Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
Bryan Hauxwell and Ami Hauxwell, appellants,
v. Middle Republican Natural Resources
District et al., appellees.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 23, 2025. 	No. S-23-791.
1. Motions to Dismiss: Appeal and Error. Appellate review of an order
granting a motion to dismiss is de novo.
2. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question that does not
involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion indepen-
dent of the lower court’s decision.
3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of
law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When the record demonstrates that the
decision of the trial court is correct, although such correctness is based
on different grounds from those assigned by the trial court, an appellate
court will affirm.
5. Appeal and Error. In Nebraska, the right to appeal is purely statutory
in that the right to appeal does not exist unless a statute provides for
an appeal.
6. Jurisdiction: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The requirements of a stat-
ute underlying a right to appeal are mandatory and must be complied
with before the appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action.
7. Statutes: Words and Phrases. The word “include,” as used in a statute,
connotes that the provided list of components is not exhaustive and that
there are other items includable that are not specifically enumerated.
8. Words and Phrases. A legal term of art is a word or phrase having
a specific, precise meaning in a given specialty apart from its general
meaning in ordinary contexts.
9. Statutes: Words and Phrases. When legal terms of art are used in stat-
utes, they are to be construed according to their term of art meaning.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 07:54 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
10. Statutes. It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into
a statute that is not warranted by the language; neither is it within the
province of a court to read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of
a statute.
11. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. If the district court, sitting as an
intermediate appellate court, lacked jurisdiction over a party’s appeal,
a higher appellate court also lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of
the appeal.
Appeal from the District Court for Frontier County: James
E. Doyle IV, Judge. Affirmed.
George G. Vinton for appellants.
Donald G. Blankenau and Kennon G. Meyer, of Blankenau,
Wilmoth & Jarecke, L.L.P., for appellees.
Funke, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Papik, and
Freudenberg, JJ.
Funke, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
The Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection
Act (NGWMPA) allows a person aggrieved by an order of
a natural resources district issued under the NGWMPA to
appeal the order. 1 The question before us is whether a let-
ter denying an application to pool ground water from several
registered wells, coupled with a copy of that application that
was marked as “[d]enied,” is an order of a natural resources
district under the NGWMPA. Because the relevant letter, with
the accompanying application, is not an “order” as that term
is defined in the NGWMPA, we affirm the order of the district
court dismissing the appellants’ petition for review.
BACKGROUND
Factual Background
The 	appellants, 	Bryan 	Hauxwell 	and 	Ami 	Hauxwell,
are farmers who use ground water and surface water to
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 46-701 to 46-756 (Reissue 2021).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
irrigate 	properties 	located 	within 	the 	Middle 	Republican
Natural Resources District. Since 2020, the Hauxwells have
been involved in litigation with the Middle Republican Natural
Resources District, its chairperson, and its general manager
(collectively NRD) about the Hauxwells’ irrigation practices
and the NRD’s response to those practices. 2
Hauxwells’ Request to Pool
Ground Water Denied
While this litigation was ongoing, the Hauxwells submit-
ted a “request to pool the use of ground water” from several
registered wells for the 2023 to 2027 allocation period. Several
weeks later, the Hauxwells received a letter stating that their
application was denied. As the apparent basis for denial, the
letter cited NRD rule “6-1.12.” This rule, which is not other-
wise reflected in the record on appeal, is quoted in the letter
as stating that the NRD may deny a pooling application “for
any reason, including but not limited to, violations of the
[d]istrict’s [r]ules, [r]egulations, or controls.” The letter invited
the Hauxwells to contact the NRD if they had questions.
Attached to the letter was the first page of the Hauxwells’
application, which was marked as “[d]enied” in a box labeled
“[f]or [d]istrict use only.” We hereinafter refer to the letter and
the attached application collectively as “the letter.”
The letter was seemingly sent after a meeting of the NRD
board of directors at which the board voted to deny the
Hauxwells’ application. The Hauxwells also allegedly spoke
with the NRD’s general manager after receiving the letter and
were informed that the application was denied due to “‘pend-
ing litigation.’” However, the information about the board
meeting and the Hauxwells’ conversation with the general
manager comes solely from the parties’ pleadings and other fil-
ings. There is no evidence of the meeting or the conversation
in the record on appeal.
