C.H., on behalf of minor child, P.H. v. Board of Education of the Town of Secaucus, Hudson County, and Sarah Sciscilo, 7/11/25 (#348-25)

348-25
OAL Dkt. No. 15753-24
Agency Dkt. No. 333-10/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
C.H., on behalf of minor child, P.H.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Town of Secaucus,
Hudson County and Sarah Sciscilo,
Respondents.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) have
been reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon review, and for the reasons thoroughly detailed in the Initial Decision, the Commissioner
agrees with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that the petitioner did not establish that the Board acted
in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner when it determined that P.H. committed an act of
harassment, intimidation, and bullying. The Commissioner further agrees with the ALJ that the alleged
administrative errors by the Board had no substantive impact on the case that would warrant a reversal
of the Board’s decision.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition of
appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	July 11, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	July 14, 2025
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1. Under
N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date of mailing
of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
AGENCY DKT. NO. 333-10/24
C.H. ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD, P.H.,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN
OF SECAUCUS, HUDSON COUNTY, AND
SARAH SCISCILO,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
C.H., pro se, for petitioner
Danielle N. Pantaleo, Esq., for respondent (Busch Law Group, LLC, attorneys)
Record Closed: May 2, 2025 	Decided: May 23, 2025
BEFORE MATTHEW G. MILLER, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner C.H., the parent of minor child P.H., has challenged the determination
made by the respondent, Secaucus District Board of Education, et al. (respondent,
District or BOE), that P.H. committed an act of harassment, intimidation, and bullying

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
2
(HIB) 	against 	a 	fellow 	student 	in 	violation 	of 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:37-13.2 	et 	seq. 	(the
Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The HIB complaint arose out of an incident which occurred on March 19, 2024.
Following the conclusion of an investigation on April 12, 2024, the Board of Education,
during its meeting of May 9, 2024, affirmed the finding that P.H. had committed an act of
HIB. C.H. appealed that finding. Following a hearing before the BOE on July 18, 2024,
he was advised by letter dated July 22, 2024 that the appeal had been denied.
The appeal of the BOE determination was then filed with the Department of
Education’s Office of Controversies and Disputes on or about October 19, 2024.
Respondent filed an Answer to the Appeal on October 29, 2024, and the Department
transmitted this matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) that same day for a
hearing as a contested case. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23.
An initial conference was held on December 19, 2024, during which respondent
advised that it intended to file a Motion for Summary Decision. 	Following extensive
briefing, the record closed on May 2, 2025.
THE INCIDENT AND ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
There is no significant dispute about what occurred. 	However, the “why” it
occurred and how C.H. was apprised of its occurrence are contested.
On March 19, 2024, P.H. was an almost twelve-year-old seventh-grade student
at Secaucus Middle School. Per the HIB report, the following occurred:
On March 19th, 2024, student reported to Ms. Boczun1 that
during phys. ed. class, a student made a comment about his
height, getting called “midget,” and also called him a “Jewish
1 Samantha Boczun, a counselor at the school.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
3
monkey.” In speaking to the other student PH, she admitted
that she was annoyed by him singing and dancing during
class, and that she was having a bad day, and lashed out.
Student said that in general, he has been made fun of based
on his height and religion and has not wanted to come to
school. 	Both parents were contacted and PH wrote an
apology email to the other student. PH was initially receiving
a restorative measure (Suite 360 assignment), but her father
also requested a disciplinary punishment.
[R-2B.]
TIMELINE
Much is made by C.H. as to administrative errors that were allegedly made by
the District. In order to address these, a detailed timeline is helpful.
03/19/24 – Date of incident, which A.V.2 reports to Samanta Boczun
03/19/24 – Boczun speaks with P.H. about the incident.
03/20/24 – A.V.’s mother reports the issue. 	Boczun leaves a note on Sarah
Sciscillo’s (HIB Specialist) desk about a possible HIB and requests
that she speak with A.V.
03/21/24 – HIB 338 mandatory reporting form completed (“to be filled out by
Principal or Designee”) by Boczun
03/21/24 – Boczun leaves a voicemail for C.H.
03/21/24 – Sciscillo emails C.H. at 2:30 p.m.:
Good afternoon Mr. H,
My name is Sarah Sciscilo and I am the other counselor
along with Ms. Boczon. 	We tried calling you but got your
voicemail. 	I also am the Harassment, intimidation, and
bullying specialist for middle school. 	Yesterday, during gym
class, P. got annoyed by a student who was dancing and
singing and called him “midget” and a “Jewish monkey.”
This student was very offended and upset, and in any case
2 Alleged victim.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
4
where there is a characteristic being made fun of, I am
required to write up a report to the board. 	P.'s name would
not be mentioned, just what was said. 	I spoke to P. today
and she is very apologetic and admitted to saying it because
she was having a bad day. 	She even wrote the boy an
apology email which we appreciate. 	I know she was very
nervous about being in trouble with you. 	I told her that I
wouldn't even ask the principals to give her a detention −
Instead she may just need to do an online assignment about
watching the words we say to others. I just wanted you to be
aware and to know that she understood what she said was
wrong. 	I will 	not be 	in tomorrow 	but 	if you have any
questions, please call Ms. Boczon.
Best,
Mrs. Sciscilo
03/21/24 – C.H. emails Boczun at 8:58 p.m.:
Ms. Boczon, Sorry I didn't see that you called til just now. 	I
just had a talk with P. and she told me what she had said to
the boy. 	P. knows better than to talk to anyone like that. 	I
assure 	you 	that 	she 	will 	be 	severely 	punished 	so 	that
something like this never happens again. 	I will call you
tomorrow 	morning 	to 	discuss 	this 	further 	and 	whatever
disciplinary action the school decides to take because of her
unacceptable behavior I will fully understand.
C.H.
03/21/24 – C.H. emails Sciscilo at 11:52 p.m.:
My name is C.H., P's father. I am sorry I missed your call, I
did 	email 	Ms. 	Boczon 	and 	will 	call 	her 	tomorrow. 	I
understand your position and with no disrespect I feel that P.
should be disciplined according to the rules and regulations
of the school. 	I am a single father and have been raising P.
since she was 2. 	We talk about everything and P. knows
that there are certain things I will not tolerate and bullying is
one of them, P. also knows if someone ever bullied her I
would be right there for her. 	I see this as my daughter was
bullying 	that 	boy 	and 	to 	use 	his 	ethnic 	background 	is
unacceptable. 	P. has told me about this boy since last year
and I had told her to ignore him and walk away. 	P. knew
how to handle the situation the right way but chose not to
and having a bad day is no excuse. 	I will speak with Ms
Boczon tomorrow and talk with her and then when you come

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
5
and have any questions or comments for me I will make
myself available.
Thank you
C.H.
03/22/24 – C.H. and Boczun telephone conversation3
03/26/24 – P.H. completes an online anti-bullying class.
04/12/24 – HIB investigation is concluded.
04/18/24 – Charles Voorhees confirmed as acting superintendent.
04/18/24 – Voorhees submits the investigation to BOE.
04/19/24 – C.H. is advised by letter of the HIB finding.4
05/09/24 – BOE affirms the finding of HIB.
05/13/24 – C.H. is advised by letter of the affirmation of the HIB finding.
06/18/24 – C.H. emails a request for the HIB report.
06/19/24 – BOE emails C.H. the HIB report and the letters of April 19, 2024, and
May 13, 2004.
06/20/24 – C.H. emails the BOE and claims that he never received the April 19,
2024 letter but did get the May 13, 2024 letter.
06/20/24 – BOE emails C.H. and advises that the April 19, 2024, letter was
mailed to him and A.V.’s parent, “and no letter was returned to us
from the post office.”
06/22/24 – C.H. emails an appeal request, which is acknowledged by the BOE.
07/01/24 – C.H. emails BOE requesting information on appeal scheduling with a
reply, asking if he is available to attend the July 18, 2024 meeting.
07/02/24 – C.H. emails confirming his attendance.
07/12/24 – Email from Voorhees to C.H., re: appeal hearing details
3 The contents of this conversation are disputed.
4 C.H. denies receiving this letter.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
6
07/18/24 – appeal hearing held
07/22/24 – C.H. advised that the appeal had been denied.
THE REPORT
The HIB report (R2-B) reflects that the incident occurred on March 19, 2024; the
investigative report was opened on March 21 and closed on April 12. 	Amongst the key
aspects are that contact had been made with C.H., that there were no listed witnesses,
and that the “Effects of HIB” were that:
Offender knew action would physically or emotionally cause
harm to the victim or damage to the victim's property
Insulted or demeaned a student or a group of students
Created a hostile educational environment by severely or
pervasively causing physical or emotional harm to student
Per the interview with the alleged victim (A.V.):
AV 	saw 	Ms. Boczon twice, told her that someone said
something mean to him. He feels like they won't stop, wants
to move his classes. 	I don't want to be around her . . .
doesn't want to go to school (according to mom).
− in gym, 3/20 − was sitting out and another student was
also sitting out. 	He was minding his own business, dancing
− he said other student got annoyed with him and told him
shut up midget − AV said he didn't say anything . . . said to
AV “oh you would be the jewish monkey.”
PH-confirmed and AV didn't say anything back.
Mom − thinks he's an easy target − and he is quiet and holds
it in, doesn't want to be a snitch – “he doesn't want to go to
school” − the kids in general bother him, the ones he's in
classes with all day. He tells mom he tries to hide from kids.
He doesn't stick up for himself − 2nd time about his religion −
he's at his end.
The report concluded:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
7
On March 19th, 2024, student AV reported to Ms. Boczon
that during phys. ed. class, a student made a comment
about his height, getting called "midget,” and also called him
a “Jewish monkey.” 	In speaking to the other student PH,
she admitted that she was annoyed by him singing and
dancing during class, and that she was having a bad day,
and lashed out. 	Student AV said that in general, he has
been made fun of based on his height and religion and has
not wanted to come to school. 	Both parents were contacted
and PH wrote an apology email to the other student. 	PH
was 	initially 	receiving 	a 	restorative 	measure 	(Suite 	360
assignment), but her father also requested a disciplinary
punishment.
The report continued:
3/21/2024 12:45 PM: 	AV spoke to Mrs. Sciscilo and Ms.
Boczon and stated that yesterday in gym class, he had to sit
out 	because 	he 	forgot 	his 	sneakers. 	AV 	said 	he 	was
dancing and singing by himself and P.H. started calling him
a bunch of names, including “ugly” “bitch” “midget,” and then
referred to him as a “Jewish monkey.”
AV said these comments really upset him and he tried going
to Ms. Boczon twice that day to talk to her about it. 	P. is in
all AV’s classes and he said he doesn't like school, mainly
because of the students in his classes including P. 	When
speaking to AV’s mom, she also stated that AV has dealt
with similar comments/issues in the past based on his size
and religion. 	This has made him ask his mom if he can be
home schooled or change classes to avoid getting made fun
of or bothered.
An interview with P.H. was also documented:
3/21/2024 12:54 PM: P. stated to Mrs. Sciscilo that she was
having a bad day yesterday and was getting annoyed by
AV’s singing and dancing. 	She admitted that she burst out
and used the terms “Jewish monkey” and “midget” to AV.
She did not remember calling him “ugly” or “bitch.” 	P.
admitted 	that 	she 	made 	a 	mistake 	and 	even 	wrote 	an
apology email.
In speaking with P.'s father, he was in agreement that she
should receive punishment. 	Ms. Boczon and Mrs. Sciscilo

