Christine Wells v. Board of Education of the Mercer County Special Services School District, Mercer County, 6/2/26 (#192-26)

192-26
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 10184-25
Agency Dkt. No. 173-6/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Christine Wells,
Petitioner,
v.
Board 	of 	Education 	of the Mercer 	County
Special Services School District, Mercer County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
have been reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that this
matter is ripe for summary decision pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). The Commissioner agrees
with the ALJ that the Assistant Transportation Coordinator (ATC) position previously held by
petitioner is not a secretarial or clerical position and was therefore not eligible for tenure under
N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. 	The Commissioner also agrees with the ALJ that, consequently, no tenure
violation occurred when respondent did not renew petitioner’s employment contract for the
2025-2026 school year. 	Additionally, the Commissioner agrees with the ALJ that petitioner
relinquished her secretarial tenure rights in 2019 when she voluntarily accepted a promotion
from a tenured clerical position to the non-tenurable ATC position; thus, she cannot now assert
tenure or seniority rights to a clerical position in the district.

2
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter,
respondent’s motion for summary decision is granted, and the petition of appeal is hereby
dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	June 2, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	June 3, 2026
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION ON
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 173-6/25
CHRISTINE WELLS,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
MERCER COUNTY SPECIAL SERVICES
SCHOOL DISTRICT, MERCER COUNTY,
Respondent.
Christine Wells, appearing pro se
Geoffrey N. Stark, Esq., appearing for respondent (Capehart & Scatchard, P.A.,
attorneys)
Record closed: November 21, 2025 	Decided: March 23, 2026
BEFORE KIM C. BELIN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Mercer County Special Services School District (MCSSSD or respondent)
determined not to renew Christina Wells’s (petitioner or Wells) contract for the 2025−26

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
2
school year as an assistant transportation coordinator (ATC), and Wells appealed this
decision. The inquiry is whether there are material issues of fact in dispute to warrant a
hearing. 	No, there are no material issues of fact in dispute, and summary decision is
appropriate.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 2, 2025, petitioner received notice that she was being placed on
administrative leave because her employment contract was not going to be renewed. On
May 28, 2025, Wells filed a petition of appeal in the form of emergent relief challenging
respondent’s 	decision 	to 	non-renew 	her 	contract. 	The 	Director 	of 	the 	Office 	of
Controversies and Disputes within the Department of Education transmitted the petition
and motion for emergent relief to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was
filed on June 10, 2025. 	N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13; N.J.A.C.
1:1-8.2. 	Oral argument was held on June 16, 2025. 	In an Order dated June 17, 2025,
the undersigned denied the motion for emergent relief. Respondent filed its answer and
affirmative defenses on June 26, 2025.
On October 15, 2025, respondent filed a motion for summary decision. Petitioner
filed her response and cross-motion on November 7, 2025, and respondent filed its reply
brief on November 21, 2025.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following FACTS are undisputed, and I therefore FIND:
Wells was hired on October 16, 2013, as a building and grounds secretary and as
such was a member of the Mercer County Special Services Support Staff Association
(MCSSSSA). She remained in this position until June 1, 2019, when she was promoted
to the ATC, which was a twelve-month, non-affiliated position. She was employed under
annual employment contracts from July through June, and the contract for the 2024-25
school year expired on June 30, 2025. 	(Exhibit A, Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Decision (MSD).) She reported directly to the Transportation Coordinator.

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3
Wells was presented with a letter dated April 15, 2025, notifying her that her
employment contract would not be renewed for the 2025−26 school year.1 	(Exhibit B,
Resp’t’s 	MSD.) 	Her 	position 	was 	eliminated 	due 	to 	budgetary 	constraints.
(Superintendent’s Cert.) 	On May 2, 2025, she was notified that she was placed on
administrative leave immediately and not permitted to return to the school. (Petitioner’s
Appeal2)
Respondent issued a letter dated May 7, 2025, informing Wells that respondent
approved her paid administrative leave effective May 2, 2025, through June 30, 2025.