2 See Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD, ante p. 1, ___ N.W.3d ___
(2025).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
Hauxwells’ Petition for Review
The Hauxwells filed a “Petition for Review” with the dis-
trict court for Frontier County, Nebraska, under the NGWMPA
and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 3 challenging
the denial of their pooling application. In the petition, the
Hauxwells alleged that the denial of their application violated
their constitutional rights and was arbitrary and capricious.
The Hauxwells also alleged that the denial was contrary to a
court order in another case staying penalties that the NRD had
imposed on the Hauxwells. One of those penalties was that
the Hauxwells “shall not receive the benefit of any pooling
agreements.” The Hauxwells asked the court to reverse the
denial of their pooling application and to order that the appli-
cation be granted. The Hauxwells also sought attorney fees
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1803 (Reissue 2016) on the ground
that the NRD’s position was not substantially justified.
NRD’s Motion to Dismiss
The NRD moved to dismiss the Hauxwells’ petition for lack
of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. The NRD argued that the letter denying the
Hauxwells’ pooling application was not “entitled to judicial
review under the APA,” because the letter was not a “final
agency action or an order of the [natural resources district] in
a contested case.” The NRD based this argument on the APA’s
definition of a “[c]ontested case” as a proceeding before an
agency wherein the parties’ legal rights, duties, or privileges
are required by law or constitutional right to be determined
after a hearing. 4 The NRD argued that no agency adjudica-
tory hearing was required or held in this case. Instead, the
NRD argued that the Hauxwells’ petition for review “simply
. . . reimagin[ed]” an earlier lawsuit between the same parties
that was dismissed, in part, on sovereign immunity grounds.
3 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 84-901 to 84-920 (Reissue 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2022).
4 See § 84-901(3).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
The NRD claimed that sovereign immunity similarly barred
the present petition. The NRD also sought attorney fees under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-824 (Reissue 2016) on the ground that the
Hauxwells’ claims were frivolous.
Hauxwells’ Response to
Motion to Dismiss
The Hauxwells filed a response to the NRD’s motion to dis-
miss, contesting, among other things, the NRD’s claim that the
petition was “not entitled to judicial review under the APA.”
Primarily, the Hauxwells argued that the NRD “conflate[d]
‘contested case’” as defined in the APA with an appeal under
§ 46-750 of the NGWMPA. The Hauxwells argued that natural
resources districts are not “agencies” under the APA and, thus,
are not subject to the APA’s provisions regarding contested
cases. Instead, the Hauxwells argued that § 46-750 permits any
person aggrieved by any order of a natural resources district to
appeal the order. The Hauxwells argued that the denial of their
pooling application was an “order” of a natural resources dis-
trict for purposes of § 46-750. Relatedly, the Hauxwells argued
that nothing in § 46-750 states that the order appealed from
must be the result of an adjudicatory hearing.
Hauxwells’ Motions to Stay Denial of Pooling
Application, Supplement Record, and
Disqualify NRD’s Counsel
In their response to the NRD’s motion to dismiss, the
Hauxwells moved to stay the denial of their pooling applica-
tion. The Hauxwells also sought to supplement the record on
the ground that their application was denied without a hearing
and without “making any kind of a record.” In addition, the
Hauxwells sought to disqualify the NRD’s counsel from the
present proceeding because he had served as the hearing officer
at an earlier hearing where the Hauxwells were found to have
violated the NRD’s rules and regulations.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
Ami’s Affidavit Filed
Contemporaneously with their response to the motion to
dismiss and the motions described above, the Hauxwells filed
an affidavit by Ami, recounting what she viewed as the rel-
evant circumstances surrounding the denial of the pooling
application. Attached to the affidavit were several exhibits,
including the court order staying the penalties the NRD had
imposed against the Hauxwells. The Hauxwells subsequently
sought to introduce the affidavit into evidence at the hearing
on the motion to dismiss, but the district court declined to
admit it, as discussed below.