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
8
also said that she would complete a Suite 360 on bullying
behavior.
The determination that this was an act of HIB was that:
a. 	There was verbal harassment.
b. 	The harassment was based on A.V.’s religion and height.
c. 	It took place on school grounds (the gymnasium).
d. 	A.V. 	“was 	upset, 	wanted 	to 	change 	schedule 	or 	be
homeschooled.”
e. 	A reasonable person would know that the act will have the effect
of (emotionally) damaging a pupil.
f. 	The harassment had the effect of insulting or demeaning a
student.
g. 	It created a hostile educational environment by interfering with
the pupil’s education or by severely or pervasively causing
emotional harm to the student.
CERTIFICATIONS
Respondent supplied three Certifications in support of its Motion.
Samantha Boczun
Ms. Boczun is the school counselor involved in this case. 	She reviewed the
timeline of the incident and its aftermath. 	She certified that on March 19, 2024, a
student reported to her that P.H. had called him a “midget” and a “Jewish monkey.” He
was particularly concerned because she was in all his classes and did not feel that she
would stop. She then spoke to P.H., and she admitted to me that “she was annoyed by
A.V.’s singing and dancing during class, that she was having a bad day, and lashed
out.” (R-1 at ¶6.)

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9
A.V.’s mother contacted her the next day and advised her that he did not want to
come to school that day because of the incident. Ms. Boczun then left a note on Sarah
Sciscillo’s desk (the HIB Specialist at the school) about the incident and requested that
she speak with A.V. 	Then, on March 21, 2024 (two days post-incident), she completed
an HIB 338 Form (R-1A.) 	She also contacted C.H. and left him a voicemail, which he
returned via email. (R-1B.)
She then certified that, with Ms. Sciscillo being absent from school, she called
C.H. and that during that conversation, she “explained the process about the HIB
investigation and report”. (R-1 at ¶11.)
Sarah Sciscilo
Ms. Sciscilo certified that she is employed as the Anti-Bullying Specialist at the
middle school and that she learned about the incident on March 21, 2024. 	She
interviewed A.V. that day, who told her that “P.H. said offensive comments to him in
gym class, which included calling him ‘Jewish monkey,’ ‘ugly,’ ‘bitch,’ and ‘midget.’”
(P-2 at ¶3.)
She also interviewed P.H. that day, who admitted to calling A.V. “Jewish monkey”
and “midget,” but not to the other names. She noted that “P.H. was very apologetic and
admitted that she said the names . . . called A.V. those names because she was having
a bad day.” P.H. also wrote an apology note “(o)n her own accord.” (P-2 at ¶4.)
Given the facts and circumstances, she decided to open an HIB investigation.
She attempted to call C.H. but failed to connect with him so she sent an email to him
explaining the situation. 	(R-2A.) 	C.H. responded to the email late on March 21, in
which he advised that P.H. had effectively admitted to the behavior. (R-2A.)
Since she was absent from school on March 22, Ms. Boczun spoke to C.H. “and
further explained the process regarding the HIB report.” 	She then certified that in her
report, she concluded that the incident constituted an instance of HIB, and that report
was forwarded to the Acting Superintendent on April 12. (R-2B.)

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Charles Voorhees
Mr. Voorhees certified that he was approved as the Acting Superintendent of
Schools on April 18, 2024, and that he was provided with the HIBster Report on this
case that same day. 	He reviewed the report and presented a summary of the same to
the BOE during the executive session of its meeting that night.
The following day (April 19), he notified C.H. of the HIB investigation findings in
writing. 	(R-3B.) 	On July 18, 2024, at C.H.’s request, an HIB appeal hearing was
conducted during the executive session of the BOE meeting. 	C.H. presented his
defense (which is repeated in his opposition to respondent’s Motion), but “the Board
was persuaded by the finding of the anti-bullying specialist that P.H. admitted to making
offensive comments to another student and, in fact, wrote the student an apology.” The
HIB finding was then affirmed.
At his direction, a letter was sent to C.H. advising him of the Board’s findings and
how to file an appeal. (R-3A.)
THE MOTION
Respondent has filed a Motion for Summary Decision, arguing that there is no
cognizable evidence that the District’s finding of a Harassment, Intimidation or Bullying
(HIB) violation was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and that it has met the
standard of Brill v. Guardian Life Ins., 142 N.J. 520.
It points out that a District is entitled to a presumption of correctness and that
without an affirmative showing that such a decision was arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable, it must prevail. Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327,
332 (App. Div. 1965). See also, Kopera v. W. Orange Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288,
294 (App. Div. 1960).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
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It is argued clear evidence that a thorough investigation was performed in
compliance with the District’s HIB policy (R-3A) and that both A.V. and P.H. “offered
statements confirming that the event in question occurred as described therein” and that
“the facts satisfy the criteria required under the definition of HIB, as articulated in the
statute.” N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.
As 	for 	any 	alleged 	procedural 	missteps, 	the 	respondent 	claims 	that 	the
investigation clearly complied with N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6) in that it was performed
“promptly” and was “completed as soon as possible, but no later than 10 school days
from the date of the written report . . .” 	N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(6)(a). 	It is also argued
that C.H. was given every opportunity to appeal the finding and did so and that he was
apprised of the incident, that it was an HIB issue and of the results of the investigation in
a timely and proper manner.
In his opposition argument, C.H. cites to no case law and does not provide any
certifications or affidavits from anyone (himself, P.H. or any witnesses). 	Rather, he
alleges that respondent made a litany of administrative and factual errors during the
investigation that are violative of N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.2 et seq. and its own District
policies.
More specifically, he claims that:
1. 	The investigation was incomplete.
2. 	Whatever 	statements 	were 	made 	to 	A.V. 	were 	not 	based 	on 	any
distinguishing characteristics.
3. 	More specifically, that P.H.’s reference to “Jewish monkey” was actually to
an Israeli rock band. 5
4. 	P.H.’s apology letter was not genuine and was only written because she
was promised that the incident would “go away” if she wrote it.
5 Is there a group called the Jewish Monkeys? Yes, there is. (P-M.) https://jewishmonkeys. bandcamp.com/music
(last accessed May 13, 2025)

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5. 	He was not made aware of the HIB investigation and never received the
April 19, 2025 letter advising him of the results.
6. 	It was impossible for the principal to have signed the HIB report, since that
office was vacant at the time of the incident.
7. 	The veracity of A.V. and his mother should be questioned.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary decision may be granted “if the papers and discovery which have been
filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of
law.” 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). 	The OAL summary decision rule is essentially the same as
the summary judgment rule under the New Jersey Court Rules, which states:
The judgment or order sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	issue 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact
challenged 	and 	that 	the 	moving 	party 	is 	entitled 	to 	a
judgment or order as a matter of law. 	An issue of fact is
genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial,
the 	evidence 	submitted 	by 	the 	parties 	on 	the 	motion,
together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the
non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to
the trier of fact.
[R. 4:46-2(c).]
The New Jersey Supreme Court has modified and clarified the analysis required
when considering a motion for summary decision/judgment. In Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995), the Court adopted the summary judgment standard
utilized by federal courts:
Under this new standard, a determination whether there
exists 	a 	“genuine 	issue” 	of 	material 	fact 	that 	precludes
summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider
whether the competent evidential materials presented, when

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
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viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the
alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. The
“judge's function is not himself [or herself] to weigh the
evidence 	and 	determine 	the 	truth 	of 	the 	matter 	but 	to
determine 	whether 	there 	is 	a 	genuine 	issue 	for 	trial.”
[Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct.
2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 212 (1986).] . . . If there exists
a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue
of 	fact, 	that 	issue 	should 	be 	considered 	insufficient 	to
constitute a “genuine” issue of material fact for purposes of
R. 4:46-2. Liberty Lobby, supra, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S. Ct.
at 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 213. 	The import of our holding is
that when the evidence “is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law,” Liberty Lobby, supra, 477 U.S. at
252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 214, the trial court
should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.
[Id. at 540.]
The burden is on the moving party to exclude all reasonable doubt as to the
existence of any genuine issue of material fact, and all inferences of doubt are drawn
against the moving party and in favor of the non-moving party. Saldana v. DiMedio, 275
N.J. Super. 488, 494 (App. Div. 1994). 	The critical question, therefore, is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require [a hearing] or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Brill, 142 N.J. at 533 (citation
omitted). 	If the non-moving party’s evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment should not be denied. 	See Bowles v. City of Camden,
993 F. Supp. 255, 261 (D.N.J. 1998).
An 	action 	by 	a 	local 	board 	of 	education 	“is 	entitled 	to 	a 	presumption 	of
correctness and will not be upset unless there is an affirmative showing that such
decision was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.” 	Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of
Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327, 332 (App. Div. 1965). 	Our courts have held that “[w]here
there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised
honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous
conclusion has been reached.” Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 122 N.J.
Super. 184, 199–200 (Ch. Div. 1973), aff’d, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974). Thus,
in order to prevail, those challenging a decision made by a board of education “must

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demonstrate that the Board acted in bad faith, or in utter disregard of the circumstances
before it.” 	G.H. & E.H. ex rel. K.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Lakes, 2014 N.J. AGEN
LEXIS 19 (Feb. 24, 2014) (citation omitted), adopted, 2014 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1137
(Apr. 10, 2014). Also, a board’s decision may be overturned if its determination violates
the legislative policies expressed or implied in the governing act. 	J.A.H. ex rel. C.H. v.
Twp. of Pittsgrove Bd. of Educ., 2013 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 58 (Mar. 11, 2013) (citing
Campbell v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)), adopted, 2013 N.J. AGEN
LEXIS 436 (Apr. 25, 2013).6
The Anti-Bullying Act is designed “to strengthen the standards and procedures
for preventing, reporting, investigating, and responding to incidents of harassment,
intimidation, and bullying of students that occur in school and off school premises.”
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.1(f). 	Under the Act, “[h]arassment, intimidation or bullying” is
defined as:
any gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any
electronic communication, whether it be a single incident or
a series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as
being 	motivated 	either 	by 	any 	actual 	or 	perceived
characteristic, 	such 	as 	race, 	color, 	religion, 	ancestry,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity
and expression, or a mental, physical or sensory disability,
or by any other distinguishing characteristic, that takes
place on school property, at any school-sponsored function,
on a school bus, or off school grounds as provided for in
section 	16 	of 	P.L. 	2010, 	c.122 	(C.18A:37-15.3), 	that
substantially disrupts or interferes with the orderly operation
of the school or the rights of other students and that:
a. 	a 	reasonable 	person 	should 	know, 	under 	the
circumstances, will have the effect of physically or
emotionally 	harming 	a 	student 	or 	damaging 	the
student’s property, or placing a student in reasonable
fear of physical or emotional harm to his person or
damage to his property;
b. 	has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student
or group of students; or
6 	See R.Z. and L.D. ex rel., L.Z. v. N. Valley Reg. High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., OAL Dkt. No. EDU
10029-23, Initial Decision (Feb. 12, 2025), adopted, Comm’r (Apr. 28, 2025), from which much of this
section is borrowed.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
15
c. 	creates 	a 	hostile 	educational 	environment 	for 	the
student by interfering with a student’s education or by
severely or pervasively causing physical or emotional
harm to the student.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.]
Each school district must adopt a policy that prohibits HIB and provides “a
procedure for prompt investigation of reports of violations and complaints.” 	N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15(b)(6). 	Once an alleged HIB incident is reported to the school principal, the
principal must initiate an investigation within one school day of the report. 	N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15(b)(6)(a). 	The investigation shall be conducted by a school anti-bullying
specialist, but “[t]he principal may appoint additional personnel who are not school
anti-bullying specialists to assist in the investigation.” 	Ibid. 	The investigation shall be
completed within ten days of the initial HIB complaint. Ibid.
The 	results 	of 	the 	investigation 	shall 	then 	be 	quickly 	reported 	to 	the
superintendent 	of 	schools, 	who 	may 	take 	certain 	remedial 	action. 	N.J.S.A.
18A:37-15(b)(6)(b). 	In 	particular, 	“the 	superintendent 	may 	decide 	to 	provide
intervention services, establish training programs to reduce [HIB] and enhance school
climate, 	impose 	discipline, 	order 	counseling 	as 	a 	result 	of 	the 	findings 	of 	the
investigation, or take or recommend other appropriate action.” Ibid.
At this point, it is important to note that the interplay of sections (a), (b) and (c) of
the HIB statute was addressed by the Commissioner in Wehbeh v. Bd. of Ed., Twp. of
Verona, 2020 N.J. Agen LEXIS 50 (Feb. 4, 2020).
[A] 	finding 	of 	[HIB] 	requires 	three 	elements. 	First, 	the
conduct must be reasonably perceived as motivated by any
actual 	or 	perceived 	enumerated 	characteristic 	or 	other
distinguishing characteristic and, second, the conduct must
substantially 	disrupt 	or 	interfere 	with 	the 	rights 	of 	other
students or the orderly operation of the school. 	The third
condition is that one of the three criteria enumerated in the
Act 	regarding 	the 	effect 	of 	the 	conduct 	must 	also 	be
satisfied.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
16
[Id. at *5 (footnotes omitted).]
The Commissioner explained that “as a matter of standard statutory construction,
the term ‘or’ between subsections (b) and (c) also applies to subsection (a), such that a
demonstration of any of these three criteria can support a finding of HIB.” Ibid. at n.2.
Put another way, for there to be a valid finding of an HIB violation, these things
had to have happened:
1. 	A reasonable person would perceive that the conduct
was based upon a distinguishing characteristic.
AND
2. 	The conduct took place on school property.
AND
3. 	The conduct must substantially disrupt or interfere with
the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other
students.
AND
3a. 	A reasonable person should know that the conduct
would 	have 	the 	effect 	of…emotionally 	harming 	a
student.
OR
3b. 	The conduct has the effect of insulting or demeaning
the student.
OR
3c. 	The conduct created a hostile educational environment
for 	the 	student 	by 	interfering 	with 	the 	student’s
education 	or 	by 	severely 	or 	pervasively 	causing
emotional harm to the student.
[See generally, Shim v. Ridgefield Pub. Schs., Bd. of Educ.,
2023 N.J. Agen LEXIS 526 (July 26, 2023), adopted, 2023
N.J. Agen LEXIS 441 (Sept. 7, 2023).]

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
17
In other words, in order for there to be a cognizable finding of an HIB violation,
the petitioner must demonstrate that it met prongs 1, 2 and 3 and then any of 3a, 3b or
3c. Any break in the chain causes the charge to fail.
STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Prong 	1 	− 	The 	conduct 	was 	reasonably 	perceived 	to 	be 	based 	upon 	a
distinguishing characteristic.
The primary argument made by C.H. is that P.H. did not intend to harass or bully
A.V. but rather praise (?) him with the “Jewish monkey” descriptor and called him a
midget “in fear” after he (understandably) stared at her after she called him a “Jewish
monkey.”
However, New Jersey law is clear; P.H.’s intent is irrelevant. 	Rather, it is the
perception of the victim that controls, as long as they reasonably perceive that the
action is motivated by an actual or perceived characteristic.
One of the first cases to discuss this issue was Melynk v. Teaneck Bd. of Educ.,
No. 16-0188, 2016 WL 6892077 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2016):
On its face, the HIB Policy requires that several factors must
be 	met 	before 	an 	expression 	can 	be 	found 	to 	be
harassment. 	First, the communication must be “reasonably
perceived 	as 	motivated” 	by 	an 	actual 	or 	perceived
characteristic. 	That 	is 	to 	say, 	the 	comment 	must 	be
objectively perceived to a reasonable person as motivated
by a characteristic.
[Id. at 12.]
Melynk was cited with approval in R.H. ex rel. A.H. v. Borough of Sayreville Bd.
of Educ., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83587 (D.N.J. May 12, 2023):
First, the communication must be “reasonably perceived as
being 	motivated 	either 	by 	any 	actual 	or 	perceived

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
18
characteristic, 	such 	as 	race 	. 	. 	.” 	among 	other 	things.
N.J.S.A. § 18A:37-14. “The ‘reasonably perceived’ test is an
objective one that has withstood constitutional scrutiny,” and
does 	not 	present 	a 	vagueness 	issue. 	See 	Melynk 	v.
Teaneck Bd. of Educ., No. 16-0188, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
161524, 2016 WL 6892077, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2016).
[Id. at 9.]
This result is also alluded to in S.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Moorestown, 2019 N.J.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2114 (App. Div. October 15, 2019). 	There, in a case involving a
teacher who requested a student’s (poor) test papers as part of his job duties, the court
concluded that an HIB violation had not occurred since:
[W]e do not discern sufficient facts to support a conclusion
that any actions by R.L. were motivated by G.A.'s ADHD or
other personal characteristics.
[Id. at 7.]
It further noted that:
[E]ven if we presume R.L. was insensitive or even unkind,
there is no evidence R.L. was prompted by any actual or
perceived 	characteristic, 	such 	as 	race, 	color, 	religion,
ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity and expression, or a mental, physical or sensory
disability, or by any other distinguishing characteristic.
[Ibid.]
This prong was again discussed in L.K. and T.K. ex rel. A.K. v. Mansfield Bd. of
Educ., 2019 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 62 (January 22, 2019), Final Decision, 2019 N.J. Agen.
LEXIS 345 (Comm’r of Ed. April 22, 2019), reversed and remanded, L.K. v. Bd. of Educ.
of Mansfield, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2082 (App. Div. November 2, 2020).
In L.K., the ALJ found that “the statute focuses on the impact of (the) conduct on
(the alleged victim) and what (the alleged victim) reasonably perceived.” 	However, in
that case involving young children and a gender-transitioning student, the Court further
found:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
19
There is no requirement that the Board find that A.K.’s
conduct 	was 	actually 	motivated 	by 	the 	perceived
characteristic, because, as petitioners argue, A.K. most likely
does 	not 	even 	know 	what 	“gender 	identity” 	means.
However, even under the actual wording of the statute, the
only corroborated finding from the investigation was that A.K.
asked questions about why N.V. dressed like a girl even
though N.V. asked her to stop. 	Therefore, the age of A.K.
was relevant to whether A.K.’s conduct was motivated by the
perceived characteristic or because a seven-year-old would
be curious about why a student she knew as a boy was
dressing like a girl. 	The investigators had the time to find
and interview someone in the cafeteria who may have heard
A.K. continue the “harassment,” but they did not.
[L.K., 2019 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 62 at *17−*18.]
Given the lack of clarity in the statute, there will, of course, be some confusion.
However, that lack of clarity was addressed in Wehbeh v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of
Verona, 2020 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 50 (Comm’r of Ed. February 4, 2020), where the
Commissioner found that a “standard reasonableness determination common in many
types of adjudications” should be utilized. 	It was noted that to require an actor to have
intentionally 	committed 	an 	offense, 	the 	burden 	concerning 	motivation 	would 	be
improperly placed on the alleged victim. Id. at 3.
Ultimately, I FIND that in order to find the first prong of the statute had been
satisfied, an investigating body must view the evidence in its entirety and determine
whether a reasonable person could perceive that the conduct could be “motivated by an
actual or perceived characteristic.” 	That determination should take into account the
totality of the circumstances, including the traits/characteristics of the alleged victim, the
age, knowledge and experience of the actor, as well as the time, place and location of
the act, etc.
Then, if the investigator determines that a reasonable person would conclude
that the act was motivated by an actual or perceived characteristic, the investigation will
proceed to the next element of the HIB offense. 	In essence, the consideration of this
prong does not focus purely on either the perception of the alleged victim or the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
20
expressed intent of the alleged actor but instead provides an objective standard based
on the totality of the circumstances.
In doing so, I FIND that a reasonable person could very easily conclude that
P.H.’s motivation in both calling A.V. a “Jewish monkey” and a “midget” was “motivated
by an actual or perceived characteristic.” 	To expect a reasonable person to make the
asserted “Jewish monkey” connection is, to put it mildly, a huge stretch and the use of
the word “midget” to a short person who was annoying you cannot really be defended,
even accepting C.H.’s assertion of P.H.’s current version of events as being true.
Prong 2 – Location of the conduct
That the second prong of the HIB statute, which concerns the location of the
incident, has been met is unchallenged, since the conduct occurred in the school
gymnasium.
Prong 3 – The conduct substantially disrupted or interfered with the orderly
operation of the school or the rights of other students.
The 	only 	evidence 	supplied 	clearly 	supports 	a 	conclusion 	that 	this 	event
“substantially disrupt(ed) or interfere(d) with the orderly operation of the school or the
rights of other students.” 	While the petitioner questions the impact of the incident and
the veracity of both A.V. and his mother, the evidence demonstrates that both of them
confirm that P.H.’s conduct led him to express a desire not to return to school and even
to ponder the possibility of homeschooling.
The “evidence” cited by C.H. in his opposition to the motion isn’t so much
evidence as speculation and ignores the documented fact that A.V. went to see Ms.
Boczun twice on the day of the incident and that his parent reported it again the next
day. 	The complaints made by both A.V. and his mother are documented in the HIB
reports and his mother even notes that A.V. “doesn’t want to be a snitch,” but that the
conduct clearly had a significant impact on him.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
21
While case law is relatively sparse concerning this prong, it is clear that when
there is more than a negligible impact on the student, it is satisfied. 	As noted by the
Commissioner in D.D.K. o/b/o D.K. v. Bd. of Educ. of Readington, et al., 2016 N.J.
Agen. LEXIS 1348 (Nov. 11, 2016):
However, the report determined that the incident did not
amount to HIB because the comments did not substantially
disrupt or interfere with the orderly operation of the school or
the rights of other students. 	In support of this finding, the
report noted that D.K. stated in his interview that “fortunately,
this was not problematic for my learning experience, but it
ticked me off at the time.” 	(Exhibit J-l.) 	The student witness
observed 	the 	alleged 	aggressor 	make 	an 	“embarrassed
laugh” to himself when he realized what he had said had
come out wrong, but did not hear anyone else laugh and did
not think D.K. was upset as a result of the comment. 	Ibid.
The teachers did not hear any of the alleged comments.
Previously, conduct has been determined to substantially
disrupt the orderly operation of the school when students are
so upset or embarrassed that they are “not fully available for
learning.” 	G.H. and E.H. on behalf of K.H. v. Board of
Education of the Borough of Franklin Lakes, Bergen County,
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 13204-13, decided February 24, 2014,
adopted Commissioner Decision No. 157-14, April 10, 2014.
Additionally, 	when 	other 	students 	are 	“so 	affected” 	by
behavior that they report it, the orderly operation of the
school may be substantially disrupted. 	T.R. and T.R. on
behalf of E.R. v. Bridgewater-Raritan Regional Board of
Education, 	OAL 	Dkt. 	No. 	EDU 	10208-13, 	decided
September 25, 2014, adopted Commissioner Decision No.
450-14, November 10, 2014. 	Given that D.K. indicated that
the 	comments 	were 	not 	problematic 	for 	his 	learning
experience and other students did not appear to be affected
by them − combined with a lack of any other evidence to the
contrary − the Commissioner is constrained to agree that
petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the
comments 	substantially 	disrupted 	or 	interfered 	with 	the
orderly 	operation 	of 	the 	school 	or 	the 	rights 	of 	other
students.
[D.D.K. o/b/o D.K., 2016 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 1348 at *3−*4.]
It is also addressed in R.P. o/b/o A.P. v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Hamilton, 2018
N.J. Agen. LEXIS 83 (Jan. 2, 2018), adopted, Comm’r, 2018 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 346

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
22
(Mar. 29, 2018). 	That matter involved a ten-year-old student who was exposed to
repeated sexual innuendos and gestures by another student. 	She wrote a letter to the
school “urgently seeking help . . . due to A.P.'s ongoing inappropriate behavior.
Through this letter and confirmed during her interview with (a school official), S.W.
expressed her extreme discomfort and distress over A.P.'s ongoing conduct.” 	R.P. at
2018 N.J. Agen. LEXIS 83 at *14. 	Given the severity of the harassment, the Court
found that the student’s “extreme discomfort and distress” was sufficient to satisfy the
“disruption prong.” 	Ibid. 	See also, W.D. & J. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson, 2020 N.J.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1787 (Sept. 29, 2020).
Prong 3a – A reasonable person should know that the conflict would have the
effect of . . . emotionally harming a student.
Prong 3b – The conduct has the effect of insulting or demeaning the student.
Prong 3c – The conduct created a hostile educational environment for the student
by 	interfering 	with 	the 	student’s 	education 	or 	by 	severely 	or
pervasively causing emotional harm to the student.
In order for there to be a finding of an HIB violation, only one of Prongs 3a, 3b
and 3c has to be satisfied. 	Here, even assuming that C.H.’s assertion that P.H. did not
intend that the use of the term “Jewish monkey” (or “midget”) be derogatory, or by
inference 	that 	she 	would 	not 	know 	that 	the 	conduct 	would 	have 	the 	effect 	of
“emotionally harming a student,” that only relieves the burden of Prong 3a.
Here, there is no question that the only evidence presented is that P.H.’s
conduct, no matter the intent, had “the effect of insulting or demeaning” A.V. 	This is
clearly documented in the HIB report, and while C.H. attempts to raise a credibility issue
about this issue, he has provided no evidence to support his claims. For instance, there
is no evidence (such as texts, details of conversations, social media postings, etc.) that
A.V. did not feel insulted or demeaned and was effectively “making it up.”

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
23
As for Prong 3c, once again, the only cognizable evidence presented is that
P.H.’s conduct indeed created a hostile educational environment by interfering with
A.V.’s education to the degree that he expressed a desire to change classes to avoid
P.H., not attend school and/or be homeschooled. 	While the support for a violation of
Prong 3c is perhaps not as strong as Prong 3b, C.H. again fails to provide any
cognizable evidence to support his opposition to the HIB finding.
CONCLUSION
While I understand C.H.’s desire to defend his daughter, his arguments are
strained. From the start, while not required by N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b), the failure to supply
affidavits in support of his opposition to the Motion was extremely unhelpful. 	This is
particularly true in light of the contradictions between the C.H.’s emails to the school
and his Opposition to the Motion.
For example, within the first six lines of his submission, C.H. writes: 	“I spoke to
my daughter and she told me she asked A.V. if he was a ‘Jewish monkey,’ and she did
refer to him as a ‘Midget.’” 	(Pet’r’s Opp’n at 2.) 	So, the base allegations (which were
explicitly spelled out in Ms. Sciscilo’s March 21 email7) against P.H. are admitted. 	In
fact, in reply to that email, C.H. wrote back:
I see this as my daughter was bullying that boy and to use
his ethnic background is unacceptable. P. has told me about
this boy since last year and I had told her to ignore him and
walk away. 	P. knew how to handle the situation the right
way but chose not to and having a bad day is no excuse.
[R-2A.]
Nowhere in any of the submitted materials is there any evidence that P.H. was
referencing a music group when she called A.V. a “Jewish monkey,” and nowhere does
she deny calling him a midget (her claim now, per C.H., is that after she called him a
Jewish monkey, he turned and stared at her, which is claimed to have “intimidated” her
and made her “nervous”). 	And while, as noted above, her motivation is ultimately (and
7 R-2A.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
24
literally) irrelevant, nowhere does P.H. claim that she was doing this in jest. 	In fact, all
of 	the 	evidence 	(even 	including 	the 	“period” 	explanation 	espoused 	by 	C.H.)
demonstrates that P.H. was annoyed with A.V. and lashed out.
In other words, while C.H. presents alternative explanations in his opposition, he
provides no cognizable evidence to support his assertion that P.H. did not commit an
act of HIB and certainly no logical narrative supporting that position.
The petitioner has simply not demonstrated what about the investigation or
conclusions was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 	Not only is there evidence that
P.H. admitted her actions to the District (and in her email apology to A.V.), but also the
emails from her father reflected that she admitted them to him. Only after C.H. came to
understand that there was a HIB complaint and its consequences did the story change
and his unverified alternate explanations for P.H.’s actions were propounded. In fact, in
his opposition, he actually writes, in claiming that Mr. Voorhees “twisted his words,” that:
I never said calling a ‘Jewish Monkey’ and a “midget”
were not discriminatory. 	What I did say was the way my
daughter used the words “Jewish Monkey” she was talking
about a music group. 	When she said midget he scared her
by staring at her.
[Pet’r’s Opp’n at 14 (emphasis added.)]
Ultimately, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has failed to demonstrate as a matter of
law 	that 	respondent’s 	determination 	that 	P.H.’s 	actions 	constituted 	a 	violation 	of
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.2 et seq. was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. 	I FIND that
this is by far the most logical conclusion and that the evidence is clear that P.H. indeed
committed an act of HIB and that the District’s conclusion was correct.
As to the purported procedural violations, I FIND that there was nothing about
those actions (giving all reasonable inferences to petitioner) that substantively impacted
the case. It must be noted that there is substantial support for the conclusion that there
is no private remedy in the HIB statute in cases of administrative errors during the
investigative process. 	This was most recently discussed in H.P. o/b/o R.S. v. Borough

