Board of Education of the Borough of Milltown, Middlesex County v. Egnita Pardo, 5/25/2022, (#113-22)

113-22Njcommned

Gesamter Gesetzestext

113-22
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Borough of Milltown,
Middlesex County,
Petitioner,
v.
Egnita Pardo,
Respondent.
Synopsis
The petitioning Board filed this matter seeking to preclude respondent from being sworn in as a
member of the board due to her interest in a claim against the school district. The Commissioner
granted emergent relief to the Board in an Order that precluded respondent from being sworn in as a
Board member pending a final decision on the merits of the case. Respondent, who was elected to the
Board in November 2021 and was due to be sworn in on January 4, 2022, had filed a notice of tort claim
with her husband against the Board on behalf of her minor son in 2017. Respondent withdrew her
notice of tort claim in December 2021, and later executed a release of her minor son’s claims, which
was approved by the Superior Court in a friendly hearing on January 28, 2022. The Board filed a motion
for summary decision; respondent filed a cross-motion seeking indemnification for her costs and
attorney fees in defending this matter.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: the issue of indemnification of members of boards of education against
the cost of legal proceedings is governed by N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20, which provides for indemnification when
a legal action against a sitting board member arises out of and in the course of the performance of their
duties as a member of the board; the issue here is whether N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 requires that petitioner
be indemnified for legal fees and expenses incurred in connection with her defense in this matter;
respondent cured the initial conflict of interest by executing the release of claims, but also has a direct
interest in a claim for reimbursement for costs and attorney’s fees; respondent is not entitled to
indemnification as the Board’s actions in seeking to preclude her from being sworn in were justified
based on her conflict of interest in violation of N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4; and respondent’s expenditures in this
matter are related to resolving her own conflict of interest prior to being seated on the Board. The ALJ
concluded that respondent has not shown entitlement to indemnification as her actions and
expenditures were related to resolving her conflict. Accordingly, respondent’s claim for indemnification
was dismissed and respondent was cleared to be sworn in as a member of the Board.
Upon review, the Commissioner, inter alia, concurred with the ALJ that the respondent no longer has a
conflict and may be seated as a member of the Board. Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL was
adopted as the final decision in this matter; respondent’s claim for indemnification was dismissed and
she is eligible to be sworn in as a Board member.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader.
It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10256-21
Agency Dkt. No. 237-12/21
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Board of Education of the Borough of
Milltown, Middlesex County,
Petitioner,
v.
Egnita Pardo,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision1 of the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL) have been reviewed, as have the exceptions filed pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4 by
respondent Egnita Pardo and petitioner Milltown Board of Education (Board or Milltown), as
well as the Board’s reply to the respondent’s exceptions.
Milltown filed this matter seeking to preclude respondent from being sworn in as a
Board member due to her interest in a claim against the school district. Respondent, who was
elected to the Board in November 2021 and was due to be sworn in on January 4, 2022, had
filed a notice of tort claim with her husband against the Board on behalf of her minor son in
2017. Respondent withdrew her notice of tort claim in December 2021; however, due to the
nature of the claims, a notice of tort claim is no longer required in order for her son to file suit,
and respondent had not released the claims.
1 This matter was captioned as a “Revised Initial Decision” in order to correct an error in which this
matter was inadvertently captioned as an “Order.”
113-22
2
In deciding the Board’s motion for emergent relief on December 29, 2021, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that respondent had a direct or indirect interest in an
inchoate claim made by her minor child against the Board, which would preclude her from
serving on the Board in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2. The Commissioner granted
emergent relief to the Board in an Order that precluded respondent from being sworn in as a
Board member, and additionally precluded the Board from filling respondent’s seat while this
matter is pending. Respondent also filed a cross petition for indemnification, which the
Commissioner determined would be decided as part of this matter. On January 3, 2022,
respondent executed a release of her minor’s claims, which was approved by the Superior
Court in a friendly hearing on January 28, 2022.
In the Initial Decision, the ALJ found that respondent cured the conflict of interest by
executing the release of claims, but also had a direct interest in a claim for reimbursement for
costs and attorney’s fees. The ALJ concluded that respondent was not entitled to
indemnification because the Board’s actions in seeking to preclude her from being sworn in
were justified based on her conflict of interest in violation of N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and
respondent’s expenditures in this matter and the Superior Court action were related to
resolving her own conflict of interest. As such, the ALJ found that she could be sworn in as a
member of the Board but dismissed her claim for indemnification.
