Board of Education of the Bordentown Regional School District, Burlington County v. Raymond Marini, Interim Executive County Superintendent, New Jersey State Department of Education; Board of Education of the Northern Burlington County Regional School District, Burlington County; and Z.L. and T.L., on behalf of minor children, J.L. and B.L., 10/19/22, (#269-22)

269-22
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Bordentown Regional
School District, Burlington County,
Petitioner,
v.
Raymond Marini, Interim Executive County
Superintendent, New Jersey Department of Education,
Board of Education of the Northern Burlington County
Regional School District, Burlington County, and Z.L. and
T.L., on behalf of minor children, J.L. and B.L.,
Respondents.
Synopsis
The Board of Education of the Bordentown Regional School District (Bordentown) appealed the determination
of respondent Raymond Marini, Interim Executive County Superintendent (Marini), that Z.L. and T.L. and their
minor children are homeless. Bordentown contended that Z.L. and T.L. are domiciled in Bordentown, as they
have resided in the Bordentown home of T.L.’s mother for a number of years since losing their housing within
the Northern Burlington County Regional School District (Northern Burlington) due to financial hardship, and
further argued that Bordentown is therefore not financially responsible for tuition costs related to J.L. and
B.L.’s attendance in Northern Burlington schools.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: Z.L. and T.L. have lived in Bordentown with T.L.’s mother for five years and have
no plans to relocate; the family has full access to the Bordentown home’s bathroom and kitchen; all family
members have a bed; and the Bordentown home is a fixed, regular, and adequate place to live; accordingly,
the children can no longer be considered homeless. The ALJ concluded that the family have become residents
of Bordentown and Bordentown has no financial responsibility for the children’s attendance in Northern
Burlington schools.
Upon review, the Commissioner is constrained to remand this matter to the OAL as she is unable to determine
from the present record whether the family is homeless. The Commissioner noted, inter alia, that although
domicile attaches immediately when a child’s dwelling becomes fixed, regular and adequate, homelessness
determinations require a fact-specific analysis that includes the intentions of the parents or guardians, and
“cannot rest upon a simple calculation of the amount of time that children have spent in a particular location
or municipality,” 	M. O’K. v. Board of Education of the Borough of Cresskill, et al, Commissioner Decision
No. 325-14, decided August 12, 2014 at 3, aff’d, A-0828-14T4 (App. Div. Sept. 8, 2016). 	Further, a
determination as to the date when the L family were no longer homeless is necessary in order to resolve the
competing claims for tuition reimbursement. Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the OAL for further
proceedings consistent with the Commissioner’s decision.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It has
been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 01693-22
Agency Dkt. No. 7-1/22
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Bordentown
Regional School District, Burlington County,
Petitioner,
v.
Raymond Marini, Interim Executive County
Superintendent, New Jersey Department of
Education, Board of Education of the
Northern Burlington County Regional School
District, Burlington County, and Z.L. and T.L.,
on behalf of minor children, J.L. and B.L.,
Respondents.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
have been reviewed, as have the exceptions filed pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4 by respondent
Northern Burlington County Regional Board of Education (Northern Burlington) and the reply
thereto filed by petitioner Bordentown Board of Education (Bordentown).1
The L. family resided in Chesterfield, which is part of the Northern Burlington school district,
until they lost their housing due to financial hardship. They moved in with T.L.’s mother in
Bordentown.2 The children continued to attend school in Northern Burlington, and Bordentown
1 The other respondents, ECS Marini and Z.L. and T.L., did not file exceptions or a reply.
2 The record is not clear when the family moved in with T.L.’s mother. In making the homelessness determination
at issue in this matter, ECS Marini indicated that the family was displaced in April 2017, and the ALJ based her
decision on that date. However, a note from T.L.’s mother to Northern Burlington, stating that the family is living
with her, is dated October 13, 2014. The ALJ indicated that this date was an error, but it is not clear to the
Commissioner how the ALJ reached that conclusion. Still other documentation indicates that the family began
269-22

