State v. Keadle

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Joshua W. Keadle, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed December 19, 2025. 	No. S-25-128.
1. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. Appellate review of a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and
fact. When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an
appellate court reviews the factual findings of the lower court for clear
error. With regard to the questions of counsel’s performance or prejudice
to the defendant as part of the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984),
an appellate court reviews such legal determinations independently of
the lower court’s decision.
2. Postconviction: Constitutional Law. Postconviction relief is a very
narrow category of relief, available only to remedy prejudicial constitu-
tional violations that render the judgment void or voidable.
3. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. In order to establish a right to post-
conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, the defendant has the burden, in accordance with Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), to
show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s defi-
cient performance prejudiced the defense in his or her case.
4. ____: ____. To show that counsel’s performance was deficient, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance did not equal that of
a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law.
5. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Words and Phrases. To show preju-
dice in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 01:01 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
6. Trial: Effectiveness of Counsel: Presumptions: Appeal and Error. In
determining whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient, there is
a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably.
7. Postconviction: Appeal and Error. In an appeal from the denial of
postconviction relief, an appellate court will not consider for the first
time on appeal claims that were not raised in the verified motion.
Appeal from the District Court for Gage County: Ricky A.
Schreiner, Judge. Affirmed.
Benjamin H. Murray, of Murray Law, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellant.
Michael 	T. 	Hilgers, Attorney 	General, 	and 	Melissa 	R.
Vincent for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, and Papik, JJ., and Riedmann,
Chief Judge, and Bishop and Freeman, Judges.
Funke, C.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Joshua W. Keadle appeals from an order of the district
court for Gage County, Nebraska, denying his motion for
postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Keadle’s
motion alleged, among other things, ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, and on appeal, Keadle argues that the district
court erred in finding that his two trial counsel were not inef-
fective in several regards. In fact, Keadle claims that one of
his trial counsel has admitted to performing deficiently in a
manner that prejudiced Keadle. Because Keadle’s arguments
are without merit or are not properly before us on appeal, we
affirm the order of the district court.
II. BACKGROUND
1. Trial and Direct Appeal
This is the second time that Keadle’s conviction for second
degree murder has come before us. 1 The following paragraphs
1 See State v. Keadle, 311 Neb. 919, 977 N.W.2d 207 (2022).

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STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
recount only those aspects of Keadle’s trial and direct appeal
that specifically pertain to his arguments in the present matter.
Keadle was charged with first degree murder in connection
with the disappearance of Tyler Thomas. Keadle and Thomas
were students at the same college when Thomas went missing.
Keadle admitted that he was with Thomas in the early morning
hours of the day she disappeared. However, Keadle claimed
that he left Thomas by a river after the two of them argued.
(a) Keadle’s Trial
A jury trial was held. At the trial, the State’s theory was
that Keadle killed Thomas and disposed of her body. The
defense countered by proposing “several possible explana-
tions” for Thomas’ disappearance. 2 One explanation was that
Thomas, who was intoxicated and was not wearing a coat,
succumbed to hypothermia, became disoriented, fell into the
river, and died.
Consistent with that explanation, the defense called Dr.
Thomas Young, a forensic pathologist, as a witness to testify
about hypothermia. On direct examination, Young was ques-
tioned by Keadle’s lead counsel, Jeffery A. Pickens, about the
circumstances where hypothermia “is a cause of death.” Young
explained that persons who are drunk or have Alzheimer’s
disease and “wander[] off” without adequate clothing “may
succumb to cold exposure.” Pickens then asked Young whether
“in those examples,” hypothermia is “typically an accident,
or is it a purposeful thing.” Young responded that it is “typi-
cally an accident.” Young also said that people who have
been exposed to “a lot of cold” typically become “delirious”
or “disoriented.”
Subsequently, on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked
Young what he meant by “‘hypothermia not being purpose-
ful.’” Young clarified that he meant the person did not “mean[]
to kill themselves” in the circumstances described. Instead,
2 Id. at 928, 977 N.W.2d at 214.

