September 23, 2010 – Maria T. Stennis v. City of Santa Fe, No. 28,985

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: __________
Filing Date: September 23, 2010
NO. 28,985
MARIA T. STENNIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF SANTA FE,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
James A. Hall, District Judge
Simons & Slattery, LLP
Thomas A. Simons, IV
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
City of Santa Fe
Frank D. Katz, City Attorney
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee

OPINION
KENNEDY, Judge.
{1} 	In Stennis v. City of Santa Fe, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 4, 143 N.M. 320, 176 P.3d
309, the Supreme Court held that a municipality has valid authority to regulate
domestic wells and remanded this case to the district court for additional findings of
fact. Specifically, the district court was ordered to determine whether the actions of
Defendant City of Santa Fe (City) conformed with NMSA 1978, Section 3-53-1.1(D)
(2001), which requires municipalities to file ordinances restricting the drilling of
domestic water wells with the Office of the State Engineer (OSE). The district court
concluded that although the City never actually filed a copy of its ordinance with the
OSE, it substantially complied with Section 3-53-1.1(D) by providing actual notice
in the form of faxes and letters to OSE personnel.
{2} 	The sole issue on appeal is whether Section 3-53-1.1(D) allows for substantial
compliance. We hold that it does not and reverse the order of the district court.
BACKGROUND
{3} 	In 1999, the City passed an ordinance restricting the drilling of domestic water
wells. Stennis, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 5. Titled, “Regulation of New Domestic Wells,”
the ordinance prohibited drilling on property with a property boundary within two-

2
hundred feet of a water distribution main. 	Id. 	Two years later, in 2001, the state
Legislature passed Section 3-53-1.1(D), which, in allowing municipalities to restrict
domestic well drilling, provided that “[a] municipality shall file with the [OSE] its
municipal ordinance restricting the drilling of new domestic water wells.” Stennis,
2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 6 (emphasis omitted). Thereafter, the City and the OSE engaged
in an informal process in which the OSE would issue well permits to qualifying
applicants and then periodically notify the City of those applicants who also required
permits under the city ordinance.
{4} 	Plaintiff Maria T. Stennis (Stennis) is one such applicant. In 2003 she applied
for and was issued a well permit from the OSE. As Stennis’s well fell within the city
limits, the OSE notified the City, which then informed Stennis of its own internal
permit requirement. Id. ¶ 7. Stennis chose to challenge the City’s authority to enact
the ordinance and proceeded to dig the well under her OSE permit. Id. ¶ 8. Instead
of pursuing her challenge within the municipal administrative process, she filed a
declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the ordinance. The district court
found her claim without merit and ruled in favor of the City on its motion for
summary judgment. Id. ¶ 9.
{5} 	On appeal, this Court affirmed, assuming without deciding that declaratory
judgment was available to Stennis. Stennis v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMCA-125, ¶ 6,

3
140 N.M. 517, 143 P.3d 756. This Court also held that the City possessed the power,
through its ordinance, to regulate domestic wells. We stated that “the City complied
with Subsection 3-53-1.1(D) because it filed a copy of its 1999 Ordinance with the
[OSE] . . . and there is nothing to suggest that the City violated the statute.” Stennis,
2006-NMCA-125, ¶ 22. Addressing Stennis’s assertion that Section 3-53-1.1 requires
a specific method of enactment and enforcement, we indicated that Section 3-53-1.1
has no “procedural requirements that must be satisfied by a municipality when
adopting an ordinance regulating the drilling of domestic wells.” 	Stennis, 2006-
NMCA-125, ¶ 23. Rather, we held that no evidence indicated that the City failed to
meet any of the statutory conditions. Id.
{6} 	Taking certiorari, the Supreme Court held that Stennis had a right to challenge
the ordinance with a declaratory judgment action, Stennis, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 14, and
that the City’s ordinance was a valid exercise of its home rule authority. Id. ¶ 15. The
Court immediately concluded, however, that “[i]f the City did not file its ordinance
before Stennis applied for her permit, the City is without authority to regulate
Stennis’s well and she is permitted to use it.” Id. ¶ 4. Disagreeing with this Court’s
opinion, the Supreme Court held, “Section 3-53-1.1(D) clearly mandates that the City
file the 1999 Ordinance with the [OSE].” 	Stennis, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 23. Citing
insufficient facts, however, the Court held that genuine issues of material fact required

