In the Matter of Sheila Brogan, Ridgewood Board of Education, Bergen County, 4/14/2022, (#79-22SEC)

79-22SECNjcommned

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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SEC Dkt No. C71-20
OAL Dkt. No. EEC 04006-21
Agency Dkt. No. 66-2/22
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
In the Matter of Sheila Brogan, Ridgewood
Board of Education, Bergen County.
The Commissioner has reviewed the record of this matter and the February 25, 2022
decision of the School Ethics Commission (Commission). The Commission found that
respondent, a member of the Ridgewood Board of Education, violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) in
connection with her attendance in an executive session discussing litigation in which she had a
personal involvement. The Commission recommended a penalty of censure for the violation.
The Commission’s decision was forwarded to the Commissioner for final determination on the
recommended penalty pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29(c). Respondent has neither filed
exceptions to the recommended penalty nor instituted an appeal, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:4-1 et
seq., of the Commission’s underlying finding of violation.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the penalty recommended by the
Commission for respondent’s actions.
79-22SEC
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Accordingly, respondent is hereby censured as a school official found to have violated
the School Ethics Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1.
Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.
April 14, 2022
April 14, 2022
Before the School Ethics Commission
OAL Docket No.: EEC-04006-21
SEC Docket No.: C71-20
Final Decision
I/M/O Sheila Brogan,
Ridgewood Board of Education, Bergen County
I. 	Procedural History
The above-captioned matter arises from a Complaint that was filed on October 30, 2020,
by Laurie Weber (Complainant), alleging that Sheila Brogan (Respondent), a member of the
Ridgewood Board of Education (Board), violated the School Ethics Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
21 et seq. More specifically, the Complaint alleged that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24(c) in Count 1, N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b) in Count 2, and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(b), N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24.1(e), and N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) in Count 3.1
At its meeting on February 23, 2021, and after considering Respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss in Lieu of Answer (Motion to Dismiss) and Complainant’s response thereto, the School
Ethics Commission (Commission) adopted a decision granting the Motion to Dismiss as to the
allegations in Count 2 and Count 3, denying the Motion to Dismiss as to the allegations in Count
1, and directing Respondent to file an Answer to Complaint (Answer) to Count 1. On March 2,
2021, Respondent filed an Answer as directed.
Following receipt and review of Respondent’s Answer, the Commission adopted a
decision at its meeting on April 27, 2021, finding probable cause for the alleged violation of
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) in Count 1. Based on its finding of probable cause, the Commission
transmitted the within matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for a plenary hearing
and, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:28-10.7(b), the attorney for the Commission (Petitioner) was
charged with prosecuting the allegations in the Complaint for which the Commission found
probable cause to credit.
At the OAL, the contested matter was assigned to the Honorable Kimberly A. Moss,
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ Moss). Initial Decision at 1. ALJ Moss conducted a hearing on
September 23, 2021, and the parties filed closing briefs on December 6, 2021; immediately
thereafter, the record was closed. Id.
On December 14, 2021, ALJ Moss issued an Initial Decision detailing her findings of
fact and legal conclusions, and the Commission acknowledged receipt of same; therefore, the
forty-five (45) day statutory period for the Commission to issue a Final Decision was January 28,
2022. Prior to January 28, 2022, the Commission requested a forty-five (45) day extension of
1 The Complaint initially cited a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(g) in Count 3, but was later amended to
accurately reflect what was intended, namely a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g).
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time to issue its final decision. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) and N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.8, and for
good cause shown, the Commission was granted an extension until March 14, 2022.
On January 14, 2022, Petitioner filed Exceptions to the Initial Decision, and Respondent
filed her reply to Complainant’s Exceptions on January 18, 2022.
At a special meeting on February 4, 2022, the Commission considered the full record in
this matter. Subsequently, and at a special meeting on February 25, 2022, and for the reasons
more fully detailed below, the Commission voted to adopt ALJ Moss’s findings of fact, but to
reject the legal conclusion that Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c). Based on its
finding of a violation, the Commission also voted to recommend a penalty of censure.