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STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
Young said the death was “what you would call an accident.”
The following exchange then ensued:
Q. You weren’t referring to someone who might take
someone out into an area where they would have little
chance of coming back to safety. That might be purposeful.
That’s not what you were referring to, were you?
A. Okay. Usually, when, as a medical examiner, when I
assign accident as a manner [of death], it basically means
that there’s an environmental cause to the death, and
there’s no evidence of intent, either other destructive or
self-destructive intent.
Q. So . . . you are not saying that it’s not possible for
someone to purposely take someone in a situation where
they may never be able to get back to safety; that wasn’t
your intent. That wasn’t the meaning?
A. If . . . there was evidence of something like that,
then you would call it a homicide.
The defense did not object to Young’s testimony. Nor did
it engage in any further questioning of Young on redirect
examination.
Pickens then asked to speak with his cocounsel, Matthew
McDonald, and Keadle. However, that conversation was not
recorded, and Pickens and McDonald subsequently testified
that they could not recall what, if anything, the defense had
discussed beyond whether Keadle wanted to testify in his
own behalf.
After the conversation, the defense rested and moved to
dismiss the charge against Keadle on the ground that the State
had failed to meet its burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Thomas was dead and that her death was the result
of criminal action. The court asked the defense whether it
waived that argument when it “started putting on evidence.”
The defense said it did not think so. Speaking for the defense,
Pickens “admit[ted] [he was] a little bit confused by that.”
However, Pickens argued that the defense’s moving to dismiss
at that time was akin to renewing a motion for a directed

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STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
verdict that had been overruled at the close of the State’s case.
The court overruled the motion to dismiss.
A jury instruction conference was then held. The jury
instructions do not appear to be part of the record on appeal
in this case. However, Pickens subsequently testified that
although he could not think of any instruction that “would
have in some way aided to clarify manslaughter versus mur-
der in this circumstance,” the jury was instructed on the “ele-
ments of murder.”
After the jury instruction conference, the parties presented
closing arguments. As is relevant here, in its closing argu-
ment, the defense argued that
Keadle is not the cause of [Thomas’] death. You can-
not hold him accountable for making a bad decision of
leaving her at the river because she refused to get in [his
vehicle]. That may be a bad decision on his part. But he
is going to live with that the rest of his life. You cannot
convict him if you are mad at him for leaving her down
there. That is not a crime that he can be charged with.
After 	closing 	arguments, 	the 	jury 	began 	its 	delibera-
tions. Approximately 3 hours into the deliberations, the jury
requested a transcript of the “‘cross from [the] State from . . .
Young.’” The court responded by asking the “‘exact nature of
[the] difficulty’” and the “‘precise testimony that can resolve
it.’” 3 The jury never answered that question. On the follow-
ing day, the jury found Keadle guilty of the lesser-included
offense of second degree murder.
(b) Sentencing Hearing
Subsequently, at the sentencing hearing, Pickens said he
could not “help but feel that [he was] responsible” for Keadle’s
conviction of second degree murder. Pickens explained that the
State’s theory of the case was premediated murder; namely, that
Keadle raped Thomas, killed her, and dragged her body to the
3 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 260 Neb. 1008, 620 N.W.2d 738 (2001).

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STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
river and threw it in. Pickens opined that “the State didn’t have
a very strong case” against Keadle under that theory. However,
Pickens said “there was one event that made [the State’s]
case considerably stronger, and that was when [he] called . . .
Young . . . to testify about hypothermia.” Pickens specifically
pointed to Young’s testimony that purposely placing a person
in a situation from which “‘they may never be able to get back
to safety’” is homicide.
Pickens faulted himself for his response to that testimony.
Pickens said:
I sat [t]here and did nothing. I didn’t know what to do.
I didn’t know how to clean up. When my expert gets on
the stand and essentially says that [Keadle] committed a
homicide, there is no way I knew at that time [how] to
clean that up, and the risk was I was just going to make it
a hell of a lot worse.
Pickens said that it was “difficult to stand in a courtroom and
admit deficient performance,” but that he had no question his
performance was deficient with respect to Young. Pickens also
said that Young’s testimony was a “turning point” in the case,
as shown by the jury’s subsequent request for a transcript of
the State’s cross-examination of Young. Pickens said, “[W]e
all knew what they wanted. They wanted this portion from
the examination where he says that would be a homicide read
back to them.” Pickens also said that in conversations with the
jurors after the trial, the jurors said “[h]aving . . . Young say
that was a homicide made the difference.” As such, Pickens
claimed that but for Young’s testimony, Keadle “should have
been found guilty of manslaughter or . . . acquitted.”
Keadle 	was 	sentenced 	to 	a 	term 	of 	71 	years’ to 	life
imprisonment.
(c) Direct Appeal
Subsequently, still represented by Pickens, Keadle filed a
direct appeal. On appeal, Keadle assigned only that the evi-
dence adduced at the trial was insufficient to establish the