2
assumed responsibility for the cost of their tuition and transportation for the 2018-2019 and 2019-
2020 school years. On October 14, 2021, after Bordentown challenged the family’s homelessness
status, Interim Executive County Superintendent (ECS) Raymond Marini issued a determination that
the family was still homeless. Bordentown filed an appeal challenging this ECS decision and seeking
a determination that Bordentown had become the family’s permanent residence, and that
Bordentown is not responsible for the cost of educating the children for the 2020-2021 school year
and future years.3
Following motion practice, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the Bordentown
home is a fixed, regular, and adequate place to live and that the children can no longer be
considered homeless. The ALJ noted that the family has lived in Bordentown for five years and has
no plans to relocate.4 The ALJ indicated that the family has full access to the Bordentown home’s
bathroom and kitchen,5 and that all members of the family have a bed. Accordingly, the ALJ
living in Bordentown in June 2017. Notably, none of the documentation in the record that was completed by the
family provides the date on which they relocated.
3 The petition also sought an order that Northern Burlington be required to repay to Bordentown the costs of
tuition and transportation for the 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 school years. This request for relief was apparently
incorrectly included during a period of transition of the Board’s counsel. It was not briefed during motion practice,
nor was it specifically addressed in the Initial decision. Bordentown formally withdrew this request for relief in its
reply to Northern Burlington’s exceptions.
4 It is unclear how the ALJ reached the conclusion that the family has no plans to relocate. That statement, which
is represented as a direct quotation in the Initial Decision, does not appear in any of the questionnaires completed
by the family. Furthermore, even if the ALJ did not intend for the statement to be a direct quotation but instead
inferred that the family had no plans to relocate based on their length of stay in Bordentown or from other
evidence, the family has repeatedly stated that they intend their residence in Bordentown to be temporary and
has not made any statement that the Commissioner interprets to mean that they have no plans to relocate. To the
extent that this information may have been presented during oral argument – of which the Commissioner was not
provided a recording or a transcript – the Commissioner notes that argument does not constitute evidence.
5 While the family described difficulties related to having six family members sharing one bathroom, from which
the ALJ may have inferred that they have full access to the bathroom, none of the questionnaires mention
anything about the kitchen.

3
concluded that the children have become residents of Bordentown and that Bordentown has no
financial responsibility for their attendance in Northern Burlington.
In its exceptions, Northern Burlington argues that the L. family did not participate in this
matter and that there is insufficient information about their living situation to support a finding that
they are no longer homeless. In particular, Northern Burlington notes that correspondence sent
from Z.L. to Northern Burlington indicates that he is constantly looking for adequate employment
and housing, contradicting the ALJ’s finding that the family has no plans to move back to Northern
Burlington. Northern Burlington further contends that the ALJ did not make a determination as to
exactly when the family’s living situation transformed into a fixed, regular, and adequate residence,
such that the ALJ may only have intended her finding to be prospective. Finally, pointing to existing
case law, Northern Burlington argues that Bordentown would have been financially responsible for
the children’s education if they had attended school in Bordentown, and that Bordentown should
therefore be required to reimburse Northern Burlington for the costs of the children’s attendance
in Northern Burlington.
In its reply, Bordentown argues that the ALJ adopted the version of facts submitted by
Northern Burlington and found that, even under that most favorable version, the facts do not
support a finding that the family continues to be homeless after so many years of residing in
Bordentown. According to Bordentown, the family’s residence with T.L.’s mother is adequate and
has become fixed and regular. Finally, Bordentown notes that it is currently under its targeted
enrollment and would not be required to hire additional staff to educate the L. children in its
schools, such that there would be no costs associated with the children’s attendance in
Bordentown.

4
Upon review, the Commissioner is constrained to remand this matter, as she is unable to
determine from the present record whether the L. family is homeless. Under the McKinney-Vento
Act, homeless children are defined as “individuals who lack a fixed, regular and adequate nighttime
residence,” which includes “children sharing housing with other persons due to loss of their own
housing, economic hardship, or a similar reason.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 11434a. Similarly, under state law,
homeless children are defined as “child[ren] or youth who lack[] a fixed, regular and adequate
residence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12 and N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2,” which includes children living in
the “residence of relatives or friends where the homeless child resides out of necessity because his
or her family lacks a regular or permanent residence of its own.” N.J.A.C. 6A:17-1.2 and 2.2.
Thus, conducting a homelessness evaluation to determine whether a child’s home is
considered fixed, regular and adequate requires a fact-specific analysis and “cannot rest upon a
simple calculation of the amount of time that children have spent in a particular location or
municipality.” M. O’K. v. Board of Education of the Borough of Cresskill, et al, Commissioner
Decision No. 325-14, decided August 12, 2014 at 3, aff’d, A-0828-14T4 (App. Div.,
September 8, 2016). In conducting such a fact-specific inquiry, the Commissioner must consider the
totality of the circumstances, as “[t]he reasons for the children’s homelessness, their living
conditions, and the resources and intentions of the parents or custodians are relevant.” Ibid.
The Commissioner has previously addressed the fact-specific nature of a homelessness
inquiry. In M. O’K., supra, following the foreclosure of their home in Cresskill, the O’K family
occupied the bottom floor of their relatives’ house in Little Ferry, which consisted of one small
bedroom and a common area, without a bathroom or kitchen. The parents and two of the children
shared the bedroom, while their third child slept in the common area. At the time of the litigation,
neither parent was employed, and the family’s sole income consisted of Social Security Disability