In her exceptions, respondent contends that N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 supports her claim for
indemnification because she is an elected Board member who was forced to expend her own
funds in the defense of this administrative action that arises out of her duties as a member of
the Board. Respondent disagrees with the ALJ’s findings that: she was not entitled to
3
indemnification because she was required to institute the Superior Court matter to cure her
conflict; her expenditures in the administrative matter needed to be addressed before
becoming a Board member; and board members-elect are not entitled to indemnification.
Respondent points out that her claim for indemnification only involves this matter, and not the
matter in Superior Court. Respondent further contends that whether the Board’s actions were
“proper” or whether her expenditures needed to be addressed are misguided arguments
because the Board failed to inform her of her conflict until a month after her election and
ignored good faith efforts to cure it, forcing her to defend against the administrative action.
Respondent also argues that the ALJ failed to consider or analyze the extensive case law
presented that demonstrates that board members-elect who need to cure a conflict of interest
prior to assuming office are entitled to indemnification of costs and fees. See Jones v. Kolbeck,
119 N.J. Super. 299 (App. Div. 1972); Surada v. Jersey City Board of Education, 167 N.J. Super
331 (Law Div. 1979); Edgar Brown and Oliver Brown v. Board of Education of the City of Newark,
Essex County, Agency Dkt. No. 119-4/84, dated September 19, 1988. Additionally, respondent
contends that the cases relied upon by the ALJ are inapplicable to this matter. Finally,
respondent maintains that her claim for indemnification does not create an inconsistent
interest that would disqualify her from Board membership pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2.
Accordingly, respondent asks the Commissioner to reject the Initial Decision as it pertains to her
claim for indemnification, and award her with the attorneys’ fees and costs associated with her
defense of this matter.
In reply, the Board argues that the ALJ appropriately found that respondent is not
entitled to indemnification. The Board maintains that N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 unambiguously
4
applies to members of boards of education, such that the statute is limited to members who
have been sworn in. The Board argues that respondent was not a sworn member of the Board;
she was ineligible to take the oath of office; and her expenses were personal, not arising from
board member duties. The Board also contends that members of a board are treated
differently than board members-elect with respect to determining conflicts of interest because
members-elect must meet the requirement that they have no inconsistent claims as a condition
for assuming office as a board member, whereas certain conflicts may not require removal of a
sitting member of a board. Respondent maintains that the cases respondent relies upon are
inapplicable because they either involve board members who have already been sworn in or
are otherwise distinguishable. Further, the Board argues that Francesco Cordasco v. Board of
Education of the Town of West New York, Hudson County, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 661, dated May
8, 1996, demonstrates that board members who are not sworn in are not entitled to
indemnification. As such, the Board asks the Commissioner to adopt the Initial Decision.
Additionally, the Board seeks guidance from the Commissioner regarding respondent’s
continued litigation of her claims for indemnification, including a potential appeal of this
matter, which would be an inconsistent claim that is subject to disqualification or removal.2
Upon review, the Commissioner agrees with the ALJ that respondent no longer has a
conflict and may be seated as a member of the Board. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2, “No
member of any board of education shall be interested directly or indirectly in any contract with
or claim against the board . . . .” According to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2.1, “Each member of a board of
2 The Board filed exceptions because the ALJ did not consider its Opposition to the Cross-Motion for
Summary Decision/Reply Brief, dated February 27, 2021. The Commissioner notes that the letter brief
and exhibits are in the record.
5
education shall, before entering upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe: (1) An oath
that he possesses the qualifications of membership prescribed by law . . . .” In this matter,
respondent has executed a release of her claim against the Board and, accordingly, no longer
has the conflict that disqualified her from taking the oath of office. As such, respondent may be
sworn in as a member of the Board.3
With respect to respondent’s claim for indemnification, the Commissioner finds that
respondent is not entitled to recovery of the costs and fees incurred in this matter. N.J.S.A.
18A:12-20 provides:
Whenever a civil, administrative, criminal or quasi-criminal action
or other legal proceeding has been or shall be brought against any
person for any act or omission arising out of and in the course of
the performance of his duties as a member of a board of
education, and in the case of a criminal or quasi-criminal action
such action results in final disposition in favor of such person, the
board of education shall defray all costs of defending such action,
including reasonable counsel fees and expenses, together with
costs of appeal, if any, and shall save harmless and protect such
person from any financial loss resulting therefrom. . . .
It is established that legal fees in connection with the defense of a challenge to board
membership fall within the purview of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20. Surada, supra, 167 N.J. Super at 333-
34 (citing Jones, supra, 119 N.J. Super. 299). In this matter, the question is whether the statute
applies to those who are not yet sworn in as board members.
