Do Yeon Shim v. Board of Education of the Borough of Ridgefield, Bergen County, 9/7/2023, (#270-23)

270-23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Do-Yeon Shim,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of Ridgefield,
Bergen County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
In this matter, petitioner – a tenured teacher employed by the respondent, Board of Education of the
Borough of Ridgefield (Board) – challenged the determination of the Board that she had committed an
act of harassment, intimidation and bullying (HIB) against a second-grade student. The Board alleged
that petitioner committed HIB when she took a photograph of the student’s braided hairstyle as he bent
down to tie his shoelace, then showed the photograph to the student, and told him that “they could
play tic-tac-toe on his head because his hair looked like a tic-tac-toe board.” Petitioner asserted that she
had taken the picture because she thought the student’s hairstyle “was cool” and she wanted to create
a bonding moment with him. The school district’s HIB investigation determined that petitioner’s actions
were “reasonably perceived to be motivated on the basis of appearance, race or ethnic origin” and that
she had committed an act in violation of the HIB statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14. 	The parties filed cross
motions for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: there are no material facts at issue in this matter and the case is ripe for
summary decision; 	the statutory elements of a HIB violation are set forth in the Anti-Bullying Bill of
Rights Act, at N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14, and require a finding that the petitioner’s conduct substantially
disrupted or interfered with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students; here,
the record is devoid of evidence to establish this requirement; no student witnesses, nor the alleged HIB
victim himself, reported or reacted in any negative way to the incident in question; the incident was
reported by one of two staff members who observed petitioner’s interaction with the student. The ALJ
determined that petitioner’s conduct, while wholly inappropriate and racially insensitive, did not
constitute a HIB violation under New Jersey law. Accordingly, the ALJ granted petitioner’s motion for
summary decision, concluding that the Board’s HIB determination in this case was arbitrary, capricious,
and unreasonable.
Upon review, the Commissioner adopted the Initial Decision of the OAL as the final decision in this
matter. In so doing, the Commissioner did not condone the petitioner’s conduct and poor judgment but
agreed with the ALJ’s well-reasoned conclusion that the incident did not meet the statutory
requirements of an HIB violation. Summary decision was granted to the petitioner.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader.
It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 02751-23
Agency Dkt. No. 69-3/23
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Do Yeon Shim,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of
Ridgefield, Bergen County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by respondent Board of Education of the Borough of Ridgefield (Board)
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and petitioner’s reply thereto, have been reviewed and considered.
This matter involves the Board’s determination that petitioner, a teacher, committed an
act of harassment, intimidation, or bullying (HIB) when she took a photograph of a second-grade
student’s braided hairstyle as he bent down to tie his shoelace, showed the photograph to the
student, and told him that “they could play tic-tac-toe on his head because his hair looked like a
tic-tac-toe board.” Initial Decision, at 3. During the HIB investigation, one staff member witness
reported that the student seemed “unfazed” by petitioner’s conduct. Ibid. While another staff
member witness said that the student seemed “confused” by petitioner’s conduct, she confirmed
that “there was no apparent impact on [him] the rest of the day.” Id. at 4. The student told
270-23

2
administrators that petitioner took the photograph because “she liked [his] hair” and reported
that “he liked the picture because his hair looked good.” Id. at 3.
Petitioner appealed the Board’s determination, and the matter was transmitted to the
OAL. The parties cross-moved for summary decision. Upon finding that the material facts were
not in dispute, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted petitioner’s motion for summary
decision and concluded that the Board’s HIB determination was arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable. The ALJ analyzed the statutory elements of a HIB violation as set forth in the
Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (the Act) at N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14, along with relevant case law, and
determined that the record was devoid of evidence to establish that petitioner’s conduct
substantially disrupted or interfered with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of
other students. Consequently, petitioner’s conduct—although wholly inappropriate and racially
insensitive—did not constitute a HIB violation under New Jersey law.
In their exceptions, the Board argues that petitioner’s conduct “substantially interfered
with the student’s right to be let alone and feel comfortable among his peers.” Respondent’s
Exceptions, at 3. The exceptions focus upon the nature of petitioner’s conduct, which was
unquestionably offensive, insensitive, and demeaning. Id. at 4-5. While the Board concedes that
“no students reported the matter” to administrators, it emphasizes that a staff member did. Id.
at 3-4. In reply, petitioner asks the Commissioner to adopt the ALJ’s Initial Decision because the
Board had no basis upon which to conclude that a substantial disruption resulted from the
interaction between petitioner and the student.
Upon review, the Commissioner adopts the ALJ’s thoughtful and well-reasoned
Initial Decision as the Final Decision in this matter. While the Commissioner absolutely does not

3
condone petitioner’s conduct and poor judgment, the ALJ correctly determined that it did not
meet the statutory requirements of a HIB violation based upon the evidentiary record. The Act
defines HIB as:
[A]ny gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any
electronic communication, whether it be a single incident or a
series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being motivated
either by any actual or perceived characteristic, such as race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity and expression, or a mental, physical or sensory
disability, or by any other distinguishing characteristic, that takes
place on school property, at any school-sponsored function, on a
school bus, or off school grounds as provided for in section 16 of
P.L. 2010, c.122 (C.18A:37-15.3), that substantially disrupts or
interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of
other students and that:
a. a reasonable person should know, under the
circumstances, will have the effect of physically or emotionally
harming a student or damaging the student's property, or placing
a student in reasonable fear of physical or emotional harm to his
person or damage to his property;
b. has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student or
group of students; or
c. creates a hostile educational environment for the student
by interfering with a student's education or by severely or
pervasively causing physical or emotional harm to the student.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.]
In sum, a finding of HIB requires three elements under the Act. First, the conduct must
be reasonably perceived as being motivated by any actual or perceived characteristic expressly
identified in the statute, or by any other distinguishing characteristic.1 Second, the conduct must
substantially disrupt or interfere with the rights of other students or the orderly operation of the
school. Third, one of the three conditions set forth in subsections (a), (b), and (c) must be
1 The parties do not dispute that the conduct at issue took place on school property.

