F.L., on behalf of D.L. v. Board of Education of the Ramapo Indian Hills Regional High School District, Bergen County, 1/30/25 (#37-25E)

37-25E
OAL Dkt. No. 16312-24
Agency Dkt. No. 355-11/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
F.L., on behalf of D.L.,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Ramapo Indian Hills
Regional High School District, Bergen County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) have been reviewed. Upon such review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioner has
failed to demonstrate entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v.
DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6. The Commissioner further concurs with the
ALJ’s conclusion that it is in the interest of justice to defer a decision on respondent’s motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioner’s application for emergent relief is
adopted for the reasons stated therein. This matter shall continue at the OAL with such proceedings as
the parties and the ALJ deem necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	January 30, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	January 31, 2025
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER DENYING
EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 16312-24
AGENCY DKT. NO. 355-11/24
F.L. O/B/O D.L.,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
RAMAPO INDIAN HILLS REGIONAL
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT,
BERGEN COUNTY
Respondent.
______________________________
F.L., petitioner, pro se
Rachel E. Farley, Esq., for respondent (Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, attorneys)
Record Closed: December 18, 2024 Decided: December 20, 2024
BEFORE ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI, ALJ
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner, F.L., the mother of the adult student, D.L. petitioned the Director
of the Office of Controversies and Disputes, of the New Jersey Department of
Education, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6 et. seq., for an order for emergent relief which
seeks to “alter” D.L.’s Official High School Transcript. Prior to filing the appeal, F.L.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 16312-24
2
engaged a New Jersey attorney to advocate and negotiate a settlement agreement with
the Respondent (District/BOE), and, as a part of her petition attached an itemized bill
from her attorney in the amount of $4330.00 for about two months’ work. As part of her
appeal she seeks reimbursement for the fees she paid for her attorney’s bill. She also
sought the appointment of a “mediator who is an expert in special education who can
facilitate a mutually favorable outcome and issue an Official School transcript that dos
[sic] not discriminate against” her son D.L. (whom she refers to as DFL). She seeks
emergent relief saying the issue is “time sensitive.” The underlying appeal was
transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on November 20, 2024 with
instructions that the merits of the appeal be addressed once the request for emergent
relief has been decided.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying appeal with the request for emergent relief was transmitted to the
Office of Administrative Law on November 20, 2024 with instructions that the merits of
the appeal be addressed once the request for emergent relief has been decided. On
November 27, 2024, the BOE filed a letter-brief in opposition to the request for
emergent relief and also sought to dismiss the petition altogether. The respondent
makes three preliminary procedural objections to going forward with the underlying
petition, before addressing the Request for Emergent Relief.
First the BOE argues that D.L. is a 21-year-old and only he or his legal guardian
may file appeals on his behalf. F.L. attached no proof of guardianship nor argues that
she is his legal guardian. Therefore F.L. lacks standing to bring this appeal. Second, it
argues petitioner’s purported representation of D.L. constitutes the unauthorized and
illegal practice of law by non-attorneys. Thus to prevent any further violation of the
NJAC 1:15-1. and Court Rule 1:21-1.(e), the petition must be dismissed. Finally, the
BOE argues the petition of appeal is barred in that it seeks to appeal the July 1, 2024
final transcript for D.L. issued by the Director of Social Services that day. A complaining
party has ninety days from the date she is aware of the claims and F.L. did not file her
appeal until some 140 days of receipt of the transcripts.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 16312-24
3
These are serious and on their face meritorious defenses to the underlying
appeal. Further F.L’s absence from the State of New Jersey made it impossible to
have an in person proceeding on the emergent Appeal, as initially scheduled on
December 2, 2024. Further, F.L. would not agree to return to NJ for argument on the
motion due to her wanting to remain out of state to help her son settle into a new home,
and her request to hold argument via ZOOM was denied. However, petitioner has had
an extra two weeks to reply to respondent’s opposition to her motion for emergent
appeal and its motion to dismiss, and/or in the alternative, to seek apparently much
needed legal counsel for her son D.L. and/or herself.
In any event, I have reviewed her various lengthy replies to the District/BOE’s
opposition in writings of various forms, dated December 4, December 11, December 12,
and the last reply is dated December 13 but received on December 18. It is noted with
concern that despite numerous opportunities for F.L. to demonstrate it, I do not perceive
any understanding on F.L.’s part of the arguments that she lacks standing, and/or that
she is possibly engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, and/or that her entire
complaint is time barred. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is basically unopposed.
However, a final ruling on the motion to dismiss will not be made at this time. Instead,
F.L. will have an additional twenty-one days to engage a lawful representative to enter
his or her appearance in this court on this case. He or she will then be given
appropriate time to defend against the motion to dismiss, provided the efforts are made
in good faith. However, if there is no appearance by such lawful representative by that
time, this Order will be amended to dismiss the complaint with prejudice for the reasons
cited by the respondent, and as identified herein, which currently remain essentially not
effectively opposed.
Motion for Emergent Relief
The motion was not accompanied by the required letter memorandum or brief
addressing the standards for granting such relief which are governed by Crowe v.
DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1990).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 16312-24
4
As correctly cited by respondent in its November 27, 2024 letter brief, the failure
of a pro se litigant to information a tribunal so that it may competently consider the
request for emergent relief in light of the Crowe standards is itself grounds for
dismissing the request.
A motion for stay or emergent relief shall be accompanied by
a letter memorandum or brief which shall address the
following standards to be met for granting such relief
pursuant to Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982):
[N.J.S.A. 6A:3-1.6(b)]
The petitioner has the burden of establishing all of the above requirements in
order to warrant relief in their favor. D.I. and S.I. on behalf of T.I. v. Monroe Township
Board of Education, 2017 N.J. Agen LEXIS 814, 7 (OAL Docket No. EDS 10816-17,
October 25, 2017). The moving party bears the burden of proving each of the Crowe
elements “clearly and convincingly.” Waste Mgmt. of N.J. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth.,
399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008).
Although here petitioner failed to address the Crowe standards as required in her
initial pleading and arguably should have the motion dismissed that failure alone, I will
instead address the standards as best I can noting that respondent is also unfairly
disadvantaged by the petitioner’s failure to provide information that clearly relates to the
Crowe standards.
1. Did petitioner demonstrate substantial immediate and irreparable harm?
Here the answer is a resounding no. There is a lack of concrete creditable
evidence that could lead the tribunal to do more than speculate any harm will befall D.L.
if his transcripts are not “immediately changed”. Instead , petitioner notes she signed a
“monetary amount” in October 2024, as part of predecessor litigation where she claims
the court found, her son was denied FAPE in 2021-2022. It appears the pursuit of that
award took over two years. She also attaches her partially paid attorney’s fees for

