Cathleen Cahn v. Board of Education of the Ramapo Indian Hills Regional High School District, Bergen County, 9/16/26 (#369-26R)

369-26R
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10869-25 (EDU 05928-23 on remand)
Agency Dkt. No. 125-5/23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Decision
Cathleen Cahn,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Ramapo Indian Hills
Regional High School District, Bergen County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
following the Commissioner’s 2025 remand, the exceptions filed by petitioner pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the Ramapo Indian Hills Regional High School District Board of Education’s
(Board) reply thereto, have been reviewed and considered.
Petitioner challenges the Board’s denial of her application for a substitute teacher
position, alleging that she was denied employment due to her social media posts concerning the
Board’s operations. In an Initial Decision dated March 12, 2025, the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) concluded that petitioner was not employed by the Board and was therefore not entitled
to the protections related to the non-renewal of school district employment; the Board took no
action to prevent petitioner’s free expression; and petitioner had not shown that the Board’s
action was the result of a discriminatory action based upon a protected class. The ALJ also found
that petitioner had not put forward facts that would allow a reasonable inference that

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petitioner’s online activity formed the basis for the Board’s decision, and that there was nothing
to objectively establish that but for petitioner’s social media posts, the Board would have
appointed her to the position of substitute teacher. Accordingly, the ALJ granted the Board’s
motion for summary decision and dismissed the petition.
On June 12, 2025, the Commissioner issued a written decision concurring with the ALJ
that petitioner had not demonstrated that the Board’s decision was in violation of her
constitutional rights. However, the Commissioner remanded the matter for further factfinding,
explaining that the petition of appeal “alleges that the Board’s decision not to appoint petitioner
to the position of substitute teacher was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, in violation of
N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1.” 	That statute requires the Commissioner to examine whether the Board
exceeded its power to withhold approval of petitioner’s appointment. See also Truncellito v. Bd.
of Educ. of the Twp. of Lyndhurst, Bergen Co., 2022 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 92, at *8 (App. Div.
Jan. 24, 2022) (holding that under N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1, the Commissioner must review whether
the Board’s conduct was arbitrary and capricious). 	The Commissioner explained that “the
absence of any explanation whatsoever by the Board for its action here creates a genuine issue
of material fact as to what the Board’s reason was, sufficient to preclude summary decision at
this stage.” Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the OAL for further proceedings.
Following the remand, the Board moved for summary decision again. 	It provided
additional discovery to petitioner, including certifications from Board members expressing
numerous reasons why they did not vote in favor of her appointment, including negative public
opinion, emails written by petitioner, and personal interactions with petitioner. 	Petitioner
opposed summary decision on the grounds that the Board’s proffered reasons not to appoint her

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necessarily touch upon issues regarding the Board members’ intent and credibility, which are not
appropriate for summary decision. 	The ALJ made findings of fact based upon the expanded
record before him and granted the Board’s motion for summary decision over petitioner’s
objection.
Upon review, the Commissioner disagrees with the ALJ that summary decision was
appropriate in this matter, because the additional discovery and certifications contained in the
record demonstrate that the reasons for petitioner’s non-appointment are contested. As noted
above, N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1 requires the Commissioner to examine whether the Board exceeded
its power to withhold approval of petitioner’s appointment. The Commissioner remains unable
to make that determination because the material facts are contested. 	Further factfinding is
needed to determine the reason or reasons for petitioner’s non-appointment, which warrants
consideration of the Board members’ credibility to determine whether the Board acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1. Petitioner bears the
burden of establishing that the Board violated N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is rejected, the Board’s motion for summary decision is
denied, and the matter is remanded to the OAL for a contested hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	September 16, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	September 17, 2026

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10869-25
(On Remand EDU 05928-23)
AGENCY DKT. NO. 125-5/23
CATHLEEN CAHN,
Petitioner,
v.
RAMAPO INDIAN HILLS REGIONAL
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOARD OF
EDUCATION, BERGEN COUNTY,
Respondent.
__________________________________
Edward A. Cridge, Esq., for petitioner (Mellk Cridge, LLC, attorneys)
Matthew J. Giacobbe, Esq., and Anthony LoBrace, Esq., for respondent (Cleary,
Giacobbe, Alferi, Jacobs, LLC, attorneys)
BEFORE JOSEPH A. ASCIONE, ALJ (Ret., on Recall):
Record Closed: April 8, 2026 	Decided: June 29, 2026

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10869-25
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 6, 2023, petitioner Cathleen Cahn filed a Verified Petition of Appeal with
the Commissioner of Education. On July 6, 2023, the New Jersey State Department of
Education, Bureau of Controversies and Disputes, transmitted the case to the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL) under N.J.A.C. 1:1-8.2. On March 13, 2025, I issued an Initial
Decision granting the motion of respondent, the Ramapo Indian Hills Regional High
School District Board of Education, for summary decision in EDU 05928-23. 	Petitioner
appealed that Initial Decision, and the Civil Service Commission remanded the case for
further 	proceedings. 	On 	February 	6, 2026, 	respondent again filed 	a 	motion 	for
summary decision. 	On March 20, 2026, petitioner filed answering papers. 	On April
2, 2026, respondent filed reply papers. 	No oral argument was held. 	The record on the
motion closed on April 8, 2026.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
Petitioner 	possesses 	teacher 	of 	elementary 	school 	and 	teacher 	of 	the
handicapped certificates. 	(Verified Petition Paragraph 1). 	On or about January 26,
2023, petitioner submitted an application for employment as a substitute teacher with
the respondent pursuant to a request posted by respondent. On March 13, 2023, at the
Board’s 	meeting, 	Dr. 	Riu 	Dionisio, 	the 	Board 	Superintendent, 	recommended 	the
appointment of petitioner to the position of substitute teacher. The matter was tabled at
that meeting but considered at the March 27, 2023, meeting, where the appointment did
not receive sufficient votes for approval. The petitioner is not an employee of the Board,
nor was she at the time the application was submitted for consideration. 	The petition
maintains she was denied employment due to the Board’s influence arising from
petitioner’s speech published on social media, specifically Facebook, addressed to the
operation of the Board. 	Petitioner maintains the Board violated the 1st and 14th
Amendments to the United States Constitution; the New Jersey Constitution, Article 1,
Paragraph 6; and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6.1 et. seq.
Respondent proffers that the petitioner is not an employee of the Board, the
respondent here is the Board, not its individual members, and the deliberative process

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privilege generally exempts public officials from being required to explain their reasons
for voting for or against any action. Petitioner here did not receive an affirmative vote of
a majority of the members of the Board to be offered a position as a substitute teacher.
On remand, respondent provided additional discovery. 	Specifically, additional
interrogatories were requested of the then-serving Board members. 	Their answers
reflected that one member had seen the alleged posts; however, a sufficient number of
members maintain that their votes were the result of negative public opinions regarding
the petitioner conveyed to the Board members.
One of those items was Exhibit G, a certification by Judith Sullivan, a former
member of the Board of Education, expressing her concerns about the appointment of
petitioner as a substitute teacher. Specifically stating:
“Sometime prior to my election to respondent, I witnessed
petitioner publicly attack and destroy a special education
parent 	who 	asked 	an 	innocent 	question 	on 	a 	private
Facebook group. 	The question asked, as I recall it, was
regarding where Project Graduation was going to be held,
with the parent explaining that she needed to be near her
child in the event a medical emergency arose. 	I viewed the
parent’s inquiry as a request for assistance and, in response,
petitioner publicly destroyed this parent. 	I was horrified to
see 	how 	petitioner 	treated 	this 	parent, 	who 	was 	clearly
anxious about her child. 	I never forgot this incident and it
has left an indelible mark on me to present. 	Based on this
incident, I did not believe that petitioner should ever be in a
position in which she has authority over children or parents.”
Another item, Exhibit H, a certification of Marianna Emmolo, a parent, expresses
her concerns about the appointment of petitioner as a substitute teacher, stating:
“In 2021, when I was a parent of a student in the district and
petitioner 	was 	the 	Executive 	Board 	Secretary 	for 	the
Ramapo High School Association of Parents, Teachers, and
Students, I received an email communication from petitioner
in such capacity regarding a matter involving my child. 	I felt
intimidated and bullied by petitioner’s email communication,
found such email communication to be factually inaccurate,
and found her tone to be condescending and bullying. When

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I raised these concerns in responding to petitioner’s email, I
never received a reply stating otherwise, nor an apology. As
a 	leader 	of 	the 	Association 	of 	Parents, 	Teachers, 	and
Students, which is intended to represent parents’ interests,
questions, and concerns, I found that, if petitioner could
engage in such arrogant and insolent conduct towards a
parent, she could easily engage in such conduct towards
students. 	In my opinion, petitioner lacked the discretion,
good judgment, professionalism, and temperament to be a
substitute teacher in the district that I, as a Board member,
was responsible for safeguarding the best interests of its
students and families.”
Another item, Exhibit O, a certification of Thomas Lambe, states:
“Between March 10, 2023 and March 27, 2023, the district
and/or 	respondent 	received 	email 	communications 	from
concerned 	constituents, 	including 	a 	former 	member 	of
respondent, 	imploring 	respondent 	to 	reject 	petitioner's
appointment as a substitute teacher in the district. 	At its
March 27, 2023 public meeting, a majority of respondent
voted 	against 	petitioner's 	appointment 	as 	a 	substitute
teacher. 	These 	email 	communications 	are 	included 	in
response to these Interrogatories and speak for themselves.
See 	documents 	bates-stamped 	Board-001 	through
Board-030.”
FINDINGS OF FACT
As a result of the certifications and documentary evidence provided, I FIND the
following FACTS:
1. 	The petitioner is not and was never an employee of the respondent prior
to the incident in question.
2. 	On January 6, 2023, the petitioner applied for a substitute teaching
position for the 2022−2023 school year at respondent. 	(See Verified
Petition Paragraph 4.)
3. 	The then superintendent, Dr. Rui Dionisio, recommended the petitioner for
the position. (See Verified Petition Paragraph 5.)

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4. 	Prior to respondent’s vote on the consideration of the appointment of
petitioner, various members of the public expressed concern about the
appointment of petitioner. 	(See Pet’r’s Interrogatories, Cahn Responses
7, 11, 13, and Certifications G, H, I, J, K, M, N, and O.)
5. 	Respondent’s duties include consideration of public input.
6. 	On March 27, 2023, a majority of the members of respondent Board voted
against the consideration of hiring petitioner for the position of substitute
teacher. (See minutes of Resp’t’s March 27, 2023, meeting.)
7. 	The petitioner alleges that submissions by the public in opposition to
consideration of the petitioner for the position of substitute teacher, which
contained excerpts of online posts by petitioner resulted in a violation of
her freedom of expression. There is no support for this position.
8. 	The excerpt reflects the petitioner’s opinion regarding the actions of the
public at respondent’s meetings. 	Specifically, related to the public’s
misimpression that a member of the respondent has any obligation to
respond to a public comment. 	This in no way can be characterized as a
criticism of the respondent or its members and does not support any claim
of petitioner.
9. 	The second excerpt reflects petitioner’s comment as, “(o)ur school board
has been hijacked by an uninformed majority.” 	While critical of a school
board, it is insufficient to qualify as language that rises to a “substantial
and motivating factor” in the adverse decision made.
10. 	There is no showing that the action of the Board was motivated by an
impermissible motivation, i.e., protected class − age, race, national origin,
religion, etc.
11. 	The petitioner exercised her freedom of expression.

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12. 	The petitioner has failed to show a causal relationship between her
Facebook posts and the determinations of respondent.
13. 	The petitioner has failed to show any violation of a constitutional right.
14. 	A potential employee has no cause of action for a failure to hire when, as
here, there is no claim or showing that petitioner is a member of a
protected class.
15. 	Respondent is within its rights to reject the application of a potential
employee based upon negative public input.
16. 	Here, there is substantial negative public input to the appointment of the
petitioner.
17. 	Here, 	the 	members 	of 	the 	Board 	who 	voted 	against 	petitioner 	had
sufficient reason based upon their personal experiences with petitioner to
vote against her appointment, unrelated to her social postings.
18. 	Respondent is within its rights to reject the application of a potential
employee based upon personal or informed information regarding the
character of petitioner.
19. 	Respondent’s action can in no way be deemed arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable.
20. 	Petitioner’s actions have expended substantial resources of the Ramapo
educational system in defending this frivolous action, at a time when those
resources are considerably challenged.
21. 	Petitioner should be responsible for the legal costs the district has incurred
in defending petitioner’s claim.

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LEGAL DISCUSSION
Under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5, “[a] party may move for summary decision upon all or
any of the substantive issues in a contested case.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). 	Summary
decision may be granted if “[t]he papers and discovery which have been filed, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” 	N.J.A.C.
1:1-12.5(b). 	And “[w]hen a motion for summary decision is made and supported, an
adverse party in order to prevail must by responding affidavit set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary
proceeding.” Ibid.
In making this determination, a judge is to consider the “[w]hether the competent
evidential materials presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a
rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.
Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995). 	The relevant inquiry is
whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury
or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. 	Id. at 536
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251−52 (1986).
In this situation, the petitioner is not a public employee; accordingly, non-renewal
protections are not applicable here. The petitioner does not allege any protected class;
rather, she claims entitlement to a position she did not receive. 	She maintains that
because she expressed her opinion on social media, her 1st Amendment and New
Jersey 	Constitution 	rights 	were 	denied 	because 	she 	had 	been 	denied 	potential
employment as a substitute teacher. 	Petitioner has only offered submissions of
excerpts from negative public comments regarding her potential appointment. 	She has
failed to identify the protected speech that she maintains supports her claim. 	She has
offered no evidence of these facts. 	She attempted to obtain these facts from one or
more of the five members of the Board who did not vote to approve her appointment as
a potential substitute teacher; however, petitioner did not bring her action against
individual Board members. The respondent is the Board. This tribunal does not accept

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petitioner’s 	argument 	that 	the 	1st 	and 	14th 	Amendments 	of 	the 	United 	States
Constitution, the New Jersey Constitution, or the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A.
10:6.1 et. seq., provide her with a valid claim when rejected for public employment
based upon her freedom of expression. 	Petitioner has presently offered insufficient
evidence 	to 	support 	her 	position 	that 	the 	Board’s 	actions 	were 	based 	upon
impermissible rationales. 	All of the cases put forth by petitioner involve retaliatory
action taken against an employee based upon the exercise of free speech. Even in the
case of Smith v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 419 F. Supp. 2d 639 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
23, 2005), that petitioner was a teacher at Central Dauphin School District and had
previously held a position of assistant coach, which was not renewed after the petitioner
had brought to the attention of a State agency a mold problem. 	Here, the petitioner
exercised her rights of free speech, and the respondent took no action to prevent her
exercise of free speech. 	Petitioner must recognize that the use of free speech may
result in consequences. 	To argue that the respondent cannot consider her actions in
determining whether to offer her employment has no basis in law. 	A public body can
determine that the employment of a gadfly or opinionated individual does not support its
objectives is an acceptable decision. 	Whether the decision in this matter was made
because of the negative public input or the actual content of online postings is not
relevant. 	There is no showing that the action was the result of a discriminatory action
based upon a protected class. 	The current case presents insufficient evidence for a
reasonable factfinder to believe a person of ordinary firmness would feel deterred from
exercising free speech. 	Here, it did not deter the petitioner, but to now bring an action
that her exercise of free speech formed an actionable basis to compel a public board to
provide her employment is not a recognizable claim.
This tribunal’s consideration of the line of cases dealing with retaliation for the
exercise of free speech requires a finding that the speech was a substantial and
motivating factor in the respondent’s action. 	Specifically, supported by an unusually
suggestive temporal proximity between the speech and the respondent’s retaliatory
action; a pattern of antagonism coupled with suspicious timing; or that the record
evidence, taken as a whole, compels the trier of fact to infer that causation existed. See
Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2017); Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v.
Deflaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007). 	This burden is not discharged by simply

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showing that the challenged governmental action happened to relate in some way to the
protected 	speech; 	rather, 	there 	must 	be 	“particular 	facts 	that 	allow 	the 	court 	to
reasonably infer it is the protected activity itself . . . that formed the basis for the
defendant’s adverse action.” 	Oliver, F.3d at 192. 	Courts must be diligent in enforcing
this causation requirement so as to avoid chilling a governmental actor’s appropriate
discharge of the responsibilities of their office or position. 	Lauren W., 480 F.3d at
267−68. 	Petitioner has not put forward particular facts that allow this tribunal to
reasonably infer that it was petitioner’s online activity that formed the basis for the
respondent’s decision. Petitioner has put forward ten (10) words she posted online that
were marginally critical of the respondent and somehow concludes that it was these ten
(10) words that the respondent’s decision was based upon. 	There is no recorded
evidence demonstrating any sort of antagonism or hostility that arose or previously
existed between the respondent and petitioner in connection with the content she
posted on social media, nor is there record evidence from which an inference could be
drawn 	that 	it 	was 	petitioner’s 	actual 	social 	media 	content 	itself 	that 	caused 	the
respondent’s decision. 	Petitioner claims that, but for her Facebook postings, the
respondent would have appointed her; however, there is nothing to objectively establish
that to have been the case.
The record evidence put forward by petitioner in seeking to avoid summary
decision in this matter is simply insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
that the respondent’s decision not to appoint her violated her state or federal free
speech rights. 	Petitioner has not identified any of her own Facebook content that the
respondent’s decision was allegedly based upon, and the Facebook content that she
has identified, through emails of others that were sent to the Board, is incomplete,
without sufficient information for this tribunal to conduct a legitimate First Amendment
analysis, and is not of such a quality that any plausible inference could be drawn that
the respondent’s decision not to appoint petitioner was premised upon the speech
identified in her discovery. Nor has petitioner identified any fact or evidence that ties the
respondent’s non-appointment to the content she posted on social media.
A public body has a privilege to protect the process of deliberation. This privilege
is designed to provide governmental entities with the freedom to conduct uninhibited

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communications so that the best decisions can be reached. 	See Educ. Law Ctr ex rel.
Abbott v. New Jersey Dept. of Educ., 198 N.J. 274, 285 (2000); and McGee v. Twp. of
E. Amwell, 416 N.J. Super. 602, 619 (App. Div. 2010).
The Department of Education’s position is that there is great latitude in a Board’s
determination regarding the renewal of a teacher’s contract. 	Such latitude should also
apply by analogy to a non-employee, prospective employee. 	See Truncellito v. Bd. of
Educ. of Lyndhurst, Bergen Cnty, 2019 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 643 (Sept. 18, 2019), rev’d,
2019 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1093 (Dec. 3, 2019), rev’d and remanded, 2022 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 92 (App. Div. Jan. 24, 2022). 	This tribunal relies on the positions stated
by the Department of Education in the Truncellito matter, despite the reversal by the
Appellate Division. 	This tribunal also relies on Hubbard v. Springfield Bd. of Educ.,
80 Fed. 	Appx. 	757 	(3d 	Cir. 	2003). 	The 	Hubbard 	case 	deals 	with 	a 	claim 	of
discrimination. 	It places the burden of proof on the party claiming the discrimination.
This 	tribunal 	seriously 	questions 	whether 	a 	potential 	employee’s 	1st 	Amendment
speech rights automatically make a negative vote approving that individual actionable.
The challenging party bears the burden of proving that the agency action was
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable by the preponderance of the credible evidence.
J.P. & M.P. v. Bd. of Educ. of S. Brunswick, Middlesex Cnty., 2002 N.J. AGEN LEXIS
952 at *10-12 (Dec. 17, 2002); New Jersey Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.
New Jersey Dep’t of Agric., 196 N.J. 366, 385 (2008); In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot.
Act Rules, 180 N.J. 415, 432 (2004); New Jersey State League of Muns. v. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affs., 158 N.J. 211, 222 (1999).
Every Board member confirmed that they received either e-mails or phone calls
from members of the public expressing strong opposition to petitioner’s prospective
appointment. 	These are the types of concerns Board members consider when making
their employment decisions. 	Petitioner has not shown that the Board's decision was
based on anything other than legitimate concerns.
Petitioner previously argued that the Board’s rejection of her appointment was
based on “yet-to-be-identified” social media content she posted on Facebook. Now, her

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claim seems to be that the Board violated her constitutional rights because one Board
member based her decision in part upon emails that petitioner sent to the Board
regarding prior actions. 	Petitioner did not amend her Verified Petition to include this
new theory of the Board’s liability. Her new theory of liability is at odds with the theory of
liability she had pursued previously. 	Respondent argues that petitioner’s free speech
analysis is inapplicable because she was never an employee. 	Her appointment
required a majority vote of the full membership of the Board, and even excluding one
member’s vote, she still lacked sufficient support. 	Respondent argues that petitioner
has not shown that the emails were a “but-for” cause of the Board’s decision.
The record reflects that the decision was based on statements received from
members of the public regarding petitioner’s potential appointment. 	Additionally, the
members of the Board were at all times subject to an ethical obligation to appoint the
best-qualified personnel as employees, and the Board can, and sometimes must,
consider the concerns of its constituents when deciding these appointments, citing
N.J.S.A. 18A: 12-24.1(h).
Here, petitioner is not and was never an employee of the respondent school
district. 	She is not considered a public employee for the purposes of free speech
retaliation. 	The cases the petitioner cites in her Opposition involve a public employee
who made a statement about their employer or about a matter of public concern. 	See
Pickering 	v. 	Bd. 	of 	Ed. 	of 	Twp. 	High 	Sch. 	Dist. 	205, 	Will 	County, 	391 	U.S.
563 (1968); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Marquardt v. Carlton, 971 F.3d
546 (2020). 	Those employees were afforded First Amendment protection due to their
employment, whereas here, petitioner is not and was never an employee of the School
District. 	Further, petitioner argues that the fact that she was “never hired” by the Board
is irrelevant because she cannot be deprived of a benefit, a substitute teaching position,
due to her engaging in First Amendment-protected speech. 	The cases she cites are
irrelevant to her argument, as they involve public employees, not individuals who are
seeking public employment. 	See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997);
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).

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Petitioner maintains that her First Amendment was violated due to the Board’s
denial of her employment appointment. 	She previously claimed that she was denied
employment due to her Facebook postings. 	Petitioner now claims that the Board
denied her appointment on the basis of her email communications. 	(See Resp’t
Bd.-032 and 0-33.) 	Judith Sullivan, a member of the Board, included several reasons
as to why she voted against petitioner’s appointment, including the Facebook posts,
email communications, feedback from other members of the Board who interacted with
petitioner, and concerns of the public. (See Resp’t’s Exh. G.) The petitioner has not set
forth facts that would allow that court to reasonably infer that her Facebook posts are
the protected activity that solely formed the basis of the Board’s decision. However, the
respondent has set forth several reasons as to why the Board came to its decision.
Therefore, petitioner’s argument of free speech retaliation fails.
Regarding the motion for summary decision, self-serving assertions alone do not
create a question of material fact. 	Martin v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.J. Super.
320, 323 (App. Div. 1999), certif. den., 163 N.J. 74 (2000) (questions of law dependent
upon the operative facts cannot be decided by summary judgment when those facts are
in dispute). 	When deciding whether or not to grant such a motion, the Court examines
the evidence in light most favorable to the non-moving party. 	Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.
Such motions are only defeated when the opposing party establishes the “existence of
‘genuine’ disputes of material fact.” 	Ninoska L. Lazo v. New Jersey State Dep’t of
Educ., Crim. Hist. Rev. Unit, 2011 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 431, *4−5 (Aug. 10, 2011). 	In the
present matter with respect to respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision, this Court
finds it is proper to grant this motion. 	Petitioner argues that the Board members'
Interrogatories are self-serving and that there is an issue of credibility. 	She does not
present any specific facts that would establish the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact. 	Case law allows for such self-serving assertions to be made, and such
assertions do not automatically deny a motion for summary decision. 	Viewing the facts
in the light most favorable to petitioner, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and
summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of law.

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Petitioner has not satisfied her burden of demonstrating that respondent acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably by denying her a position as a substitute
teacher.
CONCLUSION
After considering the documents submitted, I CONCLUDE that the facts do not
support the petitioner’s claim. 	Specifically, the petitioner has made a vague allegation
that the respondent's actions are arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. 	No evidence
has been put forth to cast any question that the actions fall within that categorization.
ORDER
It 	is 	hereby 	ORDERED 	that 	respondent’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	disposition
dismissing the petitioner is GRANTED.
It is hereby ORDERED that respondent, if it chooses, should submit an affidavit
of services in connection with its representation, for the Department of Education to
consider the imposition of attorney’s fees in connection with this matter, as a frivolous
litigation.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and
unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become
a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10869-25
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OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. 	Exceptions may be filed by email to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other
parties.
June 29, 2026
DATE 	JOSEPH A. ASCIONE, ALJ (Ret., on recall):
Date Received at Agency: 	June 29, 2026
Date Mailed to Parties: 	June 29, 2026
cc

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10869-25
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APPENDIX
LIST OF EXHIBITS
For petitioner:
P-1 	Moving papers, dated 2/6/26
P-2 	Reply, dated 4/2/26
For respondent:
R-1 	Answering papers, dated 3/18/26