When evaluating a statute, the intent of the legislature can be gleaned from the plain
meaning of the language. Board of Education of the City of Sea Isle City v. Kennedy, 196 N.J. 1,
12 (2008). The language of the statute indicates that indemnification is permitted when legal
proceedings are initiated “against any person for any act or omission arising out of and in the
3 It appears that respondent has already been sworn in as a member of the Board.
6
course of the performance of his duties as a member of a board of education.” N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
20. It is unambiguous that the protections against incurring costs and fees would only apply to
board members when the matter arises out of in and the course of the performance of their
role on the board, and not those who are not yet members of the board.
The Commissioner will nevertheless review the relevant case law cited by respondent.
First, in Jones v. Kolbeck, 119 N.J. Super. 299 (App. Div. 1972), appellants sought the removal of
board members because they were teachers in another school district. The Appellate Division
found that respondents were not precluded from serving as board members and ordered their
counsel fees to be paid because they were sued based on their board membership. Similarly, in
Surada v. Jersey City Board of Education, 167 N.J. Super 331 (Law Div. 1979), three people were
appointed to the Board by a lame duck mayor, and after taking office, the new mayor
challenged their appointments. One of the members was successful in defending the challenge,
while the other two were not. Regardless, the court found that they were rendering the
services required of their office and were entitled to indemnification for the defense of the
challenge to their membership.
Additionally, in Board of Education of the Township of Barnegat, Ocean County v.
Robert A. Houser, Commissioner’s Decision No. 306-07, dated July 30, 2007, Houser’s wife had a
pending Worker’s Compensation case at the time of his election to the board, which would
have precluded him from being qualified for office, but neither the board nor Houser addressed
the inconsistent interest. He nevertheless took the oath of office, entered into the duties of
membership, and served on the board for a year. The Commissioner found that both the Board
and Houser were equally culpable in failing to identify the conflict, which was promptly cured.
7
Accordingly, in the interests of justice, the Commissioner deemed the Board’s petition and the
curing of the conflict nunc pro tunc – i.e., as if they had occurred prior to Houser’s seating on
the board – and found that Houser was entitled to indemnification of the costs of defending the
board’s action.
Finally, in Edgar Brown and Oliver Brown v. Board of Education of the City of Newark,
Essex County, Agency Dkt. No. 119-4/84, dated September 19, 1988, the petitioners were
elected to the Board and qualified for membership, but the Board acted illegally and denied
their right to be sworn in. The Commissioner found that “[b]ut for the illegal action of the
Board, there is no question that petitioners would be protected by N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20 for
indemnification of legal fees and costs.” The Commissioner further found that “it is not
unreasonable to conclude that duly elected, qualified board members, prevented from
assuming the duties of such membership by an illegal board action, are entitled, within the
intendment of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20, to the same protection of indemnification for defending a
challenge to board membership as individuals who were sworn in and served as de facto board
members but were subsequently disqualified.”
The Commissioner finds that Jones, Surada and Houser all demonstrate that sitting
board members are entitled to indemnification after their membership has been challenged –
even when the conflict may have occurred prior to entering office – but fail to address whether
the statute applies to those who are not yet sworn in as board members. While the board
member in Houser should have been precluded from taking the oath of office due to his
inconsistent interest, he nevertheless did take office and performed the duties as a board
member, entitling him to indemnification.
8
The one case that granted indemnification to board members who had not taken the
oath of office is distinguishable from the current matter and falls short of setting a precedent
for all board members-elect because it is limited in circumstance. Brown allows those who are
“duly elected, qualified board members, prevented from assuming the duties of such
membership by an illegal board action” to be indemnified. In this matter, respondent was not
qualified as a Board member until after her conflict was cured, which did not occur until after
the date that she was originally scheduled to take the oath of office. Additionally, the Board in
this matter did not take illegal action to block respondent from being sworn in. Instead, the
Board sought approval through legal avenues to address respondent’s conflict. As such, while
the board members-elect in Brown, were entitled to indemnification, no such factual
circumstance exists here to bring respondent under the intendment of the statute.
The Board cites to Francesco Cordasco v. Board of Education of the Town of West New
York, Hudson County, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 661, dated May 8, 1996, for the proposition that
board members who have not entered office are not entitled to indemnification, but the
Commissioner notes that the case is not persuasive. In that matter, a challenge arose against
Cordasco’s appointment to the Board by a lame duck mayor prior to his swearing in as a board
member. The Commissioner found that Cordasco was not entitled to indemnification because
he brought the legal action, rather than defending against one brought against him, which does
not fall under N.J.S.A. 18A:12-20. The Commissioner noted that “[i]n view of this finding, it is
not necessary to address the claim that petitioner never served as a board member.” Id. at
665. As such, this matter does not provide guidance as to whether people who have never
served as board members are entitled to indemnification.