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STATE v. KEADLE
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corpus delicti of homicide. Finding no merit to that argument,
we affirmed the judgment of the district court. 4
2. Motion for Postconviction Relief
(a) Keadle’s Motion and
State’s Response
Within 1 year after we issued our mandate on direct appeal
affirming Keadle’s conviction, Keadle filed the present motion
for postconviction relief. In the motion, Keadle raised mul-
tiple claims of actual innocence, prosecutorial misconduct,
and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, the only
claims from Keadle’s motion that are at issue here are the
claims, summarized and restated, that his two trial counsel
were ineffective in failing to object to Young’s testimony
on cross-examination, failing to ask any further questions of
Young to clarify the basis and meaning of that testimony, and
failing to ask that the jury be instructed about the difference
between the legal definition of “homicide” and the medical
examiner’s definition.
The State conceded that several of Keadle’s claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel required an evidentiary hearing.
However, the State claimed that the record was sufficient
to show that Keadle’s other claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel were meritless. The State similarly claimed that
Keadle’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct were procedur-
ally barred.
(b) Depositions of Pickens
and McDonald
Keadle subsequently sought and obtained permission to
depose Pickens and McDonald. What follows is an over-
view of counsels’ testimony as it pertains to Keadle’s claims
on direct appeal. As set forth in greater detail below, those
claims 	concern 	counsels’ 	alleged 	failure 	to 	respond 	to
4 See Keadle, supra note 1.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
Young’s testimony on cross-examination, their failure to move
for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case, and
Pickens’ representation of Keadle on direct appeal. The latter
two claims were not raised in Keadle’s motion for postcon-
viction relief, as described above.
Pickens and McDonald testified that the defense prepared
for Young’s testimony and that as of the close of direct exami-
nation, they thought Young’s testimony had gone well and sup-
ported their case. They also testified that they viewed Young’s
subsequent testimony on cross-examination as “damaging,”
because when coupled with Keadle’s admission that he took
Thomas to the river and left her there, it would have allowed
the jury to “infer” he committed homicide. However, Pickens
acknowledged that Young’s testimony “didn’t really fit with
the State’s theory of prosecution.” At deposition, as at Keadle’s
sentencing hearing, Pickens faulted himself for his perfor-
mance in regard to Young’s testimony, although McDonald was
less certain Pickens had made a mistake.
Specifically, Pickens testified that he performed deficiently
in not anticipating the question that the prosecutor asked
of Young and in not avoiding the line of inquiry on direct
examination that prompted that question. Pickens said that
had he anticipated the prosecutor’s question, he would not
have called Young. Pickens also said that shortly before
Young testified, Pickens decided that Young’s testimony was
not needed, because the issue of hypothermia could have
been “argue[d] to the jury” without the testimony. However,
Pickens said that he nonetheless called Young to testify
because McDonald believed Young’s testimony was needed
to support the defense’s closing arguments. At deposition,
McDonald persisted in that view, claiming that the defense
“needed to call [Young] because . . . hypothermia . . . was
part of our defense.” McDonald seemingly suggested that
even knowing what Young said on cross-examination, he “still
would have called him.”

