} 	First, Section 30-31-27.1(A) of the overdose prevention statute is not a	6
provision bestowing sentencing authority on the district court: it is a limited grant of	7
immunity from arrest, charging, prosecution, and punishment for crimes committed	8
under certain sections of the Controlled Substance Act, NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-	9
1 to -41 (1972, amended 2025). Nor is it self-executing; rather, the burden of	10
asserting immunity and proving its application is on Defendant. Our Legislature has	11
provided in Section 30-31-37 of the Controlled Substances Act, that “[t]he burden	12
of proof of any exemption or exception [within the Act] is upon the person claiming	13
it.” The immunity offered by the overdose prevention statute is such an exemption	14
or exception. Therefore, Defendant’s contention that the district court loses its	15
statutory authority to sentence and is divested of jurisdiction when there is any	16
possibility of immunity under the overdose prevention statute, even if it has not been	17
raised by the defendant, is incorrect.	18
{21} 	We also are not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that we consider the	19
evidence at trial as well as the evidence introduced at the pretrial hearing by analogy	20

11
to our review of motions to suppress illegally seized evidence. In the case of a motion	1
to suppress, our review is governed by our Supreme Court’s opinion in State v.	2
Martinez, which expanded the scope of the evidence reviewed on appeal from the	3
grant or denial of a motion to suppress to include evidence at trial. 1980-NMSC-	4
066, ¶ 16, 94 N.M. 436, 612 P.2d 228. Martinez provides for consideration of trial	5
evidence when our appellate courts review whether law enforcement had probable	6
cause to conduct a warrantless search. Id. The expansion of the evidence reviewed	7
by this Court in Martinez, however, is limited and specific—we are unaware of any	8
subsequent precedent applying this expansion to other pretrial motions or in other	9
contexts in criminal proceedings. It was adopted because the rights at stake in	10
suppression hearings are constitutional in nature. See id. ¶ 16 (holding that an	11
expanded view of the evidence is necessary so that appellate rules are not “vindicated	12
at the cost of protection under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United	13
States Constitution”).	14
{22} 	The issue before us is not constitutional in nature; rather, it concerns a limited	15
type of statutory immunity provided by our Legislature for policy reasons unrelated	16
to constitutional limits on the prosecution of crime. Moreover, unlike a pretrial	17
suppression hearing, where the rules of evidence do not apply, the pretrial immunity	18
hearing under the overdose prevention statute is an on-the-record evidentiary hearing	19

12
where Defendant, not the State, bears the burden of proof.3F
4 See State v. Rivera, 2008-	1
NMSC-056, ¶ 15, 144 N.M. 836, 192 P.3d 1213 (“At a suppression hearing, the	2
court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not	3
be admissible at trial.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Because the	4
rules of evidence do not apply in suppression hearings, affidavits of law enforcement	5
witnesses can be admitted. Id. Unlike an overdose prevention statute immunity issue	6
where witnesses must appear at the pretrial hearing, the trial may be the first	7
opportunity for the defense to cross-examine the witnesses. For these reasons, we	8
are not persuaded that the unique consideration given to trial evidence in the context	9
of reviewing constitutional interests at stake in a suppression hearing extends to	10
claims of immunity under the overdose prevention statute.	11
{23} 	We therefore agree with the State that, under the plain terms of the Controlled	12
Substances Act, a defendant bears the burden of seeking immunity under the	13
overdose prevention statute and, when immunity from charging or prosecution is	14
sought, such a motion must be decided based on a pretrial evidentiary hearing where	15
the defendant bears the burden of proof. The scope of our review on appeal is limited	16
4 Although in this case, the State introduced hearsay testimony in defending
against Defendant’s motion to reconsider, we do not assume that this is the norm in
immunity hearings under the overdose prevention statute. Since the objection to the
admission of this hearsay testimony has not been pursued on appeal, we rely, as did
Defendant, the State and the district court, on this hearsay evidence without deciding
whether it was properly admitted.