5
benefits. During the pendency of the litigation, the O’K family represented that they were actively
searching for a house in Cresskill. The Commissioner found, and the Appellate Division affirmed,
that the O’K family became homeless due to the foreclosure of their home in Cresskill, and although
they had been deemed domiciled in Little Ferry as a result of their residence in the district for over
one year, they continued to remain homeless due to their shared living conditions and the parents’
economic hardship.
In contrast, in State-Operated School District of the City of Camden, Camden County v. C.
Ann Volk, Executive County Superintendent, New Jersey Department of Education, and E.H., on
behalf of minor child, K.M., Commissioner Decision No. 172-17R, decided June 20, 2017, the family
relocated from Voorhees to Camden due to economic hardship that prevented them from
continuing their lease. In the Camden residence, the family was able to use the entire residence
and was not relegated to a portion of the home that would otherwise be considered inadequate.
E.H., the children’s mother, argued that the residence was inadequate because the siblings had to
share a room, which the Commissioner found was not uncommon. Furthermore, given E.H.’s
ongoing employment at an annual salary of $65,000, the Commissioner was not persuaded that she
was unable to find suitable housing in Voorhees, particularly in light of her testimony that she had
stopped looking for apartments. The Commissioner found that the family was not residing in the
Camden residence of out necessity and that it qualified as a “fixed, regular, and adequate”
nighttime residence, such that the family was not homeless. Ibid.
Similar to Volk, in J.G., on behalf of minor children, T.G. and C.G. v. Board of Education of the
Township of Edison, et al, Commissioner Decision No. 125-20, decided June 15, 2020, the G. family
moved in with J.G.’s mother in Edison after being evicted from their home in Milltown. The family
was able to use three of the four bedrooms, the kitchen, bathrooms, all common areas, and utilities

6
in the Edison home. J.G. and his wife were both employed, with an income of $71,000 a year, but
they did not pay rent or contribute to housing costs, other than food and a storage facility. While
they stated that their intent was to move back to Milltown, there was no documentation of their
search for a new home, and J.G. admitted that he had not submitted a rental application in at least
six months. The Commissioner found that, while J.G.’s intention may be to eventually move back to
Milltown, the totality of the facts and circumstances demonstrate that the family is no longer
homeless.
Here, the Commissioner cannot determine on the present record whether the L. family is
homeless because it is unclear if the family is residing in the Bordentown home out of necessity or
whether it has become a permanent residence. The Commissioner has no information on the
current status of Z.L. and T.L.’s employment, their salaries, or any other sources of income to
determine whether they are able to afford to rent or purchase another home. Nor is there any
information in the record to demonstrate whether Z.L. and T.L. have made any efforts to find a
permanent home in Northern Burlington. While the Commissioner acknowledges that Z.L. and T.L.
have not participated in this matter to date, the fact remains that they are the only source of
information about their living situation and financial circumstances, and thus their participation
through discovery or testimony is critical to a determination in this matter. Furthermore, the fact
that the family has lived in Bordentown for years6 does not alone demonstrate that they are no
longer living there out of necessity, especially when weighed against their stated intent that the
6 The precise number of years should be clarified on remand, based on information provided by the family about
the actual date they relocated to Bordentown. The Commissioner notes that the ALJ dismissed
Northern Burlington’s request for reimbursement from Bordentown for dates prior to October 2017, when
Northern Burlington notified Bordentown that the family had relocated. The Commissioner does not reach the
issue of whether this dismissal was proper. However, even if the ALJ is correct that Northern Burlington was not
entitled to reimbursement from Bordentown prior to the notification, the date on which the family relocated is
nonetheless relevant to a determination of whether their home in Bordentown is fixed and regular.