4
satisfied. Wehbeh v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Verona, Essex Cnty., Commissioner Decision No.
510-20 (Feb. 4, 2020).
Here, it is undisputed that the Board’s written HIB determination referenced only the first
element of the statute vis-à-vis petitioner’s conduct, i.e., that it can be reasonably perceived as
being motivated by “appearance, race and ethnic origin.” Initial Decision, at 9. The Board made
no findings regarding the other requisite statutory elements. Because the ALJ correctly
concluded that the record fails to establish that petitioner’s conduct substantially disrupted or
interfered with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students, the
Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner’s conduct did not constitute a HIB violation
under the Act. Consequently, it is unnecessary to analyze whether one of the three conditions
set forth in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14 was satisfied.
The Board’s reliance in its exceptions upon T.R. and T.R., on behalf of minor child, E.R. v.
Board of Education of the Bridgewater-Raritan Regional School District, Somerset County, OAL
Dkt. No. EDU 10208-13, Initial Decision (Sept. 25, 2014), Commissioner Decision No. 450-14
(Nov. 10, 2014), and R.H. and M.H., on behalf of minor child, A.H. v. Board of Education of the
Borough of Sayreville, Middlesex County, OAL Dkt. Nos. EDU 09435-17 and EDU 14833-17,
Initial Decision (June 24, 2021), Commissioner Decision No. 198-21 (Sept. 23, 2021), is unavailing.
The Board cited those matters to illustrate that students have a right to be let alone, and that
substantial disruptions have been found to occur under the Act when other students are so
affected by the HIB incident that they report it to administrators. Respondent’s Exceptions, at 2-
3. Here, however, there is no indication that students present in the hallway during the incident
noticed what had occurred or were affected in any way by petitioner’s conduct. Initial Decision,

5
at 19. In addition, the Board concedes that no students reported the incident to administrators.
Respondent’s Exceptions, at 3.
Accordingly, the Commissioner hereby adopts the Initial Decision as the Final Decision in
this matter, grants petitioner’s motion for summary decision, and denies respondent’s cross-
motion for summary decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the
date of mailing of this decision
September 7, 2023
September 8, 2023

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DECISION AND
DENYING RESPONDENT’S CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
AGENCY DKT. NO. 69-3/23
DO YEON SHIM,
Petitioner,
v.
RIDGEFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD
OF EDUCATION, BERGEN COUNTY,
Respondent.
______
Michael J. DeMarco, Esq, for petitioner (Ricci & Fava, P.C., attorneys)
Frances L. Febres, Esq., for respondent (Cleary, Giacobbe, Alfieri, Jacobs,
L.L.C, attorneys)
Record Closed: July 24, 2023 	Decided: July 26, 2023
BEFORE: MATTHEW G. MILLER, ALJ

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a Harassment, Intimidation, and Bullying (“HIB”) case arising out of an
alleged violation of the New Jersey Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13, et
seq.
Petitioner, Do Yeon Shim, is employed as a teacher in the Ridgefield, New Jersey
School District. Following an incident involving a student that occurred on December 15,
2022, the District’s HIB Coordinator determined that Ms. Shim had violated the HIB
statute in a December 23, 2022 report. 	The District Superintendent signed off on the
report on January 3, 2023 and a determination letter dated January 9, 2023 was sent to
petitioner.
Ms. Shim, through counsel, appealed this determination by letter dated January
11, 2023, but the decision was affirmed by the Ridgefield Board of Education (“RBOE”),
with the result being forwarded to Ms. Shim by letter dated January 20, 2023
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 13, 2023, Ms. Shim filed a Verified Petition of Appeal. Respondent filed
an Answer to the Petition on or about March 21, 2023 and the matter was transmitted to
Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) on March 24, 2023 for hearing as a contested case.
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13.
An initial conference was held on April 14, 2023. Petitioner then filed this Motion
for Summary Decision on May 31, 2023. 	Respondent followed with opposition to the
Motion 	and 	a 	Cross-motion 	for 	Summary 	Decision 	and 	following 	the 	filing 	of
Opposition/Reply Briefs by both parties, the record closed on July 24, 2023.
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT
The following FACTS of the case are not in dispute:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
3
1. 	At all times relevant to this matter, petitioner, Do Yeon Shim, was a tenured
teacher employed by the Ridgefield, New Jersey School District.
2. 	On December 15, 2022, while working at the Bergen Boulevard School1, Ms.
Shim was involved in an incident with a student that was witnessed by two other staff
members (“SM1” and “SM2”). (Exhibit P-A).
3. 	More specifically, SM1 was walking the student back from a bathroom break to
his classroom. 	When the student bent over to tie his shoe, Ms. Shim told him to
hold that position and then used her phone to take a picture of his hair. 	(Exhibit
R-A).
4. 	After doing so, Ms. Shim showed the photo to the student and stated that they
could play tic-tac-toe on his head because his hair looked like a tic-tac-toe board.
5. 	SM1 intervened and complimented the student’s hairstyle, and they left the
area. SM1 further stated that the student seemed “unfazed” by the interaction and
was excited to receive stickers on his testing chart.
6. 	SM1 reported the incident and an investigation commenced on December 16,
2022 that was performed by the District’s Anti-Bullying Coordinator, Kara Doviak
and signed off on by Dr. Letizia Pantoliano, the District Superintendent.
7. 	In conjunction with that investigation, the student was interviewed by Ms.
Doviak and Dr. Tamika DePass, the District’s Affirmative Action Officer. 	During
the interview, the student confirmed the incident and felt that Ms. Shim had taken
the picture because “she liked (his) hair”. 	He also expressed that he liked the
picture because his hair looked good.
8. 	SM2 was also interviewed and confirmed the incident, noting that Ms. Shim
told the student to stay down because she wanted to take a picture of his head.
1 This school is attended by 1 st and 2 nd grade students.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
4
She felt that the student seemed “confused” but admitted that she “could not read
him well”. She noted that other students in the hallway were “quiet” and that she
was “uncomfortable” with the interaction, although there was no apparent impact
on the student the rest of the day.
9. 	Ms. Shim was also interviewed as part of the investigation and confirmed the
basics of the incident, claiming that she took the picture because she thought the
student’s hairstyle was cool and she wanted to create a bonding moment with him.
10. 	The 	investigation concluded that Ms. Shim’s 	actions were “reasonably
perceived to be motivated on the basis of appearance, race or ethnic origin” and
that she had committed an act in violation of the HIB statute.
11. 	Ms. Shim was advised of the result of the investigation on January 9, 2023
and offered an opportunity to contest the result before the RBOE. (Exhibit P-B).
12. 	On January 10, 2023, Ms. Shim was further advised that her actions violated
RBOE Policy 3280 (Liability for Pupil Welfare) and 3281 (Inappropriate Staff
Conduct). (Exhibit R-B).
13. 	On January 11, 2023, petitioner requested a hearing before the RBOE and
on January 19, 2023, the RBOE affirmed the district’s determination that she had
committed an act of HIB. (Exhibit P-C and Exhibit R-C).
14. 	Petitioner was advised of the outcome via a January 20, 2023 letter. (Exhibit
P-D).
15. 	The sole issue in dispute is whether respondent’s affirmation of the district’s
determination that petitioner violated N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13, et seq. was arbitrary,
capricious and unreasonable.
MOTION
Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Decision, arguing that;