(Ibid.)
On May 28, 2025, Wells filed for emergent relief. (Exhibit E, Resp’t’s MSD.) The
motion for emergent relief was denied on June 17, 2025. 	Respondent’s answer with
affirmative defenses was filed on June 26, 2025. (Exhibit F, Resp’t’s MSD.) The motion
was denied on June 17, 2025.
The major responsibilities of the ATC were to: 	1) assist with the setup and
coordination of bus routes for the regular and extended school years; 2) maintain pupil
records in the transportation system, including additions, deletions, and route changes;
3) disseminate bus passes and transportation data to all students prior to the start of the
school year; 4) purchase and coordinate pupil safety equipment with transportation
contractors; 5) prepare monthly billing statements and invoices for contractors; 6) assist
the transportation coordinator with parents, principals and contractors regarding route
issues, complaints, and other issues that may arise; 7) create purchase orders in the
accounting 	system 	for 	department 	supplies 	and 	other 	needs; 	8) 	assume 	all
responsibilities in the absence of the transportation coordinator; and 9) perform other
tasks as assigned by the transportation coordinator or Mercer County Special Services
District Administrators. (Exhibit C, Resp’t’s MSD.) 	Additional qualifications, such as
“knowledge of computer applications and excellent clerical skills,” were essential in the
transportation department. (Ibid.)
1 The letter is dated April 14, 2025, and is unsigned.
2 Petitioner’s original appeal packet does not contain exhibit labels or page numbers.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
4
The collective bargaining agreement between the MCSSSD and the MCSSSSA,
effective July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2025, covers all “full-time salaried, part-time
salaried, full-time hourly and part-time hourly cleaning, clerical, custodial, grounds person,
[and] transportation employees of the school district” but excludes the transportation
coordinators. (Exhibit D, Resp’t’s MSD.)
ARGUMENTS ON THE MOTIONS
Respondent contends that it is entitled to summary decision because Wells was
not a tenured employee at the time her employment was non-renewed. 	Wells had
acquired tenure as a secretary; however, she relinquished that status when she accepted
the role as ATC. Further, Wells had no bumping rights to return to a secretarial position
when the ATC position was eliminated because she relinquished her tenure rights. 	In
addition, 	N.J.S.A. 	18A:17-2, 	which 	grants 	tenure 	to 	secretaries, 	school 	business
administrators or business managers, does not apply to petitioner’s ATC position. Finally,
petitioner’s duties as an ATC exceeded the duties of a clerical employee, and the
collective bargaining agreement between respondent and the MCSSSSA specifically
excluded transportation coordinators. (Resp’t’s Letter Brief at 6-9.)
Conversely, Wells contends that she held tenure under N.J.A.C. 18A:17-2, and
therefore, she was entitled to be renewed as an ATC or, alternatively, returned to a
secretarial position in the District because of her seniority entitlement. 	In addition,
respondent violated her seniority rights by retaining a non-tenured employee. Finally, she
never relinquished her tenure as a secretary when she was promoted to the ATC position.
LEGAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A motion for summary decision may be granted if the papers and discovery
presented, as well as any affidavits that may have been filed with the application, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to prevail
as a matter of law. 	N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). 	If the motion is sufficiently supported, the
non-moving party must demonstrate by affidavit that there is a genuine issue of fact which
can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding in order to prevail in such an

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
5
application. 	Ibid. 	These provisions mirror the summary judgment language of R.
4:46-2(c) of the New Jersey Court Rules.
The 	motion 	judge 	must 	“consider 	whether 	competent 	evidential 	materials
presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party . . . are
sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of
the non-moving party.” Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).
And even if the non-moving party comes forward with some evidence, this forum must
grant summary decision if the evidence is “so one-sided that [the moving party] must
prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 536.