7
living situation is temporary.7 Therefore, further information is necessary to determine whether
the home is fixed, regular and adequate such that J.L. and B.L. are no longer homeless under state
and federal law. If the family is no longer homeless, it is also necessary to determine the date when
they were no longer homeless, in order to resolve the competing claims for tuition reimbursement.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is rejected, and the matter is remanded to the OAL for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
7 While a family’s intent to move is generally insufficient on its own to support a finding that they are homeless,
see, e.g., K.L. and K.L. o/b/o minor child M.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Kinnelon, Morris Cty., Commissioner
Decision No. 315-08 (July 22, 2008), aff’d, K.L. v. Bd. of Educ., 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 11 (App. Div. 2010),
intent can be relevant in determining whether the family is remaining in their current location out of necessity. If
the family intends to move, and has been actively attempting to move but has been unsuccessful in doing so
because of continued financial hardship, the family may be homeless. See M. O’K., supra.
October 19, 2022
October 19, 2022

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 01693-22
AGENCY DKT. NO. 7-1/22
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
BORDENTOWN REGIONAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT, BURLINGTON COUNTY,
Petitioner,
v.
RAYMOND MARINI, INTERIM EXECUTIVE
COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT, NEW JERSEY
STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE NORTHERN
REGIONAL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
BURLINGTON COUNTY; AND Z.L.
AND T.L ON BEHLAF OF MINOR CHILDREN,
J.L. AND B.L.,
Respondents.
____________________________
Cameron 	R. 	Morgan, 	Esq., 	for 	petitioner, 	Bordentown 	Regional 	Board 	of
Education (Cleary, Giacobbe, Alfieri and Jacobs, attorneys)
Kaitlin C. McCaffrey, Esq., for respondent, Northern Regional County School
District Board of Education (Parker McCay, attorneys)

OAL DKT. NO EDU 01693-22
- 2 -
Hasibul Haque, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent, Raymond Marini,
Interim 	Executive 	County 	Superintendent 	(Matthew 	J. 	Platkin, 	Acting
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorneys)
Z.L. and T.L, on behalf of J.L. and B.L., respondents, pro se
Record Closed: June 7, 2022 	Decided: July 22, 2022
BEFORE SARAH G. CROWLEY, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, 	Board 	of 	Education 	of 	the 	Bordentown 	Regional 	School 	District
(Bordentown), challenges the homelessness determination by the Northern (different
caption in PM/notices) Burlington (Burlington) County Regional Board of Education and
the Interim Executive County Superintendent (ECS). 	Petitioner contends that J.L. and
B.L., are not homeless, but are domiciled in the Bordentown School District, having lived
with Z.L.’s mother (and J.L. and B.L.’s grandmother) in Bordentown for over five years.
At issue is whether the children and their parents are “homeless,” under the applicable
law. Burlington determined that the family was still homeless and thus, Bordentown had
an obligation to pay tuition and bus the children to Northern Burlington High School, where
they resided prior to becoming homeless in 2017. The ECS affirmed the homelessness
determination.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter arose with the filing of a petition of appeal by Bordentown on January
10, 	2022, 	challenging 	the 	homelessness 	determination 	by 	the 	Interim 	County
Superintendent. The New Jersey Department of Education (DOE) and Interim Executive
County Superintendent, Raymond Marini, filed a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an Answer

OAL DKT. NO EDU 01693-22
- 3 -
on February 25, 2022. The matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law as
a contested matter on March 4, 2022. 	N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -
13. 	The petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Summary Decision and Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss. 	The respondent, Northern Burlington, filed a counter/cross petition
seeking to hold Bordentown responsible for the 2015–2016, 2016–2017, and 2017–2018
school years, as well as going forward. The record closed after oral argument, via Zoom,
on June 1, 2022.
FACTUAL DISCUSSIONS AND FINDINGS
The following facts are predicated on the Student Residency Questionnaire and
are not disputed:
1. 	Respondents Z.L. and T.L. and their children were residents in Chesterfield,
New Jersey, which is in the Northern Burlington Regional School District
until they became homeless in April 2017.1
2. 	They were attending school in the Northern Burlington Regional School
District at that time.
3. 	In April 2017, the family lost their housing in Chesterfield, New Jersey, due
to a financial hardship.
4. 	The family moved in with R.B., the children’s maternal grandmother, along
with their mother and father at her 9 Deerfield Court home in Bordentown,
New Jersey
1. There was some initial confusion about the date the family moved to Bordentown due to an error on a
handwritten note from the grandmother. However, the parties all agree and the ECS’s determination was
predicated on the relocation of the family in April 2017. Moreover, Northern Burlington notified Bordentown
of the family relocation in October 2017. 	Accordingly, any request for tuition and/or reimbursement for
dates prior to this notice are dismissed.