9
The Commissioner finds that respondent is not entitled to indemnification because she
was not a sworn board member who was serving in the position, nor was she qualified to
become a Board member. According to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2.1, “Each member of a board of
education shall, before entering upon the duties of his office, take and subscribe: (1) An oath
that he possesses the qualifications of membership prescribed by law . . . .” As respondent had
an inconsistent interest disqualifying her from membership pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2, she
was unable to take the oath of office because she was unable to attest that she had the
qualifications required for the office. As such, considering both the plain meaning of the
statute, as well as the relevant case law, respondent is not entitled to indemnification as her
defense of this administrative matter did not arise from her duties as a board member.4
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted as the final decision in this matter.
Respondent is eligible to be sworn in as a Board member, but her claim for indemnification is
hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
4 The Commissioner notes that this claim for indemnification cannot be a disqualifying interest as board
members have a statutory right to seek indemnification. N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2.
5 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division
within 45 days from the date of mailing of this decision.
May 25, 2022
May 25, 2022
New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
REVISED 	INITIAL 	DECISION
GRANTING 	SUMMARY 	DECISION
MOTION, AND DENYING
CROSS MOTION_
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10256-21S
AGENCY DKT. NO. 237-12/21
MILLTOWN BOARD OF EDUCATION,
MIDDLESEX COUNTY,
Petitioner,
EGNITA PARDO,
Respondent.
________________________________
Aron Mandel, Esq., for petitioner (Busch Law Group, attorneys)
Nicholas J. Repici, Esq., and Michael J. Reilly Esq., (Lenox, Socey, Formidoni,
Giordano, Lang & Casey, attorneys,) for respondent, Egnita Pardo
Record Closed: February 23, 2022 	Decided: February 28, 2022
BEFORE JOSEPH A. ASCIONE, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 3, 2022, petitioner, Borough of Milltown, Board of Education, Middlesex
County, (Board) moved for summary disposition seeking to dismiss respondent, Egnita
Pardo’s, counterclaim for attorney fees. The matter initially transmitted to the Office of
OAL DKT. NO.EDU 10256-21
2
Administrative Law (OAL) on December 17, 2021, for a ruling on the emergent application.
Respondent was not seated because of an inchoate claim against the Board of Education.
On February 23, 2022, respondent filed opposition and cross-moved for indemnification for
costs, and attorney fees. The Cross Petition seeks legal fees and cost to defend the
application, the latter Cross Petition was deferred to the Department of Education to
resubmit, as appropriate, that application was resubmitted, and a determination of the right
to reimbursement and whether the claim for reimbursement again creates a conflict
depriving respondent from her seat. Oral argument was not provided the parties. The record
with respect to the two motions for summary disposition closed on February 23, 2022.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
The essential facts in this matter are not in dispute. 	The inchoate claim of
respondent’s issue has been resolved by an Order of the Superior Court, see Exhibit P and
Q of petitioner’s brief. The remaining claim is for the reimbursement in connection with the
defense of respondent’s been disputed.
Petitioner is a board of education which is duly organized under the Statutes of the
State of New Jersey and is subject to the specific statutes covered in Title 18A of the New
Jersey Statutes.
Pardo was elected to the Milltown Board of Education at the November 2021 School
Election and is due to be sworn in at the upcoming Organization Meeting on January 4,
2022.
LEGAL DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Just as an underaged candidate for political office is deprived of the ability to be
sworn in. Here a candidate for the Board of Education is imputed with knowledge that a
conflict of interest will deprive one of the abilities to be seated.
Conflicts of interest apply to membership, not candidacy, and that if a conflict may
be cured prior to taking a seat, the successful candidate may be sworn in as a board
member.
OAL DKT. NO.EDU 10256-21
3
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-2, states as follows:
No member of any board of education shall be interested
directly or indirectly in any contract with or claim against the
board, nor, in the case of local and regional school districts,
shall 	hold 	the 	office 	as 	mayor 	or 	as 	a 	member 	of 	the
governing body of a municipality, nor, in the case of county
special services school districts and county vocational school
districts, shall he hold office as a member of the governing
body of a county.