II. 	Remaining Allegations in the Complaint
In Count 1, Complainant states that, on May 7, 2020, the Board “met for the sole purpose
of going into closed executive session with no public business on the meeting agenda.” The
topics to be discussed during executive session included “a legal matter and an [harassment,
intimidation and bullying (HIB)] appeal.” This special meeting took place “just three days after”
the Board’s regularly scheduled public meeting. Although the validity of calling the May 7,
2020, meeting was questioned in other matters filed with the Commission, Complainant takes
exception to Respondent’s involvement in the executive session discussion of “the legal matter.”
More specifically, the “legal matter” involved an “[Open Public Records Act (OPRA)] violation
case” filed on behalf of Saurabh Dani (Mr. Dani), and relating to Respondent’s and James
Morgan’s (Board Vice President) (Mr. Morgan) use of their personal email accounts to conduct
Board business. As named parties in “the legal matter,” Complainant argues that Respondent and
Mr. Morgan “would have been required to recuse themselves from all discussions,” yet the
minutes and meeting video demonstrate that neither recused themself from executive session. As
such, Complainant argues that, “by failing to recuse herself from the executive session
discussion of a legal matter to which she was a named party,” Respondent “acted in her official
capacity in a matter where she had a personal involvement and [a] clear interest in the outcome”
in violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c).
III. 	Initial Decision
After summarizing the testimony offered by Mr. Dani and Respondent at the hearing,
ALJ Moss issued findings of fact. Initial Decision. at 2-3. More specifically, ALJ Moss found
that Mr. Dani filed an OPRA lawsuit in Superior Court against the Board prior to the May 7,
2020, Board meeting. Id. at 4. 	Respondent was not a named party in Mr. Dani’s lawsuit. Id.
Respondent was required to provide a screenshot from her iPad and cell phone and a certification
regarding the lawsuit, which she provided in March 2020. Id. Mr. Dani filed a “motion to enforce
litigants,” and a hearing scheduled for May 8, 2020, was adjourned until May 14, 2020. Id. Mr.
Dani’s motion would require, among other things, Respondent to provide additional screenshots
from her iPad and cell phone. Id.
Mr. Dani was present at the May 7, 2020, Board meeting but, at that time, was not a
Board member. Id. During the public session, Mr. Morgan (Board Vice President) stated that the
“settlement of an OPRA lawsuit by a candidate ([Mr.] Dani) for the Board would be discussed,”
and Respondent “stated the matter should be discussed in executive session.” Id.
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During executive session, the Board “received an update” regarding the OPRA litigation
filed by Mr. Dani. Id. According to ALJ Moss, the Board was advised there was a pending court
date of May 14, 2020, and that, “based on what determination was made at the Superior Court
hearing[,] if [Mr.] Dani was the prevailing party in the lawsuit, the Board would have to pay
attorney fees.” Id. Respondent was present for the executive session discussion. Id. Despite what
Mr. Morgan stated publicly, i.e., “that settlement of [Mr.] Dani[’s] lawsuit would be discussed,”
“there was no discussion of the settlement of [Mr.] Dani[’s] lawsuit at the May 7, 2020, Board
meeting.” Id. In addition, Respondent “did not discuss or vote on [Mr.] Dani[’s] lawsuit at the
May 7, 2020, Board meeting.” Id.
ALJ Moss additionally found that, “[w]hen there are settlement negotiations[,] the Board
is made aware of them.” Id. Further, the Board officers “may have more information regarding
items than” the other Board members. Id. Respondent was not aware of the nature of the
settlement negotiations in the lawsuit filed by Mr. Dani. Id.
Finally, at the May 18, 2020, and June 1, 2020, Board meetings, there were settlement
discussions related to Mr. Dani’s litigation and, at both meetings, Respondent recused herself
from those discussions. Id. at 5.
As stated by ALJ Moss, the issue in this matter “is whether [Respondent] being present in
the executive session of May 7, 2020, violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c). Id. at 6. Referring to
Friends Retirement Concepts v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Somerville (356 N.J. Super. 203,
214 (Law Div. 2002)), a matter which “addresses members who vote on a matter,” ALJ Moss
found:
At [the May 7, 2020, executive] session, the Board members received an update
on [Mr.] Dani[’s] litigation by the Board’s attorney. The Board was informed of
the hearing date of May 14, 2020. The Board was also informed by the attorney
that they would have to pay attorney fees. There was no testimony that there was
any discussion of [Mr.] Dani[’s] lawsuit other tha[n] the update by the attorney.
