March 18, 2020- Maureen A. Telles v. Edmundo Telles, No. A-1-CA-36935

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO	1
MAUREEN A. TELLES	2
n/k/a MAUREEN A. RADER,	3
Petitioner-Appellee,	4
v. 	No. A-1-CA-36935	5
EDMUNDO TELLES,	6
Respondent-Appellant.	7
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY	8
Gerard J. Lavelle, District Judge	9
The Law Office of Dorene A. Kuffer, P.C.	10
Dorene A. Kuffer	11
James P. Deacon	12
Albuquerque, NM	13
for Appellee	14
Edmundo Telles	15
Albuquerque, NM	16
Pro Se Appellant	17
MEMORANDUM OPINION	18
DUFFY, Judge.	19
{1} 	In his second appeal in this divorce case, Husband again challenges the district	20
court’s decisions surrounding the division of the couple’s two automobiles and the	21
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Filed 3/18/2020 8:23 AM

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district court’s award of attorney fees to Wife. Having carefully considered the	1
parties’ briefing and the record,1 we affirm.	2
DISCUSSION2
3
I. 	Law of the Case Issues	4
{2} 	In this appeal, Husband argues that the district court, in several of its findings	5
and conclusions, failed to follow our opinion and mandate on remand. See Telles v.	6
Telles, No. 35,170, memo. op. (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2016) (non-precedential)	7
(Telles I). In so arguing, Husband invokes the law-of-the-case doctrine. State ex rel.	8
King v. UU Bar Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 2009-NMSC-010, ¶ 21, 145 N.M. 769, 205 P.3d	9
816 (stating that under the law of the case doctrine, “a decision by an appeals court	10
on an issue of law made in one stage of a lawsuit becomes binding on subsequent	11
1 Husband’s reply brief, at eighty-one pages, far exceeds the volume limitation
prescribed in the Rules of Appellate Procedure and we decline to consider any
arguments or contentions set forth in the pages exceeding those limits. See Rule 12-
318(F)(2), (3) NMRA (limiting reply brief to fifteen pages or 4,400 words); Rule
12-312(D) NMRA (“For any failure to comply with [our rules of appellate
procedure], the appellate court may, on motion by appellant or appellee or on its own
initiative, take such action as it deems appropriate . . . including but not limited to
. . . refusal to consider the offending party’s contentions[.]”); Bruce v. Lester, 1999-
NMCA-051, ¶ 4, 127 N.M. 301, 980 P.2d 84 (“[W]e regard pleadings from pro se
litigants with a tolerant eye, but a pro se litigant is not entitled to special privileges
because of his pro se status.”).
2 Because the parties are familiar with the facts and history of this case, we set
forth the factual and procedural background only to the extent it is pertinent to our
analysis in the discussion section.

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trial courts as well as subsequent appeals courts during the course of that litigation”).	1
“Whether law of the case applies, as well as how it applies, are questions of law	2
subject to de novo review.” 	Id. 	¶ 20. “[T]he law-of-the-case doctrine leaves	3
considerable discretion to appellate courts to interpret what, precisely, the law of the	4
case is[.]” Id. ¶ 27. “The law of the case generally applies to questions of law, not	5
‘purely fact’ questions.” Id. ¶ 21. Here, Husband argues that the district court did not	6
follow the law of the case when it determined the status of the automobiles, when it	7
determined that Husband was not prejudiced by Wife’s sale of the 2014 Lexus, and	8
when it awarded Wife attorney fees. We discuss each argument in turn.	9
A. 	2014 Lexus	10
{3} 	Husband argues that the district court’s ruling was contrary to Telles I when	11
it concluded that the 2014 Lexus was Wife’s separate property. Whether property is	12
separate or community is a question of law that we review de novo. Gabriele v.	13
Gabriele, 2018-NMCA-042, ¶ 18, 421 P.3d 828, cert. denied, 2018-NMCERT___,	14
(No. S-1-SC-36945, May 4, 2018).	15
{4} 	In Telles I, we held that the district court erred when it found that the 2014	16
Lexus “was transmuted into community property.” See Telles I, No. 35,170, memo.	17
op. ¶ 2 (stating that “both the BMW and the [2014] Lexus were erroneously treated	18
as community property”). We reversed and remanded with instructions to the district	19

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court to strictly apply the terms of the parties’ premarital agreement (PMA) in	1
dividing their property and debts. See id. ¶ 8 (instructing the district court to “strictly	2
apply the terms of the PMA, including the provisions for reimbursement when debt	3
owed on separate property is reduced due to contributions made by the other	4
spouse”). Although our prior opinion was admittedly imprecise in places, see, e.g.,	5
id. (instructing the district court to “fashion a remedy for the deprivation of	6
Husband’s separate property that occurred as a result of the circumvention of the	7
execution-and-sale statutes” (emphasis added)), we did not make any explicit	8
determination as to the status of the 2014 Lexus; rather, we instructed the district	9
court to make that determination. Id.	10
{5} 	On remand, the district court determined that the 2014 Lexus was Wife’s	11
separate property based on a provision in the parties’ PMA defining separate	12
property as “any property purchased by either party where that party obtains the	13
property by creation and payment of a separate debt in the manner set forth in NMSA	14
1978, [Section] 40-3-9(A)(4) [(1983)].” The 2014 Lexus was purchased during the	15
marriage, and although Husband made a down payment and traded in his 2006 Lexus	16
toward the purchase of the 2014 Lexus, Wife financed the remaining balance of	17
$45,000.85 in her name alone. The district court concluded that the debt on the 2014	18
Lexus was Wife’s separate debt, pursuant to Section 40-3-9(A)(4), and Husband	19