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to the evidence presented at the pretrial evidentiary hearing. Lastly, we offer no	1
opinion on whether the overdose prevention statute allows a defendant to raise	2
immunity from conviction or punishment at trial or post-trial. Defendant did not do	3
so here and, therefore, we do not consider this question.4F
5
4
B. 	Seeking Medical Assistance in Good Faith Requires That Assistance Be	5
Sought Diligently, Without Undue Delay	6
{24} 	We next construe the meaning of “good faith” as our Legislature has used that	7
term in the overdose prevention statute. We then apply that definition to the facts	8
admitted into evidence at the pretrial immunity hearing and at the pretrial hearing on	9
the motion to reconsider to determine whether substantial evidence supports the	10
district 	court’s 	conclusion 	that 	Defendant 	is 	not 	entitled 	to 	immunity 	from	11
prosecution because he did not call 911 “in good faith,” as required by the overdose	12
prevention statute.	13
{25} 	As we have previously noted, the meaning of the phrase “in good faith,” as	14
applied by the overdose prevention statute to a person who seeks medical assistance	15
for someone experiencing an overdose, has not yet been addressed by our appellate	16
courts. This is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Hovet	17
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-010, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 397, 89 P.3d 69. “Our primary	18
5 We note that at least one other state court with an overdose prevention statute
similar to New Mexico’s has construed their statute to allow a defendant to raise
immunity pretrial, at trial, at conviction, and post-trial. See, e.g., State v. W.S.B., 180
A.3d 1168, 1183-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).

14
goal when interpreting statutory language is to give effect to the intent of the	1
[L]egislature.” State v. Torres, 2006-NMCA-106, ¶ 8, 140 N.M. 230, 141 P.3d 1284.	2
“In determining legislative intent, we look to the plain language of the statute and	3
the context in which it was enacted, taking into account its history and background.”	4
Pirtle v. Legis. Council Comm., 2021-NMSC-026, ¶ 14, 492 P.3d 586.	5
{26} 	The overdose prevention statute provides in pertinent part:	6
A. 	A person who, in good faith, seeks medical assistance for	7
someone experiencing an alcohol- or drug-related overdose shall not be	8
arrested, charged, prosecuted or otherwise penalized, nor shall the	9
property of the person be subject to civil forfeiture, for violating any of	10
the following if the evidence for the alleged violation was obtained as	11
a result of the need for seeking medical assistance.	12
Section 30-31-27.1.	13
{27} 	We first note that neither the overdose prevention statute nor the definitions	14
section of the Controlled Substance Act, § 30-31-2, the act that includes the overdose	15
prevention statute, defines the phrase “in good faith.” Both Defendant and the State	16
argue that we should adopt the plain, common meaning of “good faith” found in	17
most dictionaries. Both parties rely primarily on the definition of “good faith” in	18
Black’s 	Law Dictionary, 	as 	representative of the 	commonly 	used 	dictionary	19
definitions of “good faith.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “good faith,” in relevant	20
part as “[a] state of mind consisting in . . . honesty in belief or purpose.” Good Faith,	21
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Despite this agreement by the parties on	22
the common meaning of the term “good faith,” Defendant and the State have	23

15
conflicting views on how this definition should be applied in the context of the	1
overdose prevention statute.	2
{28} 	Defendant argues that “the focus of [the overdose prevention statute] is	3
whether a person honestly, sincerely, believ[es] a person needs medical assistance	4
and calls for help.” If a defendant calls for help with a subjective belief that medical	5
assistance is needed at the time the call is placed, and with the sincere desire to obtain	6
such assistance for the person experiencing an overdose, Defendant claims that the	7
requirement of good faith is satisfied. According to Defendant, so long as, at the	8
moment it is placed, the call for assistance is made with the honest purpose of	9
obtaining medical care and with the belief that the assistance is required, rather than	10
with some ulterior motive (such as obtaining immunity from prosecution), the call	11
for help has been made in “good faith.” Defendant points to his expression of	12
concern for Victim during his 911 call and his request that emergency personnel	13
“hurry” in support of his subjective good faith.	14
{29} 	The State claims, in contrast, that our Legislature intended that seeking	15
medical assistance in “good faith” should take into account the totality of a	16
defendant’s 	conduct 	from 	the 	time 	a 	defendant 	discovers 	that 	someone 	is	17
experiencing an overdose until the call for help is placed, and not just a defendant’s	18
subjective good faith at the moment of the call. According to the State, “good faith”	19
requires 	that 	Defendant 	establish 	that 	he 	acted 	with 	diligence 	under 	the	20