There was no testimony that [Brogan] spoke to anyone during the executive
session regarding [Mr.] Dani[’s] litigation. There was no action taken by the
Board regarding [Mr.] Dani[’s] litigation during the May 7, 2020, executive
session. There was no vote taken regarding [Mr.] Dani[’s] litigation at the May 7,
2020, meeting.
Based on the foregoing, ALJ Moss concluded that Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A.
18A:12-24(c) because she did not vote, there was no discussion of Mr. Dani’s litigation, and
there was no action taken regarding Mr. Dani’s litigation. Id. at 6. As such, ALJ Moss ordered
that the remaining Count of the Complaint (Count 1) be dismissed. Id.
IV. 	Exceptions
Petitioner’s Exceptions
Petitioner takes “exception to the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion” that Respondent’s conduct
did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c). According to Petitioner, ALJ Moss “could not conclude
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based on the evidence in the record that no other discussions of the lawsuit took place during that
private Board meeting.” Instead, Petitioner argues that, “[t]he record clearly establishes that
during the May 7, 2020[,] executive session, the Board discussed options, other than settlement,
in responding to any judgment that granted [Mr.] Dani’s remaining motions in the OPRA
lawsuit.” Moreover, the executive session meeting minutes indicate, “another option that was
undoubtedly deliberated over by the Board” was the Board’s “option of appealing the judge’s
decision.” Further, Petitioner argues Respondent testified that she “precluded herself from
discussion about how the Board should respond to settlement offers,” but “never testified that
she excluded herself from all discussions pertaining to how the [B]oard should respond to a
judge’s decision in the OPRA matter.” Per Petitioner, “when counsel for the Commission
pointed this distinction out, the ALJ dismissed it because Respondent ‘is not an attorney.’”
However, Petitioner argues counsel “was only holding Respondent to the standards expected of a
board member, rather than that of an attorney.”
Citing I/M/O Anne Pirillo (Washington Township Board of Education, Gloucester
County (C12-04)), Petitioner maintains that the Commission has “explicitly found that a board
member is precluded from being present and/or participating in discussions which deliberate
actions relating to matters that they are indirectly involved in.” Petitioner asserts the record
“clearly establishes that Respondent participated in executive session deliberations over the
Board’s option of appealing a judge’s pending decision in an OPRA lawsuit that would require
only Respondent and [Mr.] Morgan to disclose personal information about her email and
devices.” Therefore, Petitioner asserts “there exists a preponderance of evidence that Respondent
had an indirect personal interest in the outcome of the OPRA litigation, a public member could
justifiably believe that her objectivity would be impaired during executive session discussions
over the Board’s option of appealing a decision in that matter, or at least present a situation in
which Respondent would be highly tempted to pursue her personal interests over those of the
Board.” As such, and because Respondent failed to recuse herself from the discussion, Petitioner
maintains that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c).
As to the penalty, Petitioner argues that Respondent “engaged in conduct which could
reasonably be seen as an attempt to gain a personal benefit in a pending litigation matter which
she was personally involved in.” Further, Respondent was “fully aware of her ethical and
statutory obligations as seen by the fact that she recused herself from the Board’s executive
session discussion concerning the Board’s option of settling the same matter at the very next
meeting.” According to Petitioner, Respondent “was not new to the job or unfamiliar with the
process,” and since her “actions constitute a serious violation of the public trust,” and are most
aligned to those in I/M/O Rodriguez (C09-15), “a penalty of no less than a censure is called for.”
Reply to Petitioner’s Exceptions
Despite Petitioner’s Exceptions, Respondent maintains that the Commission should
“adopt [ALJ] Moss’s Decision as the Final Decision in the matter and thereby dismiss the
Complaint.” Respondent asserts Petitioner’s attempt to “see if any settlement offers or terms may
have been discussed” during the May 7, 2020, executive session, is “contrary to Respondent’s
answers” and shows Petitioner’s “misrepresentation” of Respondent’s testimony. According to
Respondent, she “repeatedly testified that settlement offers, terms, and how to proceed with the
OPRA litigation were not discussed on May 7, 2020.” Moreover, Respondent asserts, “any
discussions about settling the OPRA litigation took place on May 18th, not May 7th.”
