May 28, 2014 – Melissa Galetti v. Derral W. Reeve, Kim Gillen, Brenda Conyne, and Texico Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 32,625

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number:

Filing Date: May 28, 2014

NO. 32,625

MELISSA GALETTI,
Plaintiff-A ppellant,

V.

DERRAL W. REEVE, KIM GILLEN,
BRENDA CONYNE, and TEXICO
CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION OF
SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISIS,

Defendants-A ppellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
C. Shannon Bacon, District Judge

Maestas & Suggett, P.C.

Wayne R. Suggett
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.
Edward Ricco

Jocelyn Drennan

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellees

OPINION
GARCIA, Judge.
{1} 	Melissa Galetti (Plaintiff) appeals from the district court’s grant of Defendants’
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA.
The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint against the Texico Conference
Association of Seventh-Day Adventists (the Conference), Derral W. Reeve, Kim
Gillen, and Brenda Conyne because it concluded that Defendants are immune from
suit pursuant to the church autonomy doctrine, which is based on the First
Amendment. See Celnik v. Congregation B’Nai Israel, 2006-NMCA-039, ¶¶ 10-11,
139 N.M. 252, 131 P.3d 102. We conclude that the district court erred in dismissing
Plaintiff’s complaint. The First Amendment does not immunize every legal claim
against a religious institution or its members, but only those claims that are rooted in
religious belief. See id.; see also Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo.,
289 F.3d 648, 657 (10th Cir. 2002). As pled, Plaintiff’s claims are not rooted in
religious belief and thus do not implicate the First Amendment as a matter of law. We
reverse the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	For purposes of this appeal, “we accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in
the complaint as true and resolve all doubts in favor of sufficiency of the complaint.”

1Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she was harassed “during the summer of
2011” but it is clear from the timeline of events and other documents in the record that
the alleged harassment took place in 2010, not 2011.
2
Madrid v. Vill. of Chama, 2012-NMCA-071, ¶ 18, 283 P.3d 871 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-006, 294 P.3d 1243.
{3} 	Plaintiff alleges that she was employed as a principal and a teacher at
Crestview Elementary School (Crestview) located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from
2009 to 2011. Crestview is a religious school operated by the Conference, which is
part of the Southwestern Union and North American Division of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church. Plaintiff alleges that she was harassed by her supervisor, Reeve, in
the summer of 2010. 1 Plaintiff submitted a complaint to the Conference, which issued
a written reprimand to Reeve. Plaintiff alleges that Reeve, Gillen, and Conyne
retaliated against her, which ultimately led to the termination of her employment.
{4} 	Plaintiff alleges that she was told she would be employed as a teacher at
Crestview for the 2011-12 school year and was not notified of a change prior to the
May 1, 2011, deadline. She filed a formal charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission on May 17, 2011. Reeve raised the issue of
Plaintiff’s employment at a board meeting on May 23, 2012. At the meeting, which
Plaintiff did not attend, the Board voted to terminate Plaintiff’s employment “without
reason or cause.”

2 Plaintiff also asserted a claim for intentional and negligent misrepresentation
against the Conference, but she voluntarily dismissed that claim.
3
{5} 	Plaintiff filed a complaint for wrongful termination asserting the following
claims for relief: (1) breach of contract against the Conference; (2) retaliatory
discharge and violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act against Reeve; (3)
intentional interference with contract and civil conspiracy against Reeve, Gillen, and
Conyne; and (4) defamation and civil conspiracy against Reeve, Gillen, and Conyne.2
Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, interest, attorney fees, and costs.
{6} 	Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1-012(B)(6), arguing that
all of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by First Amendment considerations embodied in
the church autonomy doctrine. In support of their motion, Defendants submitted
portions of the Texico Conference Employee Handbook and the Southwestern Union
Conference Education Code K-12. Defendants also filed a motion for a protective
order, arguing that they should not have to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests.
Plaintiff fully responded to these motions.
{7} 	Following a hearing, the district court issued a brief order granting Defendants’
motion to dismiss and dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. The district
court stated that it found Defendants’ motion to be “well taken” but did not otherwise
explain the basis for its decision. The district court noted that its decision mooted
Defendants’ motion for a protective order.

