Diana Kaiser, S.M.V., F.R., and P.L. v. Board of Education of the Township of Monroe, Middlesex County, 7/25/25 (#371-25E)

371-25E
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 11301-25
Agency Dkt. No. 214-6/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Order on Emergent Relief
Diana Kaiser, S.M.V., F.R., and P.L.,
Petitioners,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of Monroe,
Middlesex County,
Respondent.
The record of this emergent matter, the sound recording of the hearing held at the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), and the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) have been
reviewed and considered.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the ALJ that petitioners have failed to demonstrate
entitlement to emergent relief pursuant to the standards enunciated in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126,
132-34 (1982), and codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6.
Accordingly, the recommended Order denying petitioners’ application for emergent relief is
adopted for the reasons stated therein. This matter shall continue at the OAL with such proceedings as
the parties and the ALJ deem necessary to bring it to closure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	July 25, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	July 28, 2025

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ORDER ON
EMERGENT RELIEF
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11301-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 214-6/25
DIANA KAISER,
S.M.V., F.R., AND P.L.,
Petitioners,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOWNSHIP
OF MONROE,
Respondent.
Diana Kaiser, S.M.V., F.R., and P.L., petitioners, pro se
Rita F. Barone, Esq., and Robert M. Tosti,1 Esq., for respondent (Flanagan,
Barone & O’Brien, LLC, attorneys)
BEFORE MARY ANN BOGAN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioners Diana Kaiser, a teacher at the Monroe Township School District,
S.M.V., and the parents of S.M.V., F.R. and P.L. (petitioners), filed a Verified Petition of
Appeal (Petition) and Motion for Emergent Relief with the Commissioner of Education.
1 Conducted oral argument on July 1, 2025.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11301-25
2
The Office of Controversies and Disputes of the Department of Education transmitted
the contested case to the Office of Administrative Law, where it was filed on June 26,
2025.
Petitioner S.M.V., an eighteen-year-old senior at Monroe Township High School
(District), was denied graduation because he received a failing grade in Algebra II after
he did not pass the Dynamics of Algebra II Final Exam.
Diana Kaiser, F.R., and P.L. failed to appear at the emergent hearing. The
District demands that any claims related to them be dismissed.
For the reasons cited below, S.M.V.’s request for emergent relief to graduate
high school shall be denied. Furthermore, claims as to Diana Kaiser, F.R., and P.L.
shall be dismissed.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
Petitioner S.M.V. disputes the District’s decision that disqualified him from
graduating high school. Petitioner claims that he is an English Language Learner and
should have been exempt from the Dynamics of Alegra II Final Exam (math final) or
provided with more accommodations when he took the math final. S.M.V. also claims
that he performed better in the class than the other students in his class, and these
students passed the test and qualified for graduation. S.M.V. maintains that his
attempts to discuss his concerns with the District administration were unsuccessful.
Furthermore, the District’s action to disqualify him from graduation has disrupted his
plan to enter the United States Marine Corps.
The District states, by way of certifications of Dr. Kelly Roselle, the supervisor of
Language Arts, World Language, ESL/Bilingual, and Media Literacy, and Dr. Kevin
Higgins, the principal of Monroe Township High School, that even though S.M.V. was
provided with the appropriate accommodations for testing, the student did not pass the
examination. S.M.V. was given the opportunity to retake the examination on the date of

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3
graduation and did not earn a passing grade. S.M.V. was then advised that he could
make up the lost credits by taking an online course.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9, the Commissioner’s jurisdiction is defined and is limited
to “controversies and disputes arising under the school laws.” In Dunellen Board of
Education v. Dunellen Education Association, 64 N.J. 17, 23 (1973), the New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded that “the Legislature enacted provisions entrusting school
supervision and management to local school boards . . . subject to the supervisory
control [of] . . . the State Commissioner of Education.”
The regulations governing such disputes before the Commissioner of Education
provide that “[w]here the subject matter of the controversy is a particular course of
action by a district board of education or any other party subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner, the petitioner may include with the petition of appeal, a separate motion
for emergent relief or a stay of that action pending the Commissioner’s final decision in
the contested case.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(a). The regulations further provide that the
Commissioner may “[t]ransmit the motion to the OAL for immediate hearing on the
motion.” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(c)(3).
As set forth in N.J.A.C. 1:6A-12.1(e), N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b), and N.J.A.C. 6A:14-
2.7(s), an application for emergent relief will be granted only if it meets the following four
requirements:
1. The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the requested
relief is not granted;
2. The legal right underlying the petitioner’s claim is settled;
3. The petitioner has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits
of the underlying claim; and
4. When the equities and interests of the parties are
balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11301-25
4
respondent will suffer if the requested relief is not
granted.
The moving party must demonstrate each element “clearly and convincingly.”
Waste Mgmt. of N.J. v. Union Cnty. Utils. Auth., 399 N.J. Super. 508, 520 (App. Div.
2008). Emergent relief is designed “to ‘prevent some threatening, irreparable mischief,
which should be averted until opportunity is afforded for a full and deliberate
investigation of the case.’” Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132 (citation omitted) (1982);
see also N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.6(b) (citing Crowe, 90 N.J. 126, which echoes the regulatory
standard for this extraordinary relief). It is well established that a moving party has the
burden of proving each of the four elements of emergent relief.
Turning to the first criterion, it is well settled that relief should not be granted
except “when necessary to prevent irreparable harm.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132. In this
regard, harm is generally considered irreparable if it cannot be adequately redressed by
monetary damages. Id. at 132‒33. Moreover, the harm must be substantial and
immediate. Judice’s Sunshine Pontiac, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1212,
1218 (D.N.J. 1976) (citation omitted). More than the risk of irreparable harm must be
demonstrated. Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir.
1980). The requisite for injunctive relief is a “clear showing of immediate irreparable
injury” or a “‘presently existing actual threat; (an injunction) may not be used simply to
eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury, or a future invasion of rights, be those
rights protected by statute or by the common law.’” Ibid. (citation omitted).
This action was filed after the date for graduation had passed. The respondent
correctly argues that there is no immediate or irreparable harm since S.M.V. may
graduate in the near future if he completes an online course that permits him to proceed
at his own pace and recover the credits he needs to graduate.
For the foregoing reasons, I CONCLUDE that petitioner S.M.V. has not
demonstrated that he will suffer irreparable harm if the requested emergent relief is not
granted.