Briefing and Hearing Before District Court
Thereafter, in briefing and at a hearing before the district
court, the NRD argued that the court lacked jurisdiction
because the letter denying the Hauxwells’ pooling application
did not arise from a contested case, and “only decisions made
through a contested case” may be appealed under § 84-917(1)
of the APA. Relatedly, the NRD argued that there was no
requirement for an adjudicatory hearing regarding a pooling
application and that “[b]ecause there was no hearing, there
[was] no record from which an appeal may be conducted.”
The NRD argued that the Hauxwells’ petition “must be dis-
missed” on this basis alone. However, the NRD also argued
that a pooling agreement was not a “‘protected entitlement’”
and could be granted or denied by government officials in
their discretion. As to Ami’s affidavit, the NRD argued that it
should not be admitted into evidence because the APA limits
the court’s review to the record of the agency. 5
The Hauxwells, in turn, argued that “any hearings by [a
natural resources district] are not ‘contested cases’ as defined
in the APA.” The Hauxwells acknowledged that the NGWMPA
calls for an appeal of an order of a natural resources district
to be “taken in accordance with the APA.” However, the
5 See § 84-917(5)(a).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
Hauxwells argued that this does not mean that the APA’s
provisions requiring a “final decision in a contested case”
apply to appeals under the NGWMPA, given the NGWMPA’s
broad reference to “any order” of a natural resources district.
The Hauxwells also pointed to NRD rules and regulations
that they claimed “entitle[d] a farmer to pool,” as well as the
“economic damage” they allegedly sustained from the “denial
of pooling,” with the apparent implication that this showed a
protected entitlement. As to Ami’s affidavit, the Hauxwells
argued that it was admissible because it was offered only in
connection with the motion to dismiss. The district court took
matters under advisement.
After the hearing, and while the court’s decision was pend-
ing, the NRD filed a notice of supplemental authority, citing
Dodge Cty. Humane Soc. v. City of Fremont 6 as further proof
that certain actions by government officials are not judicial
in nature. The Hauxwells countered that Dodge Cty. Humane
Soc. did not involve an appeal under the NGWMPA. The
Hauxwells also argued that Ami’s affidavit was admissible
under Prokop v. Lower Loup NRD 7 as evidence of “procedural
irregularities” denying them due process.
District Court’s Order
The district court dismissed the Hauxwells’ petition for
“fail[ure] to state a basis for appeal.” The court found that
no contested case was involved because no hearing was held
regarding the Hauxwells’ pooling application. Instead, the
court found that the NRD board considered the application at
a “[r]egular business meeting[].”
Relying on Dodge Cty. Humane Soc., the court found there
was no indication that the board acted in a “quasi-judicial
manner” in denying the pooling application. The court simi-
larly concluded that the letter denying the Hauxwells’ pooling
6 Dodge Cty. Humane Soc. v. City of Fremont, 314 Neb. 714, 992 N.W.2d
747 (2023).
7 Prokop v. Lower Loup NRD, 302 Neb. 10, 921 N.W.2d 375 (2019).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
application was not a “‘record’ of the board’s action on the
application,” but, rather, “the general manager’s apparent action
in response to the board’s action.” As such, the court reasoned
that “[w]ithout a final order of the decision-making body and
without a record of the action taken by the decision-making
body, no basis for review has been stated.”
The district court declined to admit Ami’s affidavit and
overruled the Hauxwells’ motion to supplement the record. The
Hauxwells’ motions to disqualify the NRD’s counsel and to
stay the denial of their pooling application were also overruled,
as were both parties’ motions for attorney fees.