16
circumstances, promptly seeking emergency medical assistance without undue	1
delay.	2
{30} 	Both of these approaches to the requirement of good faith are found in New	3
Mexico law. Which approach applies varies depending on the context in which the	4
term “good faith” is used.5F
6 We turn to the history and purpose of the statute and to	5
precedent in other states’ construing language virtually identical to the New Mexico	6
overdose prevention statute to determine the meaning intended by our Legislature.	7
{31} 	The overdose prevention statute was enacted in 2007. See 2007 N.M. Laws,	8
ch. 260, § 1. New Mexico was the first state to enact an overdose prevention statute.	9
Schill, supra note 20, at 126. All but three states have since followed New Mexico’s	10
lead. See id. The overdose prevention statute has been construed by this Court as	11
“clearly [intended] to encourage those experiencing an overdose, as well as those	12
witnessing another person overdose, to seek medical attention without fear of [arrest,	13
6 Our Supreme Court’s recent decision in CCA of Tennessee, LLC v. New
Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, 2024-NMSC-013, ¶ 15, 548 P.3d 1,
construed “good faith” in the context of the recipient of a nontaxable transaction
certificate. The Supreme Court notes in that opinion that the term good faith “has
been described as a term that is used in various contexts, with its meaning varying
somewhat depending on the context.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Conts.,
§ 205 cmt. a (1981)). The Court identifies as the two most common approaches those
argued by the parties here: a subjective approach that focuses solely on the person’s
subjective belief at the time the action is taken, and an objective approach that
considers the actions taken by the person under the surrounding circumstances. Id.
¶ 17 n.5. Defendant’s approach is an example of the subjective approach; the State’s
approach is an example of an objective approach to good faith.

17
charging, prosecution, or other penalties]” for possession of drugs or other specified	1
relatively minor crimes discovered by authorities as a result of the call of help. State	2
v. Herrera, 2024-NMCA-063, ¶ 15, 554 P.3d 743. The Legislature amended the	3
overdose prevention statute in 2019 to expand the types of offenses that would be	4
immunized from arrest and prosecution, in order to further encourage someone who	5
is a drug user to call 911 when they experience or see someone else experiencing an	6
overdose. Id. (addressing the 2019 amendment, which adds immunity for probation	7
and parole violations).	8
{32} 	The context in which the overdose prevention statute was enacted, and in	9
which it was expanded by amendment in 2019, provide insight into the Legislature’s	10
intent in using the term “in good faith.” New Mexico’s statute, and those of other	11
states—many of them adopting New Mexico’s approach of providing immunity	12
from 	arrest 	and 	prosecution, 	others 	choosing 	other 	methods—are 	aimed 	at	13
preventing fatal overdoses. See Schill, supra at 126. The enactment of the overdose	14
prevention statute, its amendment, and the enactment of similar statutes in other	15
states, coincided both with a rapidly increasing death toll from illegal narcotic use,	16
and with the availability of drugs capable of quickly reversing an overdose from	17
those drugs. Id. at 124-25. The combination made it clear that if someone witnessing	18
or experiencing an overdose called for medical assistance promptly, it would be	19
possible to save the life of someone who is overdosing. Id. at 125 n.13. Our	20

18
Legislature and others realized that “[t]here is a better chance of survival from an	1
overdose if medical assistance arrives quickly.” Id. at 156.	2
{33} 	A requirement that to be entitled to immunity from arrest or prosecution, a	3
defendant must seek medical assistance “in good faith” is included in nearly all of	4
the state overdose prevention statutes. See id. at 149-50. The good faith requirement	5
has been construed by both legal scholars and state courts to require a defendant to	6
be objectively diligent in reporting the overdose in a timely manner. See Scott	7
Koven, 	Deserving Life: How Judicial Application of Medical Amnesty Laws	8
Perpetuates Substance Use Stigma, 80 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1745, 1776-81 (2023).	9
State courts construing their state’s overdose prevention statute have concluded that	10
diligence in seeking medical assistance is essential to achieving the statutory purpose	11
of saving lives and that such diligence is part of the “good faith in seeking medical	12
assistance” demanded by their statute. See State v. Gill, 642 S.W.3d 356, 362-63	13
(Mo. Ct. App. 2022) (holding that “good faith in seeking medical assistance requires	14
an honest and diligent effort on the part of the person seeking aid”); People v. Taylor,	15
60 N.Y.S.3d 779, 783 (2017) (concluding that the defendant did not seek health care	16
“in good faith” because he did not immediately ask someone to call 911 when he	17
discovered the overdose victim unresponsive).	18
{34} 	In its decision in Gill, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s	19
grant of immunity from prosecution based on evidence showing that the defendant	20