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Respondent contends the ALJ’s decision and findings “were based on the testimony of
[Respondent] and the record did not lack any support for Judge Moss’s legal conclusions” and,
therefore, “no violation of the Act can be established.”
Respondent maintains her “careful actions highlight[] her intent to avoid the appearance
of impropriety, and no reasonable member of the public would believe that their trust was
violated by [Respondent’s] refusal and recusal to speak on the OPRA litigation in three
consecutive executive sessions.” Respondent further argues she did not violate the Act because
she did not engage in any conduct during the May 7, 2020, May 18, 2020, and/or June 1, 2020,
executive session meetings other than simply being present in the room on May 7, 2020, when
the Board “received a legal update.” Respondent asserts she did not “speak or vote” during the
May 7, 2020, executive session, and she “recused herself when there would be Board discussions
and/or vote as to how the underlying OPRA litigation would progress.” Therefore, Respondent
maintains that the Commission should adopt ALJ Moss’s Initial Decision dismissing the matter.
V. 	Analysis
Upon a careful and independent review of the facts and evidence set forth in the record,
the Commission adopts ALJ Moss’s findings of fact, but rejects the legal conclusion that
Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c):
No school official shall act in his official capacity in any matter where he, a
member of his immediate family, or a business organization in which he has an
interest, has a direct or indirect financial involvement that might reasonably be
expected to impair his objectivity or independence of judgment. No school
official shall act in his official capacity in any matter where he or a member of his
immediate family has a personal involvement that is or creates some benefit to the
school official or member of his immediate family;
According to the factual record, as a direct result of a lawsuit filed by Mr. Dani against
the Board, Respondent “was required to provide a screenshot from her [personal] iPad and
cellphone and a certification regarding the lawsuit.” Id. at 4. In addition, depending on the
court’s ruling on a motion filed by Mr. Dani in that lawsuit, which was pending at the time of the
Board’s meeting on May 7, 2021, Respondent would be required “to provide additional
screenshots from her [personal] iPad and cellphone.” Id. (emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing facts, it is beyond dispute that because Respondent was required
to provide screenshots from her personal iPad and cellphone and, depending on the ruling of a
pending motion, might have to provide additional screenshots from her personal iPad and
cellphone, Respondent had a personal interest and involvement in the lawsuit filed by Mr. Dani
against the Board. The only remaining question is whether, given her personal interest and
involvement in the lawsuit filed by Mr. Dani, Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c) by
being present in executive session on May 7, 2021.
As to this question, based on case precedent, the Commission answers yes. In I/M/O
Michael Kilmurray, the Commission specifically stated, “[w]hen a school official has a conflict
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of interest of which the public is aware, and that school official goes behind closed doors when
that item is discussed, the situation creates a justifiable impression among the public that their
trust is being violated.” Lacey Township Board of Education, Docket No. C12-94, at 3. 	The
Commission continued:
In the present case, the public may believe that the respondent is actively
participating in the discussion behind closed doors, that the board member will
tell his relative what was said, or at the least, that the other board members will be
inhibited in their discussion of the matter because of his presence. … The board
member’s rights are not circumscribed by leaving the private session only while
that particular item is being discussed. This is consistent with the Commission’s
public advisory opinion A33-95. This opinion advised that a board member who
has a conflict prohibiting him from negotiating would be in violation of the Act if
he sat on the board’s closed session strategy discussions. This advisory followed
the Superior Court-Appellate Division’s ruling in Scotch Plains v. Syversten, 251
N.J. 566 (App. Div. 1991) (School board member who had litigation pending
against the district could not attend executive sessions of the board discussing
that litigation). …
Id. (emphasis added).
In addition, in I/M/O Anne Pirillo, the Commission found that, because Respondent
Pirillo was present and participated in an executive session discussion concerning a matter (bids
from commercial vendors) that her spouse had a financial interest, she too violated N.J.S.A.
18A:12-24(c). Washington Township Board of Education, Docket No. C12-04.