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does not challenge this conclusion on appeal. Husband, moreover, appears to have	1
affirmatively argued below that the debt on the 2014 Lexus was Wife’s separate	2
debt. In keeping with our mandate to strictly apply the parties’ PMA, the district	3
court concluded that the 2014 Lexus must be classified as Wife’s separate property	4
under the PMA because the debt on the 2014 Lexus was Wife’s separate debt.	5
Because the district court’s findings and conclusions regarding the debt are	6
unchallenged on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not err classifying	7
the 2014 Lexus as Wife’s separate property. See Stueber v. Pickard, 1991-NMSC-	8
082, ¶ 9, 112 N.M. 489, 816 P.2d 1111 (stating that unchallenged findings are	9
binding on appeal).	10
{6} 	Husband also argues that the divorce decree, entered before his appeal in	11
Telles I, should be read to award him the 2014 Lexus as his separate property and	12
that it should be enforced as a contract. As an initial matter, Husband does not point	13
to where this argument was preserved below. See Rule 12-318(A)(4) (requiring the	14
brief in chief to contain “a statement explaining how the issue was preserved in the	15
court below, with citations to authorities, record proper, transcript of proceedings,	16
or exhibits relied on.”); Rule 12-321(A) NMRA (“To preserve an issue for review,	17
it must appear that a ruling or decision by the trial court was fairly invoked.”). But	18
even reaching the issue on the merits, this argument fails because the final decree	19

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does not state that the 2014 Lexus was Husband’s separate property, as Husband	1
represents. Rather, it states that the 2014 Lexus was community property, awarded	2
to Husband. The community status of the 2014 Lexus was at issue in Telles I, and	3
because we concluded that the district court erred in finding the 2014 Lexus was	4
community property, the district court was required to apply the terms of the PMA	5
in dividing the property and debts regarding the 2014 Lexus on remand. No. 35,170,	6
memo. op. ¶ 2. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s findings	7
and conclusion that the 2014 Lexus was Wife’s separate property.	8
{7} 	Our affirmance on the issue of the 2014 Lexus disposes of a number of	9
Husband’s additional arguments in this appeal. First, because the 2014 Lexus was	10
Wife’s separate property, we also affirm the district court’s determination that	11
Husband suffered no prejudice from the manner in which Wife sold the 2014 Lexus.	12
Relatedly, because Husband was not prejudiced by Wife’s sale of the 2014 Lexus,	13
there was no reason for the district court to fashion any remedy for such prejudice.	14
Finally, we need not address Husband’s argument that he should have been allowed	15
more time to refinance the 2014 Lexus after it was initially awarded to him in the	16
divorce decree.	17

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B. 	BMW	1
{8} 	Husband also argues that the district court erred in its rulings regarding the	2
BMW. In the original divorce decree, the district court concluded that the BMW had	3
been transmuted into community property and awarded the vehicle to Wife. In Telles	4
I, we held that the district court erred by treating the BMW as community property	5
and remanded for further consideration of the PMA in dividing the property and	6
determining whether any party was entitled to reimbursement. No. 35,170, memo.	7
op. ¶¶ 1-2. On remand, the district court concluded that each party owned a one-half	8
interest in the BMW as tenants in common, based on evidence of a certified check	9
paid from Husband to Wife in the amount of $7,500 with the notation, “for 1/2	10
ownership/purchase of 2011 BMW X5[.]”The district court applied paragraph nine	11
of the PMA, which states in relevant part, “[N]othing shall preclude the parties from	12
owning property as . . . tenants-in-common with specific percentages owned as	13
separate property and such ownership shall not act to transmute such property into	14
community property.” Based on Husband’s payment to Wife for a one-half interest	15
in the BMW, the district court concluded that each party was entitled to a one-half	16
interest in tenancy in common.	17
{9} 	Although Husband challenges this conclusion on appeal, his arguments are	18
contradictory. He initially argues that the district court should have awarded the	19

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BMW to Wife as her separate property, and that Wife should have been ordered to	1
reimburse Husband for his $7,500 contribution. Later, however, Husband argues that	2
he purchased a one-half ownership interest in the BMW and that the district court	3
erred in declaring the BMW as Wife’s separate property. Contrary to Husband’s	4
second argument, however, the district court determined that the parties owned the	5
BMW as tenants in common, that its present value was $7,500, and that each party	6
owned a one-half interest in the value of the vehicle. Although the district court	7
ultimately applied Husband’s one-half interest in the value of the BMW to Wife’s	8
attorney’s fees, the district court nonetheless concluded that Husband had purchased	9
a one-half interest in the BMW with his $7,500 cashier’s check, and Husband has	10
failed to show that these findings were in error. Based on the district court’s	11
conclusion 	regarding 	the 	ownership 	of 	the 	BMW, 	we 	find 	no 	error 	in 	its	12
determination that Husband was not entitled to reimbursement for his $7,500	13
payment to Wife for the BMW. We therefore affirm the district court’s findings and	14
conclusions regarding the BMW.	15
C. 	Attorney Fees	16
{10} 	Defendant also argues that the district court ignored our prior opinion with	17
regard to attorney fees and incorrectly ordered an additional fees award in favor of	18
Wife. In Telles I, we instructed the district court as follows:	19