19
delayed calling 911 until well after he was aware that the overdose victim was facing	1
a medical emergency. 642 S.W.3d at 362-63. The Missouri statute, in language	2
nearly identical to the New Mexico overdose prevention statute, provides immunity	3
from certain drug-related prosecutions to “[a] person who, in good faith, seeks or	4
obtains medical assistance for someone who is experiencing a drug or alcohol	5
overdose.” Mo. Ann. Stat. § 195.205.2. (West 2017); Gill, 642 S.W.3d at 360. The	6
Missouri court rejected the narrow, subjective interpretation of “good faith in	7
seeking or obtaining [medical assistance]” advocated by Defendant here, construing	8
the statute to require “that an individual claiming immunity must exercise good faith	9
generally 	in 	seeking 	or 	obtaining 	medical 	assistance,” 	including 	exercising	10
“reasonable diligence” under the circumstances. See Gill, 642 S.W.3d at 362	11
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the evidence showed that	12
the defendant waited hours to call for medical assistance after he knew his friend	13
was experiencing an overdose—first cleaning up vomit and blood stains—the	14
Missouri court determined that the defendant did not satisfy the statute’s requirement	15
to seek medical assistance “in good faith,” “even if [the defendant] genuinely	16
intended to obtain help for the victim when he finally made the call for help.” Id. at	17
363.	18
{35} 	In Taylor an appellate court in New York similarly concluded, under New	19
York’s overdose prevention statute, N.Y. Penal Law § 220.78(4) (McKinney 2021),	20

20
that a defendant violated the good faith requirement of the New York overdose	1
prevention statute by not immediately seeking medical assistance when he first	2
discovered the victim. 	Taylor, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 783-85. The court in 	Taylor	3
determined that even a short delay to dress the victim and get rid of a box of needles	4
before directing someone to call 911 showed that defendant had not sought medical	5
assistance with the diligence required to be acting in “good faith” and held that the	6
defendant, therefore, was not entitled to immunity from prosecution under the New	7
York statute. Id. at 785.	8
{36} 	The legislative purpose of the New Mexico statute, like the Missouri and New	9
York statutes, is to save the lives of overdose victims by encouraging people to	10
promptly seek medical assistance. See Herrera, 2024-NMCA-063, ¶ 15 (“[T]he	11
purpose 	of 	[the 	overdose 	prevention 	statute] 	is 	clearly 	to 	encourage 	those	12
experiencing an overdose, as well as those witnessing another person overdose, to	13
seek medical attention without fear of a probation or parole revocation action.”).	14
Doing so with diligence is essential to achieve the statutory purpose of saving lives.	15
We therefore hold that in the context of the overdose prevention statute, seeking	16
medical assistance in good faith necessarily requires that a defendant seek medical	17
assistance without delay.	18
{37} 	Having concluded that “good faith” necessarily requires that a defendant seek	19
medical assistance without delay, we next review the record to determine whether	20

21
substantial evidence supported the district court’s finding that Defendant failed to	1
seek medical assistance in good faith.	2
C. 	The District Court’s Finding That Defendant Failed to Seek Medical	3
Assistance in Good Faith Is Supported by Substantial Evidence	4
{38} 	The district court found that “[t]here was no good faith request for emergency	5
assistance . . . on the part of . . . Defendant.” Defendant’s substantial evidence	6
argument applies what we have concluded is an improper subjective legal standard	7
to the evidence in the record, arguing that the evidence shows conclusively that	8
Defendant called 911 not for the sake of escaping criminal culpability, but for the	9
honest purpose of getting medical assistance, and that the district court erred in	10
finding otherwise.	11
{39} 	Because Defendant applies the wrong legal standard, Defendant does not	12
adequately address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court’s	13
finding that Defendant did not act in good faith because he did not call 911 in a	14
timely manner, without undue delay. Our substantial evidence review, however,	15
must focus on the sufficiency of the evidence under what we have determined is the	16
applicable law. Having concluded that “good faith” under the overdose prevention	17
statute requires objective evidence that medical assistance was sought diligently,	18
without undue delay, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence against this	19
definition of good faith.	20