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
5
Clearly, the determination in this case only addresses the
distinguishing characteristic element of the statute and fails to
address any other element required.
Petitioner emphasizes that none of the evidence supplied by respondent addresses
the other three elements of the statute; that the conduct substantially disrupted the orderly
operation of the school, that a reasonable person should have known that the conduct would
physically or emotionally harm a student and that it either insulted or demeaned the student
or created a hostile educational environment for him. N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.
Citing to Wehbeh v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Verona, 2020 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 50
(Comm’r of Ed. February 4, 2020) and N.U. on behalf of minor child, M.U. v. Bd. of Educ. of
the Town of Mansfield, Burlington County, 2020 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 244 (Comm’r of Ed.
August 2, 2020), petitioner argues that respondent’s finding of an HIB violation was arbitrary,
capricious and unreasonable and therefore must be reversed.
Respondent opposed the Motion and filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Decision,
arguing that with the presumption of correctness and what it considers to be a lack of
affirmative showing that its decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, its decision
was clearly correct. Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327, 332 (App. Div.
1965).
It was also argued that petitioner’s actions met all four prongs of the HIB statute in any
event and that respondent’s decision was well-supported by the facts of the case;
The 	District 	correctly 	concluded 	that 	Petitioner’s 	actions
constituted HIB because they were motivated by appearance,
race and/or ethnic origin, the conduct occurred in school,
substantially interfered with the student’s right to be left alone
and to feel secure and comfortable in school and was the type
of conduct that a reasonable person would find would cause
emotional harm, and which was offensive and demeaning.
Those findings were ultimately affirmed by the Board, and
which decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,
as required for its decision to be overturned.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
6
Respondent’s brief at 4.
LEGAL POSITIONS
PETITIONER:
Petitioner argues that by the very findings of the HIB investigation, the Board’s
affirmation of Ms. Shim’s guilt of the offense was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
Referencing the HIB statute, it was argued that respondent cited to only a single prong of
what is a multi-part test to determine whether a violation had occurred and while she
disagreed with that finding, in the absence of even a mention of the other prongs made
the finding de jure unsustainable. Pointing to N.U. o/b/o M.U, petitioner notes;
In addition to the fact that no specific findings were made
addressing 	all 	elements 	of 	the 	statute, 	the 	allegations
themselves likewise do not meet the standard to constitute
acts of HIB. 	Therefore, the determination that petitioner
engaged in (an) act of HIB is substantively deficient as well as
procedurally deficient and this, is arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable and must be reversed.
Petitioner brief at 7.
Petitioner then goes on to analyze the incident against the specific prongs of the
statute and argues that there is nothing about same that violates same in any way. In so
doing, counsel points to Wehbeh, Melnyk v. Teaneck Bd. of Educ., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
161524 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2016) and D.D.K. o/b/o D.K. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tp. of
Readington, 2016 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 835, (Initial Decision, October 6, 2016), adopted as
modified, 2016 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 1348 (Comm’r of Ed., November 11, 2016).
RESPONDENT:
Respondent argues that Ms. Shim’s actions unquestionably constituted a violation
of the HIB Act and that its conclusions were not only not arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable, but were clearly correct.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
7
More specifically, it argued that its investigation confirmed that petitioner’s actions
met all four prongs of the HIB statute and that while petitioner may disagree with the
Board’s determination, as long as its discretion was “exercised honestly and upon due
consideration”, it should be upheld. 	J.B. o/b/o minor child J.B. v. Northern Valley Reg.
High Sch. District, 2021 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 571 (March 8, 2021).
It should be noted that respondent’s Brief included a section concerning the
manner in which the investigation was conducted and how potential administrative errors
in same should be overlooked. However, petitioner did not question the technicalities of
either the investigation or the manner in which it was affirmed by the Board of Education.
Petitioner’s only complaint is the finding (and subsequent affirmation) itself.
HIB REPORT:
The HIB report reads in full as follows;
On December 15, 2022, staff member #1 at BB school
reported an incident that took place in the hall way (sic)
outside of the bathroom while the class was taking an allotted
bathroom break. 	Staff member #1 stated that she was
walking victim back to his classroom teacher and he asked to
show his teacher his work. 	Present were Offender, staff
member #2, staff member #3 and victim’s classmates. 	Staff
member #1 reports the following: “Victim bent down to tie his
shoe. 	Offender took her phone out and told victim to stand
still as offender took a picture. At first I thought offender was
taking a picture of victim tying his shoe. 	Offender then
showed victim the picture and stated that they could play tic
tac toe on victim’s head. 	Victim looked puzzled, maybe in
shock, not sure what offender meant. 	Offender then further
explained that they could play tic tac toe together on his head
because his hair looked like a “tic tac toe board.” Immediately
after staff member #1 told him how much she liked his braids
and who helps him with his hair. Then they went back to finish
their work in the testing office. 	Nothing else was said of the
incident and victim appeared unfazed as he was excited to
receive stickers on his testing chart.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
8
On December 16, 2022, victim was interviewed by myself and
Dr. DePass. 	Though questioning victim confirmed that his
teacher took a picture of his head and said it looked like a tic
tac toe board. He was asked why he thought she did this and
he said, 	“She liked my hair” 	Did you like that she took a
picture of your hair? Yes. Did you tell your mom? Yes. How
did she take the picture? I was tying my shoelaces. Did she
show you the picture? Yes. She said I didn’t know what the
top looks like and said she wanted to play tic tac toe. Did you
like the picture? Yes. Why did you like it? Because my hair
looks good.
On December 16, 2022, staff member #3 was interviewed as
a possible witness. 	She stated she was not present at the
time the picture was taken. She said she was walking down
the hall and staff member #1 took victim out for a break. They
talked about how proud she was about victim’s sentence
structure work.
Staff member #2 reports she was in the hallway when victim
came to show her his sentences. 	She confirms that victim
bent over to tie his shoes and offender told him to stay down
because she wanted to take a picture of his head. She reports
victim looking confused. 	She then said offender took a
picture, showed victim the picture and told him that is (sic)
looks like a tic tac toe board and that they can play. 	When
asked about victim’s reactions she said she couldn’t read him
well but he looked confused. 	When asked about victim’s
reactions she said she couldn’t read him well but he looked
confused. When asked the reaction of the other students she
said they were quiet. 	When asked how she felt about the
incident staff member #2 reported feeling uncomfortable. She
was asked if offender did anything further and she said no.
When asked how victim was for the rest of the day she said
he seemed normal and didn’t seem out of sorts.
Interview with Offender on December 19, 2022 with Dr.
DePass and Kara Doviak. 	Dr. DePass verified with offender
that she took the photo and asked her why she took it.
Offender responded that she thought the pattern was cool and
wanted to share it with victim. 	Offender said she wanted to
find bonding moments and thought victim’s hair was cool.
Victim showed me his writing booklet and I told him I wanted
to see the same things from him in class as well and that he
can do it. Victim couldn’t see the top of his head so I wanted
to show him. When asked if she asked for victims’ permission
before taking the photo she said she did not but let him know
she was taking the picture. 	It was just the top of his head.
When you took the pic were there other student reactions?

