Prinz v. Omaha Operations

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
Jennifer Prinz, appellee, v. Omaha Operations LLC,
doing business as Emerald Nursing &
Rehab Omaha, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed September 27, 2024. 	No. S-23-994.
1. Appeal and Error. As a threshold matter, an appellate court must
determine what assignments of error were properly raised and argued
on appeal.
2. Rules of the Supreme Court: Appeal and Error. The cross-appeal
section of an appellate brief must set forth a separate title page, a table
of contents, a statement of the case, assigned errors, propositions of law,
and a statement of the facts.
3. ____: ____. When a brief of an appellee fails to present a proper cross-
appeal pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109 (rev. 2023), an appellate
court declines to consider its merits.
4. Workers’ Compensation: Appeal and Error. An appellate court may
modify, reverse, or set aside a Workers’ Compensation Court decision
only when (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its
powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3)
there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the
making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by
the compensation court do not support the order or award.
5. ____: ____. On appellate review, the factual findings made by the trial
judge of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court have the effect of
a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.
6. Workers’ Compensation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. In testing
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact in a work-
ers’ compensation case, an appellate court considers the evidence in the
light most favorable to the successful party, every controverted fact must
be resolved in favor of the successful party, and the appellate court gives
the successful party the benefit of every inference reasonably deducible
from the evidence.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:28 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
7. Workers’ Compensation: Proof. In order to recover under the Nebraska
Workers’ Compensation Act, a claimant has the burden of proving by the
greater weight of the evidence that an accident or occupational disease
arising out of and occurring in the course of employment proximately
caused an injury which resulted in disability compensable under the act.
8. Workers’ Compensation: Evidence: Appeal and Error. Admission of
evidence is within the discretion of the Workers’ Compensation Court,
whose determination in this regard will not be reversed upon appeal
absent an abuse of discretion.
9. Expert Witnesses. Expert testimony should not be received if it appears
the witness is not in possession of such facts as will enable him or her to
express a reasonably accurate conclusion, as distinguished from a mere
guess or conjecture.
10. Trial: Expert Witnesses. It is within the trial court’s discretion to deter-
mine whether there is sufficient foundation for an expert witness to give
his or her opinion about an issue in question.
11. Expert Witnesses: Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not a
superexpert and will not lay down categorically which factors and prin-
ciples an expert may or may not consider; such matters go to the weight
and credibility of the opinion itself and not to its admissibility.
12. Workers’ 	Compensation: 	Expert 	Witnesses: 	Physicians 	and
Surgeons. The Workers’ Compensation Court is the sole judge of the
credibility and weight to be given medical opinions, even when the
health care providers do not give live testimony.
13. Trial: Expert Witnesses. An objection to the opinion of an expert based
upon the lack of certainty in the opinion is an objection based upon rel-
evance and not upon foundation.
14. Workers’ Compensation: Expert Witnesses. If the nature and effect
of a claimant’s injury are not plainly apparent, then the claimant must
provide expert medical testimony showing a causal connection between
the injury and the claimed disability.
15. ____: ____. Although a claimant’s medical expert does not have to couch
his or her opinion in the magic words “reasonable medical certainty” or
“reasonable probability,” the opinion must be sufficient to establish
the crucial causal link between the claimant’s injuries and the accident
occurring in the course and scope of the claimant’s employment.
16. Workers’ Compensation: Evidence: Expert Witnesses. Expert medi-
cal testimony based upon “could,” “may,” or “possibly” lacks the defi-
niteness required to support an award from the Workers’ Compensation
Court.
17. Trial: Proximate Cause. The determination of causation is ordinarily a
matter for the trier of fact.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
18. Workers’ Compensation: Expert Witnesses. It is the role of the
Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court as the trier of fact to determine
which, if any, expert witnesses to believe.
19. Expert Witnesses: Physicians and Surgeons: Appeal and Error. An
appellate court examines the sufficiency of a medical expert’s statements
from the expert’s entire opinion and the record as a whole.