4
the district court to consider “whether the City filed the 1999 Ordinance with the
[OSE].” Id. ¶ 24. The Court held:
If the City filed the 1999 Ordinance with the [OSE] before Stennis
applied for her domestic well permit, Stennis must file for city
authorization and the City must provide her the procedural protections
required by Section 3-53-1.1. If the City did not file the 1999 Ordinance
with the [OSE] before Stennis applied for her domestic well permit, then
the City failed to comply with the Section 3-53-1.1(D) requirement and
cannot validly regulate Stennis’s well.
Stennis, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 24 (emphasis added).
{7} 	After holding an evidentiary hearing on remand, the district court answered that
question and found that the ordinance was “not filed with, or sent to, the [OSE].”
Taking a step around home plate, however, it also found that the OSE had actual
notice of the ordinance, its content, and substance because the City provided actual
notice of the ordinance to the OSE in early 1999. In light of this finding, in its order
and final judgment on remand, the district court decided that “because the City
substantially complied with the statutory requirement in . . . Section 3-53-1.1[(D)]
before . . . Stennis applied to the [OSE] for her domestic well permit, under the
Supreme Court’s opinion . . . Stennis was required to apply for City authorization.”
{8} 	Stennis appeals again. She argues that simply providing notice of the
ordinance’s language is insufficient to satisfy Section 3-53-1.1(D), which requires
filing of the actual ordinance. 	See id.; see also NMSA 1978, § 3-17-5(A) (1965)

5
(requiring an ordinance to be “authenticated by the signature of the presiding officer
of the governing body and the municipal clerk”). Furthermore, she argues that even
if Section 3-53-1.1(D) permits substantial compliance, the City’s actions were
insufficient to meet that standard. 	In light of our Supreme Court’s opinion in this
matter, we conclude that Section 3-53-1.1 requires strict compliance with the statute.
Accordingly, we do not analyze whether the City substantially complied.
DISCUSSION
{9} 	While strict compliance is certainly not necessary in all situations, a statute’s
mandatory language cannot be lightly dismissed because “many legislative goals
require strict compliance.” 	Green Valley Mobile Home Park v. Mulvaney, 1996-
NMSC-037, ¶ 11, 121 N.M. 817, 918 P.2d 1317. Strict compliance means that the
statutory provision at issue must be followed precisely. 	See Cochrell v. Mitchell,
2003-NMCA-094, ¶ 17, 134 N.M. 180, 75 P.3d 396 (finding strict compliance
requires nothing less than “letter-perfect” performance). Substantial compliance, on
the other hand, recognizes the reality that legislatures cannot predict all possible
applications when drafting a statute. See also Brown v. Trujillo, 2004-NMCA-040,
¶ 18, 135 N.M. 365, 88 P.3d 881 (refusing to apply substantial compliance because
of the absence of an unanticipated contingency); see also Lane v. Lane, 1996-NMCA-
023, ¶ 17, cert. denied, 121 N.M. 414, 912 P.2d 290 (“The [L]egislature, as with

6
anyone who issues an order, cannot anticipate every contingency.”). 	Thus, it
sometimes happens that a party’s actions satisfy the will of the Legislature despite that
party’s clear failure to comply with a statute’s mandatory language. See Green Valley,
1996-NMSC-037, ¶ 10; Brown, 2004-NMCA-040, ¶ 13. 	“[B]lind adherence to
statutory language does not always lead to a just result[.]” 	Green Valley, 1996-
NMSC-037, ¶ 10 (citation omitted). Nor should courts elevate form over function.
Id. 	Accordingly, because the outcome of this case turns the application of our
Supreme Court’s previous opinion in this case and upon legislative intent, we apply
a de novo standard of review. 	Stennis, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 13 (“Interpretation of
municipal ordinances and statutes is a question of law that we review de novo.”).
{10} 	Our courts have repeatedly observed that a statute’s plain language is the most
reliable indicator of legislative intent. 	See Johnson v. N.M. Oil Conservation
Comm’n, 1999-NMSC-021, ¶ 27, 127 N.M. 120, 978 P.2d 327. Furthermore, unless
the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent, we are to give statutory words
“their ordinary meaning” and are prohibited from reading “into a statute . . . language
which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Lion’s Gate Water v. D’Antonio, 2009-NMSC-
057, ¶ 23, 147 N.M. 523, 226 P.3d 622 (“When a statute is clear and unambiguous,
we interpret it as written.”). We must construe statutes “in the most beneficial way

7
of which their language is susceptible to prevent absurdity, hardships or injustice, to
favor public convenience, and to oppose all prejudice to public interests.” 	City
Comm’n of Albuquerque v. State ex rel. Nichols, 75 N.M. 438, 445, 405 P.2d 924, 928
(1965). The City concedes it failed to comply with the filing requirement of Section
3-53-1.1(D) and urges us to regard as appropriate the district court’s acceptance of
substantial compliance. 	Unfortunately, under the plain meaning rule, the very
language with which the City failed to comply most completely expresses the will of
the Legislature. 	For this reason, although we look first to the plain language of
Section 3-53-1.1(D) itself, we must also look to the other provisions of the statute to
determine whether they express a legislative intent that might override the plain
language of Section 3-53-1.1(D) and allow for substantial compliance. See Martinez
v. Sedillo, 2005-NMCA-029, ¶ 9, 137 N.M. 103, 107 P.3d 543 (observing that courts
should consider “all provisions of a statute” when discerning legislative intent). In its
entirety, Section 3-53-1.1 provides:
A. 	A municipality may, by ordinance, restrict the drilling of new
domestic water wells, except for property zoned agricultural, if the
property line of the applicant is within three hundred feet of the
municipal water distribution lines and the property is located within the
exterior boundaries of the municipality.
B. 	No municipality may deny authorization for a new domestic water
well permit to an applicant if the total cost to the applicant of extending
the 	municipal 	water 	distribution 	line, 	meter 	and 	hook-up 	to 	the

8
applicant’s residence exceeds the cost of drilling a new domestic water
well.
C. 	A municipality that fails to authorize the drilling of a new
domestic water well shall provide domestic water service within ninety
days to the property owner under the municipal water provider’s usual
and customary charges and rate schedules.
D. 	A municipality shall file with the [OSE] its municipal ordinance
restricting the drilling of new domestic water wells.
E. 	An applicant for a domestic water well located within the exterior
boundaries of a municipality with a new domestic water well drilling
ordinance shall obtain a permit to drill the well from the municipality
subsequent to the [OSE]’s approval.
F. 	A municipality with a domestic water well drilling ordinance shall
act upon a new domestic water well permit application within thirty days
of receipt of the request.
G. 	A municipality shall notify the [OSE] of all municipal permit
denials for domestic well authorization.
H. 	An applicant may appeal the decision of the municipality to the
district court in the county of the municipality.
I. 	Nothing in this section shall limit the authority of the [OSE] to
administer water rights as provided by law.
J. 	The [OSE] shall not be liable for actions taken in accordance with
a municipal ordinance authorizing restriction of domestic well drilling
within the exterior boundaries of a qualified municipality.
(Emphasis added).
{11} 	As indicated above, the plain language of Section 3-53-1.1(D) requires

9
municipalities to file any ordinance restricting the drilling of wells with the OSE. If
we give these words their ordinary meaning, we must conclude that the actual notice
given by the City to the OSE falls short of that requirement. 	Based only on the
language of Section 3-53-1.1(D), to conclude that something less than filing the actual
ordinance sufficiently satisfies the statute would require us to go outside the plain
meaning of the words. The parties each urge different interpretations of Subsection
(D)’s language.
{12} 	The parties seem to agree that Section 3-53-1.1(D) is intended to facilitate
notice. 	They disagree, however, as to whom it is intended to notify. 	The City
contends that Section 3-53-1.1(D)’s filing requirement was intended “to facilitate and
coordinate” the efforts of municipalities and the OSE. 	Stennis argues that the
requirement was intended to notify not only the OSE but also the public and other
municipalities. As stated above, the district court agreed with the City. While the
interpretation embraced by the City and the district court seems reasonable enough,
Stennis’s interpretation is perhaps just as likely. Very little evidence can be found for
either argument in the other provisions of Section 3-53-1.1, and for that reason, we
adopt neither.
{13} 	As a whole, Section 3-53-1.1 recognizes the related interests of three parties:
the citizen who desires to drill a well; the municipality that desires to regulate well-

10
drilling; and the OSE, as the ultimate steward of New Mexico’s water supply.
Accordingly, Section 3-53-1.1 allocates a variety of rights and obligations to each.
Subsections (B), (C), (F), and (H) protect the citizen by (1) ensuring the citizen’s right
to drill where the cost of drilling is cheaper than establishing a connection to the
municipal system, Section 3-53-1.1(B); (2) requiring the municipality to provide water
to the citizen within ninety days of a denial, Section 3-53-1.1(C); (3) requiring the
municipality to act on all permits within thirty days, Section 3-53-1.1(F); and (4)
bestowing upon the citizen a right to appeal adverse decisions, Section 3-53-1.1(H).
Subsections (A) and (E) recognize the interests of the municipality by (1) providing
the statutory power to enact ordinances regulating wells within a municipality’s own
borders, Section 3-53-1.1(A); and (2) requiring citizens to obtain permits from both
the city and the OSE prior to drilling, Section 3-53-1.1(E). Finally, subsections (G),
(I), and (J) acknowledge the interests of the OSE by (1) providing that cities must
notify the OSE when they deny permit applications, Section 3-53-1.1(G); (2)
recognizing that the OSE retains its authority to regulate water rights, Section 3-53-
1.1(I); and (3) limiting the OSE’s liability for municipal permit denials, Section 3-53-
1.1(J). 	These provisions give us scant indication of the legislative intent behind
Subsection (D). They seem to favor equally the interests of the City, Stennis, and the
OSE; and it is therefore impossible for us to say conclusively whether Subsection (D)

11
was intended to provide simple cross-communication between municipalities and the
OSE, or whether some other motivation was at work—the creation of a filed public
record, for instance, that might be available for inspection by citizens and other
municipalities.
{14} 	What little evidence we find in other provisions seems to indicate that the
Legislature intended municipalities to actually file their ordinances with the OSE. In
Subsection (G), for example, cities must “notify” the OSE when they deny a citizen’s
municipal permit application, Section 3-53-1.1(G). They are not required to file such
denials with the OSE. Simple notice will not do, and it therefore seems clear that if
the Legislature had intended simple notice to satisfy the requirements of Subsection
(D), it would have written it to provide as much. Nor is there any indication that this
situation is one the statute’s drafters failed to anticipate. See Brown, 2004-NMCA-
040, ¶ 13; Lane, 1996-NMCA-023, ¶ 17. In fact, it is exactly the situation Section 3-
53-1.1(D) contemplates—the municipality passed an ordinance regulating the drilling
of wells within its boundaries, and for whatever reason, did not file it with the OSE.
It remains unclear exactly why the Legislature chose to require filing and not simply
notice. But we must “give effect to the legislative intent, not . . . question the wisdom
of the [L]egislature’s requirements.” Citizens for Incorporation, Inc. v. Bd. of County
Commr’s, 115 N.M. 710, 715-16, 858 P.2d 86, 91-92 (Ct. App. 1993) (citation

12
omitted). In this case, that intent is apparent in the statute’s plain language.
{15} 	The Supreme Court has read Section 3-53-1.1(D) as we do. 	Throughout
Stennis, the Court refers to the filing requirement in mandatory terms, and never once
does the Court suggest that a municipality might satisfy the statute by filing a copy of
its enactment containing the actual language of the ordinance as opposed to the
ordinance itself. 	For instance, in the introduction, the Court observes “that a
municipality must file its ordinance with the [OSE].” Stennis, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 3.
Later, it states that Section 3-53-1.1(D) “requires that the City follow a certain
procedure, in particular, the filing of the municipal ordinance with the [OSE].”
Stennis, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 11. Still later, it describes the statute this way: “Section
3-53-1.1(D) also specifically required the 1999 Ordinance to be filed with the [OSE]
to be effective.” 	Stennis, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 16. Finally, in perhaps its strongest
language, the Court holds “Section 3-53-1.1(D) clearly mandates that the City file the
1999 Ordinance with the [OSE].” Stennis, 2008-NMSC-008, ¶ 23 (emphasis added).
{16} 	Moreover, our Legislature has proven capable of explicitly providing for
substantial compliance when it decides such flexibility is necessary, and although the
absence of such language is not alone determinative, its absence provides additional
support to our holding. See, e.g., Cochrell, 2003-NMCA-094, ¶ 2 (analyzing NMCA
1978, § 7-38-70 (1982), and observing that it requires only that property be “sold

13
substantially in accordance with the Property Tax Code”); Ferguson-Steere Motor
Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 60 N.M. 114, 118, 288 P.2d 440, 444 (1955) (observing
that the Legislature explicitly allowed for substantial compliance in the case of 1953
Comp. § 64-27-70, which does not require strict compliance on the part of the
corporation commission), but cf. State v. Cherryhomes, 1996-NMSC-072, ¶ 18, 122
N.M. 687, 930 P.2d 1139 (holding that substantial compliance was permissible under
the appointment provisions for special prosecutors); Town of Hurley v. N.M. Mun.
Boundary Comm’n, 94 N.M. 606, 608, 614 P.2d 18, 20 (1980) (holding that a party
substantially complied with a statutory notice provision); Rutledge v. Johnson, 81
N.M. 217, 222, 465 P.2d 274, 279 (1970) (refusing to require strict compliance where
party received benefits created under the statute but sought to avoid responsibility
under same by arguing that verification of his signature was an absolute requirement);
Town of Hot Springs v. Able, 46 N.M. 149, 151, 123 P.2d 720, 722 (1941) (holding
the substantial compliance was permissible despite mandatory language to the
contrary).
CONCLUSION
{17} 	Substantial compliance is a doctrine of statutory interpretation that examines
whether an actor follows a statute “sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which
the statute was adopted and [in a manner that] accomplishes the reasonable objectives

14
of the statute.” Lane, 1996-NMCA-023, ¶ 17 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In this case, we hold that the plain language of Section 3-53-1.1(D) clearly
expresses the Legislature’s intent that municipalities file their ordinances with the
OSE. 	Having no doubt of Stennis’s actual notice of a municipal ordinance, but
because the City did not strictly comply with Section 3-53-1.1(D), as they must, we
yield to the mandatory requirements of the law. Accordingly, we reverse the order of
the district court.
{18} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________________
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge
____________________________
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge