Tess Iannacco v. Board of Education of the Borough of Wood-Ridge, Bergen County, 11/18/21, (#289-21)

289-21
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Tess Iannocco,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of
Wood Ridge, Bergen County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner – a tenured teacher – suffered a medical episode in her classroom and required emergency
services. Subsequently, the Board required that she undergo a fitness for duty evaluation before returning
to work and placed her on sick leave until the evaluation was completed. The petitioner filed the within
appeal, arguing that she should have been placed on paid administrative leave rather than forced to use
her accrued sick time while she waited for clearance to return to work; petitioner demanded that her sick
days be reinstated. The parties filed a joint stipulation of facts and motion for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: there are no material facts at issue in this case and the matter is ripe for
summary decision; under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2(a), boards of education may conduct physical or psychiatric
evaluations of its teachers to ensure they are mentally and physically fit to perform their duties;
N.J.S.A. 18A:16-4 addresses what occurs after a fitness evaluation and the use of sick time if the employee
is not able to return to work such that when a physician determines there is a mental or physical issue
precluding job service, the tenured employee may use sick leave until the board of education is satisfied
that the employee has recovered; here, however, no physician concluded that petitioner was unfit to
teach; rather, the physician performing the fitness evaluation permitted petitioner to return to her
teaching position. The ALJ concluded that the Board could not compel petitioner to utilize her sick days
before the completion of the fitness evaluation. Accordingly, the ALJ granted summary decision to
petitioner and ordered the Board to return 39.5 days of sick leave to her.
The Commissioner concurred with the findings and determination of the ALJ herein; accordingly, the
Initial Decision of the OAL was adopted as the final decision in this matter.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It
has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 11442-20
Agency Dkt. No. 233-11/20
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Tess Iannacco,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Borough of
Wood-Ridge, Bergen County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by the Board pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and petitioner’s reply thereto,
have been reviewed and considered.
Petitioner, a tenured teacher, suffered a medical episode in her classroom and was
required by the Board to undergo a fitness for duty evaluation before returning to work. The
Board required her to use sick leave until the evaluation was completed, and petitioner
appealed, arguing that she should have been placed on paid administrative leave. The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted petitioner’s motion for summary decision and denied
the Board’s cross-motion for summary decision, concluding that the Board could not require
petitioner to use sick days before the completion of the fitness evaluation.
In its exceptions, the Board argues that there is no statutory provision authorizing the use of
administrative leave. The Board further contends that the cases cited by the ALJ to support her
289-21

2
conclusion are distinguishable and do not directly address the issue of how the dates between a
medical episode and a clearance to return to work should be characterized. According to the
Board, there was no way for either the Board or petitioner to gauge whether she was able to return
to the classroom after her medical incident, such that she must be placed on sick leave until she
was cleared to return to work.
In reply, petitioner argues that the ALJ’s decision was correct because the Board lacks
statutory support to impose involuntary sick leave when a fitness evaluation had not been
completed and no physician had determined that petitioner was unfit. Petitioner contends that the
ALJ was correct in finding that a medical justification is required for sick leave and that the Board
does not have the medical expertise to conclude that petitioner was too ill or disabled to work.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that the Board must reinstate
petitioner’s sick days. While a board of education may place a tenured teacher on involuntary
sick leave pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:16-4, such leave may only be ordered after an examination is
performed that indicates “mental abnormality or communicable disease.” A board of
education cannot require the use of sick leave without medical justification. Mary Roberts v.
Clinton Township Board of Education, 1991 S.L.D. 751, 760 (Initial Decision, March 26, 1991),
aff’d 1991 S.L.D. 763 (Commissioner Decision, May 14, 1991), aff’d 1991 S.L.D. 767 (State Board
of Education Decision, September 4, 1991).