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
Pickens said that he did not “believ[e] [his performance]
was deficient in any other way” except as to Young. Neither
he nor McDonald could recall whether the defense discussed
how to respond to Young’s testimony before the defense
rested. Pickens also admitted that he could not think of any
objection to Young’s testimony, any questions on redirect,
or any way to “clean[] . . . up” Young’s testimony by
calling another witness or by a jury instruction. However,
both Pickens and McDonald said there were risks to ask-
ing further questions of Young on redirect examination and
attempting to rehabilitate him. Pickens said that with redirect,
there is “always concern[] about highlighting damaging testi-
mony” and “reinforc[ing] what the jury had already heard.”
McDonald testified similarly about the risks of redirect exam-
ination. McDonald also said that trying to rehabilitate Young
would have been “risky,” because the defense did not know
what he might have said and “could have made [the situation]
worse.” Ultimately, Pickens said that after the defense rested
and moved to dismiss, it discussed whether to “deal with”
Young’s testimony in closing arguments. Pickens said he
believed the testimony “could be handled in argument; that
this wasn’t the State’s theory.”
As to why the defense did not move for a directed verdict
at the close of the State’s case, Pickens said that he does not
always make such a motion. Pickens said that he “know[s] a
lot of lawyers” who do and that some argue “it’s malpractice
not to.” However, Pickens said he did not “see any point”
in making a frivolous motion he knew would be overruled.
McDonald testified that Pickens would have been the one to
decide whether to move for a directed verdict at the close of
the State’s case and that he could not recall Pickens’ reason-
ing on the issue. However, McDonald said that, like Pickens,
he does not make such motions unless they are warranted
under the facts and circumstances of the case.
Similarly, as to his representation of Keadle on direct
appeal, Pickens testified that he routinely discussed with

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STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
clients who could best represent them on appeal. Pickens
acknowledged that he raised only one issue on direct appeal
and that some attorneys raise “every argument they can.”
However, Pickens said he believed in raising only issues
that had “a chance of winning.” McDonald, who was not
“involved very much after the trial,” said he was “sure” he
and Pickens discussed with Keadle who should handle the
direct appeal. However, McDonald opined that the trial coun-
sel “know better” than other attorneys what issues to raise
on direct appeal and that any claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel could be raised on postconviction. Also, like
Pickens, McDonald said he does not “believe in throwing
every issue at the judges” on appeal, but instead raises only
genuine issues.
(c) District Court’s Order
After an evidentiary hearing at which the depositions of
Pickens and McDonald were offered and received into evidence,
the district court denied Keadle’s motion for postconviction
relief. The court first rejected Keadle’s claims of actual inno-
cence and prosecutorial misconduct, as well as two claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel that did not pertain to
Young’s testimony.
The court then turned to Keadle’s remaining claims of inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel, which included his claims
regarding counsels’ response to Young’s testimony. As to
those claims, the court found that counsels’ performance was
not deficient. According to the court, “the evidence [was]
clear” that the decisions to call Young and then not to ask
further questions of him on redirect or seek clarifying jury
instructions were “strategic choices made by a team of expe-
rienced trial lawyers, after thorough investigations of fact and
law and extensive discussion.” The court said that decisions
made during homicide trials are “often complex, requiring the
attorney to weigh risks versus rewards while trying to antici-
pate the strategies of the other party and the thought processes

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STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
of a jury,” and that counsel cannot anticipate every question
asked on cross-examination or witnesses’ answers. As such,
the court said, “[t]he fact that [Keadle] and/or his trial counsel
now believe that one of their trial decisions did not pay off in
the end does not equate to deficient performance.”
Keadle timely appealed the order of the district court, and
we moved the matter to our docket. 5
III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Keadle assigns that the district court erred in “denying [his]
Motion for Postconviction Relief.”
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Appellate review of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. 6 When review-
ing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate
court reviews the factual findings of the lower court for clear
error. 7 With regard to the questions of counsel’s performance
or prejudice to the defendant as part of the two-pronged test
articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 8 an appellate court
reviews such legal determinations independently of the lower
court’s decision. 9
V. ANALYSIS
Keadle claims that the district court erred in overruling his
motion for postconviction relief. Instead, Keadle argues that the
district court should have granted the motion because his two
trial counsel were ineffective in (1) failing to “do anything” 10
5 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
6 State v. Betancourt-Garcia, 317 Neb. 174, 9 N.W.3d 426 (2024).
7 Id.
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984).
9 Betancourt-Garcia, supra note 6.
10 Brief for appellant at 17.