The issues presented here are whether petitioner was eligible for tenure as an
ATC, whether she relinquished those tenure and seniority rights when she moved into the
ATC position, and whether she was entitled to bumping rights to a secretarial position
when her position as ATC was eliminated.
Tenure Eligibility
It is well established that tenure rights are statutory and not contractual. DiNapoli
v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. of Verona, 434 N.J. Super. 233, 237 (2014), citing Zimmerman v.
Newark Bd. of Educ., 38 N.J. 65, 72 (1962). The statute at issue in this case is N.J.S.A.
18A:17-2, which provides that:
a. 	Any secretary, assistant secretary, school business
administrator 	or 	business 	manager 	of 	a 	board 	of
education of any school district who has or shall have
devoted his full time to the duties of his office and has
or shall have served therein for three consecutive
calendar years, and
b. 	Any person holding any secretarial or clerical position
or employment under a board of education of any
school district or under any officer thereof, after
1. 	The expiration of a period of employment of
three consecutive calendar years in the district
or such shorter period as may be fixed by the
board or officer employing him, or

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
6
2. 	Employment for three consecutive academic
years, 	together 	with 	employment 	at 	the
beginning 	of 	the next 	succeeding 	academic
year, 	an 	academic 	year 	being 	the 	period
between the time when school opens in the
district after the general summer vacation and
the beginning of the next succeeding summer
vacation, and
c. 	Any person, 	who has 	acquired, or shall hereafter
acquire, tenure in any secretarial or clerical office,
position or employment under the board of education
of a school district and has been appointed district clerk
or secretary, or shall hereafter be appointed secretary
of said district, as such secretary, shall hold his office,
position or 	employment 	under tenure during 	good
behavior and efficiency and shall not be dismissed or
suspended or reduced in compensation, except for
neglect, misbehavior or other offense and only in the
manner prescribed by subarticle B of article 2 of
chapter 6 of this title.
It is uncontested that under this statute, Wells acquired tenure as a building and grounds
secretary, having served from October 16, 2013, until June 1, 2019, when she accepted
the ATC position. This statute, however, does not provide for tenure for the ATC position,
because it is expressly limited to secretaries, assistant secretaries, school business
administrators and business managers.
The Commissioner of Education (Commissioner) and the courts have explored the
definition of a “clerk” and determined that a position is clerical in nature “when the
employee is ‘employed to keep records or accounts or to perform general office work’ . .
. .The plain meaning of a ‘clerical position’ is thus one in which the employee performs
the rote record-keeping duties that are typical of office operations, such as answering
telephone calls, typing, photocopying, and filing.” Robert L. Effenberger v. Bd. of Ed. of
Toms River Reg’l Sch. Dist., 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (EDU) 690; 1995 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1280,
(App. Div. 1994) at *10, quoting Lammers v. Bd. of Ed. of Boro of Point Pleasant, 134
N.J. 264, 248 (1993); I/M/O Dempster, Bd. of Ed. of City of Trenton, 96 N.J.A.R. 2d (EDU)
120, 1995 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 550 (Aug. 25, 1995).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
7
A review of the Effenberger case is instructive. 	Robert Effenberger was a
fifteen-year employee with Toms River School District (Toms River) who held various
positions, including purchasing technical assistant, maintenance technical assistant, and
assistant transportation supervisor for special education transportation. His position was
eliminated, and he asserted tenure rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. 	As the Assistant
Transportation 	Supervisor, 	Effenberger 	was 	responsible 	for 	answering 	telephones,
inputting computer data and assisting the transportation supervisor and director in
conducting bus safety drills. 1995 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1280, *2. His duties later expanded
to handling all aspects of in-district and out-of-district transportation contracts and jointure
agreements for special needs students, and he acted in the absence of the transportation
director. 	1994 N.J.A.R. 2d (EDU) 1383, *9−10. 	Effenberger asserted that Toms River
violated his tenure rights by eliminating positions and failing and refusing to transfer him
to an appropriate position. 	The Commissioner ruled that the actual duties performed,
rather than a title, were the controlling factor when determining whether Effenberger
acquired tenure. Id. at *16. In addition, the Commissioner stated that most jobs, including
his own, contained some functions that could be classified as clerical, and thus,
“[p]erforming nominal clerical duties d[id] not make one a clerical employee within the
meaning of the statute.” 	Id. at *19. 	Accordingly, the Commissioner ruled, and the
Appellate Division affirmed, that Effenberger was not a clerical employee when he worked
in the transportation department because he had “great discretion and independence” to
act in the absence of his supervisor. Ibid.