The Hauxwells timely appealed, and we moved the matter
to our docket. 8
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The Hauxwells assign, restated and consolidated, that the
district court erred in (1) granting the NRD’s motion to dis-
miss their petition for review and failing to find that the let-
ter denying their pooling application was an order subject to
appeal under the NGWMPA, (2) sustaining the NRD’s objec-
tion to Ami’s affidavit, and (3) failing to grant their motions to
supplement the record, to disqualify the NRD’s counsel, and
for attorney fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Both the Hauxwells and the NRD point to the following
standard of review: A judgment or final order rendered by a
district court in a judicial review pursuant to the APA may be
reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for errors
appearing on the record. 9 When reviewing an order of a dis-
trict court under the APA for errors appearing on the record,
the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is
8 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
9 Uhrich & Brown Ltd. Part. v. Middle Republican NRD, 315 Neb. 596, 998
N.W.2d 41 (2023).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary,
capricious, nor unreasonable. 10
[1-3] This, however, is an appeal from an order sustaining
a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction. Appellate
review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is de novo. 11
A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual dispute
is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law, which
requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion independent
of the lower court’s decision. 12 Statutory interpretation is a
question of law that an appellate court resolves independently
of the trial court. 13
ANALYSIS
We begin with the Hauxwells’ arguments regarding the
NGWMPA because we find them to be dispositive. Insofar as
it found that the letter denying the Hauxwells’ pooling appli-
cation did not arise from a contested case, the district court
essentially found that it lacked jurisdiction over the present
matter. 14 The Hauxwells claim that the district court erred in
so finding because the letter was an order subject to appeal
under the NGWMPA.
[4] Ultimately, for the reasons set forth below, we agree
with the district court that jurisdiction is lacking, although
we base that conclusion on somewhat different grounds than
those set forth by the district court. When the record demon-
strates that the decision of the trial court is correct, although
10 Id.
11 In re Application A-19594, 315 Neb. 311, 995 N.W.2d 655 (2023).
12 Dodge Cty. Humane Soc., supra note 6.
13 Mullins v. Box Butte County, 317 Neb. 937, 13 N.W.3d 67 (2024).
14 See, e.g., Purdie v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 292 Neb. 524, 872
N.W.2d 895 (2016); Kaplan v. McClurg, 271 Neb. 101, 710 N.W.2d 96
(2006); Charity Field Farms v. Board of Ed. Lands & Funds, 27 Neb. App.
276, 930 N.W.2d 581 (2019); Kerr v. Board of Regents, 15 Neb. App. 907,
739 N.W.2d 224 (2007).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
such correctness is based on different grounds from those
assigned by the trial court, an appellate court will affirm. 15
Legal Framework
[5,6] As we have previously explained, in Nebraska, the
right to appeal is purely statutory in that the right does not
exist unless a statute provides for an appeal. 16 In other words,
the requirements of a statute underlying a right to appeal
are mandatory and must be complied with before the appel-
late court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action. 17
For example, in Purdie v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 18
we found that the courts lacked jurisdiction over an inmate’s
challenge to his level of custody because the agency’s deci-
sion regarding his custody level was not made in a “contested
case” as defined in the APA. In so doing, we held that by
statute, the presence of a “contested case” is a predicate to
jurisdiction in a case under § 84-917 of the APA. 19
More recently, in Dodge Cty. Humane Soc., we found that
the courts lacked jurisdiction over a petition in error challeng-
ing a city’s decision to terminate the petitioner’s contract. 20
We did so because the petition in error statute requires that the
challenged judgment or order be made by an entity “‘exercis-
ing judicial functions.’” 21 However, we found that the city
council was not exercising judicial functions when it approved
the letter terminating the petitioner’s contract. 22
15 State v. Pauly, 311 Neb. 418, 972 N.W.2d 907 (2022).
16 Swicord v. Police Stds. Adv. Council, 314 Neb. 816, 993 N.W.2d 327
(2023).
17 Id.
18 Purdie, supra note 14.
19 See id.
20 Dodge Cty. Humane Soc., supra note 6.
21 Id. at 719, 992 N.W.2d at 752 (emphasis omitted).
22 Dodge Cty. Humane Soc., supra note 6.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
In the present case, two different acts are cited in reference
to jurisdiction over the Hauxwells’ appeal. One of those acts is
the APA. The APA entitles “[a]ny person aggrieved by a final
decision in a contested case” to judicial review under the act. 23
The APA defines a “[c]ontested case” to mean “a proceeding
before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privi-
leges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional
right to be determined after an agency hearing.” 24 The term
“[a]gency” is further defined in the APA to mean “each board,
commission, department, officer, division, or other administra-
tive office or unit of the state government authorized by law to
make rules and regulations,” with certain exceptions. 25 Based
on the latter definition, in particular, we have held that natural
resources districts are not “agencies” under the APA. 26
The other relevant act is the NGWMPA. The NGWMPA
authorizes “[a]ny person aggrieved by any order” of a “dis-
trict” issued pursuant to the NGWMPA to “appeal the order.