The Board’s argument that a medical justification was present based on the medical
incident in petitioner’s classroom is unavailing. As the ALJ noted, simply having a medical
condition does not necessarily make an individual too ill or disabled to work and requiring
medical attention on a given day does not necessarily mean the individual is unable to work the
next day. The Board does not have the medical expertise necessary to reach the conclusion

3
that petitioner was too ill or disabled to work. Unless and until a medical professional declared
petitioner unable to work, there was no medical justification for her sick leave, and therefore
she was not required to use her sick days.1 While the Board contends that no statutory
provision requires administrative leave during this time, the statutory framework protects an
employee’s sick days until after a fitness evaluation determines she is unable to work and
further limits suspensions without pay to circumstances that do not apply here. Accordingly, a
paid leave of absence – whether termed “administrative leave” or something else – is the only
permissible option.
Accordingly, petitioner’s motion for summary decision is granted, and the Board’s
motion for summary decision is denied. The Board is ordered to reinstate 39.5 days of sick
leave to petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
1 This is consistent with the definition of sick leave as an “absence . . . because of personal disability due to illness
or injury” or because of exclusion from school due to a contagious disease or quarantine. N.J.S.A. 18A:30-1.
2 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1.
Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.
November 18, 2021
November 18, 2021

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11442-20
AGENCY DKT. NO. 322-11/20
TESS IANNACCO,
Petitioner,
v.
WOOD-RIDGE BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
Colin M. Lynch, Esq., for petitioner (Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum &
Friedman, P.C., attorneys)
Daniel R. Roberts, Esq., for respondent (Kenney, Gross, Kovats & Parton,
attorneys)
Record Closed: September 29, 2021 	Decided: October 4, 2021
BEFORE NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11442-20
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tess Iannacco, a tenured teacher, suffered a medical episode in her classroom
while wearing a mask due to COVID and needed emergency services. 	The Wood-
Ridge Board of Education (Wood-Ridge) immediately placed Iannacco on sick leave. Is
Iannacco required to use her sick days pending medical clearance to return to work?
No. 	A teacher would use sick leave following a fitness examination revealing “mental
abnormality or communicable disease,” not before. N.J.S.A. 18A:16-4.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 17, 2020, Iannacco filed a Verified Petition with the Commissioner
of Education (Commissioner), contesting Wood-Ridge’s insistence that she use sick
leave pending the outcome of a fitness for duty evaluation. 	Instead, she maintains that
while 	Wood-Ridge 	can 	require 	a 	teacher 	to 	undergo 	a 	psychiatric 	or 	physical
examination, Wood-Ridge must place her on paid administrative leave pending the
results of that evaluation.
On December 8, 2020, Wood-Ridge filed its answer, maintaining the propriety of
its actions.
On December 11, 2020, the Department of Education (DOE) transmitted this
case to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case under the Administrative
Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, and the act establishing the OAL, N.J.S.A.
52:14F-1 to -13, for a hearing under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules,
N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6.
On January 21, 2021, I held a pre-hearing conference wherein the parties
advised of their desire to resolve the case.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11442-20
3
On 	May 	28, 	2021, 	the 	parties 	advised 	that 	settlement 	negotiations 	were
unsuccessful. 	Still, the parties agreed that the material facts were undisputed, and no
hearing was necessary to resolve the legal issue presented. 	Moreover, the parties
agreed to give a joint stipulation of facts and exhibits with the motions for summary
decision.
On August 6, 2021, the parties filed cross-motions for summary decision, and on
September 10, 2021, the parties filed responses.
On September 17, 2021, Iannacco supplied a reply.
On September 29, 2021, the parties revised the joint stipulation of facts, and I
closed the record.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties presented a joint stipulation of facts and exhibits. Thus, I FIND the
following as FACT for purposes of these motions only:
Wood-Ridge employed Iannacco as an Italian teacher, and she acquired tenure
as a teacher.