Here, the ATC was a full-time, salaried position that Wells maintains was clerical
in nature because some of the duties were the same as a general secretary, such as
managing student records in the transportation system, assisting and coordinating bus
routes, assisting the Transportation Coordinator, and managing complaints or other
issues that might arise. In addition, the job required “excellent clerical skills.” (Exhibit C.,
Resp’t’s 	MSD.) 	Specifically, 	the 	job 	description 	listed 	the 	following 	as 	major
responsibilities:
1. 	Assist with the setup and coordination of bus routes for
the regular and extended school years.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
8
2. 	Maintain 	pupil 	records 	in 	transportation 	system 	–
including additions, deletions, and route changes.
3. 	Disseminate bus passes and transportation data to all
students prior to the start of the school year.
4. 	Purchase and coordinate pupil safety equipment with
transportation contractors.
5. 	Prepare monthly billing statements and invoices for
contractors.
6. 	Assists the Transportation Coordinator with districts,
parents, principals and contractors regarding route
issues, complaints, and other issues that may arise.
7. 	Create purchase orders in the accounting system for
department supplies and other needs.
8. 	In the absence of the Transportation Coordinator, the
Assistant 	to 	the 	Transportation 	Coordinator 	will
assume all responsibilities.
9. 	Perform other tasks as assigned by the Transportation
Coordinator or Mercer County Special Services District
Administrators.
(Ibid.)
Wells contends that these duties were performed by other secretaries and clerical
staff throughout the district. 	However, she provided no proof to support this allegation,
such 	as 	the 	job 	descriptions 	of 	other 	secretaries 	or 	clerks 	showing 	the 	same
responsibilities. Assuming arguendo that other secretaries or clerks performed some of
the ATC duties, the most distinguishing duty of the ATC is that the ATC assumed all
responsibilities in the absence of the Transportation Coordinator. This differentiates the
ATC from a general secretary because there was no evidence presented showing that
general secretaries assume the responsibilities in their supervisor’s absence. Wells had
great discretion and independence to act in the absence of her supervisor, as did the
petitioner in Effenberger. 	Accordingly, following the logic of the Effenberger decisions,
Wells is not a clerical employee and is not entitled to tenure protections simply because
the ATC position included some nominal clerical tasks.

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9
Wells also relies upon the decision in Bernard Sharkey v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. of
Washington, Dkt. No. EDU 09335-07 (Nov. 21, 2008), aff’d w/ mod., Comm’r Docket No.
207-78/07 (Dec. 29, 2008), which ruled that Sharkey, who was employed as a financial
officer/account-payable employee, had earned tenure under N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2(b). 	I
concur with the analysis and conclusion of the MCDSSS that this case is inapplicable to
the current controversy, and thus, no further discussion is warranted.
Finally, 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	between 	respondent 	and 	the
MCSSSSA does not specifically list the ATC but specifically excludes the “transportation
coordinators” from being part of the bargaining unit and is not relevant to the issue of
whether Wells acquired tenure because tenure rights cannot be waived by collective
bargaining. 	I/M/O Joan Dempster, 96 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU); 1995 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 550
(Nov. 6, 1995.) (Motion for Summary Decision granted on the basis that the duties of an
information systems control specialist were not primarily clerical in nature.) Accordingly,
I CONCLUDE that the ATC is not a clerical position and is not tenure eligible under
N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2.
