April 21, 2009 – State of New Mexico v. Robert LaCouture, No. 27,357

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: __________
Filing Date: April 21, 2009
NO. 27,357
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROBERT LACOUTURE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY
Karen L. Parsons, District Judge
Gary K. King, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender
Susan Roth, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant

OPINION
KENNEDY, Judge.
{1} 	In this case, we consider constitutional issues surrounding a police interrogation
of a hospital patient. Defendant-Appellant Robert LaCouture (LaCouture) pled no
contest to possession of methamphetamine, use or possession of drug paraphernalia,
and careless driving. A charge of negligent use of a deadly weapon was dropped. In
his plea, LaCouture reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress
certain inculpatory remarks he made to police as a hospital patient following a traffic
accident. He argues that his statements should have been suppressed because he made
them involuntarily and was not advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). We affirm the district court and hold that LaCouture’s statements
were voluntary and that, at the time he made them, he was not in police custody and
therefore not entitled to a Miranda warning.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	Late in the evening of April 13, 2005, LaCouture was driving from Roswell to
Ruidoso on U.S. 70 when his pickup truck collided with a semi-truck. 	Severely
injured, LaCouture was transported to the Lincoln County Medical Center where he
received treatment. LaCouture’s injuries included a damaged hip and spine, fractured
leg bones (both tibia and fibula), four broken ribs, and a bruised lung. Officer Roberto

1 Based on a comparison of the transcript contained in LaCouture’s brief in chief and
the audio recording made by Officer Diaz, we note that one of very few discrepancies
concerns LaCouture’s responses of “yes sir” and “no sir” to Officer Diaz’s questions.
Several of these are absent from LaCouture’s transcript. 	We also note that when
asked to identify his friend, LaCouture’s statement, “That’s my boy, man,” is absent
from the transcript. In this opinion, we primarily rely on the transcript, using Officer
Diaz’s recording when appropriate.
2
Diaz conducted an initial investigation at the scene and then traveled to the hospital
to speak with LaCouture. Officer Diaz testified that such questioning was standard
procedure for the New Mexico State Police.
{3} 	At the hospital, Officer Diaz made contact with LaCouture, questioned him
about the accident and the events which preceded it, and made an audio recording of
the interview. 1 During the interview, as the audio recording indicates, LaCouture was
in pain and often moaned and mumbled. 	Despite whatever pain or discomfort he
experienced, however, LaCouture was responsive to Officer Diaz’s questions and
gave coherent answers. 	No evidence in the record indicates that Officer Diaz did
anything to restrain LaCouture or to prevent him from terminating the interview.
LaCouture, likewise, indicates none.
{4} 	During this approximately seven-minute interview, LaCouture made several
inculpatory statements in response to questions. 	When asked, “Do you carry a
weapon,” LaCouture replied, “Yes sir.” 	He then proceeded to identify the type of
weapon he carried. Moments later, the following exchange took place:

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Q: 	Are you under the influence of anything?
A: 	No, sir.
Q: 	If I were to give you a blood test would it come back positive or
negative?
A: 	Probably come back positive, man.
Q: 	For what?
A: 	For amphetamine.
Q: 	When did you take amphetamine?
A: 	Ah shit, it was earlier today, man.
. . . .
Q: 	Earlier today? How much did you take?
A: 	Oh shit, man, it was not much, we smoked a little bit.
Still later, Officer Diaz asked LaCouture if he had taken any other drugs, and
LaCouture replied, “This morning I was getting a bad migraine so I took a Loratab.”
When asked if it was prescribed, LaCouture indicated that it was not.
{5} 	LaCouture 	was 	charged 	with 	possession 	of 	methamphetamine, 	use 	or
possession of drug paraphernalia, aggravated DWI, negligent use of a deadly weapon,
and reckless driving. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the statements he made
in the hospital, and the matter came before the Lincoln County District Court on
January 27, 2006. LaCouture argued that his statements were involuntary and that