Iannacco suffers from a medical condition that makes it difficult for her to wear a
face 	mask. 	Iannacco 	requested 	medical 	accommodation 	during 	the 	COVID-19
pandemic, and Wood-Ridge permitted her to remove her mask when students were not
in her classroom.
On October 26, 2020, Wood-Ridge’s school physician evaluated Iannacco about
mask-wearing. 	The physician concluded that Iannacco did not qualify for an exemption
from wearing a mask while teaching in the classroom.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11442-20
4
On October 27, 2020, while in her classroom, Iannacco suffered a medical
episode 	requiring 	local 	emergency 	medical 	services. 	Iannacco’s 	mask-wearing
prompted the medical event, and Iannacco used half of a sick day on October 27, 2020.
Later that same day, former Superintendent of Schools Nicholas Cipriano advised
Iannacco that Wood-Ridge placed her on immediate sick leave due to the medical
episode 	and 	required Iannacco 	to 	use 	her 	sick 	days 	pending a fitness for 	duty
evaluation.
On December 22, 2020, Iannacco underwent a fitness examination.
On January 14, 2021, the school principal contacted Iannacco and advised her
that the evaluation’s results permitted Iannacco to return to work.
On 	January 	15, 	2021, 	Iannacco 	returned 	to 	teaching, 	providing 	in-person
instruction.
Wood-Ridge did not grant Iannacco any paid administrative leave pending her
medical clearance and return to teaching in the classroom. 	Instead, Wood-ridge
required Iannacco to utilize thirty-nine and one-half sick days.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Summary-Decision Standard
A party may move for summary decision upon all or any of the substantive issues
in a contested case. 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). 	Briefs, with or without affidavits must
accompany 	the 	motion. When 	the 	filed 	papers 	and 	discovery, 	together 	with 	any
affidavits, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is
entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the judge may grant the motion. 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-
12.5(b). When a party makes such a motion, an adverse party, to prevail, must submit

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11442-20
5
an affidavit setting forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact
exists that an evidentiary proceeding can only determine. Ibid.
Even though a statute calls for a “hearing,” where a party makes a motion for
summary decision supported by documentary evidence and the objector submits no
evidence to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the motion
procedure constitutes the hearing, and no trial-type hearing is necessary. 	Contini v.
Newark Bd. of Educ., 286 N.J. Super. 106, 120–21 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 145
N.J. 372 (1996).
To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists that precludes
summary judgment, the motion judge must consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
are sufficient to demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
In this case, no genuine issue about the material facts exists. 	The only question
presented is whether Iannacco is required to use sick days beyond October 27, 2020,
pending the outcome of a fitness for duty evaluation about a known medical condition.
More pointedly, no genuine issue exists that Iannacco is a tenured teacher with a
medical ailment causing difficulties with mask-wearing. 	Further, she suffered a medical
episode in her classroom when wearing a face mask required by the COVID-19
pandemic. 	After the medical incident, Wood-Ridge placed Iannacco on sick leave and
charged her thirty-nine and one-half sick days until her clearance and return to work.
Since these facts are clear and undisputed, I CONCLUDE that this case is ripe for
summary decision.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11442-20
6
Fitness for Duty and Sick Leave
Under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2(a), the Legislature authorized boards of education to
conduct physical or psychiatric evaluations of its teachers to ensure they are mentally
and physically fit to perform their duties:
Every board of education may require its employees and
shall 	require 	any 	candidate 	for 	employment, 	who 	has
received a conditional offer of employment to undergo a
physical 	examination. 	The 	board 	may 	require 	individual
psychiatric 	or 	physical 	examinations 	of 	any 	employee,
whenever, in the judgment of the board, an employee shows
evidence 	of 	deviation 	from 	normal, 	physical, 	or 	mental
health.
[Ibid.]