OAL DKT. NO EDU 01693-22
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5. 	Northern Burlington was advised of the relocation to Bordentown by the
grandmother in October 2017, at which point Burlington put Bordentown on
notice of their potential responsibility under the McKinney-Vento Homeless
Assistance Act.
6. 	They attended school in Northern Burlington and arranged for their own
transportation for the 2017–2018 school year.
7. 	Thereafter, Bordentown assumed responsibility and provided tuition and
transportation to Northern Burlington pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(d).
8. 	Bordentown paid the tuition and transportation for the children in the 2018–
2019 and 2019–2020 school years.
9. 	When Northern Burlington sent the invoice to Bordentown for the 2020–
2021 school year, Bordentown filed a Notice of Dispute with the Executive
Superintendent challenging the homelessness status of the family.
10. 	On October 14, 2021, the County Superintendent concluded that the family,
who had been residing with the grandmother in Bordentown since 2017,
was still “homeless.”
11. 	The Superintendent’s decision was predicated on the information provided
in the Questionnaire provided by the family in an email where they advised
that “there are dressers in the hallway,” “two of the boys share a bed in one
bedroom,” and “the father sleeps on an air mattress in the den.” The email
further provides that “they have full access to bathing, toilet and kitchen,”
and “they have no plans to relocate at this time.”
I FIND the foregoing as FACT.

OAL DKT. NO EDU 01693-22
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LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
It is well-established that if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, a party
is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 	Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Co. of
America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). 	The purpose of summary decision is to avoid
unnecessary hearings and their concomitant burden on public resources. Under the Brill
standard, a fact-finding hearing should be avoided “when the evidence is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Brill guides us thusly:
[A] determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of
material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the
motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
non-moving party.
[Id. at 540.]
Although N.J.S.A. Const., Art. 8, section 4, paragraph 1 provides that free public
education is a fundamental right under the New Jersey Constitution, it is well known that
parents may not simply choose the school district that they wish their children to attend:
the general rule is that school districts are responsible for providing a free education to
children “domiciled” within the school district. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(a) states that public
schools shall be free to any person over five and under twenty years of age who is
domiciled within the school district. “A student is domiciled in the school district when he
or she is the child of a parent or guardian whose domicile is located within the school
district.” N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.1(a)(1).
Under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Education Assistance Improvement Act of
2001, 42 U.S.C. § 11431 et seq., state educational agencies must ensure that each
homeless child and youth has equal access to the same public education as every other
child and youth. 	The protections offered to homeless students and their parents under
the federal McKinney-Vento Act and New Jersey’s corresponding state law represent an

OAL DKT. NO EDU 01693-22
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exception to otherwise applicable residency rules. 	In contrast to the basic premise that
students must change schools when they leave a school district, the laws protecting
homeless students generally allow parents the choice to keep their children enrolled in
their original school district if the parents relocate to another school district as the result
of being homeless. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(f); N.J.A.C. 6A:22-3.2(d). The district of residence
for children whose parents temporarily move from one school district to another as the
result of being homeless shall be the district in which the parent or guardian last resided
prior to becoming homeless. N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12(c).
Under the federal McKinney-Vento Act and New Jersey’s corresponding law, the
term “homeless” refers to individuals who lack a fixed, regular, and adequate residence.
Federal law refers to the lack of an adequate “nighttime” residence. 	42 U.S.C. § (is
symbol 	her 	preference 	instead 	of 	Sec.) 	Sec. 	11434a 	(referring 	to 	42 	U.S.C.
Sec.11302(a)(1)); N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12(c); N.J.A.C. 6A17-1.2.
N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2 states that:
(a) A district board of education shall determine that a child
is homeless for purposes of this subchapter when he or
she resides in any of the following:
1. 	A publicly or privately operated shelter designed to
provide temporary living accommodations, including:
i. 	Hotels or motels;
ii. 	Congregate shelters, including domestic violence and
runaway shelters;
iii. 	Transitional housing; and
iv. 	Homes for adolescent mothers;
2. 	A 	public 	or 	private 	place 	not 	designated 	for 	or
ordinarily used as a regular sleeping accommodation,
including:
i. 	Cars or other vehicles including mobile homes;
ii. 	Tents or other temporary shelters;
iii. 	Parks;
iv. 	Abandoned buildings;