Relinquishment
The next inquiry is whether Wells relinquished her tenure rights when she accepted
the ATC position. Wells relies upon Barnes v. Bd. of Ed. of City of Jersey City, 85 N.J.
Super. 42 (App. Div. 1964), certif. denied, 43 N.J. 450 (1964) to support her contention
that she maintained her tenure rights when she accepted the ATC position. 	In Barnes,
the Appellate Division considered whether clerical, secretarial, janitorial and custodial
employees were tenured and should be reinstated after being dismissed for economic
reasons. Jersey City argued that “secretary” and “clerk” were synonymous terms and a
clerk was restricted to “one who under direction, performs routine, repetitive, non-complex
clerical work of a varied nature as a beginner at the entrance level of employment.” 	Id.
at *44-45.
The Appellate Division examined the intended definition of “clerical position” under
the predecessor statute, N.J.S.A. 18:6-27, which was similar to the current N.J.S.A.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
10
18A:17-2, granting tenure to individuals holding clerical or secretarial positions. 	The
Appellate Division rejected Jersey City’s narrow definition and ruled that six employees
performing clerical duties were entitled to tenure, and the legislative history revealed that
a “clerical position was intended to extend the statutory protection coverage beyond
secretarial employment,” and the “tenure statutes were intended to secure public service
by protecting public employees in their employment, ‘the widest range should be given to
the applicability of the law.’” Barnes, at 45; (quoting Sullivan v. McOsker, 84 N.J.L. 380,
385 (E.A. 1913)).
However, I am not persuaded that the wide range discussed in Barnes extends to
the present controversy in which Wells performs managerial duties in the absence of the
transportation 	coordinator. 	The 	petitioners 	in 	Barnes 	were 	an 	inspector 	in 	the
maintenance department, a storekeeper, stock clerks, an assistant storekeeper, and a
supervisor of maintenance. 	The question was whether these positions were clerical in
nature. 	The Commissioner ruled that the supervisors were not subject to tenure under
the clerk statute (now N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2), and the board of education acted within its legal
discretion to abolish the positions and terminate the other employees. However, the State
Board reversed, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that all the positions involved
recordkeeping, which was clerical in nature.
Wells also had recordkeeping duties; however, in stark contrast, her duties were
more expansive. Moreover, the Commissioner ruled, and the Appellate Division affirmed
that 	performing 	nominal 	clerical 	duties 	does 	not 	make 	one 	a 	clerical 	employee.
Effenberger, 194 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 1383 at *18.
Wells also cites DiNapoli v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. of Verona, 434 N.J. Super 233
(2014), in which the Commissioner upheld the ALJ’s finding that the petitioner retained
her secretarial tenure rights when she accepted a position as the assistant school
business administrator and should have been returned to a clerical position held by a
non-tenured employee when her position was eliminated. 	However, this decision was
later reversed by the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division analyzed the statute and
determined that the “plain language of the statute . . . limits the retention of tenure to the
time during which the employee holds her secretarial office, position or employment.” Id.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
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at *239. 	The Appellate Division ruled: 	“[o]nce DiNapoli voluntarily transferred to the
assistant school business administrator position, she no longer held her ‘office, position
or 	employment’ 	as 	a 	secretary, 	and 	absent 	expressed 	statutory 	authority, 	she
relinquished her right to ‘bump back’ into a secretarial position.” 	Id. at *240. 	Thus, the
prevailing law is that secretaries/clerks do not retain tenure status after transferring to a
certificated position.