20. Workers’ Compensation: Evidence: Appeal and Error. If the record
contains evidence to substantiate the factual conclusions reached by the
trial judge in workers’ compensation cases, an appellate court is pre-
cluded from substituting its view of the facts for that of the compensa-
tion court.
21. Workers’ Compensation. A workers’ compensation award cannot be
based on mere possibility or speculation.
Appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Court: Daniel R.
Fridrich, Judge. Affirmed.
Kaitlyn J. Coenen, of Prentiss Grant, L.L.C., for appellant.
Staci Hartman-Nelson, of Hartman-Nelson Law Office, for
appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Cassel, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
An employer appeals from a workers’ compensation award,
in which the compensation court made detailed factual findings
and awarded Jennifer Prinz indemnity benefits, past medical
expenses, and future medical care. As a matter of first impres-
sion, we consider Prinz’ medical expert’s use of the word
“associated” when opining on the causal connection between
the alleged work accident and her injury. On this record, we
see no clear error in the compensation court’s finding that
Prinz suffered from an injury proximately caused by a work
accident. We affirm the compensation court’s judgment.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
II. BACKGROUND
1. Work Accident and Prinz’ Injury
These facts are generally recited from the compensation
court’s award. Prinz was hired as a housekeeper for Omaha
Operations LLC, doing business as Emerald Nursing & Rehab
Omaha (Emerald), in late February 2020, shortly before the
onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. At some point, Emerald
put in place safety protocols to help control the spread of
COVID-19.
On July 17, 2020, Prinz learned that she was required to
wear an “N95 mask” during her shift and that Emerald had
acquired an ultraviolet “sterilizer machine” that cleaned used
N95 masks so they could be reused by Emerald’s employees.
When Prinz retrieved an N95 mask from the sterilizer machine
and placed it on her face, she felt a “burning sensation” and
then had difficulty breathing. Another employee called an
ambulance, which transported Prinz to a hospital. Prinz worked
her final shift for Emerald the next day.
Three days later, Prinz sought treatment from a family
care physician, Dr. Derek Marshall. She continued to see
Marshall at followup appointments for persistent respiratory
issues. Prinz also sought treatment from a pulmonologist, who
ultimately diagnosed her with “moderate persistent asthma.”
2. Petition
Prinz filed a petition in the Workers’ Compensation Court
against Emerald, claiming she suffered an injury from an acci-
dent on July 17, 2020, arising out of and in the course of her
employment. Prinz requested payment of medical expenses
and of temporary total disability benefits, a determination of
loss of earning capacity, and entitlement to permanent partial
disability benefits, vocational rehabilitation benefits, and pen-
alties, interest, and attorney fees.
Emerald filed an answer admitting that it employed Prinz
on July 17, 2020, but it denied that the alleged work accident

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
or injury occurred, that Prinz suffered an injury related to her
work, and that Prinz was disabled to the extent she claimed.
3. Trial Evidence
More than 3 years after the mask incident, the compensa-
tion court held a 2-day trial. The only witnesses to testify were
Prinz and her former supervisor at Emerald. The court also
received medical evidence. Pursuant to our standard of review,
this summary is recited in the light most favorable to Prinz.
Prinz 	presented 	evidence 	that 	her 	persistent 	respiratory
issues were caused by the alleged work accident. The court
received the medical records of both of Prinz’ treating physi-
cians, which described numerous objective tests performed on
her. Marshall first examined Prinz 3 days after the incident. He
then saw her for several followup appointments regarding her
respiratory problems.
Pursuant to a request from Prinz’ counsel, Marshall authored
a report summarizing his evaluations of Prinz and providing
his opinion in this case. Marshall opined, in pertinent part:
[Prinz] did not have any known or documented respira-
tory conditions prior to the onset of her symptoms [on]
July 17, 2020. Therefore, it was not an aggravation of
any known previous respiratory issues. She reported to
me that her respiratory issues (now known to be asthma)
started immediately after putting on a reused UV-treated
N95 mask. There is no readily available test that can
show causality between the exposure and her respiratory
issues. However, I think there is reasonable degree of
medical certainty that the two are associated as there were
no other triggers identified.