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 16312-24
5
working on the transcript issues for two months and demands reimbursement. F.L.
should be aware money awards are not granted when only injunctive immediate relief is
the appropriate effective remedy. She also seeks that a mediator be appointed. It
would appear that petitioner should know mediators, “experts in special education who
can facilitate a mutually favorable outcome” as she puts it, are not a service realistically
performed or which can be achieved on an emergent relief basis. Obviously, such a
process is not appropriate for preventing immediate harm. Finally, I find the entire issue
of immediate and irreparable harm to be mere speculation at this point.
2. Is Petitioner likely to prevail on the Merits of the Claim?
No. At this stage I must agree with respondent that there is a complete failure to
show that D.L.’s records were inaccurate, irrelevant, impermissibly disclosed, or were
improperly denied access to. See NJAC 6A:32-7.7(a). She simply complains they are
generally unfair to D.L. Since a student’s grades are known to the parent throughout
the school year and years, a transcript cannot become an issue of irreparable harm.
Thus, I certainly cannot find that petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits.
3. Does the petitioner’s request for relief rest on a well-settled right to pursue
the asserted claims?
No. It is almost axiomatic that if diplomas, grades and honors were granted by
parents’ wishes and thus giving parents the right to alter transcripts based on their
desires, those things would hardly be worth anything. No case has been cited that a
school has to rewrite a transcript out of “fairness” or the parents sense of fairness. In
fact, no case law remotely on the subject has been cited. In fact, if such a case existed,
it would be well known by practitioners and tribunals. Thus, the relief is certainly not
based on a well settled right.
4. Does the Balance of Equities Weigh in favor of the Respondent?
No. The harm claimed is not based on strong concrete creditable evidence and
as to it being irreparable. The harm is based on speculation and conjecture.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 16312-24
6
Meanwhile the respondent has an unquestionable interest in maintaining the integrity of
its transcripts. Therefore, the equities weigh completely in the BOE’s favor.
ORDER DENYING EMERGENCY RELIEF
The petitioner has the burden of establishing all of the above requirements in
order to warrant relief in their favor. D.I. and S.I. on behalf of T.I. v. Monroe Township
Board of Education, 2017 N.J. Agen LEXIS 814, 7 (OAL Docket No. EDS 10816-17,
October 25, 2017). The moving party bears the burden of proving each of the Crowe
elements “clearly and convincingly.” Waste Mgmt. of N.J. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth.,
399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div. 2008).
Beginning with the first requirement, it is well-settled that relief should not be
granted except “when necessary to prevent irreparable harm.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132-
33. In this regard, harm is generally considered irreparable if it cannot be adequately
redressed by monetary damages. Id. at 132-33. In other words, it has been described
as “substantial injury to a material degree coupled with the inadequacy of money
damages.” Judice’s Sunshine Pontiac v. General Motors Corp., 418 F.Supp. 1212,
1218 (D.N.J. 1976) (citation omitted).
Under the circumstances, I CONCLUDE that the petitioner has not met the
burden of establishing a right to emergent relief as she failed to prevail on any of the
four “prongs” of Crowe where she is required to prevail on all of them to be entitled to
relief. a clear showing of immediate irreparable injury unless the requested relief is
granted. Therefor, all emergent relief sought is DENIED.
RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION OF APPEAL
Further, I CONCLUDE that it is in the interest of justice to defer a decision on
the motion to dismiss the petition in its entirety until she has been given this advisory
warning to proceed no further without effective representation. Further, F.L.’s
representative should be prepared to address the standing issue and the timeliness of
the petitioner. If no lawful representative enters an appearance within twenty-one days

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 16312-24
7
from the date of this Order, I will sign an Order dismissing the petition with prejudice for
the reasons stated hereinabove. I shall not consider further substantive arguments,
motions or pleadings filed by F.L. on behalf of D.L.
This Order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified or
rejected by the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who/which
by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. The final decision shall be
issued without undue delay but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this
order. If the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not
adopt, modify or reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall
become a final decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10.
December 20, 2024
DATE ERNEST M. BONGIOVANNI, ALJ
Date Received at Agency 12/20/24
Date Mailed to Parties: 12/20/24
am