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following remand the district court will have the ability to adjust the	1
attorney fees awarded to account for the parties’ relative success during	2
the litigation, as well as other factors. In doing so, the court should take	3
into account the fact that $2,000 of the fees were awarded [to Wife] as	4
a result of Wife’s legally-unjustified request to circumvent the statutory	5
procedures 	concerning 	enforcement 	of 	judgments. 	At 	this 	time,	6
however, since the fees issue will be subject to adjustment on remand,	7
we decline to decide whether any particular portion of the fees awarded	8
should be reversed.	9
No. 35,170, memo. op. ¶ 6. Contrary to Husband’s understanding, however, the	10
district court on remand did not add $3,750 to Wife’s total award; instead, the district	11
court reduced the initial $7,000 award to $3,750.	12
{11} 	Although Husband argues that the award was in error, he failed to develop an	13
argument demonstrating that the district court abused its discretion in awarding	14
$3,750 in attorney fees to Wife. See Rule 1-127 NMRA (providing a procedure for	15
the district court to follow and factors for it to consider in awarding attorney fees in	16
domestic relations cases); Bursum v. Bursum, 2004-NMCA-133, ¶ 18, 136 N.M.	17
584, 102 P.3d 651 (indicating that the district court has discretion to decide whether	18
to award attorney fees under Rule 1-127); see also Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp.,	19
2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (“We will not review unclear	20
arguments, or guess at what his arguments might be.”). And while Wife also argues	21
in her answer brief that the district court abused its discretion by reducing her fee	22
award, she has not filed a cross-appeal, and her argument does not fall within Rule	23

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12-201(C) NMRA (“An appellee may, without taking a cross-appeal or filing a	1
docketing statement or statement of the issues, raise issues on appeal for the purpose	2
of enabling the appellate court to affirm, or raise issues for determination only if the	3
appellate court should reverse, in whole or in part, the judgment or order appealed	4
from.”). We therefore will not address Wife’s attorney fees argument.	5
{12} 	Husband has not demonstrated that the district court failed to follow our	6
mandate on remand, nor has he established any other error regarding the district	7
court’s disposition of the parties’ assets. We therefore affirm.	8
II. 	The District Court Afforded Husband an Opportunity to Be Heard	9
{13} 	Husband additionally argues that the district court did not provide him the	10
opportunity to make his arguments during the hearing on November 2, 2015, and at	11
the hearings on remand in 2017. It appears that Husband made a similar argument	12
in his last appeal, see Telles I, No. 35,170, memo. op. ¶ 7 (“[A]lthough Husband	13
complains that the judge was impatient with him and refused to listen to certain of	14
his arguments, it does not appear that Husband raised this issue with the district	15
judge by, for example, asking the judge to recuse from the case.”), but just as in that	16
appeal, Husband does not appear to have raised the issue in the district court to	17
preserve it for purposes of appeal. See Rule 12-321 (requiring a party to raise an	18
issue with the district court in order to preserve it for appeal).	19

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{14} 	Moreover, our review of the record reveals that Husband does not accurately	1
describe the proceedings. In the 2015 hearing, the district court allowed Husband an	2
opportunity to present his argument, and we find no support for Husband’s	3
characterization that the district court judge exhibited anger or raised his voice.	4
Likewise, in the post-remand hearings to which Husband refers, on August 22, 2017,	5
the district court allowed both parties to make opening statements. In his opening	6
statement, Husband started to quote our previous memorandum opinion in this case,	7
at which point the district court said, “sir, you don’t need to read to me . . . here’s	8
what an opening statement is: what do you think is going to be proved, and what	9
rulings are you requesting as a result of your anticipated evidence. Simple as that.”	10
Husband said “okay” and proceeded. At the end of his statement, Husband said, “I	11
think that’s all I have to say; I think it’s pretty clear.” The district court did not abuse	12
its discretion by limiting Husband’s arguments, to the extent it did so. See Gonzales	13
v. Surgidev Corp., 1995-NMSC-047, ¶ 14, 120 N.M. 151, 899 P.2d 594 (discussing	14
the trial court’s inherent authority to control its docket, proceedings, and affairs “so	15
as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases” (internal quotation	16
marks and citation omitted)).	17
CONCLUSION	18
{15} 	Because we perceive no error in the proceedings below, we affirm.	19

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{16} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.	1
______________________________	2
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge	3
WE CONCUR:	4
______________________________	5
J. MILES HANISEE, Chief Judge	6
______________________________	7
ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge	8