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DISCUSSION
{8} 	Plaintiff contends the district court erred in granting Defendants’ motion to
dismiss because the church autonomy doctrine does not prohibit breach of contract
claims and does not apply to individuals sued in their individual capacity. Plaintiff
also contends the district court erred in failing to convert Defendants’ motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that the district
court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, we do not consider this second issue.
{9} 	We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim under Rule 1-012(B)(6) de novo. See Madrid, 2012-NMCA-071, ¶ 12.
“Dismissal under Rule 1-012(B)(6) is appropriate only if the non-moving party is not
entitled to recover under any theory of the facts alleged in their complaint.” Madrid,
2012-NMCA-071, ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The purpose
of our rule is to test the law of the claim, not the facts that support it.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
A. 	Church Autonomy Doctrine
{10} 	The church autonomy doctrine “prohibits civil court review of internal church
disputes involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and polity.” Bryce,
289 F.3d at 655. The doctrine is based on the First Amendment, which states in
pertinent part that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[.]” U.S. Const. amend. I. The church

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autonomy doctrine protects both interests embodied in the First Amendment. See
Celnik, 2006-NMCA-039, ¶ 11. “First, it prevents civil legal entanglement between
government and religious establishments by prohibiting courts from trying to resolve
disputes related to ecclesiastical operations.” Id. Second, it protects the free exercise
of religion “by limiting the possibility of civil interference in the workings of religious
institutions[.]” Id.
{11} 	In Celnik, we recognized that the immunity afforded by the church autonomy
doctrine “is not absolute[.]” Id. ¶ 20. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained
in Bryce, the church autonomy doctrine “does not apply to purely secular decisions,
even when made by churches.” 289 F.3d at 657. Before a court concludes that the
church autonomy doctrine is implicated, it must engage in the “threshold inquiry” of
determining “whether the alleged misconduct is rooted in religious beliefs.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Bell v. Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (describing threshold inquiry as
determining whether the dispute is ecclesiastical or purely secular).
{12} 	Here, it does not appear that the district court considered whether Plaintiff’s
claims are rooted in religious belief; instead, it appears that the district court simply
concluded that Defendants are immune from suit as a matter of law. We do not believe
that the church autonomy doctrine is so easily triggered. Whether it applies to any
particular claim depends upon the specific nature of the claim and the remedy sought.

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We agree with the following:
Before barring a specific cause of action, a court first must analyze
each element of every claim and determine whether adjudication would
require the court to choose between competing religious visions, or cause
interference with a church’s administrative prerogatives. . . . The court
must next examine the remedies sought by the plaintiff and decide
whether enforcement of a judgment would require excessive procedural
or substantive interference with church operations.
If the answer to either of those inquiries is in the affirmative, then
the dispute is truly of a religious nature . . . and the claim is barred from
secular court review. 	If, however, the dispute can be resolved by the
application of purely neutral principles of law and without impermissible
government intrusion . . . there is no First Amendment shield to
litigation.
McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 856-57 (N.J. 2002) (emphasis, internal quotation
marks, and citations omitted).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim
{13} 	We first consider whether the district court erred in concluding that the church
autonomy doctrine precludes consideration of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim
against the Conference. Plaintiff contends the district court erred in dismissing this
claim because it is secular in nature and can be resolved without implicating the First
Amendment. Defendants contend this claim was properly dismissed because any
question regarding Plaintiff’s termination is a religious question in light of Plaintiff’s

3We assume for purposes of this appeal that Plaintiff’s position was a
ministerial one, even though she was not the head of the congregation. See Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 697, 707 (2012)
(agreeing with the lower courts that “[t]he ministerial exception is not limited to the
head of a religious congregation”). We note, however, that the question of whether a
particular individual’s position should be considered ministerial is a question of fact,
not of law, and thus should generally be decided in the context of a motion for
summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss. See id. at 700, 707-09 (refusing
“to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister” and
concluding based on various factors that a “called teacher” was a minister for purposes
of the ministerial exception).
4We note that the record contains a letter from the Conference to Plaintiff, dated
June 1, 2011, stating that the Board voted “not to retain [Plaintiff] as a teacher.” This
letter appears to invoke the non-renewal provision set forth in the Southwestern Union
Conference Education Code K-12, which states that “[t]he employing organization
shall give written notice to the regular employee by May 1 [of] its intention not to
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ministerial position.3 We agree with Plaintiff.
{14} 	In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Conference made express and implied
promises to her concerning her employment, which she reasonably relied upon in
accepting employment. She alleges that the Conference breached its promises to her,
among them “the failure to timely notify [Plaintiff] of non-renewal and [the] failure
to timely terminate her 2011-12 teaching contract year with just cause.” As pled, it
appears that Plaintiff can succeed on her breach of contract claim without any
religious intrusion. The district court does not need to determine whether the
Conference had cause to terminate Plaintiff’s employment, but only whether the
Conference complied with its contractual obligation with respect to the timeliness of
the notice it provided to Plaintiff. 4