22
{40} 	Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable	1
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Salgado, 1999-	2
NMSC-008, ¶ 25, 126 N.M. 691, 974 P.2d 661 (internal quotation marks and citation	3
omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Martinez, 2021-NMSC-002, 478	4
P.3d 880. When evidence is “subject to conflicting interpretations and inferences,	5
the [district] court as the fact[-]finder [is] empowered to weigh the evidence,	6
determine the credibility of the witnesses, and resolve any conflicts in the evidence.”	7
State v. Goss, 1991-NMCA-003, ¶ 20, 111 N.M. 530, 807 P.2d 228. “An appellate	8
court must indulge in all reasonable inferences in support of the district court’s	9
decision and disregard all inferences or evidence to the contrary.” State v. Martinez,	10
2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 15, 410 P.3d 186 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and	11
citation omitted).	12
{41} 	The court’s ultimate finding that Defendant did not seek medical assistance	13
for Victim in good faith is supported by the court’s underlying findings of fact and	14
by substantial evidence of significant delay by Defendant in calling 911 after he	15
knew that Victim had overdosed. Although the record is not clear about either the	16
time Victim ingested the drugs or when she first began to experience an overdose,	17
the district court received evidence that Defendant went to Jeffrey’s house shortly	18
before 10:00 a.m. and told Jeffrey that he had given Victim a mixture of “black and	19
white”—heroin and methamphetamine—and that she had overdosed. After that	20

23
disclosure, Jeffrey and Defendant returned to Defendant’s house. Only at that point,	1
at 10:05 a.m. did Defendant call 911. The transcript of that call shows that Defendant	2
reported that Victim had overdosed, that she was not breathing, and had no pulse.	3
The law enforcement officer who arrived minutes after the 911 call testified that he	4
found Victim’s body cold and stiff. A paramedic who arrived at 10:13 a.m., eight	5
minutes after Defendant’s 911 call, testified that she believed, based on medical	6
factors she observed and described, that Victim had been dead for at least an hour.	7
{42} 	The district court inferred from Jeffrey’s testimony that Defendant likely	8
knew that Victim was experiencing an overdose from the time he injected her with	9
the heroin and methamphetamine or shortly thereafter. The evidence from law	10
enforcement and paramedics that Victim was dead when they arrived, and that she	11
had been dead over an hour by 10:13 a.m. created a reasonable inference that	12
Defendant injected Victim and then waited until revival was unlikely before going	13
to Jeffrey’s house to tell him Victim had overdosed. Defendant did not call 911 until	14
he returned home with Jeffrey. Under our standard of review, drawing all inferences	15
in support of the district court’s findings, the court’s finding of a lack of good faith	16
based on significant delay by Defendant in seeking medical assistance is supported	17
by reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record. Defendant, who had the	18
burden of proof, introduced no evidence that contradicted the inferences reasonably	19
drawn by the district court. No evidence relating to the defense later raised by	20

24
Defendant at trial—that Victim had overdosed on her own fentanyl pills during the	1
night while Defendant slept—was offered at either pretrial hearing.	2
{43} 	To effectuate the purpose of Section 30-31-27.1, a defendant must seek	3
medical assistance without unnecessary delay. The evidence in the record at the	4
pretrial immunity hearing supports the district court’s findings that Defendant did	5
not do that. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the district court’s order, and	6
we find no error.6F
7
7
II. 	Law Enforcement’s Search of the Notebook Found on Defendant’s Desk	8
Was Within the Scope of the Search Warrant	9
{44} 	Defendant next challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to	10
suppress the methamphetamine seized from inside the notebook found on his desk	11
during the search of his home. Defendant claims that the warrant authorizing the	12
search did not identify the notebook with sufficient particularity and that “officers	13
exceeded the scope of the search warrant” when they opened the notebook and seized	14
the methamphetamine from inside its cover. In reviewing the grant or denial of a	15
motion to suppress evidence, “we review the district court’s ruling to determine	16
7 Because we affirm the district court’s decision on grounds relied on by the
district court—that Defendant did not seek medical assistance in “good faith”
because he did not do so with diligence—we need not address the State’s right for
any reason argument regarding whether someone must be alive to be “experiencing”
an overdose, nor do we need to decide whether the overdose prevention statute also
requires subjective belief that victim is alive and medical assistance is needed,
questions discussed by the parties in their briefs on appeal.

25
whether the law was correctly applied to the facts, viewing the facts in the light most	1
favorable to the prevailing party.” State v. Hinahara, 2007-NMCA-116, ¶ 7, 142	2
N.M. 475, 166 P.3d 1129 (omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).	3
“The district court’s determination that a search warrant is insufficiently particular	4
is reviewed de novo.” See id.; see also State v. Gutierrez, 2004-NMCA-081, ¶ 4, 136	5
N.M. 18, 94 P.3d 18 (stating that appellate courts “apply a de novo standard of	6
review to the [district] court’s application of law to the facts”).	7
A. 	Background	8
{45} 	After Victim’s death, law enforcement officers prepared a probable cause	9
affidavit and obtained a warrant to search Defendant’s home for, as relevant here,	10
illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant does not contest the issuance of the	11
warrant based on probable cause to search his home for these items. The warrant	12
authorized law enforcement to search for and seize, “[c]ontrolled substances listed	13
in the New Mexico Controlled Substance [A]ct” (listing Methamphetamine), and	14
“[p]araphernalia commonly associated with the use of and distribution of illicit	15
drugs.”	16
{46} 	During the search, law enforcement opened a notebook that was on top of	17
Defendant’s desk and found the methamphetamine that forms the basis of the drug	18
possession charge in this matter concealed inside the notebook.	19

26
{47} 	Defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine, claiming that the search	1
warrant did not “authorize[] the seizure or search of [Defendant]’s notebooks,	2
journals, diaries, or books” with the required particularity, and that therefore the	3
search of the notebook was outside the scope of the warrant.	4
{48} 	At the district court hearing on the motion to suppress Investigator Diana	5
Chavez, the law enforcement officer who prepared the affidavit for the warrant and	6
conducted the search, testified that based on her experience and training, controlled	7
substances may be found in inconspicuous locations like jeweler’s baggies that are	8
sometimes a “square inch in size, and [the drugs] could be either located on the	9
clothing, pants pockets, shoes, socks, inside of booklets, or envelopes.” Investigator	10
Chavez testified that she found the methamphetamine inside a cookie wrapper	11
concealed inside the notebook, and that such a place was a place where drugs were	12
often stashed. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the	13
methamphetamine, concluding that the search warrant was sufficiently particular	14
and that law enforcement had probable cause to believe that the drugs that were the	15
focus of the warrant would be found inside the notebook.	16
B. 	Discussion	17
{49} 	We understand Defendant to argue that the methamphetamine seized from the	18
notebook should have been suppressed because the affidavit and search warrant	19
failed to identify the notebook with particularity as a place to be searched within	20

27
Defendant’s home. Defendant contends that law enforcement was aware that there	1
were books, notebooks and papers in his home, and that they easily could have	2
identified these specifically as items to be searched. We note that Defendant does	3
not claim that the search was aimed at written content in the notebook. Defendant,	4
therefore, does not challenge the search on First Amendment grounds.	5
{50} 	“A description in a search warrant is sufficient if the description enables the	6
officer to identify the place intended to be searched or item to be seized with	7
reasonable effort.” Hinahara, 2007-NMCA-116, ¶ 9 (alteration, internal quotation	8
marks, and citation omitted). To fulfill the particularity requirement, “[t]here must	9
be a sufficient nexus between the evidence law enforcement is looking for and the	10
particular place being searched.” State v. Sabeerin, 2014-NMCA-110, ¶ 26, 336 P.3d	11
990.	12
{51} 	We look at the search warrant and the accompanying affidavit together to	13
determine whether a warrant meets the particularity requirement. “[I]f the factual	14
basis for the warrant is sufficiently detailed in the search warrant affidavit and the	15
issuing court has found probable cause, the reviewing courts should not invalidate	16
the 	warrant 	by 	interpreting 	the 	affidavit 	in 	a 	hypertechnical, 	rather 	than 	a	17
commonsense, manner.” State v. Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, ¶ 30, 146 N.M. 488,	18
212 P.3d 376 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).	19

28
{52} 	Under the facts in this case, we do not agree with Defendant that the warrant	1
lacked sufficient particularity. The warrant clearly stated the place to be searched: it	2
was Defendant’s home. It specifically listed methamphetamine among the items to	3
be seized, along with other controlled substances listed in the New Mexico	4
Controlled Substance Act. It is undisputed that the affidavit provided sufficient	5
probable 	cause 	for 	searching 	the 	home 	for 	controlled 	substances, 	and 	for	6
methamphetamine in particular. Our caselaw makes clear that “if there is probable	7
cause to search for a particular item [here methamphetamine] the officer can search	8
every container and location within the permitted area where that item could be	9
located.” Hinahara, 2007-NMCA-116, ¶ 14 (emphasis added). Investigator Chavez	10
testified at the hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress that in her experience and	11
training, controlled substances may be found in inconspicuous locations similar to	12
the 	one 	where 	the 	methamphetamine 	was 	found 	here. 	The 	district 	court’s	13
determination that the warrant was sufficiently particular about the location and the	14
items to be seized to allow officers to open and search inside a notebook is supported	15
by both the law and the evidence at the suppression hearing. We affirm.	16
III. 	Defendant Was Not Entitled to an Adverse Inference Instruction	17
{53} 	Defendant makes one remaining argument: that the district court erred in	18
failing to give an adverse inference jury instruction as a sanction for the law	19
enforcement officers’ failure to record the search of Defendant’s home with their	20

29
body cameras. See UJI 14-5062 NMRA (instructing the jury that if the state failed	1
to gather evidence, the jury may, “but [is] not required to, infer that the evidence	2
would be unfavorable to the [s]tate”).	3
{54} 	In order to be entitled to such an instruction when the failure to collect	4
evidence is alleged, a defendant must show that the two-part test adopted by our	5
Supreme Court in Ware, 1994-NMSC-091, ¶ 25, for determining whether to sanction	6
the state when police fail to gather evidence from a crime scene, applies. First, the	7
district court must determine that the evidence that was not collected is “relevant,	8
material, or important to the defense, as opposed to extraneous or duplicative of	9
other evidence.” Id. ¶ 24. Second, the district court must also find that law	10
enforcement’s failure to collect the evidence “was done in bad faith, in an attempt	11
to prejudice the defendant’s case.” Id. ¶ 26.	12
{55} 	Defendant claims that the body camera footage would have been important to	13
support his claim in the suppression hearing that the search of his home exceeded	14
the scope of the search warrant. Defendant argues that “[w]hile admittedly slightly	15
speculative, body camera recordings of the officers executing the search warrant	16
would have shown to what extent officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant.”	17
We are not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that body camera footage would	18
have been material to his claim that the search of his home exceeded the scope of	19
the warrant. The officer who searched the notebook testified at the suppression	20

30
hearing and was subject to cross-examination. Defendant concedes that he has no	1
reason apart from speculation to believe that the video camera footage would differ	2
in any material way from the officer’s testimony admitting that they found the	3
notebook on Defendant’s desk, opened the notebook, and searched inside it for	4
methamphetamine. The body camera footage thus would have been duplicative of	5
this testimony.	6
{56} 	Moreover, the manner of opening and searching the notebook, the only	7
information that might have been shown by the body camera footage, is not material	8
to the district court’s determination, which we affirm, that the search of the notebook	9
and seizure of its content was lawful. See Hinahara, 2007-NMCA-116, ¶ 14	10
(holding that if there is probable cause to search for a particular item “the officer can	11
search every container and location within the permitted area where that item could	12
be located” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).	13
{57} 	Although we need not address the second factor of the Ware test, we note that	14
even if the body camera evidence was material, Defendant does not contend that the	15
officers acted in bad faith in not activating their body cameras. The record shows	16
that the officers did not activate their cameras based on a reasonable belief that body	17
cameras only needed to be used in encounters with the public. See NMSA 1978,	18
§ 29-1-18(A)(1) (2020, amended 2023) (requiring law enforcement officers to	19
activate a “body-worn camera whenever a peace officer is responding to a call for	20

31
service or at the initiation of any other law enforcement or investigative encounter	1
between a peace officer and a member of the public”). Even if the officers were	2
mistaken in their understanding that the use of the body cameras was limited to	3
encounters with the public, a question we need not and do not decide, sanctioning	4
the State for failure to collect this evidence is not appropriate where, as here,	5
Defendant concedes that officers did not act in bad faith.	6
{58} 	Neither prong of the Ware test was satisfied by Defendant. We therefore	7
conclude that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s request to sanction	8
the State by giving the jury an adverse inference instruction.	9
CONCLUSION	10
{59} 	We affirm Defendant’s convictions of possession of methamphetamine and of	11
drug paraphernalia.	12
{60} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	13
_________________________	14
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge	15
WE CONCUR:	16
___________________________________	17
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge	18
___________________________________	19
SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge	20