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their admission would violate Miranda.
{6} 	After hearing evidence and the arguments of counsel, the district court denied
LaCouture’s motion. It found that LaCouture’s statement was voluntary because he
was “conscious and knew what he was saying[,] . . . was quite coherent[,] and [had]
asked and answered questions appropriately.” The court concluded that “under the
circumstances, I do not believe it was necessary to read Miranda [to LaCouture] prior
to [Officer Diaz] asking questions about the accident.”
{7} 	After the denial of his motion to suppress, LaCouture entered a plea agreement
with the State. 	In return for the dismissal of his charges for aggravated DWI,
negligent use of a deadly weapon, and reckless driving, LaCouture entered a plea of
no contest to the charges of possession of methamphetamine, use or possession of
drug paraphernalia, and careless driving. As a result, he was sentenced to almost three
years of probation.
{8} 	LaCouture asks this Court to reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. He claims that his inculpatory statements to Officer Diaz should have been
suppressed because they were involuntary and because he was not issued a Miranda
warning prior to making them. We consider each of his arguments in turn.
DISCUSSION
1. 	Standard of Review

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{9} 	When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we consider
its findings of fact for substantial evidence, State v. Leyba, 1997-NMCA-023, ¶ 8, 123
N.M. 159, 935 P.2d 1171, and view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party. State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. We then
consider the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. Leyba, 1997-NMCA-023, ¶
8. In this way, we analyze de novo the questions of whether a defendant’s statement
was voluntary and whether the defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation.
State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶¶ 25-28, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660 (providing
the standard of review to determine voluntariness); State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031,
¶ 19, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442 (providing the standard of review to establish
custodial interrogation).
2. 	LaCouture’s Claim That His Statements Were Involuntary
{10} 	LaCouture first asserts that his confession to Officer Diaz was involuntary and
should have been suppressed by the district court. 	In arguing against a motion to
suppress, the prosecution must prove that the defendant’s statement was voluntary by
a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 298, 901 P.2d 708,
716 (1995). On appeal, we determine the voluntariness of a statement by analyzing
the entire record and the circumstances under which the statement was made. Id. The
“totality of the circumstances” provides our guiding light in such an analysis. 	Id.

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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{11} 	New Mexico defines voluntariness as “freedom from official coercion.” State
v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 21, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). 	As stated above, we analyze the totality of the
circumstances, but an involuntary statement must also have been made in response to
some “element of official overreaching” by the police. Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). 	Examples of official overreaching include “intimidation,
coercion, 	deception, 	assurances, 	or 	other 	police 	misconduct 	that 	constitutes
overreaching.” 	Id. ¶ 23. 	Looking at the totality of the circumstances may require
considering the physical and mental state of the Defendant as a context affecting what
might be coercive and overreaching. 	What techniques that may be coercive when
employed with an injured or medicated subject may not be when dealing with a
healthy and unmedicated defendant.
{12} 	Despite his physical condition, LaCouture was responsive to Officer Diaz’s
questions and was able to answer them coherently. 	At the time Officer Diaz
interviewed him, LaCouture had suffered an automobile crash that caused him various
injuries, including damage to his hip and spine, broken ribs, fractured leg bones (both
tibia and fibula), and internal bruising. Despite these injuries, LaCouture was able to
respond coherently to all of Officer Diaz’s questions, more often than not providing