In addition, the Commission notes that, during the public portion of the Board meeting on
May 7, 2021, which immediately preceded adjournment to executive session, Mr. Morgan
publicly “stated that the settlement of an OPRA lawsuit by a candidate ([Mr.] Dani) for the
Board would be discussed.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added). Furthermore, immediately following the
substance of Mr. Morgan’s public statement, Respondent acknowledged that the matter, namely
“settlement of an OPRA lawsuit,” “should be discussed in executive session.” Id. (emphasis
added). In this way, regardless of whether a settlement was actually discussed, Respondent was
under the belief that a settlement of a lawsuit in which she had a personal interest and involved
would be discussed.
With the above in mind, the Commission must reiterate that when, as here, a school
official has a conflict of interest regarding a matter, recusal from any and all discussions and
Board action is absolute. See Advisory Opinion A24-16 (“…a conflict would present itself
requiring absolute recusal from that matter and abstaining from all votes” (emphasis added)).”
Because recusal must be absolute, receiving an update or information of any kind regarding a
matter in which a school official has a conflict of interest (in this case, a personal interest and
involvement in a pending lawsuit), especially when it was publicly stated that a “settlement”
regarding the matter would be discussed, is strictly prohibited. The fact that the Board “only”
received information about the next hearing date; was informed that the Board would have to pay
attorney’s fees; Respondent did not speak to anyone; and the Board did not take action or vote on
the litigation after executive session is of no moment, and does not preclude the Commission
from finding a violation of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c). Id. at 4. Contrary to Respondent’s argument,
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recusal is absolute, and cannot be selectively practiced. Selectively choosing when to recuse
subverts the purpose of a recusal.
Moreover, when Mr. Morgan publicly stated that “settlement of [Mr.] Dani[’s] lawsuit
would be discussed” by the Board in executive session, that should have cued Respondent to
immediately recognize that, due to her conflict of interest (her personal interest and involvement
in Mr. Dani’s lawsuit), she had to recuse herself from that discussion and, therefore, not be in
executive session (at least for the discussion of Mr. Dani’s litigation). By merely being
physically present in executive session, Respondent directly impacted, whether deliberately or
otherwise, the ability of the non-conflicted Board members and Board counsel to engage in a
candid conversation about the litigation. Although it was fortunate that substantive settlement
negotiations did not occur, a fact which could have been directly attributable to Respondent’s
physical presence in executive session, Respondent’s “luck” does not mean that she did not
violate the Act by being present for a discussion concerning a matter in which she has a conflict
of interest.
Furthermore, the fact that even this limited conversation took place in executive session
and not in public only underscores the confidential nature of the information that was discussed –
if the public was not able to hear the information, a fact that Respondent undoubtedly recognized
because she publicly stated that the matter should be discussed in executive session, it
necessarily follows that conflicted members of the Board (Respondent) must not hear it either.
Although it can be a challenge for a Board member to recuse herself from a matter when
it is being discussed in public, it is simple for her to do so when a matter is discussed in
executive session. Having been advised, in public, that a settlement regarding Mr. Dani’s lawsuit
would be discussed in executive session, Respondent’s decision to attend executive session,
regardless of what was actually discussed during executive session, violates N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24(c).
VI. 	Decision
For the reasons more fully detailed above, the Commission adopts ALJ Moss’s findings
of fact, but rejects the legal conclusion that Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c).
VII. 	Penalty
Having found that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c), and following its review
of the facts and evidence set forth in the record, the Commission recommends a penalty of
censure. 	In 	recommending 	a 	penalty of 	censure, 	the 	Commission 	finds 	I/M/O 	Michael
Kilmurray and I/M/O Anne Pirillo to be most instructive.
In both I/M/O Michael Kilmurray and I/M/O Anne Pirillo, cases which are factually
analogous – although not identical – to the within matter, the Commission recommended censure
for the violations of the Act. Although, in this case, there is no evidence that Respondent actively
participated in the executive session discussion that ensued, the Commission finds that censure is
appropriate because Respondent was undoubtedly on notice that a settlement would be discussed
(even if it did not actually occur); publicly acknowledged and overtly stated that the conversation
regarding the lawsuit should occur in executive session; and then she seconded the motion to
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adjourn to executive session. R-1. In short, Respondent publicly commented on a matter in
which she had a conflict of interest (noting its confidentiality); she seconded the motion to
adjourn to executive session to discuss a matter in which she had a conflict of interest; and then
attended executive session knowing that a matter in which she had a conflict of interest would be
discussed. Based on all these facts, and because Respondent could have easily recused herself
from the discussion concerning Mr. Dani’s lawsuit, the Commission does not see Respondent’s
actions as “mere attendance” in executive session, but rather deliberate disregard of her clear
conflict of interest.