The pulmonologist first evaluated Prinz approximately 6
weeks after the incident on a referral from Marshall. Because
of the time that had passed since the incident, the pulmonolo-
gist declined to opine on the cause of her respiratory issues.
But the pulmonologist opined “there was a change in [Prinz’]
condition” on July 17, 2020, and he generally agreed with
Marshall that her symptoms started on that day.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
Prinz testified that she had suffered from respiratory issues
since the incident on July 17, 2020. She also testified that prior
to the incident, she had no respiratory problems. Other than
a handful of unrelated doctor visits, there is no evidence that
Prinz received medical treatment from 2017 to 2020.
Although Emerald denied any causal connection between the
incident and Prinz’ respiratory issues, it did not present expert
opinion evidence identifying a different source of Prinz’ symp-
toms or stating that her respiratory issues were not caused by
the alleged work accident. Instead, Emerald posited that Prinz
had a history of “breathing problems” and that her account of
the events on July 17, 2020, was inaccurate.
4. Compensation Court’s Award
The compensation court entered a written award finding that
on July 17, 2020, Prinz suffered an injury to her respiratory
system in an accident arising out of and in the course of her
employment with Emerald. The court awarded Prinz temporary
total and permanent partial disability benefits, past medical
expenses, and future medical care.
In the award, the compensation court expressly acknowl-
edged the parties’ disagreement regarding whether Prinz’ respi-
ratory issues were caused by the July 17, 2020, incident. But,
after stating that it had carefully reviewed all of the evidence,
it concluded the evidence supported a finding of causation. In
particular, the compensation court found Prinz had no preex-
isting history of respiratory problems before the July 17 work
accident. Moreover, it found Marshall’s opinion “both legally
sufficient and persuasive given the timing of the events and the
objective evidence that something happened to [Prinz] on July
17, 2020.” In making that finding, the court rejected Emerald’s
contention that Marshall’s opinion lacked foundation. The
court also noted consistencies in the pulmonologist’s state-
ments and the absence of a contrary medical opinion. Finally,
the compensation court found Prinz’ testimony credible and
supported by the objective tests in evidence.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
In determining the amount of the award, the compensation
court found that Prinz sustained a 30-percent loss of earning
capacity. In analyzing the issue, the court “reviewed in detail
[Prinz’] testimony regarding her abilities and limitations, . . .
Marshall’s restrictions, and the four factors used to determine
a loss of earning capacity” as set forth in our case law.
Emerald filed a timely appeal, which we moved to our
docket, 1 and Prinz filed a purported cross-appeal.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Emerald assigns, consolidated and renumbered, that the
compensation court erred in (1) finding Prinz suffered an injury
to her respiratory system in an accident arising out of and in
the course of her employment and (2) finding Prinz sustained a
30-percent loss of earning capacity.
[1-3] Prinz attempted to raise a cross-appeal challenging
certain determinations of the compensation court, but she
failed to separately assign errors as the basis for the purported
cross-appeal. As a threshold matter, an appellate court must
determine what assignments of error were properly raised
and argued on appeal. 2 Pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. App. P.
