FRANK CARNEY V. UNION CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, HUDSON COUNTY, 8/30/99 (283-99)

283-99Njcommned

Gesamter Gesetzestext

283-99
AGENCY DKT. NO. 287-8/97
FRANK CARNEY, :
PETITIONER, :
V. : COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY : DECISION
OF UNION CITY, HUDSON COUNTY,
:
RESPONDENT.
:
_______________________________________
The record and initial decision issued by the Office of Administrative Law have
been reviewed. Respondent’s exceptions, which, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, were due to be
filed with the Commissioner no later than August 2, 1999, were erroneously filed with the
Director of the Office of Administrative Law. The exceptions were accepted for consideration by
the Commissioner on August 12, 1999 so that the Board would not be prejudiced by the
erroneous filing. See State Board of Education decision, Arthur Krupp v. Board of Education of
Union County Regional High School District No. 1, Union County, 1991 S.L.D. 2568.
Petitioner’s reply exceptions were filed in accordance with the requirements of N.J.A.C. 1:1-
18.4.
Respondent’s exceptions aver that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in
concluding that “[a]s the [public forfeiture] statute now reads, without the order being issued the
- 11 -	11
mere conviction for an offense touching employment is not sufficient to effectively forfeit the
employment.” (Initial Decision at p. 6) The Board argues that this interpretation ignores the
- 12 -	12
clear language of the forfeiture statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 et seq., that the court was mandated to
order forfeiture and reiterates its legal position that the Commissioner has the authority and
responsibility to correct the municipal court judge’s refusal and/or failure to order petitioner’s
forfeiture. In support thereof, respondent cites a number of decisions issued by other State
agencies, such as the Department of Human Services and the Department of Corrections, which,
respondent avers, continue to litigate issues of public forfeiture.
Respondent also excepts to the ALJ’s conclusion on page seven of the initial
decision that “[The tenure process] is unfortunately necessary if the Board intends to remove this
miscreant,” maintaining that this conclusion of law ignores the inherent authority of the
Commissioner to terminate employment of a tenured employee found guilty of a forfeitable
offense. With respect to the aforementioned, respondent contends, inter alia, that to require
tenure removal proceedings in this matter would be nothing more than a waste of public funds,
with the subsequent cost being borne by educational programs. It states:
Although [the] tenure law (N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 et seq.) demands an
administrative hearing prior to a tenured employee’s termination,
the criminal statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 et seq.) does not. The filing
of tenure charges to effectuate the obvious conclusion that Carney
committed a forfeitable offense is legally unnecessary and
burdensome. The only purpose to be served by requiring a tenure
hearing under the circumstances of this case would be to impose a
two year back pay burden on the school system. (Respondent’s
Exceptions at p. 7)
Petitioner’s reply exceptions, which incorporate those arguments previously set
forth in the original brief to the ALJ in this matter, aver, inter alia, that respondent appears to be
arguing that “common sense” requires that forfeiture be automatic, notwithstanding the specific
language of N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(g), enacted in 1995, which states:
The fact that a court has declined to order forfeiture shall not
preclude the public officer or public entity having authority to
- 13 -	13
remove the person convicted from seeking to remove or suspend
the person from office, position or employment on the ground that
the conduct giving rise to the conviction demonstrates that the
person is unfit to hold the office, position or employment.
(Reply Exceptions at pp. 1-2)
Of this, petitioner states “[b]y the theory argued by Respondent, even in a
situation such as that herein, where a prosecutor seeks a ruling that an individual convicted of a
violation has forfeited his public employment, and the court declines to issue such a ruling,
employment is forfeited regardless, rendering the amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 in Subsection
(g) meaningless.” (Reply Exceptions at p. 2)
Upon review of the record and pleadings of the parties, including the exceptions
filed by the parties, the Commissioner concurs with and adopts the recommended decision of the
ALJ granting petitioner’s motion for summary decision, with the exception of one modification
indicated below. In affirming the grant of summary decision to petitioner, the Commissioner
notes for the record that the ALJ’s conclusions of law are consistent with the holdings of the
Commissioner in prior cases such as In the Matter of the Tenure Hearing of Robert Morton,
School District of the City of Camden, Camden County, decided July 30, 1999; In the Matter of
the Tenure Hearing of Alan P. Tighe, School District of the Township of Old Bridge, Middlesex
County, decided May 3, 1999; In the Matter of the Tenure Hearing of Neal Ercolano, School
District of the Township of Branchburg, Somerset County, decided June 25, 1998; In the Matter
of the Tenure Hearing of Robert R. Vitacco, School District of the Borough of Lincoln Park,
Morris County, 97 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 449, appeal pending State Board; In the Matter of the
Tenure Hearing of Leonard J. Marano, School District of the Borough of Lincoln Park, Morris
County, decided February 13, 1997, appeal pending State Board, and others, all of which
determined that the Commissioner does not have jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 to enter
- 14 -	14
orders for forfeiture of public employment. Notwithstanding respondent’s vigorous legal
arguments otherwise, the Commissioner finds and determines that the ALJ correctly concluded
that if a court declines to act to order forfeiture of public employment, then the only means for a
board to seek removal of that individual from its employ is through the certifying of tenure
charges pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 et seq. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the
express statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(g).
The Commissioner does not, however, adopt that portion of the ALJ’s order
which directs that any monies and benefits owed to petitioner be paid within 15 days of the
issuance of the Commissioner’s final decision. Certainly, any back pay and benefits which may
be owed to petitioner must be paid by the Board in a reasonable period of time; however, to
place a requirement that such payment be made by the Board within 15 days is simply too
restrictive. Once the precise amount of the award is determined, petitioner may invoke the
regulations for payment of post-hearing interest, N.J.A.C. 6:24-1.16, should the Board fail to
satisfy the award within 60 days.
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted to petitioner, except as modified
herein relative to the time frame for payment of back pay and benefits.*
IT IS SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
AUGUST 30, 1999
*This decision, as the Commissioner’s final determination in the instant matter, may be appealed to the State Board
of Education pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-27 et seq. and N.J.A.C. 6:2-1.1 et seq., within 30 days of its filing.
Commissioner decisions are deemed filed three days after the date of mailing to the parties.

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.