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STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
in response to Young’s testimony on cross-examination that
purposely placing a person in a situation from which “they
may never be able to get back to safety” is homicide, (2) fail-
ing to move for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s
case, and (3) representing Keadle on direct appeal. The State
disagrees. The State argues that Keadle’s claim regarding
counsels’ response to Young’s testimony is without merit,
because counsels’ performance was not deficient and Keadle
cannot show that he suffered any prejudice. As to Keadle’s
other claims, the State argues that those claims are not prop-
erly before the court on appeal.
[2,3] Postconviction relief is a very narrow category of
relief, available only to remedy prejudicial constitutional vio-
lations that render the judgment void or voidable. 11 In order
to establish a right to postconviction relief based on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant has the
burden, in accordance with Strickland, to show that counsel’s
performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient perfor-
mance prejudiced the defense in his or her case. 12
[4,5] To show that counsel’s performance was deficient, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance did not equal
that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal
law. 13 To show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable prob-
ability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. 14 A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome. 15 A court may examine performance and
11 State v. Davis, 317 Neb. 59, 8 N.W.3d 247 (2024).
12 State v. Munoz, 309 Neb. 285, 959 N.W.2d 806 (2021).
13 Betancourt-Garcia, supra note 6.
14 Id.
15 Id.

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prejudice in any order and need not examine both prongs if a
defendant fails to demonstrate either. 16
1. Response to Young’s Testimony
on Cross-Examination
Turning first to Keadle’s claim that his two trial counsel
were ineffective in their response to Young’s testimony on
cross-examination, we agree with the State that counsels’
performance was not deficient. The district court found that
the decisions to call Young and then not to ask further ques-
tions of him on redirect examination or to seek clarifying
jury instructions were strategic choices. As courts in other
jurisdictions have explained, when applying the framework
set forth in Strickland,
[i]nquiries into strategic or tactical decisions challenged
as ineffective assistance of counsel involve both a factual
and a legal component. The question of whether an
attorney’s actions were actually the product of a tactical
or strategic decision is an issue of fact . . . . By contrast,
the question of whether the strategic or tactical decision
is reasonable enough to fall within the wide range of
professional competence is an issue of law not one
of fact . . . . 17
Under the standard of review previously noted, we review the
trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal deter-
minations independently of the trial court’s decision.
16 Id.
17 Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998), rehearing
and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied 162 F.3d 100 (11th Cir). See,
also, United States v. Cockrell, 720 F.2d 1423 (5th Cir. 1983), rehearing
denied 724 F.2d 976 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1251, 104 S. Ct.
3534, 82 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1984); Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121 (9th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1009, 128 S. Ct. 532, 169 L. Ed. 2d 371;
Sallahdin v. Mullin, 380 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004); Floyd v. State, 159
So. 3d 987 (Fla. App. 2015); State v. Hernandez, 227 N.C. App. 601, 742
S.E.2d 825 (2013).