OAL DKT. NO EDU 01693-22
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v. 	Bus or train stations; or
vi. 	Temporary shelters provided to migrant workers and
their children on farm sites;
3. 	The 	residence 	of 	relatives 	or 	friends 	where 	the
homeless child resides out of necessity because his
or her family lacks a regular or permanent residence
of its own;
4. 	Substandard housing; or
5. 	Any temporary location wherein children and youth
are awaiting foster care placement.
[N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2.]
This subchapter and subsection, however, must be read, in conjunction with 42
U.S.C. § 11302(a)(1), which defines “homeless” for the McKinney-Vento Act, and N.J.S.A.
18A:7B-12(c), which defines “homeless” for school-funding purposes. Under the former,
“homeless” means lacking “a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence.” 	Under
the 	latter, 	“homeless” 	means 	temporarily 	lacking 	“a 	fixed, 	regular 	and 	adequate
residence.” Thus, both definitions have at their core the concept of a fixed, regular, and
adequate place to live with regular sleeping accommodations. This shared concept is not
a coincidence, as the New Jersey regulatory scheme, looks to the federal regulatory
scheme for its definition of terms. 	See N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.1 (“Nothing in this subchapter
shall limit the educational rights of homeless children and youth or school district
responsibilities 	under 	Subtitle 	VII-B 	of 	the 	Stewart 	B. 	McKinney-Vento 	Homeless
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11431 et seq.)”.)
Financial responsibility of the district of residence terminates when the family is
deemed “domiciled” in another district, which occurs when the family has lived in another
district for a full year or longer. 	At this time, financial responsibility shifts to the school
district in which the student now resides. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(d) states:
Any person whose parent or guardian, even though not
domiciled within the district, is residing temporarily therein, but
any person who has had or shall have his all-year-round

OAL DKT. NO EDU 01693-22
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dwelling place within the district for one year or longer shall
be deemed domiciled within the district for the purposes of this
section.
Northern Burlington, as the original district of residence, was responsible for the
children’s tuition when they first became homeless, and they continued to go to school
there throughout the 2017–2018 school year. However, after residing in Bordentown for
more than one year, they were deemed domiciled in Bordentown pursuant to N.J.S.A.
18A:38-1(d) and financial responsibility shifted to Bordentown. 	Bordentown provided
tuition and transportation for an additional two years. When they received the tuition bill
for the two remaining children in the Northern Burlington Regional School District in 2021,
they requested a review by the County Superintendent claiming that the Bordentown
residence had become “regular, fixed and adequate” home and they could no longer be
deemed “homeless,” having resided in this regular fixed and adequate housing for more
than four years (and now five years), and by their own admission had no plans to move
back to Northern Burlington or secure other housing.
Respondents argue that the family remains homeless, and they are entitled to
continue school in Northern Burlington at Bordentown’s expense because they are in a
“doubled-up living arrangement” and continue to “experience financial hardship.” 	The
facts provided by Burlington and relied upon by ECS are provided by the family and for
the purposes of these motions will be considered as fact. 	There is no documentation
regarding the family’s employment status or financial situation. 	The parents have not
responded or filed any papers in connection with this action. The family advises that the
situation where they have been living for the last five years is temporary, but they have
no plans to relocate. Moreover, although it is not ideal, they have full access to bath and
kitchen, and they all have a bed in the home of the grandmother. 	The position of the
respondents is that the living arrangement is less than ideal and that the family is “doubled
up.” However, it is undisputed that it is fixed, adequate, and permanent to the extent that
they have been living there for five years.