§ 2-109(D)(4) (rev. 2023), the cross-appeal section of an
appellate brief must set forth a separate title page, a table of
contents, a statement of the case, assigned errors, propositions
of law, and a statement of the facts. 3 Although Prinz’ brief con-
tains at least one subheading purporting to assign error, such
subheadings do not satisfy the requirements of our appellate
rules. 4 When a brief of an appellee fails to present a proper
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
2 Fentress v. Westin, Inc., 304 Neb. 619, 935 N.W.2d 911 (2019).
3 Id.
4 See § 2-109(D)(1). See, also, Fentress v. Westin, Inc., supra note 2, 304
Neb. at 627, 935 N.W.2d at 920 (subheading in brief on cross-appeal was
“not an acceptable substitute for a proper assignment of error”).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
cross-appeal pursuant to § 2-109, an appellate court declines to
consider its merits. 5 We do not address it further.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[4] An appellate court may modify, reverse, or set aside a
Workers’ Compensation Court decision only when (1) the com-
pensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2)
the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there
is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant
the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the find-
ings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order
or award. 6
[5,6] On appellate review, the factual findings made by the
trial judge of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court have
the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless
clearly wrong. 7 In testing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings of fact in a workers’ compensation case,
an appellate court considers the evidence in the light most
favorable to the successful party, every controverted fact must
be resolved in favor of the successful party, and the appellate
court gives the successful party the benefit of every inference
reasonably deducible from the evidence. 8
V. ANALYSIS
1. Proof of Causation
[7] Emerald’s primary contention is that the compensation
court erred in finding that Marshall’s opinion as to causa-
tion had sufficient foundation and in relying on it to find that
Prinz’ injury was causally connected to her employment. The
causal connection is important because it is an element of
5 Fentress v. Westin, Inc., supra note 2.
6 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-185 (Reissue 2021). See, also, Mosher v. Whole
Foods Market, ante p. 26, 8 N.W.3d 733 (2024).
7 Spratt v. Crete Carrier Corp., 311 Neb. 262, 971 N.W.2d 335 (2022).
8 Parks v. Hy-Vee, 307 Neb. 927, 951 N.W.2d 504 (2020).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
Prinz’ claim. In order to recover under the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act, a claimant has the burden of proving by
the greater weight of the evidence that an accident or occu-
pational disease arising out of and occurring in the course of
employment proximately caused an injury which resulted in
disability compensable under the act. 9
In the next sections, we first address Emerald’s arguments
attacking the foundation for Marshall’s opinion. We then con-
sider the sufficiency of the evidence to support the compensa-
tion court’s finding of causation.
(a) Purported Lack of Foundation
for Marshall’s Opinion
[8-10] Admission of evidence is within the discretion of
the Workers’ Compensation Court, whose determination in
this regard will not be reversed upon appeal absent an abuse
of discretion. 10 Expert testimony should not be received if it
appears the witness is not in possession of such facts as will
enable him or her to express a reasonably accurate conclu-
sion, as distinguished from a mere guess or conjecture. 11 It is
within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether there is
sufficient foundation for an expert witness to give his or her
opinion about an issue in question. 12
In the first of three arguments, Emerald contends that
Marshall’s opinion lacked foundation because he disregarded
Prinz’ previous history of “breathing problems.” 13 Emerald
highlights medical records pertaining to a single doctor visit
in November 2017 and an unrelated doctor visit in January
2020 that were received in evidence. The appellate record
9 See Hintz v. Farmers Co-op Assn., 297 Neb. 903, 902 N.W.2d 131 (2017).
10 Fentress v. Westin, Inc., supra note 2.
11 Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 291 Neb. 757, 869 N.W.2d 78 (2015).
12 McGill Restoration v. Lion Place Condo. Assn., 309 Neb. 202, 959 N.W.2d
251 (2021); Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra note 11.
13 Brief for appellant at 13.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
provides no indication that Marshall possessed or considered
those records in forming his opinion. Nonetheless, this argu-
ment lacks merit.
We have previously recognized that there may be instances
where a medical expert is not aware of the claimant’s entire
history, yet there is foundation for the expert’s opinion. In one
case, 14 the claimant asserted she suffered a work-related injury
and offered into evidence a report from an expert witness
who opined as to the causation and extent of the claimant’s
psychological injuries. The employer sought to exclude the
expert’s opinions for lack of foundation because the claimant
was allegedly untruthful about her personal and psychological
history during her interview with the expert.
[11] On appeal in that case, we concluded that the compen-
sation court had not abused its discretion in finding the claim-
ant’s expert’s opinions had sufficient foundation. We reasoned
that whether the expert possessed or considered the entirety
of the claimant’s personal or psychological history in forming
her opinion “ultimately concern[ed] the weight to be given to
[the expert’s] opinions by a trier of fact, rather than the admis-
sibility of the opinions.” 15 We recalled, “An appellate court is
not a superexpert and will not lay down categorically which
factors and principles an expert may or may not consider; such
matters go to the weight and credibility of the opinion itself
and not to its admissibility.” 16
[12] Applying that precedent here, we cannot agree with
Emerald that Marshall’s opinion lacked foundation. Whether
Marshall possessed or considered the entirety of Prinz’ medi-
cal history concerned the weight to be given his opinion by
the trier of fact, rather than the admissibility of his opinion.