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We find no clear error in the district court’s factual finding
that the actions of trial counsel of which Keadle complains
were the product of strategic decisions. The “clearly errone-
ous” standard of review is a deferential one, 18 under which an
appellate court will overturn the trial court’s factual findings
only if it has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. 19 We have no such conviction here.
Relying primarily on Pickens’ statement at the sentencing
hearing that he “sat [t]here and did nothing” when Young made
the allegedly problematic statement on cross-examination,
Keadle argued before this court that Pickens “froze,” with
the apparent implication that Pickens’ actions were not the
product of strategic choices. However, we understand Pickens’
statement at sentencing to have concerned his immediate reac-
tion to Young’s testimony on cross-examination. Pickens’ sub-
sequent testimony at the deposition provided a fuller picture
of his actions over the course of the entire trial. Specifically,
Pickens testified that “[t]o this day,” he did not know how
Young’s testimony could have been “clean[ed] up” by some
of the means proposed by Keadle. In addition, both Pickens
and McDonald testified that there were risks to asking further
questions of Young on redirect examination and attempt-
ing to rehabilitate him. Pickens also testified that after the
defense rested and moved to dismiss, it discussed dealing with
Young’s testimony in closing argument, and that he believed
“it could be handled in argument.”
[6] Our review of whether counsels’ strategic decisions
were reasonable enough to fall within the wide range of pro-
fessional competence is less deferential but leads to a similar
conclusion. This is because in determining whether trial coun-
sel’s performance was deficient, there is a strong presumption
18 See Rice v. Poppe, 302 Neb. 643, 924 N.W.2d 344 (2019).
19 See, e.g., State v. Toney, 243 Neb. 237, 498 N.W.2d 544 (1993), abrogated
on other grounds, State v. Matteson, 313 Neb. 435, 985 N.W.2d 1 (2023).

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that counsel acted reasonably. 20 The defendant has the burden
of overcoming that presumption. 21 Keadle failed to meet that
burden. Keadle’s primary argument on appeal is that counsels’
“failure . . . to do anything” in response to Young’s testimony
“was not objectively reasonable.” 22 Keadle also argued before
this court that counsel “ha[d] to do something to rehabilitate”
Young. However, the record before us shows that counsel did
in fact discuss and decide to address Young’s testimony in
its closing arguments. In fact, in closing, the defense actu-
ally argued that Keadle could not be convicted for “leaving
[Thomas] down there. That is not a crime that he can be
charged with.” The record also shows that both Pickens and
McDonald were concerned that asking further questions of
Young on redirect examination and attempting to rehabilitate
him risked drawing attention to the allegedly problematic tes-
timony and opened the door to further testimony by Young for
which the defense was unprepared.
As to Pickens’ own belief that his performance was defi-
cient, counsel for Keadle conceded in arguments before this
court that he does not view that admission to be “binding” on
the court. We agree. A contrary approach would be inconsistent
with the standard of review set forth above, which calls for an
appellate court to independently review legal determinations. 23
And a rule that would permit lawyers to bind the court by
impugning their own professional conduct, at least outside
20 State v. Anders, 311 Neb. 958, 977 N.W.2d 234 (2022). See, also,
Strickland, supra note 8, 466 U.S. at 689 (“a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance”).
21 See, e.g., State v. Alfredson, 287 Neb. 477, 842 N.W.2d 815 (2014); State
v. Iromuanya, 282 Neb. 798, 806 N.W.2d 404 (2011); State v. Williams,
259 Neb. 234, 609 N.W.2d 313 (2000).
22 Brief for appellant at 17.
23 See, e.g., Betancourt-Garcia, supra note 6. Cf. State v. Blocher, 313
Neb. 699, 986 N.W.2d 275 (2023) (parties have no right to stipulate as to
questions of law and such stipulation, if made, will be disregarded).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. KEADLE
Cite as 320 Neb. 583
disciplinary proceedings, could perversely incentivize lawyers
to “confess” deficient performance. 24
2. Remaining Claims
[7] Keadle also argues that his two trial counsel were inef-
fective in failing to move for a directed verdict at the close
of the State’s case and in representing him on direct appeal
after admitting deficient performance. However, as the State
observes, neither of those claims were raised in Keadle’s
motion for postconviction relief. As such, those claims are not
properly before us on appeal. In an appeal from the denial of
postconviction relief, an appellate court will not consider for
the first time on appeal claims that were not raised in the veri-
fied motion. 25
VI. CONCLUSION
Keadle’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
either are without merit or are not properly before this court on
appeal. As such, we affirm the order of the district court.
Affirmed.
Freudenberg and Bergevin, JJ., not participating.
24 Cf. Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988) (to claim
ineffective assistance of counsel in immigration proceeding, alien must
file complaint against attorney with appropriate disciplinary authorities or
explain why no such complaint was filed).
25 State v. Goynes, 318 Neb. 413, 16 N.W.3d 373 (2025).