7
the required information and occasionally stating that he did not remember. 	For
instance, LaCouture was able to state his vehicle’s direction of travel, the highway on
which he was driving, his destination, and the city from which he departed. He was
able to remember and communicate the events of the crash: first, that he saw a semi-
truck, and second, that he tried to steer clear of it “[b]efore the impact.” He was able
to remember that he carried a gun, that he had taken amphetamines, and that he had
taken a Loratab. Interestingly, he refused to give the name of the person from whose
house he had departed, stating, “I can’t tell you that, man. [That’s my boy, man.] I’m
sorry.” And when asked about where and with whom he had taken amphetamines,
LaCouture stated that he smoked them at this same “friend’s house” and remained
silent about the person’s identity. Throughout the interview, LaCouture said “yes sir”
or “no sir” several times and cooperated fully with Officer Diaz. Finally, near the end
of the interview, after Officer Diaz read the Implied Consent Act, LaCouture even
asked, “Could you repeat all that stuff?” 	These aspects of the taped conversation
between Officer Diaz and LaCouture provides substantial evidence supporting the
district court’s findings of fact.
{13} 	We turn now to the behavior of Officer Diaz. For example, at no time during
the interview did he threaten LaCouture, promise special treatment in return for
LaCouture’s cooperation, physically abuse LaCouture, or engage in coercion of any

8
type. Most of his questions were benign, revolving around the facts of the accident.
And although LaCouture never explicitly consented to the questioning, when Officer
Diaz stated, “I’m here . . . to ask you a couple of questions, OK,” LaCouture did not
resist. 	Officer Diaz also repeatedly made sure that LaCouture understood, and on
multiple occasions during the interview he asked, “Do you understand?” The entire
exchange between LaCouture and Officer Diaz lasted approximately seven minutes.
{14} 	We conclude that LaCouture’s mental state, though certainly not that of an
uninjured, healthy person, was not so impaired as to transform Officer Diaz’s
questions into official overreaching. 	A review of the taped interview therefore
demonstrates that LaCouture was responsive and capable of coherently answering
Officer Diaz’s questions. Our review likewise indicates that Officer Diaz’s conduct
shows no traces of “official overreaching” due to LaCouture’s mental state or Officer
Diaz’s own actions as that term is defined in this state or in federal jurisprudence. The
record thus provides substantial evidence for the district court’s findings of fact.
3. 	LaCouture’s Claim That He Should Have Received a Miranda Warning
{15} 	LaCouture next contends that his confession should have been suppressed
because he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without first being issued a
Miranda warning. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment requires the exclusion of certain confessions when the police fail to

9
notify a defendant of his rights. State v. Ybarra, 111 N.M. 234, 236, 804 P.2d 1053,
1055 (1990). Such a warning is required only when police subject a defendant to a
“custodial interrogation.” State v. Juarez, 120 N.M. 499, 502, 903 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct.
App. 1995). Police meet the “interrogation” requirement whenever they expressly
question a defendant or expose him to the functional equivalent of questioning.
Ybarra, 111 N.M. at 236, 804 P.2d at 1055. Police meet the “custodial” requirement
in one of two ways; either the defendant’s “freedom of movement [was] restrained to
a degree associated with a formal arrest” or the defendant was restrained in such a way
that a reasonable person would feel “not free to leave the scene.” 	Munoz, 1998-
NMSC-048, ¶ 40 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 	The test is an
objective one, and the “subjective beliefs of the defendant and the interviewing officer
. . . are irrelevant.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{16} 	Our appellate courts have never considered whether the interrogation of a
hospital patient constitutes a custodial interrogation. We therefore look to other state
authority that has dealt with the issue. 	Based on the out of state authority the
determination that a defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation most often
turns on the distinction between circumstantial restraints and direct police-imposed
limitations on a defendant’s freedom. See Yarborough v. State, 178 S.W.3d 895, 901-
02 (Tex. App. 2005) (holding that factors incident to medical treatment, not police,