As we have said previously, the Workers’ Compensation Court
14 Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra note 11.
15 Id. at 768, 869 N.W.2d at 88.
16 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be given
medical opinions, even when the health care providers do not
give live testimony. 17
Turning to its second argument, Emerald highlights a spe-
cific finding by the compensation court that Prinz’ N95 mask
was not sprayed with chemicals before she attempted to wear
it. Emerald contends that this factual finding “render[ed]” 18
Marshall’s opinion to be without foundation because Marshall
“clearly 	was 	under 	the 	impression 	that 	a 	chemical 	was
sprayed onto [Prinz’] mask before being placed in the steril-
izer machine.” 19
This argument is premised on speculation, and we reject the
notion that the court’s factual finding somehow affected the
foundation for Marshall’s opinion. The evidence shows that
Marshall was one of Prinz’ treating physicians, and his opinion
was based on his in-person evaluations of Prinz and his review
of her medical records following the mask incident. Here,
Marshall was in possession of such facts as would enable him
to express a reasonably accurate conclusion, as distinguished
from a mere guess or conjecture. 20
[13] Finally, Emerald argues that Marshall’s opinion lacked
foundation because he used the word “associated” when opin-
ing on the causal connection between the work accident
and Prinz’ injury. We will consider the level of certainty in
Marshall’s opinion in the next section, when addressing the
sufficiency of the evidence to prove causation. But for pur-
poses of resolving Emerald’s foundation argument, we recall
that an objection to the opinion of an expert based upon the
lack of certainty in the opinion is an objection based upon
17 Damme v. Pike Enters., 289 Neb. 620, 856 N.W.2d 422 (2014).
18 Brief for appellant at 14.
19 Id. at 15.
20 See Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra note 11.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
relevance 21 and not upon foundation. 22 Seeing no merit to
Emerald’s foundation arguments, we conclude that the com-
pensation court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Marshall’s opinion had sufficient foundation to be admitted in
evidence to prove causation.
(b) Sufficiency of Evidence
The next question is the sufficiency of Prinz’ evidence to
prove causation. On this issue, Emerald essentially argues that
Marshall’s use of the word “associated” was insufficient as a
matter of law to establish the causal connection between the
work accident and Prinz’ injury.
Marshall’s opinion is set forth in the background section
above, but we repeat part of it here for the reader’s convenience:
[Prinz] reported to me that her respiratory issues (now
known to be asthma) started immediately after putting
on a reused UV-treated N95 mask. There is no readily
available test that can show causality between the expo-
sure and her respiratory issues. However, I think there is
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the two are
associated as there were no other triggers identified.
[14-16] The law on causation in workers’ compensation
cases is well settled. If the nature and effect of a claimant’s
injury are not plainly apparent, then the claimant must provide
expert medical testimony showing a causal connection between
the injury and the claimed disability. 23 Although a claimant’s
medical expert does not have to couch his or her opinion in
the magic words “reasonable medical certainty” or “reasonable
21 Richardson v. Children’s Hosp., 280 Neb. 396, 787 N.W.2d 235 (2010);
Paulsen v. State, 249 Neb. 112, 541 N.W.2d 636 (1996). See, also, Salem
Grain Co. v. City of Falls City, 302 Neb. 548, 924 N.W.2d 678 (2019)
(relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make existence
of any fact that is of consequence to determination of action more probable
or less probable than it would be without evidence).