For all the aforementioned reasons, the Commission recommends that Respondent be
censured for having violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:12-29(c), this decision shall be forwarded to the Commissioner
of Education (Commissioner) for review of the Commission’s recommended sanctions. Parties
may 	either: 	1) 	file 	exceptions 	to 	the 	recommended 	sanction; 	2) 	file 	an 	appeal 	of 	the
Commission’s findings of violations of the Act; or 3) file both exceptions to the recommended
sanction and an appeal of the Commission’s findings of violations of the Act.
Parties taking exception to the recommended sanctions of the Commission but not
disputing the Commission’s findings of violations may file, within thirteen (13) days from the
date the Commission’s decision is forwarded to the Commissioner, written exceptions regarding
the recommended sanctions to the Commissioner. The forwarding date shall be the mailing date
to the parties, as indicated below. Such exceptions must be forwarded to: Commissioner of
Education, c/o Bureau of Controversies and Disputes, P.O. Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625,
marked 	“Attention: 	Comments 	on 	Ethics 	Commission 	Sanction,” 	as 	well 	as 	to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov. A copy of any comments filed must be sent to the
Commission (school.ethics@doe.nj.gov) and all other parties.
Parties seeking to appeal the Commission’s findings of violations must file an appeal
pursuant to the standards set forth at N.J.A.C. 6A:4, et seq. within thirty (30) days of the filing
date of the decision from which the appeal is taken. The filing date shall be three (3) days after
the mailing date to the parties, as indicated below. In such cases, the Commissioner’s review of
the 	Commission’s 	recommended 	sanctions 	will 	be 	deferred 	and 	incorporated 	into 	the
Commissioner’s review of the findings of violations on appeal. Where a notice of appeal has
been filed on or before the due date for exceptions to the Commission’s recommended sanction
(thirteen (13) days from the date the decision is mailed by the Commission), exceptions need not
be filed by that date, but may be incorporated into the appellant’s brief on appeal.
Robert W. Bender, Chairperson
School Ethics Commission
Mailing Date: 	February 25, 2022
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Resolution Adopting Decision in
Connection with C71-20
Whereas, at its meeting on April 27, 2021, the School Ethics Commission (Commission)
voted to find probable cause to credit the allegation that Respondent violated N.J.S.A. 18A:12-
24(c), and voted to transmit the above-captioned matter to the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL) for a plenary hearing; and
Whereas, at the OAL, the attorney for the Commission (Petitioner) was responsible for
prosecuting the allegations for which it found probable cause; and
Whereas, following a hearing and the submission of closing briefs, the Honorable
Kimberly A. Moss, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ Moss) issued an Initial Decision dated
December 14, 2021; and
Whereas, in her Initial Decision, ALJ Moss found that Respondent did not violate
N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24(c), and dismissed the above-captioned matter; and
Whereas, on January 14, 2022, Petitioner filed Exceptions to ALJ Moss’s Initial
Decision, and Respondent filed a reply to Petitioner’s Exceptions on January 18, 2022; and
Whereas, at a special meeting on February 4, 2022, the Commission reviewed and
discussed the full record in the above-captioned matter; and
Whereas, at a special meeting on February 4, 2022, the Commission discussed adopting
the findings of facts; rejecting the legal conclusion that Respondent did not violate N.J.S.A.
18A:12-24(c); and recommending a penalty of censure; and
Whereas, at a special meeting on February 25, 2022, the Commission reviewed and voted
to approve the within decision as accurately memorializing its actions/findings from its special
meeting on February 4, 2022; and
Now Therefore Be It Resolved, the Commission hereby adopts the within decision.
____________________________________
Robert W. Bender, Chairperson
I hereby certify that this Resolution was duly
adopted by the School Ethics Commission
at a special meeting on February 25, 2022.
________________________________
Kathryn A. Whalen, Esq.
Director, School Ethics Commission

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