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The determination of whether a student is considered “homeless,” triggering the
protections for homeless students available under the law, is fact sensitive. 	In M. O’K.
and S. O’K., A. O’K. and C. O’K. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Cresskill and Bd. of
Educ. of the Borough of Little Ferry, OAL No. 14830-13, Agency No. 214-9/13 (N.J.
Comm’r of Educ. Aug. 12, 2014); aff’d, 2016 WL, 4699166 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Sept.
8, 2016, the school district argued that the students who lived with their parents in the
grandparents’ home were no longer “homeless” as they had lived there for over a year.
The family prevailed in their argument that they were still “homeless” in part because five
people occupied the bottom floor of the house which had no shower, sink or kitchen. This
was found to be less than a regular and adequate nighttime residence. 	This case is
clearly distinguishable from the facts in the present case as the family has a shower, sink
and kitchen as well as bedrooms for the children, and the father sleeps in the den.
More recently, an administrative law judge (ALJ) wrote that “homelessness is best
viewed in a continuum.” 	State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Camden v. Volk, EDU 4521-16,
Initial 	Decision 	(March 	22, 	2017), 	modified, 	Comm’r 	(June 	20, 	2017), 	at 	*11,
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/. 	In that case, the ALJ thoroughly examined
whether a family in a borderline situation was homeless and considered the totality of the
circumstances. Among the factors the ALJ considered were intent, fixed location, regular
use, and adequacy. The ALJ determined that the family intended to stay in their current
living situation because they stopped looking for another place to live; that the location
was fixed and that the use was regular because the family had lived in the same place
for several years; and that their living situation was adequate because the children had a
designated sleeping area and access to a kitchen and bathroom facilities, despite the
sharing of rooms and limited space. 	To the extent that homeless status is identified as
one without a “fixed, regular and adequate” living place, given the very lengthy period of
residence, the adequacy of the living place and the regularity of occupation, the ALJ found
that the child did live in a “fixed, regular, and adequate residence” and concluded that she
was not homeless. See also L.C. on behalf of her Minor Child B.C. v. Bd of Educ. of the
Twp. of Branchburg, Somerset County, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d(EDU)1003 (Commissioner found
that “while her living arrangements with her brother [in his apartment] may not be

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permanent in the sense that she may wish to eventually return to Branchburg, the
evidence shows them to have become sufficiently fixed, regular, and adequate so as to
preclude a finding of homelessness.”)
Similar to Volk, in J.G., on behalf of minor children, T.G. and C.G. v. Board of
education of the Township of Edison, et al, Commissioner’s Decision No. 125-20, decided
June 15, 2020, the G. family was evicted from their home in Milltown and moved in with
J.G.’s mother in Edison. The family had the use of three of the four bedrooms, the kitchen,
bathrooms, all common areas and utilities in the Edison home. 	Although both J.G. and
his wife were employed, with an income of $71,000 a year, they did not pay rent or
contribute to the housing costs, other than food and a storage facility. While they stated
that their intent was to move back to Milltown, there was no documentation of their search
for a new home. 	The Commissioner found that while J.G.’s intentions may be to
eventually 	move 	back 	to 	Milltown, 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	facts 	and 	circumstances
demonstrated that the family was no longer homeless.
The County Superintendent’s determination that respondents are McKinney-Vento
eligible, and that Bordentown is fiscally responsible for the students was based on the fact
that the family lost their home due to financial hardship and that the family is residing with
friends/relatives out-of-necessity. He found that they were doubled up and hoped to move
out eventually, with no current plans to relocate. 	There was no other analysis undertaken
with regards to homelessness. 	There was no analysis of whether the housing was fixed,
adequate or permanent. It does not appear that any consideration was given to the fact that
the family had been living there for five years and has made no efforts to find housing. The
totality of the facts and circumstances demonstrate that the T.L, Z.L., J.L. and B.L. are no
longer homeless and have become permanent residents in Bordentown and entitled to
enroll and attend school in that district.
For the reasons stated, I CONCLUDE that the family is no longer homeless, and
Bordentown is their District of Residence. I further CONCLUDE that Bordentown has no
financial responsibility for the respondent’s attendance at Northern Burlington Regional

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High School, and respondents should be placed in the Bordentown Public School District.
I further CONCLUDE that Northern Burlington has no basis for tuition reimbursement for
the years 2015–2017. The ECS’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 	I further CONCLUDE
that the Burlington’s Motion for Summary Decision is DENIED, the ECS’s determination
of homelessness should be REVERSED, and judgment entered in favor of the petitioner,
Bordentown Township Board of Education.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the relief requested in the
petition is GRANTED, the ECS’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, the Cross Motion for
Summary Decision by Burlington is DENIED, and the homelessness decision of the
Interim Executive County Superintendent is REVERSED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

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Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND
DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-
0500, marked “Attention: 	Exceptions.” 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the
judge and to the other parties.
July 22, 2022___________________ 	_______________________________
DATE 	SARAH G. CROWLEY, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
SCG:sm