The present matter, however, concerns whether a tenured secretary retains tenure
rights after transferring to a non-clerical, non-tenure-eligible position. 	The case that
addresses this issue is Amelia Colon-Serrano v. Bd. of Ed. of the City of Plainfield, 2008
N.J. AGEN LEXIS 252, in which the petitioner earned tenure as an attendance aide, which
was a clerical position, and transferred to a classroom aide position that was neither
clerical nor tenure eligible. The district failed to renew her contract at the end of the school
year, and petitioner claimed tenure rights to a clerical position held by a non-tenured or
less senior clerical employee. The Commissioner determined that petitioner had acquired
tenure as an attendance aide; however, petitioner relinquished her tenure rights when
she accepted a separate, non-tenurable position of classroom aide, and therefore she
was not entitled to “bump back” into a clerical position. 	Ibid. 	The Commissioner
concluded, “in the absence of express legislative provision for retention of accrued tenure
rights upon transfer to a position which is not tenure eligible, the petitioner must be
deemed to have relinquished the protections associated with her clerical tenure upon
acceptance of the nonprotected position of classroom aide.” Id. at *2−3. A similar result
is warranted here.
It is uncontested that Wells acquired tenure as a secretary and maintained that
tenure while she was in the position. However, she relinquished those protections when
she voluntarily accepted the ATC position, a separate, non-clerical, non-tenurable
position. 	Wells confuses the tenure protections contained in N.J.S.A. 18A:28-6, which
extends tenure protections upon promotion or transfer to teaching staff members who are
defined as professional staff members holding employment, office or position that
requires a valid and effective standard, provisional or emergency certificate appropriate
for the position. 	N.J.S.A. 18A:1-1. 	Wells is not a teaching staff member, and “N.J.S.A.
18A:17-2 does 	not 	contain 	a similar 	tenure 	retention provision regarding 	tenured

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
12
secretarial employment, thus reflecting the Legislature’s decision not to afford such
rights.” DiNapoli, 434 N.J. Super. at *240−241.
Finally, Wells contends that she has seniority rights under N.J.S.A. 18A:28-13 and
thus is entitled to bump back into a clerical position. N.J.S.A. 18A:28-13 authorizes the
Commissioner 	to 	establish 	seniority 	standards 	in 	“the 	fields 	or 	categories 	of
administrative, 	supervisory, 	teaching 	or 	other 	educational 	services 	and 	fields 	and
categories of school nursing which are performed in school districts in this state.” 	Ibid.
The ATC position does not fall within these parameters, and thus, I CONCLUDE Wells’s
reliance upon this statute is misplaced.
“Seniority provides a mechanism for ranking all tenured teaching staff members so
that reductions among the tenured force can be effected in an equitable fashion and in
accord with sound education policies. 	Capodilupo v. W. Orange Bd. of Ed., 218 N.J.
Super. 510, 514 (App. Div. 1987), certif. den., 109 N.J. 514 (1987). 	Seniority does not
create comparable rights for non-tenured employees. 	Bednar v. Westwood Bd. of Ed.,
221 N.J. Super. 239 (App. Div. 1987). Moreover, it is well established that seniority rights
do not accrue to clerical employees. 	Sheridan v. Bd. of Ed. of Ridgefield Park, 1976
S.L.D. 995 (Dec. 17, 1976). Thus, I CONCLUDE that Wells cannot assert a seniority right
to a clerical position.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I CONCLUDE that respondent has established that
Wells was not a tenured employee at the time her employment was non-renewed, and
she did not retain tenure as a secretary when she transferred to the ATC position. There
are no genuine material facts in dispute that require an evidentiary hearing.
ORDER
I ORDER that the Mercer County Special Services School District’s motion for
summary decision is GRANTED, and petitioner’s cross motion for summary decision is
DENIED.

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I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE 	DEPARTMENT 	OF 	EDUCATION. 	Exceptions 	may 	be 	filed 	by 	email 	to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
March 23, 2026
DATE 	KIM C. BELIN, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	March 23, 2026
Date Mailed to Parties: 	March 23, 2026
KCB/gd

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 10184-25
14
APPENDIX
Exhibits
For petitioner:
Letter brief with exhibits in support of petitioner’s application for emergent relief
For respondent:
Letter brief, dated June 13, 2025, with exhibits in opposition to petitioner’s
application for emergent relief