10
restrained the defendant); Commonwealth v. Perry, 710 A.2d 1183, 1185-86 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that a defendant who was wearing a neck brace, attached
intravenously to tubes, and lying on a hospital gurney was not in custody); see also
State v. Melton, 476 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Neb. 1991) (holding that a hospital patient was
not subjected to custodial interrogation); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 94 (Del.
1989) (where an emergency room patient was restrained not by police but by his
condition); but cf. Ybarra, 111 N.M. at 235, 238, 804 P.2d at 1057 (interrogation was
custodial where a hospital patient was placed in handcuffs by police prior to
questioning); State v. Pebria, 938 P.2d 1190, 1192, 1194 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997)
(interrogation was custodial where defendant was detained by hospital security guards
prior to and during questioning); State v. O'Loughlin, 637 A.2d 553, 555, 557 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (interrogation was custodial where defendant was detained
by police at a hospital).
{17} 	On the record before us, we find little evidence to support the notion that
LaCouture was subjected to a custodial interrogation. His inculpatory statements were
made prior to being placed under formal arrest. 	And though he had experienced
serious physical injuries and was apparently in a great deal of pain, LaCouture was
never placed in handcuffs, and the record indicates no time at which he and Officer
Diaz engaged in physical contact of any kind. Officer Diaz questioned LaCouture in

11
a public place, as indicated by the ambient noise on the interview tape. 	Finally,
Officer Diaz never antagonized LaCouture or applied aggressive tactics to elicit the
confession.
{18} 	Nevertheless, LaCouture asserts that despite the absence of any police-imposed
restraint on his freedom, he was still subjected to a custodial interrogation because his
injuries confined him to the bed and rendered him unfree to leave, he was surrounded
by “antagonistic forces” and “techniques of persuasion,” and he asked for a lawyer
and was told that he did not need one. These arguments fail to persuade us. First, as
outlined in the cases above, the fact that LaCouture was restrained by injuries and
medical accoutrements warrants little consideration. LaCouture was exposed only to
circumstantial restraints, and, as stated above, the record indicates no action by Officer
Diaz to restrain him. 	Second, Officer Diaz’s conduct can hardly be interpreted as
“antagonistic.” 	Throughout the interview, Officer Diaz conducted himself in a
professional manner, thanked LaCouture repeatedly, and asked him if he understood
on several occasions. 	As to LaCouture’s alleged “techniques of persuasion,” we
remain unclear on exactly what that means. LaCouture provides no examples, and we
reject it.
{19} 	Third, that LaCouture requested and was denied a lawyer does not transform
his non-custodial interrogation into a custodial interrogation. 	After making the

12
inculpatory remarks that form the subject of this appeal, LaCouture asked, “Am I
going to need a lawyer?” Officer Diaz answered, “Not yet.” LaCouture asserts that
this exchange reflects a custodial interrogation. We disagree. A person has a right to
an attorney only after being exposed to custodial interrogation, which occurs “as soon
as [the person’s] freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal
arrest.” 	Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). 	LaCouture misapprehends the interrelationship between
Miranda, custodial interrogation, and his constitutional right to counsel. His inquiry
of Officer Diaz about whether he needed legal representation neither renders his
interrogation custodial nor creates a right to legal representation.
{20} 	LaCouture’s request for an attorney after his arrest constitutes another matter
entirely, but it has no operative legal effect on the outcome of this appeal, and we
consider it only in the interest of clarity. After making various incriminating remarks
to Officer Diaz, LaCouture was placed under arrest. Shortly after being placed under
arrest, he invoked his right to counsel, but the record fails to indicate whether the
request was honored. Of course, once Officer Diaz placed LaCouture under arrest, a
custodial relationship was created. But we note that LaCouture made no inculpatory
statements after this event, and his request for an attorney, even if denied, was
therefore immaterial.

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{21} 	Based 	on 	the 	analysis 	above, 	we 	affirm the 	district 	court’s 	denial 	of
LaCouture’s motion to suppress his statements to Officer Diaz and hold that he was
not subjected to a custodial interrogation. Because he was not subjected to a custodial
interrogation at the time his incriminating statements were made, a warning under
Miranda was unnecessary. His statements were admissible.
CONCLUSION
{22} 	For the reasons stated above, we hold that LaCouture’s admission was
voluntary and that he was not subjected to a custodial interrogation. 	The district
court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record, and its
conclusions of law were accurately applied. We affirm.
{23} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________________
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
WE CONCUR:
________________________________
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
________________________________
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge