Mellk Cridge LLC v. Board of Education of the City of Trenton, Mercer County; and Mellk Cridge LLC v. Board of Education of the City of Trenton, Mercer County, 6/27/25 (#328-25)

328-25
OAL Dkt. Nos. 09738-22 and 04893-23 (consolidated)
Agency Dkt. Nos. 250-9/22 and 112-4/23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Mellk Cridge, LLC,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the City of Trenton, Mercer
County,
Respondent,
AND
Mellk Cridge, LLC,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the City of Trenton, Mercer
County,
Respondent.
The record of these consolidated matters, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL), and the exceptions filed by the petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, have been
reviewed and considered. The Trenton Board of Education (Board) did not file a reply to petitioner’s
exceptions.
Petitioner served as legal counsel to seven employees of the Board who were investigated by
the New Jersey Department of Children and Families, Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit (IAIU).

2
Petitioner sought indemnification of its legal fees and costs from the Board, pursuant to N.J.S.A.
18A:16-6. 	Following cross-motions for summary decision, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
concluded that petitioner’s claims failed because it had not notified the Board of the indemnification
requests within a reasonable period of time after learning of the charges against the employees.
Accordingly, the ALJ granted the Board’s motion for summary decision.
In its exceptions, petitioner argues that the ALJ imposed a de facto statute of limitations for
indemnification requests, without having the authority to do so. Petitioner also contends that the
ALJ’s decision would require employees under IAIU investigation to seek indemnification before their
claims accrued. Finally, according to petitioner, it would be impossible for the Board to take all the
steps necessary to assign counsel to an employee before an IAIU investigation concluded, such that
requiring notice to the Board would leave the employee without the benefit of legal counsel during
the course of the IAIU investigation.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner failed to give the Board
reasonable notice of its indemnification requests, for the reasons detailed in the Initial Decision. An
employee seeking reimbursement from a board of education pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 “cannot
wait until the action is completed and must provide the school board with reasonable notice after
the initiation of the proceeding.” Azzaro v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Trenton, 477 N.J. Super. 427,
432 (App. Div. 2023). 	The Commissioner concludes that petitioner’s delay in requesting
indemnification until months or years after the conclusion of the IAIU investigations was not
reasonable.
The Commissioner does not find petitioner’s exceptions persuasive. While IAIU timelines are
shorter than those that may be involved in civil litigation, in this matter, the record demonstrates
that petitioner’s representation of each employee lasted at least 40 days. Petitioner’s assertion that

3
the Board would have been unable to review an indemnification request and assign counsel to the
employees within that period of time is speculative and not supported by anything in the record. The
Commissioner declines to accept petitioner’s assumption, particularly when petitioner’s failure to
give the Board notice deprived the Board of any opportunity to demonstrate that it could complete
those steps in a timely manner.
Furthermore, even if petitioner is correct that the Board could not have assigned counsel
before 	the 	IAIU 	investigations 	were 	concluded, 	the 	Board’s 	response 	to 	the 	request 	for
indemnification is irrelevant; what Azzaro holds is that the party seeking indemnification must make
the request within a reasonable time of learning about the charges. 	Id. at 442-443. Indeed, the
Appellate Division specifically noted that it was aware that a board of education may deny an
employee’s indemnification request, but “the fact that the Board may have declined petitioners’
request for defense costs is not a basis to refrain from requesting defense and indemnification under
N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6.” Id. at 441. Similarly, the Commissioner concludes that, here, the fact that the
board may have failed to respond to petitioner’s requests – either quickly or at all – was not a basis
to refrain from requesting defense and indemnification.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the ALJ did not create an immediate notice requirement
that is applicable in all circumstances, or a de facto statute of limitations. Citing to Azzaro, the ALJ
acknowledged that what constitutes reasonable notice is a fact-specific inquiry, and she found that
immediate notice would have been reasonable under the circumstances present in this matter. Even
if the Commissioner were to reject the “immediate” notice that the ALJ found reasonable here, the
fact remains that petitioner represented the employees for periods ranging from approximately one
and half months to three months. The Commissioner concludes that petitioner’s failure to make its
indemnification requests during those periods was unreasonable, and it was further compounded by

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petitioner’s failure to request indemnification for periods of one month to nearly two years after the
investigations were concluded.
Finally, the Commissioner rejects petitioner’s argument that its claims did not accrue until the
IAIU issued its findings that the allegations were unfounded. The Appellate Division rejected a similar
ripeness argument in Azzaro, concluding that “unlike N.J.S.A.18A:16-6.1, which requires an employee
to wait until the dismissal of a criminal action to seek reimbursement of legal fees, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6
has no such requirement.” Id. at 441. Moreover, the Appellate Division concluded that if the board
of education denied the employee’s indemnification request because it had determined that her
actions were outside the scope of her employment, the employee could have challenged that
determination; nonetheless, the employee was “obligated to request the Board to provide defense
costs even if the request may have initially been rejected.” Ibid.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition
of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	June 27, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	June 30, 2025
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09738-22
AGENCY DKT. NO. 250-9/22
MELLK CRIDGE, LLC, 	(CONSOLIDATED)
Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF TRENTON, BOARD
OF EDUCATION, MERCER
COUNTY,
Respondent,
AND
MELLK CRIDGE, LLC 	OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04893-23
Petitioner, 	AGENCY DKT. NO. 112-4/23
v.
CITY OF TRENTON, BOARD
OF EDUCATION, MERCER
COUNTY,
Respondent.
___________________________________
Edward A. Cridge, Esq. and Arnold M. Mellk, Esq., for petitioner Mellk Cridge,
LLC (Mellk Cridge, LLC, attorneys)

OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 09738-22 and EDU 04893-23
2
James Rolle, Jr., Esq., for respondent Trenton Board of Education
(Trenton Board of Education general counsel, attorneys)
Record Closed: February 3, 2025 	Decided: April 10, 2025
BEFORE JUDITH LIEBERMAN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner law firm Mellk Cridge LLC, represented seven employees of respondent
City of Trenton Board of Education (“Board”) who were the subjects of investigations by
the New Jersey Department of Children and Families, Institutional Abuse Investigation
Unit (“IAIU”). 	Petitioner seeks indemnification of its legal fees and costs, pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6, from respondent. 	The parties filed cross-motions for summary
decision.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner filed its petitions with the Commissioner of the Department of Education
(“Department”) on September 16, 2022, (EDU 09738-22), and April 26, 2023, (EDU
04893-23). 	The Department of Education transmitted the matters to the Office of
Administrative Law, where on October 31, 2022, and June 2, 2023, respectively, they
were filed as contested cases. 	N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13.
Because the matters shared material facts and presented the same legal issues, they
were consolidated on August 2, 2023.
Orders of Inactivity were issued on January 19, 20231, August 2, 2023, February
15, 2024, and August 26, 2024, pending the disposition of Azzaro v. Board of Education
of Trenton, 477 N.J. Super. 427 (App. Div. 2023), certif. denied, 258 N.J. 438 (2024),
because the issue presented in that case was substantially similar to the issue presented
here. The Order of Inactivity was lifted after the Supreme Court denied certification of the
1 The January 19, 2023, Order of Inactivity applied to only EDU 09738-22.

OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 09738-22 and EDU 04893-23
3
Appellate Division’s decision in Azzaro. 	Petitioner and respondent filed their cross-
motions for summary decision on February 3, 2025, and the record for the motions closed
that day.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
The following facts, taken from the pleadings, briefs, and supporting certifications,
are undisputed. I, therefore, FIND it as FACT.
1. 	A.D., D.C., D.A., I.P., L.D., T.Y. and U.A. (“the employees”) were employed by the
Board during the times relevant to the consolidated matters.
2. 	The employees were the subjects of investigations conducted by the IAIU concerning
allegations of abuse and/or neglect of students who attended school in the City of
Trenton School District (“District”).
3. 	Petitioner 	was 	assigned 	by 	the 	employees’ 	union, 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Education
Association (“NJEA”) to represent the employees throughout each of the IAIU
investigations.
4. 	The 	IAIU 	concluded 	that 	the 	allegations 	against 	each 	of 	the 	employees 	was
unfounded pursuant to N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c)(4).
5. 	Petitioner’s legal services for each employee began and ended on the following dates:
Employee 	Start of
Representation
End of
Representation
A.D 	September 15, 2021 	December 21, 2021
D.C 	April 1, 2022 	May 11, 2022
D.A. 	October 26, 2022 	December 9, 2022
I.P. 	September 21, 2018 	December 20, 2018
L.D. 	May 16, 2022 	July 12, 2022
T.Y. 	February 6, 2023 	March 29, 2023

OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 09738-22 and EDU 04893-23
4
U.A. 	December 6, 2022 	February 22, 2023
[ P-E.]
6. 	The petition that was filed with respect to A.D., D.C., I.P. and L.D. is dated September
16, 2022, and was filed with the Department the same day. P-A.
7. 	The petition that was filed with respect to D.A., T.Y. and U.A. is dated April 26, 2023,
and was filed with the Department the same day. P-B, OAL-1.
8. 	Neither petitioner nor the employees asked the Board to provide for the employees’
defense or to indemnify them before they filed their petitions for indemnification with
the Department. Certification of James Rolle, Jr., Esq. (“Rolle Cert.”) at ¶ 6.
Parties’ Arguments
Petitioner asserts that it is entitled to indemnification because two prerequisites to
indemnification under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 are satisfied. First, the allegations made against
the employees “arose from [their] performance of their duties as employees of the
[Board]” because the IAIU found that the allegations were unfounded. 	Pet’r’s Brf. at 4 -
5. Second, petitioner provided the Board with reasonable notice of its intention to request
indemnification. 	It was unable to notify the Board before the IAIU investigations
concluded because IAIU investigations are required to proceed significantly more quickly
than other proceedings. 	Due to the rapid pace of these investigations, boards of
education are necessarily unable to assess requests for representation and assign
counsel in a timely manner.
Respondent does not address whether the actions that were the subject of the
investigations arose from the employees’ performance of their job duties. 	It focuses on
petitioner’s 	failure 	to 	provide 	reasonable 	notice 	of 	its 	intentions 	until 	after 	the
investigations 	were 	over. 	Had 	petitioner 	made 	a 	timely 	request 	for 	defense 	of
indemnification, 	the 	Board 	could 	have 	taken 	steps 	to 	manage 	the 	costs 	of 	the

OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 09738-22 and EDU 04893-23
5
investigation, such as using its in-house attorneys or the law firms with which had
contractual agreements.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Standard of Review
Summary decision is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact. 	Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). A “determination
whether there exists a ‘genuine issue’ of material fact that precludes summary judgment
requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials
presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient
to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-
moving party.” Ibid. Because the material facts are not in dispute, summary decision is
appropriate.
Indemnification
“Under the civil indemnification statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6, a board of education
employee may be indemnified for attorney's fees and costs incurred defending civil
actions arising out of an act or omission that took place in the course and scope of
employment duties.” 	L.A. v. Board of Educ., City of Trenton of Mercer Cnty., 221 N.J.
192, 201–202 (2015). In Bower v. Bd. of Educ., 149 N.J. 416 (1997), the Supreme Court
addressed the statutory prerequisite. 	It held that the statute requires “mere proof by a
preponderance of the evidence that the act on which the charges are predicated arose
out of and in the course of performance of the duties of employment.” 	Id. at 434. 	See
also Waters v. Bd. of Educ. of Toms River, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3083, *12
(December 22, 2011) (“In the context of the defense of a civil action, the outcome of the
litigation is irrelevant, the statute protects both successful and unsuccessful litigants as
long as” the cause of action arose out of the performance of the employee’s duties and
occurred in the performance of the duties) (citing Lonky v. Bd. of Educ. of Bayonne, OAL

OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 09738-22 and EDU 04893-23
6
Dkt. 	No. 	EDU 	07205-05, 	final 	decision, 	(July 	7, 	2008) 	(slip 	op. 	at 	3),
http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/oal/search.shtml).2
Here, the employees were alleged to have engaged in improper conduct with
students. 	The IAIU concluded that the allegations were “unfounded” which means that
“there is not a preponderance of the evidence indicating that a child is an abused or
neglected child . . . and the evidence indicates that a child was not harmed or placed at
a risk of harm.” N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c)(4). There is no evidence in the record concerning
the employees’ actions other than this determination. As they were exonerated and there
is no evidence in the record indicating that they engaged in acts outside the scope of their
duties, the undisputed evidence supports the conclusion that each employee was acting
within the scope of their duties at the relevant time.
However, parties seeking reimbursement from a board of education pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 must act “within a reasonable period of time after learning of the
charges . . . to put the Board on notice of [their] request for defense costs.” Azzaro, 477
N.J. Super. at 443. The court did not establish a bright-line rule concerning the timing of
the notice. Rather, “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable time may be a fact-specific inquiry in
certain cases.” 	Ibid.3 	The underlying principle is that the employer should at least be
aware of the possibility of costs: it “should have some control over costs, and at least be
in a position to know in advance what those costs will be.’” Id. at 442, n.7 (quoting Edison
v. Mezzacca, 147 N.J. Super. 9, 15 (App. Div. 1977)).
In so holding, the court directed employees and their counsel to not prejudge the
outcome. 	Instead, they should allow boards of education to evaluate their ability and
willingness to provide representation and offer alternatives if they decide they cannot
provide representation at the time of the request. By way of example, the prospect of a
conflict of interest between the employee and the board of education does not justify
withholding notice. Rather, the Azzaro court recognized that a board could opt to assign
2 Unpublished Appellate Division and administrative decisions are not precedential. They are offered in this
Initial Decision because they provide relevant guidance.
3 In Azzaro, the parties seeking indemnification did not request indemnification until after the underlying
litigation of an Order to Show Cause that was issued by the State Board of Education was concluded. That
matter spanned twelve years.

OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 09738-22 and EDU 04893-23
7
outside counsel or “come to an agreement with counsel of [petitioner’s] choosing . . . and
the costs thereof.” 	Id. at 442 (quoting Edison, 147 N,J. Super. at 15). 	See also A.B. v.
Montville Board of Educ., 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1086 (App. Div. 2012)(in which
a 	school 	board 	told 	its 	employee 	that 	it 	would 	ask 	its 	insurance 	carrier 	about
representation but also recommended that the employee seek representation through the
NJEA; the NJEA retained counsel through its insurance carrier and paid the costs and
fees of the employee’s defense; the board was later required to reimburse NJEA’s legal
fees and costs).
Petitioner argues that it could not have notified the Board sooner because the
investigations proceeded rapidly and it would have been impossible for the Board to
receive and consider its requests before the investigations concluded. 	Petitioner is
correct that the regulations governing IAIU investigations demand that they start and end
quickly. 	The investigation of a report of abuse must start “no later than the end of the
work day or within 24 hours of the State Central Registry representative determining the
time frame” and findings must be made within sixty days of the abuse report being
received at the Registry. 	N.J.A.C. 3A:10-2.2(a), N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(b). 	However,
petitioner asserts, without citing authority for its position, that the subject of an IAIU
investigation cannot unilaterally extend the investigatory timeline to secure counsel and
if the agency is unable to “obtain a statement/information from the subject” within the
required timeframe, it “may simply conclude the investigation without that person’s input.”
Pet’r’s Br. at 8.4
Notwithstanding the rapid timeline for IAIU investigations, as Azzaro explained,
petitioner was not obligated to predict the Board’s capacity and willingness to address its
requests for representation. Instead, petitioner’s obligation was merely to notify the Board
that it sought representation or indemnification. 	If the Board were unable to respond to
4 Rather, the regulations contemplate that the investigatory body may extend its investigation under certain
circumstances. See N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(b)(while findings shall be made within sixty days, this deadline may
be extended “for good cause approved by the office manager or designee. The office manager or designee
may grant extensions in increments of 30 days, if the child protective investigator is continuing efforts to
confirm credible information”).

OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 09738-22 and EDU 04893-23
8
the request in a timely manner, it would have at least been on notice that petitioner
intended to request indemnification when the investigation ended.
Here, the IAIU investigations concerning A.D., D.C., I.P. and L.D. ended on
December 21, 2021, May 11, 2022, December 20, 2018, and July 12, 2022, respectively.
Petitioner first notified the Board of its intent to seek indemnification on September 16,
2022. This was almost one year after A.D.’s investigation closed; four months after D.C.’s
investigation closed; nearly two years after I.P.’s investigation closed; and two months
after L.D.’s investigation closed.
The IAIU investigations concerning D.A., T.Y. and U.A. ended on December 9,
2022, March 29, 2023, and February 22, 2023. 	Petitioner first notified the Board of its
intent to seek indemnification on April 26, 2023. This was almost five months after D.A.’s
investigation closed; one month after T.Y’s investigation closed; and two months after
U.A.’s investigation closed.
The shortest IAIU investigations lasted approximately one and one-half months
(D.C., from April 1, 2022, through May 11, 2022), and nearly two months (T.Y., from
February 6, 2023, to March 29, 2023). Others lasted approximately three months (A.D.,
U.A.)
Given the speed with which IAIU investigations proceed, it would have been
reasonable for petitioner5 to notify respondent immediately. Furthermore, petitioner does
not offer an explanation for why it waited until after the investigations closed, whether for
one month, several months or a year, to notify the Board of its intention. 	For these
reasons, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has not demonstrated that its delays were
reasonable and, therefore, it is not entitled to the relief it seeks from respondent.
5 Or the employees.

OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 09738-22 and EDU 04893-23
9
ORDER
I ORDER that respondent’s motion for summary decision is GRANTED and
petitioner’s motion for summary decision is DENIED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Acting Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE 	DEPARTMENT 	OF 	EDUCATION. 	Exceptions 	may 	be 	filed 	by 	email 	to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
April 10, 2025
DATE 	JUDITH LIEBERMAN, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
JL/mg

OAL DKT. NOS. EDU 09738-22 and EDU 04893-23
10
APPENDIX
OAL
OAL-1 	Email to Department of Education, Office of Controversies and Disputes,
April 26, 2023
For petitioner:
Brief in support of motion for summary decision, February 3, 2025
P-A 	Verified Petition for Indemnification, September 16, 2022
P-B 	Verified Petition for Indemnification, April 26, 2023
P-C 	Order of Consolidation
P-D 	Order Denying Motion to Dismiss
P-E 	Table of IAIU Unfounded Findings and Legal Services Timelines
For respondent:
Brief in support of cross-motion for summary decision, February 3, 2025
Certification of James Rolle, Jr., February 3, 2025