renew the annual assignment agreement.” Defendants argue in their answer brief that
Plaintiff’s 	breach 	of 	contract 	claim 	cannot 	be 	examined 	without 	religious
entanglement because the district court must determine whether Plaintiff’s termination
was for cause. This might be an appropriate argument for a motion for summary
judgment, but not for a motion to dismiss. Looking at Plaintiff’s complaint, it appears
that she can succeed on her breach of contract claim without having to establish that
she was terminated without cause.
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{15} 	In terms of remedy, Plaintiff does not seek reinstatement of her teaching
position, but seeks only monetary damages. Defendants do not contend that entering
a money judgment against the Conference would require excessive interference with
church operations. Thus, under the framework set forth in McKelvey, Plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim does not appear to be religious in nature and thus does not
implicate First Amendment concerns as a matter of law.
{16} 	Because Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim can potentially be resolved without
any religious entanglement, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing it.
See, e.g., Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, __ S.W.3d __, 2014 WL 1512223,
at *11 (Ky. 2014) (concluding that ministerial employee’s breach of contract claims
survived motion for summary judgment because “(1) the enforcement of the
contractual arrangement . . . does not arouse concerns of government interference in
the selection of ministers, and (2) the contract does not involve any matters of
ecclesiastical concern”); Second Episcopal Dist. African Methodist Episcopal Church
v. Prioleau, 49 A.3d 812, 817-18 (D.C. 2012) (affirming the district court’s denial of

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the church’s motion to dismiss breach of contract claim and noting that plaintiff “does
not claim she was wrongfully terminated or otherwise tether her contract claim to
matters of church doctrine or governance” but “claims only that the church failed to
pay her salary after acknowledging its obligation to do so”). If, at some later stage in
the proceedings, it becomes apparent that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim in fact
turns on matters of doctrinal interpretation or church governance, then summary
judgment in favor of the Conference may be proper. See id.
C. 	Plaintiff’s Claims Against Individual Defendants
{17} 	We next consider whether the district court erred in concluding that the church
autonomy doctrine precludes consideration of Plaintiff’s claims against Reeve, Gillen,
and Conyne for retaliatory discharge and violation of the New Mexico Human Rights
Act, intentional interference with contract and civil conspiracy, and defamation and
civil conspiracy. Plaintiff contends the district court erred in dismissing these claims
because the church autonomy doctrine does not bar claims against individuals acting
in their individual capacities and because these claims do not concern religious
matters. Defendants contend these claims were properly dismissed because they arise
out of Plaintiff’s termination as a teacher and thus cannot be pursued in a judicial
forum. We conclude that the district court erred in dismissing these claims because,
as pled, they do not necessarily involve religious matters.
{18} 	In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Reeve “engaged in false statements and

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retaliatory conduct” against Plaintiff and “orchestrat[ed] and conspir[ed]” with Gillen,
and Conyne to get Plaintiff fired. Plaintiff alleges that Reeve, Gillen, and Conyne
“improperly used their position and relationships with [the Conference] . . . to cause
[the Conference] to wrongfully terminate [Plaintiff’s] employment.” And Plaintiff
alleges that Reeve, Gillen, and Conyne made defamatory statements to third parties
concerning Plaintiff’s work and family.
{19} 	Defendants contend these claims were properly dismissed because they all
“arise from a single factual nucleus: the termination of [Plaintiff’s] employment as a
teacher at Crestview, a ministerial position.” As we have already discussed, 	the
immunity afforded by the church autonomy doctrine is not triggered simply by the
subject matter of the complaint. Instead, the church autonomy doctrine applies only
if judicial resolution of the claims would violate the First Amendment. This is a fact-
specific and claim-specific inquiry, an inquiry that the district court did not engage in
here.
{20} 	We are not persuaded that the resolution of Plaintiff’s claims against Reeve,
Gillen, and Conyne, as pled, will necessarily result in religious entanglement. We thus
conclude that the district court erred in dismissing them as a matter of law. See, e.g.,
Bilbrey v. Myers, 91 So. 3d 887, 891-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the
district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for defamation against the pastor
under the church autonomy doctrine because the claim can be adjudicated without

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implicating the First Amendment); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d
951, 959 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court erred in dismissing the
plaintiff’s claims for sexual harassment and retaliation because the claims might be
purely secular).
{21} 	If it appears at a later stage of this case that Plaintiff’s claims against Reeve,
Gillen, and Conyne cannot be resolved without religious entanglement, then those
claims may properly be dismissed. See, e.g., Jennison v. Prasifka, 391 S.W.3d 660,
668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (concluding that the plaintiff’s claims for slander, tortious
interference with a contractual relationship, and wrongful discharge “are inextricably
intertwined with the church’s investigation of his performance as a priest and the
discipline imposed” and thus subject to dismissal).
CONCLUSION
{22} 	For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court’s order granting
Defendants’ motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings.
{23} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
WE CONCUR:

RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge

MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge

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