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
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No, everyone was occupied while waiting for the bathroom,
there was no reactions. 	It was just myself, staff member #3
and staff member #2.
Summary
Staff member #1 reported that offender told a student to stay
in a bent down position so she could take a picture of his head.
When showing the victim the picture, offender said they
should play tic tac toe on his head. 	The staff member
(offender) and two other staff members substantiated the
incident. The student also substantiated that this happened.
The finding of this case substantiated a case of HIB based on
the fact that the findings can be reasonable perceived as
being 	motivated 	by 	either 	any 	actual 	or 	perceived
characteristic such as race, religion, gender, mental…physical
or 	sensory 	disability 	or 	by 	any 	other 	distinguishing
characteristic. 	In this case it has been determined that the
staff 	member’s 	(offender) 	actions 	were 	motivated 	by
appearance, race and ethnic origin. 	Although the offender
reports she did not realize the potential negative impact this
incident may have had, it is still a case of HIB based on the
Anti-bullying law in New Jersey.
(Exhibit P-A)
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary decision may be granted “if the papers and discovery which have been
filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”
N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). 	The OAL summary decision rule is essentially the same as the
summary judgment rule under the New Jersey Court Rules, which states:
The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	issue 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact
challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
or order as a matter of law. An issue of fact is genuine only if,
considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence
submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
10
legitimate 	inferences 	therefrom 	favoring 	the 	non-moving
party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.
[R. 4:46-2(c).]
The New Jersey Supreme Court has modified and clarified the analysis required
when considering a motion for summary decision/judgment. 	In Brill v. Guardian Life
Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), the Court adopted the summary
judgment standard utilized by federal courts:
Under this new standard, a determination whether there exists
a “genuine issue” of material fact that precludes summary
judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the
competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to
permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed
issue in favor of the non-moving party. The “judge's function
is not himself [or herself] to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 212
(1986).] . . . If there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of
the alleged disputed issue of fact, that issue should be
considered insufficient to constitute a “genuine” issue of
material fact for purposes of R. 4:46-2. Liberty Lobby, supra,
477 U.S. at 250, 106 S. Ct. at 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 213. The
import of our holding is that when the evidence “is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,” Liberty
Lobby, supra, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512, 91 L. Ed.
2d at 214, the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary
judgment.
[Id. at 540.]
The burden is on the moving party to exclude all reasonable doubt as to the
existence of any genuine issue of material fact, and all inferences of doubt are drawn
against the moving party and in favor of the non-moving party. Saldana v. DiMedio, 275
N.J. Super. 488, 494 (App. Div. 1994). 	The critical question therefore is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require [a hearing] or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	Brill, 142 N.J. at 533 (citation
omitted). 	If the non-moving party's evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly

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11
probative, summary judgment should not be denied. See, Bowles v. City of Camden, 993
F. Supp. 255, 261 (D.N.J. 1998).
An action by a local board of education “is entitled to a presumption of correctness
and will not be upset unless there is an affirmative showing that such decision was
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.” 	Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of Educ., 89 N.J.
Super. 327, 332 (App. Div. 1965). 	Our courts have held that "[w]here there is room for
two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due
consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been
reached." Bayshore Sewage Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199-200
(Ch. Div. 1973),aff'd, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974). Thus, in order to prevail, those
challenging a decision made by a board of education “must demonstrate that the Board
acted in bad faith, or in utter disregard of the circumstances before it.” G.H. & E.H. ex rel.
K.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Lakes, 2014 N.J. AGEN. LEXIS 19 (February 24, 2014)
(citation omitted), adopted, 2014 N.J. AGEN. LEXIS 1137 (April 10, 2014). Also, a board’s
decision may be overturned if its determination violates the legislative policies expressed
or implied in the governing act. 	J.A.H. ex rel. C.H. v. Twp. of Pittsgrove Bd. of Educ.,
2013 N.J. AGEN. LEXIS 58 (March 11, 2013) (citing Campbell v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 39
N.J. 556, 562 (1963)), adopted, 2013 N.J. AGEN. LEXIS 436 (April 25, 2013).
The Anti-Bullying Act is designed “to strengthen the standards and procedures for
preventing, 	reporting, 	investigating, 	and 	responding 	to 	incidents 	of 	harassment,
intimidation, and bullying of students that occur in school and off school premises.”
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.1(f). Under the Act, “[h]arassment, intimidation or bullying” is defined
as;
any gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any
electronic communication, whether it be a single incident or a
series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being
motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic,
such as race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender,
sexual 	orientation, 	gender 	identity 	and 	expression, 	or 	a
mental, 	physical 	or 	sensory 	disability, 	or 	by 	any 	other
distinguishing 	characteristic, 	that 	takes 	place 	on 	school
property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus,
or off school grounds as provided for in section 16 of P.L.

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12
2010, c.122 (C.18A:37-15.3), that substantially disrupts or
interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the rights
of other students and that:
a. 	a reasonable person should know, under the
circumstances, will have the effect of physically or
emotionally 	harming 	a 	student 	or 	damaging 	the
student’s property, or placing a student in reasonable
fear of physical or emotional harm to his person or
damage to his property;
b. 	has the effect of insulting or demeaning any
student or group of students; or
c. 	creates a hostile educational environment for
the student by interfering with a student’s education or
by 	severely 	or 	pervasively 	causing 	physical 	or
emotional harm to the student.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.]
At this point, it is important to note that the interplay of sections (a), (b) and (c) was
addressed by the Commissioner in Wehbeh, 2020 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 50;
…a finding of HIB requires three elements. First, the conduct
must be reasonably perceived as motivated by any actual or
perceived enumerated characteristic or other distinguishing
characteristic and, second, the conduct must substantially
disrupt or interfere with the rights of other students or the
orderly operation of the school. (Footnote omitted). The third
condition is that one of the three criteria enumerated in the Act
regarding the effect of the conduct must also be satisfied.
Id. at 3.
The Commissioner explained that “as a matter of standard statutory construction,
the term "or" between subsections (b) and (c) also applies to subsection (a), such that a
demonstration of any of these three criteria can support a finding of HIB.” Id. at n2.
Each school district must adopt a policy that prohibits HIB and provides “a
procedure for prompt investigation of reports of violations and complaints.” 	N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15(b)(6). 	Once an alleged HIB incident is reported to the school principal, the

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principal must initiate an investigation within one school day of the report. 	N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15(b)(6)(a). 	The investigation shall be conducted by a school anti-bullying
specialist, but “[t]he principal may appoint additional personnel who are not school anti-
bullying specialists to assist in the investigation.” 	Ibid. 	The investigation shall be
completed within ten-days of the initial HIB complaint. Ibid.
The results of the investigation shall then be quickly reported to the superintendent
of schools, who may take certain remedial action. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(b). 	In
particular, “the superintendent may decide to provide intervention services, establish
training programs to reduce [HIB] and enhance school climate, impose discipline, order
counseling as a result of the findings of the investigation, or take or recommend other
appropriate action.” Ibid.
The results shall also be reported to the board of education “no later than the date
of the board of education meeting next following the completion of the investigation, along
with information on any services provided, training established, discipline imposed, or
other action taken or recommended by the superintendent.” N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(c).
The parents of the students involved in any alleged HIB incident “shall be entitled
to receive information about the investigation, . . . including the nature of the investigation,
whether the district found evidence of [HIB], or whether discipline was imposed, or
services provided to address the incident of [HIB].” 	N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(d). 	The
parents may request a hearing before the board, and the hearing must be held within ten-
days of the request. Ibid. Any hearing shall be held in executive session to protect the
identity of any students involved. 	Ibid. 	And “[a]t the hearing, the board may hear from
the school’s anti-bullying specialist about the incident, recommendations for discipline or
services, and any programs instituted to reduce such incidents[.]” Ibid.
A school board must issue a written decision at the first meeting after its receipt of
the investigation report. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(e). 	The board may affirm, reject, or
modify the superintendent’s decision. Ibid. The board’s decision may be appealed to the
Commissioner of Education. Ibid.

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Before determining the outcome of the case, we must analyze the facts for what
they are. This is not a case about inferring what impact Ms. Shim’s action could potentially
have had and it is certainly not a referendum on whether her decision-making was
appropriate or whether she should face discipline or not. This case is specifically about
whether petitioner’s actions that day amounted to an HIB violation.
I CONCLUDE that it did not and that respondent’s determination that it did was
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
Per the HIB statute and its interpretation by the courts, for there to be a valid finding
of an HIB violation (in this specific case), these things had to have happened;
1. 	A reasonable person would perceive that the conduct was
based upon a distinguishing characteristic.
AND
2. 	The conduct took place on school property.2
AND
3. 	The conduct must substantially disrupt or interfere with the
orderly operation of the school or the rights of other
students.
AND
3a. A 	reasonable 	person 	should 	know 	that 	the
conduct 	would 	have 	the 	effect 	of…emotionally
harming a student.
OR
3b. The 	conduct 	has 	the 	effect 	of 	insulting 	or
demeaning the student.
OR
3c. The 	conduct 	created 	a 	hostile 	educational
environment for the student by interfering with the
2 There is no dispute that the conduct took place on school property and while this prong is more inclusive, there is
no need, given this location, to delve further into this aspect of the statutory requirements.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
15
student’s education or by severely or pervasively
causing emotional harm to the student.
In other words, as will be explored in some detail below, in order for there to be a
cognizable finding of a HIB violation, respondent must demonstrate that it met prongs 1,
2 and 3 and then any of 3a, 3b or 3c. Any break in the chain causes the charge to fail.
Here, respondent’s reasoning in support of its HIB findings was;
The finding of this case substantiates a case of HIB based on
the fact that the findings can be reasonable perceived as
being 	motivated 	by 	either 	any 	actual 	or 	perceived
characteristic 	such 	as 	race, 	religion, 	gender,
mental…physical 	or 	sensory 	disability 	or 	by 	any 	other
distinguishing 	characteristic. 	In 	this 	case 	it 	has 	been
determined that the staff member’s (offender) actions were
motivated by appearance, race and ethnic origin. 	Although
the offender reports she did not realize the potential negative
impact this incident may have had, it is still a case of HIB
based on the Anti-bullying law in New Jersey.
As emphasized by petitioner, respondent did not make any other findings or
determinations as to how Ms. Shim’s conduct violated the HIB statute.
While why the incident occurred is obviously an important part of any HIB case, in
order for there to be a sustainable finding of a statutory violation, a much more detailed
analysis must take place, one that was not undertaken by respondent here.
STATUTORY ANALYSIS
PRONG 1 - THE CONDUCT WAS REASONABLY PERCEIVED TO BE BASED UPON
A DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTIC
Putting aside the obvious “What was she thinking?” aspect of the incident, the first
aspect of the statute that must be addressed is the one area where respondent
documented its conclusion, that Ms. Shim’s conduct could be reasonably perceived as
being motived by race or another distinguishing characteristic.

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16
However, it first must be determined whose perception controls. 	It is the alleged
perpetrator, the alleged victim or a “reasonable person”?
One of the first cases to discuss this issue was Melnyk;
On its face, the HIB Policy requires that several factors must
be met before an expression can be found to be harassment.
First, the communication must be "reasonably perceived as
motivated" by an actual or perceived characteristic. That is to
say, 	the 	comment 	must 	be 	objectively 	perceived 	to 	a
reasonable person as motivated by a characteristic.
Id. at 17-18.
Melynk was cited with approval in R.H. ex rel. A.H. v. Borough of Sayreville Bd. of
Educ., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83587 (D.N.J. May 12, 2023);
First, the communication must be "reasonably perceived as
being 	motivated 	either 	by 	any 	actual 	or 	perceived
characteristic, such as race . . ." among other things. N.J.S.A.
§ 18A:37-14. "The 'reasonably perceived' test is an objective
one that has withstood constitutional scrutiny," and does not
present a vagueness issue. See, Melynk v. Teaneck Bd. of
Educ., No. 16-0188, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161524, 2016 WL
6892077, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2016)
Id. at 13.
This result is also alluded to in S.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Moorestown, 2019 N.J.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2114 (App. Div. October 15, 2019). 	There, in a case involving a
teacher who requested a student’s (poor) test papers as part of his job duties, the court
concluded that a HIB violation had not occurred, since;
we do not discern sufficient facts to support a conclusion that
any actions by R.L. were motivated by G.A.'s ADHD or other
personal characteristics.
Id. at 7.
It further noted that;

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
17
even if we presume R.L. was insensitive or even unkind, there
is no evidence R.L. was prompted by any actual or perceived
characteristic, such as race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, 	gender, 	sexual 	orientation, 	gender 	identity 	and
expression, or a mental, physical or sensory disability, or by
any other distinguishing characteristic.
Ibid.
This prong was again discussed in L.K. and T.K. ex rel. A.K. v. Mansfield Bd. of
Educ., 2019 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 62 (January 22, 2019), Final Decision, 2019 N.J. Agen.
LEXIS 345 (Comm’r of Ed. April 22, 2019), reversed and remanded, L.K. and T.K. ex rel.
A.K. v. Bd. of Educ. of Mansfield, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2082 (App. Div.
November 2, 2020).
In L.K., the ALJ found that “the statute focuses on the impact of (the) conduct on
(the alleged victim) and what (the alleged victim) reasonably perceived.” However, in that
case involving young children and a gender transitioning student, the Court further found;
There is no requirement that the Board find that A.K.’s conduct
was 	actually 	motivated 	by 	the 	perceived 	characteristic,
because, as petitioners argue, A.K. most likely does not even
know what “gender identity” means. However, even under the
actual wording of the statute, the only corroborated finding
from the investigation was that A.K. asked questions about
why N3 dressed like a girl even though N3 asked her to stop.
Therefore, the age of A.K. was relevant to whether A.K.’s
conduct was motivated by the perceived characteristic or
because a seven-year-old would be curious about why a
student she knew as a boy was dressing like a girl. 	The
investigators had the time to find and interview someone in
the 	cafeteria 	who 	may 	have 	heard 	A.K. 	continue 	the
“harassment,” but they did not.
L.K. and T.K. ex rel. A.K. v. Mansfield Bd. of Educ., 2019 N.J.
Agen. LEXIS 62 at pg. 17-18.
Given the lack of clarity in the statute, there will of course be some confusion.
However, that lack of clarity was addressed in Wehbeh v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tp. of
Verona, 2020 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 50 (Comm’r of Ed. February 4, 2020), where the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
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Commissioner found that a “standard reasonableness determination common in many
types of adjudications” should be utilized. 	It was noted that to require an actor to have
intentionally committed to offense, the burden concerning motivation would be improperly
placed on the alleged victim. Id. at n3.
Ultimately, I CONCLUDE that in order to find that the first prong of the statute had
been satisfied, an investigating body must view the evidence in its entirety and determine
whether a reasonable person could perceive that the conduct could be “motivated by an
actual or perceived characteristic”. 	That determination should take into account the
totality of the circumstances, including the traits/characteristics of the alleged victim, the
age, knowledge and experience of the actor as well as the time, place and location of the
act, etc.
Then, if the investigator makes a determination that a reasonable person would
conclude that the act was motivated by an actual or perceived characteristic, the
investigation will proceed to the next element of the HIB offense. 	In essence, the
consideration of this prong does not focus purely on either the perception of the alleged
victim or the expressed intent of the alleged actor, but instead provides an objective
standard based on the totality of the circumstances.
In doing so, I FIND that a reasonable person could conclude that petitioner’s
motivation in performing the act was based upon the student’s hairstyle, which, per
September 2019 Guidance on Race Discrimination Based on Hairstyle published by the
New Jersey Division on Civil Rights, is “closely associated with Black people”. 	Id. at 1.
(Exhibit R-D)
PRONG 2 – LOCATION OF THE CONDUCT
That the second prong of the HIB statute, concerns the location of the incident,
has been met is unchallenged, since the conduct occurred in the school building.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
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PRONG 3 – THE CONDUCT SUBSTANTIALLY DISRUPTED OR INTERFERED WITH
THE ORDERLY OPERATION OF THE SCHOOL 	OR THE RIGHTS OF OTHER
STUDENTS.
Very simply, I CONCLUDE that there is no credible evidence that this entire
interaction “substantially disrupt(ed) or interfere(d) with the orderly operation of the school
or the rights of other students”. 	As much as respondent’s counsel tries to massage the
finding of the HIB report to meet the verbiage of this prong, he simply cannot. Even the
most optimistic and favorable reading of the report demonstrates that the student in
question “looked puzzled, maybe in shock” momentarily. 	However, in the next minute,
SM1 stated that the student “appeared unfazed as he was excited to receive stickers on
his testing chart”.
He also appeared “confused” to SM2, but then she admitted that “she couldn’t read
him well”, although she noted that the student “seemed normal and didn’t seem out of
sorts” for the rest of the day. 	Further, while SM2 stated that other children in the area
(who were not mentioned by SM1) were “quiet”, the report fails to mention if there was
even an indication that they had seen the interaction and none of these other students
were ever (apparently) identified or interviewed.
Finally, the victim himself literally did not express any discomfort or disruption due
to the event. He expressed that he thought Ms. Shim took his picture because she liked
his hair and that he liked the picture because his hair looked good.
The case law concerning this prong is clear that the negligible impact that this
interaction had on the student and the utter lack of evidence that it had any impact on
other students does not satisfy this prong of the HIB statute. 	As noted by the
Commissioner in D.D.K. o/b/o D.K, 2016 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 1348;
However, the report determined that the incident did not
amount to HIB because the comments did not substantially
disrupt or interfere with the orderly operation of the school or
the rights of other students. 	In support of this finding, the
report noted that D.K. stated in his interview that "fortunately,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
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this was not problematic for my learning experience, but it
ticked me off at the time." (Exhibit J-l). 	The student witness
observed 	the 	alleged 	aggressor 	make 	an 	"embarrassed
laugh" to himself when he realized what he had said had come
out wrong, but did not hear anyone else laugh and did not
think D.K. was upset as a result of the comment. Ibid. 	The
teachers did not hear any of the alleged comments.
Previously, conduct has been determined to substantially
disrupt the orderly operation of the school when students are
so upset or embarrassed that they are "not fully available for
learning." 	G.H. and E.H. on behalf of K.H. v. Board of
Education of the Borough of Franklin Lakes, Bergen County,
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 13204-13, decided February 24, 2014,
adopted Commissioner Decision No. 157-14, April 10, 2014.
Additionally, 	when 	other 	students 	are 	"so 	affected" 	by
behavior that they report it, the orderly operation of the school
may be substantially disrupted. T.R. and T.R. on behalf of
E.R. v. Bridgewater-Raritan Regional Board of Education,
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10208-13, decided September 25, 2014,
adopted Commissioner Decision No. 450-14, November 10,
2014. Given that D.K. indicated that the comments were not
problematic for his learning experience and other students did
not appear to be affected by them -- combined with a lack of
any other evidence to the contrary -- the Commissioner is
constrained to agree that petitioner failed to meet his burden
of demonstrating that the comments substantially disrupted or
interfered with the orderly operation of the school or the rights
of other students.
D.D.K. o/b/o D.K., 2016 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 1348 at 2-3.
The case cited by respondent in support of its position is unhelpful. In R.P. o/b/o
A.P. v. Bd. of Educ. of Tp. of Hamilton, 2018 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 83 (Initial Decision,
January 2, 2018), adopted, 2018 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 346 (Comm’r of Ed., March 29, 2018).
That matter involved a ten-year-old student who was exposed to repeated sexual
innuendo and gestures by another student. 	She wrote a letter to the school “urgently
seeking help…due to A.P.'s ongoing inappropriate behavior. 	Through this letter and
confirmed during her interview with (a school official), (the victim) expressed her extreme
discomfort and distress over A.P.'s ongoing conduct.” A.P., 2018 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 83 at
15. 	Given the severity of the harassment, the Court found that the student’s “extreme
discomfort and distress” was sufficient to satisfy the “disruption prong”. Ibid.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
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In the case at bar, there is no evidence that there was anything more than, at best,
a negligible, literally momentary disruption to the student’s educational process. Further,
there is no evidence at all that any other students were even aware of the incident, let
alone impacted by it.
With no evidence demonstrating that Prong 3 of the statutory requirements was
either met or considered, I CONCLUDE that any finding of an HIB violation by Ms. Shim
was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. This is not a case where reasonable minds
can differ as to the conclusion that was reached; rather this is a case where it was literally
impossible, by definition, to reach that conclusion.
Given the breaking of the chain with respondent’s failure to meet Prong 3, there is
no need to analyze the case against the balance of the statutory requirements.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Having 	reviewed 	the 	undisputed 	facts 	in 	this 	matter 	and 	even 	given 	the
presumption of correctness of respondent’s findings, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has
clearly and convincingly demonstrated that respondent’s determination that her actions
were violative of the HIB statute was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. 	Thomas,
89 N.J. Super. at 332.
Both 	the 	decision 	of 	the 	HIB 	coordinator/Superintendent 	and 	the 	Board’s
affirmation of same are quite remarkable. 	The standards that must be met before a
finding of an HIB violation can be made are well-known and the failure of the report to
mention anything other than the perceived motivation of the act is highly problematic. In
fact, the report even infers that the student was not impacted by Ms. Shim’s actions (“the
potential negative impact this incident may have had”), but nonetheless concludes that it
was “still a case of HIB based on the Anti-bullying law in New Jersey.”

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
22
No, it is not and when the Board had the opportunity to correct what was an
obviously 	incomplete 	and 	erroneous 	conclusion 	by 	the 	HIB 	coordinator 	and
Superintendent, it instead ratified it.
As noted above, this case is not about whether Ms. Shim made a poor decision or
violated other district policies. Rather, she was accused of violating a specific statute that
has specific elements that must be met before a finding of guilt can be made and
sustained. Even giving respondent every benefit of the doubt, I FIND there is no way that
a reasonable respondent could have concluded, based upon this factual scenario, that
Ms. Shim’s actions violated N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.2, et seq.
Based on the foregoing, I CONCLUDE the Board’s decision that petitioner’s
conduct meets the statutory definition of HIB and that she committed an act of HIB against
a student, was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that petitioner’s Motion for Summary Decision should
be GRANTED, and I further CONCLUDE that respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision
should be DENIED.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
23
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that petitioner's Motion for
Summary Decision be and is hereby GRANTED and it is further;
ORDERED that respondent’s Cross-Motion for Summary Decision be and is
hereby DENIED.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
24
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND
DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-
0500, marked “Attention: 	Exceptions.” 	A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the
judge and to the other parties.
July 26, 2023
DATE 	MATTHEW G. MILLER, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	July 26, 2023 	___________
Date Mailed to Parties: 	July 26, 2023 	_____
MGM/sej

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 02751-23
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APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
FOR PETITIONER:
P-A 	HIB Summary Report
P-B 	January 9, 2023 HIB Determination Letter
P-C 	January 11, 2023 Appeal Letter
P-D 	January 20, 2023 Post-Appeal HIB Determination Letter
FOR RESPONDENT:
R-A 	Picture of student taken by petitioner
R-B 	January 10, 2023 disciplinary letter
R-C 	January 19, 2023 Ridgefield Board of Education Meeting Minutes
R-D 	September 2019 Guidance on Race Discrimination Based on Hairstyle
published by the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights
R-E 	Ridgefield District Policy 3280 – Liability for Pupil Welfare
R-F 	Ridgefield District Policy 3281 – Inappropriate Staff Conduct