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
25
of Tenafly Bd. of Educ., 2024 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 73 (Jan. 24, 2024), adopted, Comm’r
(Mar. 26, 2024), where the court pointed to multiple prior cases involving procedural
errors where “the Commissioner has simply ordered school districts . . . to comply with
the statutory requirements.” Id. at *14–15 (citing T.R. & T.R. ex rel. E.R. v. Bd. of Educ.
of the Bridgewater-Raritan Reg’l Sch. Dist., 2014 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 634 (Sept. 25,
2014), adopted, Comm’r (Nov. 10, 2014)). 	See also, R.Z. and L.D. o/b/o L.Z. v. N.
Valley Reg’l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10029-23, Initial Decision
(Feb. 12, 2025), adopted, Comm’r (Apr. 28, 2025).
Here, while there are some questions concerning the exact nature of the contacts
between Ms. Sciscilo, Ms. Boczun and C.H., he was clearly aware of the nature of the
incident and that there was an allegation of bullying. 	(R-2A.) 	Whether he received the
April 19, 2024 letter or not, there is no question that he was fully aware of the fact that
there was a bullying investigation by the time of the May 13, 2024 letter. 	(P-D.) 	After
his email request of June 18, 2024, he was, the next day, provided with a copy of the
HIB Investigation Report and the April 19th letter. 	He was also advised that, because
he 	claimed 	not 	to 	have 	received 	the 	April 	19th 	letter, 	his 	time 	to 	appeal 	the
determination was extended to June 24th. 	(P-G.) 	He then appeared at the July 19,
2024 BOE meeting and presented his case in support of his daughter.
His arguments about the technicalities of the HIB report are entirely unconvincing
and to be believed, one has to believe that, effectively, the District, for no apparent
reason, concocted its version of events. 	This is simply not credible, particularly when
there is no real dispute about what happened, but only the intent behind it and its impact
on A.V.
There is nothing about the alleged substantive bobbles that deprived C.H. of his
ability to challenge the HIB findings, and, frankly, he really doesn’t allege that he was so
deprived. 	While he alleges that P.H. effectively lied in her apology email, he fails to
explain his emails in which she admits to her conduct or her unequivocal “fresh
complaint” statements made during her interview with Ms. Sciscilo, save that she was
purportedly not given an opportunity to fully explain her actions. 	Even that explanation
is called into question when the report specifically documented that P.H. admitted to the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
26
“Jewish monkey” and “midget” comments but did not recall calling A.V. a “bitch” or
“ugly.”
In other words, C.H. and P.H. were afforded a full and fair opportunity to defend
against the HIB allegations, and I CONCLUDE that any alleged administrative errors
had no substantive impact on the case and that there is no reason to reverse the
Board’s decision.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that respondent’s Motion for
Summary Decision be and is hereby GRANTED and;
It is further ORDERED that petitioner’s appeal be and is hereby DISMISSED
and;
It is further ORDERED that respondent shall follow the rules and regulations
promulgated in N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15 et seq. concerning its handling of HIB complaints in
the future.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
27
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and
unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become
a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B 10.
May 23, 2025
DATE 	MATTHEW G. MILLER, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	May 23, 2025
Date Mailed to Parties: 	May 23, 2025
sej

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
28
APPENDIX
EXHIBITS
For petitioner:
P-A 	Email from C.H. to Samantha Boczun (March 21, 2024)
P-B 	Email from Sarah Sciscilo and C.H. (March 21, 2024)
P-C 	Email from C.H. to Susan Sciscillo (March 21, 2024)
P-D 	Letter from respondent to C.H. advising of HIB finding (May 13, 2024)
P-E 	Excerpts from the Guidance for Parents on the Anti-Bullying Bills of Rights
Act (P.L. 2010, c.122)
P-F 	Secaucus BOE HIB policy (5512.01)
P-G 	Email exchange between C.H. and respondent (June 18-19, 2024)
P-H 	Email exchange between C.H. and respondent with attachments (June 20,
2024)
P-I 	Email exchange between C.H. and respondent requesting an appeal and
confirming receipt of the request (June 22, 2024)
P-J 	Email exchange between C.H. and respondent, re: appeal scheduling
(July 1, 2024)
P-K 	Email and letter from respondent to C.H., re: appeal process (July 12,
2024)
P-L 	HIBster User Guide (undated)
P-M 	Aleks, Eror, Who Are The Jewish Monkeys?, Vice Media, November 15,
2012, https://www.vice.com/en/article/who-are-the-jewish-monkeys/
P-N 	Letter from respondent to C.H. (July 22, 2024)
For respondent:
R-1 	Certification of Samantha Boczon (January 23, 2025)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 15753-24
29
R-1A 	HIB Report (March 21, 2024)
R-1B 	Email from C.H. to Samantha Boczon (March 21, 2024)
R-2 	Certification of Sarah Sciscilo (January 23, 2025)
R-2A 	Email exchange between Sarah Sciscilo and C.H. (March 21, 2024)
R-2B 	Completed HIB report (April 12, 2024)
R-3 	Certification of Charles Voorhees (January 23, 2025)
R-3A 	Secaucus BOE HIB policy (5512.01)
R-3B 	Letter from respondent to C.H. advising of the decision finding that P.H.
committed an act of HIB. (April 19, 2024)
R-3C 	Letter from respondent to C.H. advising of the BOE’s decision to affirm the
finding that P.H. had committed an act of HIB. (July 22, 2024)
R-4 	J.M. o/b/o B.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of the Chathams, 2023
N.J. Agen. LEXIS 87 (July 6, 2023)
R-5 	J.M. o/b/o B.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of the Chathams, 2023
N.J. Agen. LEXIS 118 (Apr. 13, 2023)
R-6 	W.M. o/b/o J.M. v. Twp. of Bedminster Bd. of Educ., 2022 N.J. Agen.
LEXIS 927 (Dec. 15, 2022), adopted, Comm’r (Mar. 7, 2023).