22 See, e.g., Paulsen v. State, supra note 21.
23 Hintz v. Farmers Co-op Assn., supra note 9.

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PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
probability,” the opinion must be sufficient to establish the
crucial causal link between the claimant’s injuries and the
accident occurring in the course and scope of the claimant’s
employment. 24 Expert medical testimony based upon “could,”
“may,” or “possibly” lacks the definiteness required to support
an award from the Workers’ Compensation Court. 25
[17-19] We have said that the determination of causation is
ordinarily a matter for the trier of fact. 26 Moreover, it is the role
of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court as the trier of
fact to determine which, if any, expert witnesses to believe. 27
Importantly, an appellate court examines the sufficiency of a
medical expert’s statements from the expert’s entire opinion
and the record as a whole. 28
Having considered the entire evidentiary record, we cannot
say that the compensation court was clearly wrong in finding
that Prinz met her burden to prove causation. The question
here is posed in a workers’ compensation case, where the act
should be construed liberally to carry out its spirit and benefi-
cent purpose of providing compensation to employees injured
on the job. 29 Marshall articulated that his opinion was based
on a reasonable degree of medical certainty. His opinion of
the “associat[ion]” was not based on a mere possibility. The
court, in turn, characterized Marshall’s opinion as “certainly
more definite than the words ‘could,’ ‘may,’ or ‘possibly.’”
The court made an explicit finding that Marshall’s opinion was
“sufficient and persuasive” in light of the timing of the events
and the objective evidence that something happened to Prinz
on July 17, 2020. The evidence in the record, including the
24 Damme v. Pike Enters., supra note 17.
25 Bernhardt v. County of Scotts Bluff, 240 Neb. 423, 482 N.W.2d 262
(1992); Edmonds v. IBP, inc., 239 Neb. 899, 479 N.W.2d 754 (1992).
26 Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra note 11.
27 Hintz v. Farmers Co-op Assn., supra note 9.
28 Damme v. Pike Enters., supra note 17.
29 See Mosher v. Whole Foods Market, supra note 6.

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PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
pulmonologist’s opinion, Prinz’ testimony, and Prinz’ medi-
cal records and evaluations, was sufficient to substantiate the
court’s determination that Marshall’s opinion was credible.
And that court was the sole judge of the credibility and weight
to be given Marshall’s opinion. 30
[20] If the record contains evidence to substantiate the
factual conclusions reached by the trial judge in workers’
compensation cases, an appellate court is precluded from
substituting its view of the facts for that of the compensation
court. 31 Because the record contains evidence to substantiate
the compensation court’s finding of causation, we find no clear
error in this regard.
2. Loss of Earning Capacity
Emerald argues that the compensation court erred in deter-
mining the amount of its award for loss of earning capacity. We
find no clear error.
When determining a loss of earning capacity for an injured
worker, the four factors to consider under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 48-121 (Reissue 2021) are the worker’s (1) eligibility to
procure employment generally, (2) ability to earn wages, (3)
ability to hold a job obtained, and (4) capacity to perform the
work in the job in which the worker is engaged. 32
[21] In its award, the compensation court specifically stated
that it considered the applicable factors. Emerald fails to
explain how the court’s determination was clearly wrong. And
while Emerald speculates that Prinz’ earning capacity may have
been impaired by a lesser amount than that awarded, a workers’
compensation award cannot be based on mere possibility or
speculation. 33 There was sufficient competent evidence in the
record to warrant the compensation court’s award.
30 See Damme v. Pike Enters., supra note 17.
31 Krause v. Five Star Quality Care, 301 Neb. 612, 919 N.W.2d 514 (2018).
32 See Martinez v. CMR Constr. & Roofing of Texas, 302 Neb. 618, 924
N.W.2d 326 (2019).
33 Melton v. City of Holdrege, 309 Neb. 385, 960 N.W.2d 298 (2021).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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PRINZ v. OMAHA OPERATIONS
Cite as 317 Neb. 744
VI. CONCLUSION
We find no clear error in the compensation court’s determi-
nation that Prinz proved an alleged injury was caused by an
accident arising out of and in the course of her employment.
Nor can we say that the compensation court’s determination
regarding loss of earning capacity was clearly wrong. We
affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.