The appeal shall be in accordance with the [APA].” 27 The
NGWMPA defines a “[d]istrict” to mean “a natural resources
district operating pursuant to Chapter 2, article 32 [of the
Nebraska Revised Statutes].” 28 The NGWMPA also defines the
term “[o]rder,” “except as otherwise specifically provided,” to
“include[] any order required by the [NGWMPA], by rule or
regulation, or by a decision adopted by a district by vote of the
board of directors of the district taken at any regularly sched-
uled or specially scheduled meeting of the board.” 29
23 § 84-917(1).
24 § 84-901(3).
25 § 84-901(1).
26 See Lingenfelter v. Lower Elkhorn NRD, 294 Neb. 46, 73, 881 N.W.2d
892, 912 (2016).
27 § 46-750. See, also, Medicine Creek v. Middle Republican NRD, 296 Neb.
1, 892 N.W.2d 74 (2017).
28 § 46-706(4).
29 § 46-706(26).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
Parties’ Arguments
Although the Hauxwells initially based their petition for
review partly on the authority of the APA, on appeal, they do
not appear to dispute that the letter was not issued in a “con-
tested case” as defined in the APA. Instead, the Hauxwells
argue that the letter was appealable under § 46-750 of the
NGWMPA.
In particular, as relevant here, the Hauxwells argue that the
letter was an “order” of the NRD as defined in § 46-706(26)
of the NGWMPA. The Hauxwells point to another section of
the NGWMPA and several NRD rules and regulations, with
the apparent implication that these authorities “required” the
issuance of the letter. They also observe that the decision to
deny their pooling application was “made at a regular board
meeting.” 30 In addition, the Hauxwells argue that nothing in
§ 46-750 or § 46-706(26) states that an order must arise from
an adjudicatory hearing. The Hauxwells similarly argue that
the APA’s “contested case” requirement does not apply to
appeals under § 46-750, even if those proceedings are other-
wise required to be in accordance with the APA.
The NRD, on the other hand, argues that for the NGWMPA
to operate “within Nebraska’s [c]onstitutional separation of
powers and principles of justiciability,” the statute must be
construed to permit only appeals that arise from “contested
case proceeding[s] in which the [NRD] was acting in an
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial capacity.” 31 The NRD points to
several opinions of this court, which the NRD claims prove
that for an appeal to be justiciable, “it must emerge from
a contested case required by statute or constitution.” 32 The
30 Brief for appellants at 24.
31 Brief for appellees at 15.
32 Id. at 16. See, also, Dodge Cty. Humane Soc., supra note 6; Champion v.
Hall County, 309 Neb. 55, 958 N.W.2d 396 (2021); Hawkins v. City of
Omaha, 261 Neb. 943, 627 N.W.2d 118 (2001); Stoneman v. United Neb.
Bank, 254 Neb. 477, 577 N.W.2d 271 (1998); Kropp v. Grand Island Pub.
Sch. Dist. No. 2, 246 Neb. 138, 517 N.W.2d 113 (1994); Charity Field
Farms, supra note 14; Kerr, supra note 14.

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HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
NRD argues that § 46-750 “mirror[s] this foundational prin-
ciple” by requiring appeals to proceed under the APA. 33 In
other words, the NRD suggests that § 46-750’s requirement
that appeals proceed under the APA effectively incorporates
the provisions in § 84-917(1) of the APA requiring a final
decision in a contested case.