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5
Although all four standards for emergent relief must be met, the three remaining
prongs of the standards for emergent relief will be addressed.
The second requirement is that emergent relief “should be withheld when the
legal right underlying plaintiff’s claim is unsettled.” Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133 (Citizens
Coach Co. v. Camden Horse R.R. Co., 29 N.J. Eq. 299, 304‒05 (E. & A. 1878)).
Petitioner S.M.V. asserts that he should have graduated.
As to the requirement that the right underlying the claim of a requesting party
must be settled, it is clear that each school district is obligated to provide a thorough
and efficient system of education to all children residing in its school district. N.J. Const.
art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1; N.J.S.A. 18A:33-1. To carry out this policy, local boards of education
have been granted discretionary authority at N.J.S.A. 18A:11-1(c) and (d) to adopt rules
for the management of the public schools of the district, and to perform all acts and do
all things necessary for the lawful and proper conduct of the public schools of the
district.
In general, a board of education’s actions are entitled to a presumption of
lawfulness and good faith. Where board actions are challenged, the challenger bears
the burden of proving that such actions were unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable. Schuster v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Twp., 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU)
670, 676 (citing Schinck v. Westwood Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div.
1960), and Quinlan v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Bergen Twp., 73 N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div.
1962)). The “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” standard of review imposes a
heavy burden on challengers of board actions. This standard has been defined by the
New Jersey courts as having no rational basis. Piccoli v. Bd. of Educ. of Ramapo
Indian Hills Reg’l Sch. Dist., EDU 01839-98, Initial Decision (January 22, 1999) (citing
Bayshore Sewage Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199–200 (Ch. Div.
1973), aff’d, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974)), adopted, Comm’r (March 10, 1999),
https://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/.
In the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion, the Commissioner of
Education will not substitute his or her own judgment for that of the board of education.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11301-25
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Massaro v. Bd. of Educ. of Bergenfield, 1965 S.L.D. 84, 85. In Kopera v. Board of
Education, 60 N.J. Super. 288, 294 (App Div. 1960), the Appellate Division noted “the
well-established rule that action of the local board [of education] which lies within the
area of its discretionary powers may not be upset unless patently arbitrary, without
rational basis or induced by improper motives.”
Here, there is no settled legal right to have the Commissioner decide that S.M.V.
should have graduated.
Based upon the foregoing, I CONCLUDE there is a rational basis for the District’s
action and that the right underlying petitioner S.M.V.’s claim is settled against the
petitioner’s position.
Under the third emergent-relief prong, “a plaintiff must make a preliminary
showing of a reasonable probability of ultimate success on the merits.” Crowe, 90 N.J.
at 133 (citing Ideal Laundry Co. v. Gugliemone, 107 N.J. Eq. 108, 115–16 (E. & A.
1930)). Here, the likelihood of S.M.V.’s success on the merits is unclear.
As previously stated, “action of the local board [of education] which lies within the
area of its discretionary powers may not be upset unless patently arbitrary, without
rational basis or induced by improper motives.” See, Kopera 288, 294.
Here it has not been demonstrated that the actions of the school district to
disqualify S.M.V. from graduation were arbitrary, or without a rational basis. I
CONCLUDE that petitioner S.M.V. has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits. Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that the District’s decision not to graduate S.M.V.
was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
The final requirement relates to the equities and interests of the parties. Crowe,
90 N.J. at 134. Petitioner S.M.V. has not demonstrated that when the equities and
interests are balanced, S.M.V. will suffer greater harm than the respondent if the relief is
not granted. N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.6(b)(4).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11301-25
7
Petitioner S.M.V. may make up his lost credit by participating and completing a
self-paced online course and qualifying for graduation.
I CONCLUDE that S.M.V. has failed to show that when the equities and interests
of the parties are balanced, S.M.V. will suffer greater harm than the respondent will
suffer if the requested relief is not granted. While S.M.V.’s post-graduation plan to enlist
in the Marines is delayed, the school district has an obligation to ensure that all students
are qualified to graduate.
Therefore, I CONCLUDE that petitioner S.M.V.’s request for emergent relief must
be denied.2
I further CONCLUDE that any and all claims filed by Diana Kaiser, F.R., and P.L.
shall be dismissed with prejudice.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, I hereby ORDER that petitioner S.M.V.’s request
for emergent relief is DENIED.
I also ORDER that any and all claims filed by Diana Kaiser, F.R., and P.L. are
DISMISSED.
This order on application for emergency relief shall remain in effect until the
Commissioner makes a decision as to whether or not he will return the case for a
decision on the merits in this matter.
This order on application for emergency relief may be adopted, modified, or
rejected by the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by
law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. The final decision shall be
issued without undue delay, but no later than forty-five days following the entry of this
2 This order does not preclude a plenary hearing on the merits of the petition as to S.M.V.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 11301-25
8
order. If the COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION does not
adopt, modify, or reject this order within forty-five days, this recommended order shall
become a final decision on the issue of emergent relief in accordance with N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10.
July 2, 2025
DATE MARY ANN BOGAN, ALJ
MAB/nn
c: Clerk OAL-T