However, 	as 	Judge 	Lane 	cautioned 	in 	Kochman 	v. 	Keansburg 	Board 	of
Education, 124 N.J. Super. 203, 212 (Ch. Div. 1973), the Legislature also “recognized
that although a board of education may observe signs of what it considers a harmful,
significant deviation, it does not have the expertise to question the teacher on the matter
itself but must rely on the expertise of a psychiatrist.” 	See N.J.S.A. 18A:16-3 (a
physician chosen by the board at the board’s expense may conduct the examination or
a physician selected by the employee at the employee’s expense).
N.J.S.A. 18A:16-4 addresses what occurs after a fitness evaluation and the use
of sick time if ineligible for service:
If 	the 	result 	of 	any 	such 	examination 	[by 	a 	physician]
indicates mental abnormality [or impaired physical condition]
. . . , the employee shall be ineligible for further service until
proof of recovery, satisfactory to the board, is furnished, but
if the employee is under contract or has tenure, he may be
granted sick leave with compensation as provided by law
and 	shall, 	upon 	satisfactory 	recovery, 	be 	permitted 	to
complete the term of his contract, if he is under contract, or
be reemployed with the same tenure as he possessed at the
time his services were discontinued, if he has tenure, unless
his absence shall exceed a period of two years.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11442-20
7
[Ibid.]
In other words, when the physician determines there is a mental or physical issue
precluding job service, the tenured employee may use sick leave until the board of
education is satisfied that the employee recovered.
Numerous cases addressing teacher fitness for duty evaluations demonstrate
that school districts routinely place the employee on paid administrative leave before the
fitness examination, not sick leave. 	See, e.g., 	Dickerson v. Pittsgrove Twp. Board of
Education, 2011 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 538 (October 14, 2011); Hayes v City of Camden,
State-Operated School District, Camden County, 2016 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 4 (January
04, 2016); Cummings v. Little Egg Harbor Twp. Board of Education, Ocean County,
2018 	N.J. AGEN LEXIS 968 (October 19, 2018); Diaz v. Mahwah Twp. Board of
Education, 2010 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 101 (March 2, 2010); 	Bristol v Northern Valley
Regional High School District, Bergen County, 2004 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 472 (July 1,
2004).
Still, 	other 	decisions 	have 	considered 	the 	correct 	fitness-for-duty 	process.
In Roberts v. Clinton Board of Education, 1991 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 2419 (Initial Decision,
March 26, 1991), the board of education received parent complaints about Roberts, a
tenured teacher, and placed Roberts on involuntary medical leave pending a psychiatric
evaluation. 	Notably, the board filed no disciplinary charges against Roberts. 	Once
Roberts’ sick leave and accumulated sick leave expired, the board stopped paying her
salary. 	Roberts sought to restore sick leave days she claimed the board improperly
required her to use and her unpaid salary. 	Unlike here, Roberts refused to undergo a
psychiatric examination. 	Regardless, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ordered the
restoration of Roberts’ sick leave, highlighting that a medical determination must first
occur:
It is recognized that a board of education may place a tenured
teacher 	on 	involuntary 	sick 	leave 	under 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:16-4.
However, such leave may be ordered only after a physical or

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11442-20
8
psychiatric 	examination 	is 	performed 	and 	the 	results 	thereof
“indicate mental abnormalities or communicable disease.''
[Id. at *23.]
Moreover, the ALJ noted rejected that a dangerous situation permits a board to
disregard procedural safeguards:
In 	the 	absence 	of 	an 	indictment 	or 	charges 	certified 	to 	the
Commissioner, there is no acknowledged standard as 'clear and
present danger' which would justify the suspension of a tenured
teacher from employment through placement on involuntary sick
leave without medical justification and to suspend the teacher's
salary when accumulated sick leave expires.
[Id. at *24.]