Letter Is Not Order Under NGWMPA
Even assuming that the Hauxwells are aggrieved and that
the other requirements of § 46-750 are met, the letter here
cannot be seen as an order under the NGWMPA. In so con-
cluding, we observe that the definition of “order” currently
set forth in § 46-706(26) of the NGWMPA is not as clear as
might be desired, perhaps due to its origins. That definition
was added to the NGWMPA in 2004, 34 as part of a bill that
“implement[ed] the changes in Nebraska’s water policy that
were recommended by the Water Policy Task Force.” 35 One of
those changes was a definition of the term “order” that does
not state what the term “order” “is” or “means.” 36 Rather, it
states that the term “includes” certain specified orders. 37
[7] As we have previously explained, the word “include,”
as used in a statute, connotes that the provided list of com-
ponents is not exhaustive and that there are other items
includable that are not specifically enumerated. 38 Consistent
with that principle, the definition of “order” in § 46-706(26)
33 Brief for appellees at 17.
34 See 2004 Neb. Laws, L.B. 962, § 46.
35 See Introducer’s Statement of Intent, L.B. 962, Natural Resources
Committee, 98th Leg., 2d Sess. (Jan. 21, 2004). See, also, Committee
Statement, L.B. 962, Natural Resources Committee, 98th Leg., 2d Sess.
(Jan 21, 2004).
36 See Nebraska Water Policy Task Force, Report of the Nebraska Water
Policy Task Force to the 2003 Nebraska Legislature, https://govdocs.
nebraska.gov/epubs/N1500/B003-2003.pdf (last visited May 14, 2025).
37 Id.
38 E.g., State v. Knight, 311 Neb. 485, 973 N.W.2d 356 (2022).

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HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
requires us to consider what orders, beyond those specifically
enumerated in that subsection, constitute orders for purposes
of § 46-706(26).
[8,9] Here, we must acknowledge the fact that generally,
the term “order” is a legal term of art. A legal term of art
is a word or phrase having a specific, precise meaning in a
given specialty apart from its general meaning in ordinary
contexts. 39 When legal terms of art are used in statutes, they
are to be construed according to their term of art meaning. 40
As relevant here, the meaning of “order” as a term of art is
“‘the mandate or determination of the court upon some sub-
sidiary or collateral matter . . . not disposing of the merits, but
adjudicating a preliminary point or directing some step in the
proceedings.’” 41 This is essentially the same definition that
the Nebraska Legislature has given to the term for purposes
of courts and civil procedure. 42 Notably, the term “order” is
used in contradistinction to the term “judgment.” 43 “[J]udg-
ment” denotes “[a] court’s final determination of the rights
and obligations of the parties in a case.” 44
Our review of the NGWMPA suggests that “order” is
not always used as a term of art in that act. For example,
§ 46-712 of the NGWMPA calls for natural resources districts
contemplating the establishment of a ground water manage-
ment area to conduct a public hearing and then issue an
order either determining that no management area shall be
39 Mullins, supra note 13.
40 Id.
41 Black’s Law Dictionary 1270 (10th ed. 2014) (quoting 1 Henry Campbell
Black, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments § 1 (2d ed. 1902)).
42 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-914 (Reissue 2016) (“[e]very direction of a court
or judge, made or entered in writing and not included in a judgment, is an
order”).
43 See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 41 at 970, 1270.
44 Id. at 970. See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024)
(“[a] judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an
action”).

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HAUXWELL v. MIDDLE REPUBLICAN NRD
Cite as 319 Neb. 28
established or designating the area as a management area
and adopting authorized controls. 45 We presume that it is
“orders,” such as this, that the Nebraska Water Policy Task
Force and the Legislature had in mind when they specified in
§ 46-706(26) that “[o]rder, except as otherwise specifically
provided, includes any order . . .” required by the NGWMPA,
a rule or regulation, or a decision adopted by the board of
directors of a natural resources district. However, because
the term “includes” is not exhaustive, we cannot construe the
term “order” in § 46-706(26) to include only the orders listed.
Instead, we must construe it to encompass either an order
in the term-of-art sense or an order specifically enumerated
within the statutory definition. In other words, as this case
illustrates, not every decision or action of a natural resources
district is an order subject to appeal.
Here, the letter upon which the Hauxwells rely is not an
order in either sense of the term. The letter was not issued as
part of any case or proceeding to which the Hauxwells and
the NRD were parties. The board did not receive evidence or
testimony into an official record or render a decision in an
adversarial proceeding consistent with due process when it
voted to deny the Hauxwells’ pooling application. Instead, the
board merely took a vote regarding an application for pool-
ing, a vote that apparently prompted the general manager to
send the letter in question to the Hauxwells. In other words,
the situation here is analogous to that in Dodge Cty. Humane
Soc., even if that case involved a different statutory frame-
work. 46 The Hauxwells are correct that the statute at issue in
Dodge Cty. Humane Soc. expressly refers to an entity exercis-
ing “judicial functions,” 47 while § 46-750 does not. However,
45 See, also, §§ 46-718(1) and (2), 46-719(2)(b) and (c), 46-724 through
46-726(2) and (3), 46-728(2), and 46-739.
46 See Dodge Cty. Humane Soc., supra note 6.
47 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1901 (Reissue 2016).

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when used as a term of art, the term “order” itself implies
judicial functions, as explained above. 48
The letter also cannot be seen to be among the orders
specified as “include[d]” within the definition of “order”
in § 46-706(26). As quoted above, § 46-706(26) expressly
includes orders “required” by the NGWMPA, a rule or regu-
lation, or a decision adopted by the board of directors of a
natural resources district. However, the Hauxwells do not
point to any authority that required the purported order in this
case. The statute cited by the Hauxwells, § 46-707(1)(a), says
only that a natural resources district “may . . . [a]dopt and
promulgate rules and regulations.” The rules and regulations
referenced by the Hauxwells similarly state only that pooling
is allowable but may be denied for violating the NRD’s rules
and regulations. The Hauxwells say nothing about the content
of the board’s decision; they merely observe that such decision
was adopted at a scheduled board meeting.
[10] When pressed at oral arguments about what required
the purported order here, the Hauxwells pointed to the word
“aggrieved” in § 46-750, with the apparent implication that
the letter is an “order” because they are allegedly aggrieved
by it. We decline to adopt such an approach. To do so would
effectively read the word “required” out of § 46-706(26) and
instead allow appeals under the NGWMPA whenever persons
claim to be aggrieved by orders issued pursuant to the act. It
is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into
a statute that is not warranted by the language; neither is it
within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct, or
unambiguous out of a statute. 49
We are cognizant of the Hauxwells’ argument that “not
all the [NRD] pooling rules and regulations” are part of the
48 Cf., Medicine Creek, supra note 27; Central Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v.
North Platte NRD, 280 Neb. 533, 788 N.W.2d 252 (2010).
49 State v. Jones, 317 Neb. 559, 10 N.W.3d 747 (2024).

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record in the present case. 50 That is true, and the absence of an
allegedly relevant NRD regulation from the record could pose
difficulties in a future case. However, we leave that question
for an appropriate future case because the Hauxwells do not
cite any rule or regulation not in evidence here that they claim
required the letter. We note that nothing in this opinion should
be read to determine that the denial of a pooling application
can never be subject to appeal. Rather, our conclusion is based
on the facts and circumstances surrounding the specific denial
in this case.
[11] Because the letter in question is not an “order” as
defined in the NGWMPA, the district court lacked jurisdiction
over the Hauxwells’ appeal. This means that we, too, lack juris-
diction. If the district court, sitting as an intermediate appel-
late court, lacked jurisdiction over a party’s appeal, a higher
appellate court also lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits
of the appeal. 51 Therefore, we do not reach the merits of the
Hauxwells’ arguments regarding the exclusion of Ami’s affida-
vit and the denial of their motions to supplement the record, to
disqualify the NRD’s counsel, and for attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
Because the denial of the Hauxwells’ pooling application
was not an “order” as defined in the NGWMPA, both the dis-
trict court and this court lack jurisdiction over their petition
for review. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district
court dismissing the Hauxwells’ petition for review.
Affirmed.
50 Brief for appellants at 25.
51 Johnson v. Vosberg, 316 Neb. 658, 6 N.W.3d 216 (2024).