Here, Pardo did not cure the conflict timely to be sworn in. It is now cured. Individual
circumstances in each case are required to be examined to determine whether the claim is
substantial and material so as to require disqualification. 	In the Matter of the Election of
Dorothy Bayless to the Board of Education of Lawrence Township School District, 1974
S.L.D. 595, reversed, State Board 603.
Lack of conflicting interest is a qualification for board membership. See, Visotcky v.
City Council of Garfield, 113 N.J. Super. 263 (App. Div. 1971). The interest which
disqualifies is not necessarily a direct pecuniary interest, nor is the amount of such an
interest of paramount importance; it is based on the moral rule that no man can serve two
masters whose interest’s conflict. Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495, 502
(App. Div. 1956). In Taliafero vs. Hawthorne Board of Education, 94 N.J.A.R. 2d (EDU) 197
wherein a board member’s indirect interest in his wife’s lawsuit against a board of education
disqualified him from board membership.
In this matter, Pardo, has a direct claim in reimbursement for her costs and attorney
fees. The Superior Court would not consider it and deferred it back to the Board of
Education.
In Errington v. Mansfield Twp. Bd. of Educ., 100 N.J. Super. 130, 138 (App. Div.
1968). In a suit by a former mayor, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the claim
for indemnification of attorney’s fees, where “[t]he costs he incurred were for the defense of
suits that challenged his entitlement to hold office and the regularity of his election.”
Matthews v. Atl. City, 196 N.J. Super. 338, 339- 40 (App. Div. 1984). The Matthews Court
explained 	that 	indemnification 	was 	not 	permitted, 	because 	the 	plaintiff 	sought
indemnification for “expenses [that] were not for costs incurred in the defense of legal
attacks on his actions taken in the discharge of duties imposed or authorized by law.” Id.
OAL DKT. NO.EDU 10256-21
4
This matter is akin to the finding in Cordasco v. West New York Bd. of Educ., OAL
Dkt. No. EDU 5892-95; Agency Dkt. No. 145-5/95, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 661 (Final Agency
Decision May 8, 1996), this tribunal finds little support in the cases provided by respondent.
The actions by Pardo in Superior Court she instituted to resolve her conflict. The actions of
the Board were proper in denying Pardo the position as she had a conflict. Pardo’s
expenditures in both applications needed to be addressed before she could become a
Board Member. The right to indemnification is designed to provide protection from actions
taken while a Board Member. These expenditures do not fall in that category,
CONCLUSION
The Board has shown Pardo is not entitled to reimbursement of her costs and
attorney fees.
The Board was justified in seeking direction not to seat Pardo to her position as a
member of the Milltown Board of Education.
Pardo has not shown entitlement to indemnification as her actions and expenditures
were related to resolving her conflict.
As this Order rejects Pardo’s claim for reimbursement, she no longer has a conflict
and may be seated as a Board Member.
This tribunal views the claim for indemnification as a ministerial claim by a Board
Member. Ethically, she can take no part in consideration of that reimbursement. If the
Commissioner of Education or the Appellate Division seeks to revise this Initial Decision,
then the existing conflict of interest created by that reversal can be dealt with at that time.
Therefore, I CONCLUDE summary disposition be granted in favor of the Board,
dismissing respondent’s counterclaim for indemnification of attorney fees and cost.
I CONCLUDE that respondent should be sworn as a member of the board of
education, as she no longer has a conflict of interest.
OAL DKT. NO.EDU 10256-21
5
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it is hereby ORDERED that respondent’s
cross-petition for indemnification is DISMISSED; and
It is ORDERED petitioner’s motion for Summary Disposition is GRANTED in so far
as it disposes of the Cross-Petition.
It is ORDERED Pardo be sworn in as a member of the Milltown Board of Education.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE 	DEPARTMENT 	OF 	EDUCATION, 	who 	by 	law 	is
authorized to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the
Department of Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within
forty-five days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended
decision shall become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed 	to 	the 	parties, 	any 	party 	may 	file 	written 	exceptions 	with 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF
CONTROVERSIES AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box
500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of
any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
OAL DKT. NO.EDU 10256-21
6
February 28, 2022
DATE 	JOSEPH A. ASCIONE, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	February 28, 2022
Date Mailed to Parties: 	February 28, 2022
OAL DKT. NO.EDU 10256-21
7
APPENDIX
LIST OF WITNESSES:
For Petitioner:
None
For Respondent:
None
LIST OF EXHIBITS:
Emergent Relief
For Petitioner:
P-1 	Request for Summary Disposition with attachments
For Respondent:
R-1 	Respondent’s motion for Summary Disposition with
attachments

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