The Commissioner upheld the ALJ’’s conclusions observing that other decisions
address the correct process regarding psychiatric or medical evaluations to assess
fitness. 	Specifically, 	the 	Commissioner 	highlighted 	conclusions 	reached 	in 	Emil
Scachetti v. Board of Education 	of the Twp. of Rockaway, 1977 S.L.D. 142, affirmed
State Board 153. 	In Scachetti, “a suspension without pay pending administration and
results of a disputed psychiatric exam was [found] improper and [the ALJ] ordered
Scachetti restored to employment with mitigated back pay until a medical exam properly
led to the invocation of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-4 [requiring the use of sick leave] or filing of
tenure charges.” Roberts, 1991 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 2419 	(Commissioner’s Decision,
May 14, 1991) at *4-5.
Wood-Ridge suggests that Roberts is distinguishable because Iannacco has a
known medical condition and required emergency services, whereas the board in
Roberts had no medical justification for its actions. 	Yet, this position belies the explicit
procedural protections under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-4, precluding a board of education from
substituting its judgment for that of a physician. Simply having a medical condition does
not 	make 	an 	individual 	too 	ill 	or 	disabled 	to 	work. 	Similarly, 	requiring 	medical

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11442-20
9
assistance on a given day cannot determine the employee is too ill to work beyond that
incident.
In addition to procedural defects, Iannacco also maintains that using sick leave in
this situation conflicts with the statutory framework for such absences. 	The Legislature
defines “sick leave” as "absence from [work] . . . because of personal disability due to
illness or injury.” N.J.S.A. 18A:30-1. Under N.J.S.A. 18A:30-2, all employees have sick
leave with full pay for a minimum of ten school days in any school year. 	Iannacco
maintains she was neither sick nor disabled during the imposed sick leave and Wood-
Ridge’s evaluating physician concurred.
Consistently, the Appellate Division addressed whether an employee could use
sick time for a period when she was not ill but as a means to extend her maternity
leave. 	In re Hackensack Bd. of Education, 184 N.J. Super. 311 (App. Div. 1982). The
court reviewed the statutory framework of sick leave and concluded that sick leave
could not be “used for child-rearing purposes by a nondisabled teacher.” 	Id. at 317.
Indeed, “the teacher simply would not be sick, as that term is [specifically] defined in
N.J.S.A. 18A:30-1.” Id.
The court highlighted that while N.J.S.A. 18A:30-3 provides for the accumulation
of unused sick leave "to be used for additional sick leave as needed in subsequent
years," any use “for other purposes would be directly contrary to N.J.S.A. 18A:30-3.” Id.
The court concluded that the Legislature’s inclusion of the terms “as needed” must
mean the need “for additional sick leave.” Id. 	Consequently, the Board has the right to
request a physician’s note before granting sick leave. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:30-4. 	Yet, the
statute does not authorize a board to determine whether a teacher is sick or disabled.
Here, no physician concluded that Iannacco was unfit to teach, and instead, the
physician performing the fitness evaluation permitted Iannacco to return to her teaching
position. 	Therefore, even if Wood-Ridge observed Iannacco’s “deviation from normal,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11442-20
10
physical, or mental health,” then I CONCLUDE it must wait until a physician determines
she is unfit for teaching before requiring her to utilize sick days.
Further, I CONCLUDE that Wood-Ridge could not require Iannacco to utilize
thirty-nine and one-half sick days before the fitness-for-duty evaluation and her return to
work, and thus, Iannacco is entitled to summary decision in her favor as a matter of
law.1
ORDER
Given my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I ORDER that Iannacco be
GRANTED summary decision and that the Wood-Ridge Board of Education be DENIED
summary decision. 	I further ORDER that Iannacco be returned thirty-nine and one-half
days of sick leave.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and
unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become
a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
1 Iannacco also maintains that the improper use of sick leave violates her tenure rights by reducing her
compensation without cause or the due process required by N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10. Yet, I need not reach this
issue because I granted her relief on other grounds.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11442-20
11
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
October 4, 2021
DATE 	NANCI G. STOKES, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	October 4, 2021
Date Mailed to Parties: 	October 4, 2021
ljb