Quiles v. Collazo

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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets
33 Nebraska Appellate Reports
QUILES v. COLLAZO
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 180
Rodolfo A. Quiles, appellant, v.
Taina R. Collazo, formerly known as
Taina R. Collazo-Quiles, appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed September 17, 2024. 	No. A-23-665.
1. Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. A trial court’s decision awarding
or denying attorney fees will be upheld on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion.
2. Appeal and Error. Plain error is error plainly evident from the record
and of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage
to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process.
3. ____. Whether an assignment of error and accompanying argument is
too vague to be sufficiently raised before the appellate court is a ques-
tion of law.
4. Bankruptcy: Alimony: Child Support. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(5) (2018 & Supp. IV 2022), any debt that is categorized as a
“domestic support obligation” is exempted from a chapter 13 discharge.
5. ____: ____: ____. A debt that is actually in the nature of alimony, main-
tenance, or support of a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor is
nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
6. ____: ____: ____. The determination of whether a particular debt consti-
tutes alimony, maintenance, or support within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a) (2018 & Supp. IV 2022) is a question of federal bankruptcy
law, not state law.
7. Bankruptcy. Bankruptcy courts may afford deference to a state court’s
categorization of a debt, but they are not bound by the state court’s
decision.
8. Divorce: Alimony: Child Support: Property Division. Factors to be
considered by the courts in determining whether an award arising out of
marital dissolution proceedings was intended to serve as an award for
alimony, maintenance, or support, or whether it was intended to serve
as a property settlement, include, but are not limited to: the relative
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QUILES v. COLLAZO
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 180
financial conditions of the parties at the time of the divorce; the respec-
tive employment histories and prospects for financial support; the fact
that one party or another receives the marital property; the periodic
nature of the payments; and whether it would be difficult for the former
spouse and children to subsist without the payments.
9. Bankruptcy: Alimony: Child Support. Federal bankruptcy courts are
not bound by a state trial court’s designation of a debt as a domestic sup-
port obligation. A state court’s characterization of a debt is only advisory
to a bankruptcy court.
10. Rules of the Supreme Court: Judges. The Nebraska Revised Code of
Judicial Conduct says that a judge shall perform all duties of judicial
office fairly and impartially.
11. Judges: Recusal. It is a judge’s duty to disqualify himself or herself
whenever the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. This
duty exists even in the absence of a motion by a party and continues
throughout the proceedings.
12. ____: ____. Judges are under a continuing obligation to disqualify them-
selves whenever their impartiality may be reasonably questioned, and
although a judge may initially be free from bias and prejudice, disquali-
fication may well become necessary over the course of a proceeding.
13. Rules of the Supreme Court: Judges: Recusal. As the Nebraska
Revised Code of Judicial Conduct provides, a judge should disclose
on the record any information that the judge believes the parties or
their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion
for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for
disqualification.
14. Judges: Recusal: Presumptions. It is presumed that all judges in
this state carry out all of their duties competently and diligently.
Accordingly, a defendant seeking to disqualify a judge on the basis of
bias or prejudice bears the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption
of judicial impartiality.
15. Constitutional Law: Due Process: Trial: Judges: Recusal: Waiver.
A party cannot waive the disqualification of a judge due to the judge’s
personal bias or prejudice toward the party or the party’s lawyer. This
is because the right to an impartial judge is guaranteed under the Due
Process Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, the parameters
of which are coextensive.
16. Judges: Recusal: Appeal and Error. When a party fails to object to
alleged judicial bias at trial, and instead raises the issue for the first time
on appeal, the appellate court’s review is limited to plain error.
17. Records: Appeal and Error. It is incumbent upon the appellant to pre-
sent a record supporting the errors assigned.

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QUILES v. COLLAZO
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 180
18. Appeal and Error. An alleged error must be both specifically assigned
and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error to be
considered by an appellate court. A generalized and vague assignment of
error that does not advise an appellate court of the issue submitted for
decision will not be considered.
19. Rules of the Supreme Court: Appeal and Error. Depending on the
particulars of each case, failure to abide by the rules of the Nebraska
Supreme Court may result in an appellate court waiving the error, pro-
ceeding on a plain error review only, or declining to conduct any review
at all.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Todd
O. Engleman, Judge. Affirmed.
Rodolfo A. Quiles, pro se.
David Pontier, of Koenig | Dunne, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
Pirtle, Chief Judge, and Arterburn and Welch, Judges.
Pirtle, Chief Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Rodolfo A. Quiles (Rodolfo), proceeding pro se, appeals
from the decree of the district court for Douglas County grant-
ing him a divorce from Taina R. Collazo, formerly known as
Taina R. Collazo-Quiles (Taina). After the district court issued
a divorce decree, the parties both motioned to modify the
decree, and Taina requested the court hold Rodolfo in contempt
for failing to pay her certain sums required by the decree. After
a trial was held on those matters, the court set a hearing to
determine attorney fees. This hearing was ultimately delayed
because Rodolfo filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy and later
filed an interlocutory appeal. Eventually, the hearing was held,
and the district court ordered Rodolfo to pay Taina $28,656 in
attorney fees. Rodolfo now appeals that award and asserts the
district court failed to disclose a conflict of interest. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.

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QUILES v. COLLAZO
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 180
BACKGROUND
We first note that the record in this matter is limited.
Although there was an underlying modification and contempt
trial, the record does not include any of the pretrial motions,
evidence, or testimony from the trial. The only documents
we have concerning the trial are the district court’s orders.
Likewise, while there were several posttrial hearings on a vari-
ety of matters, the motions that prompted those hearings are
not in the record. Instead, the bill of exceptions contains only
the transcribed recordings from the posttrial hearings, but not
from the trial. Accordingly, our recitation of facts relies heav-
ily on the procedural backgrounds articulated in the district
court’s orders.
On February 14, 2020, the district court issued an amended
divorce decree that finalized Rodolfo and Taina’s divorce. As
part of this decree, Taina was awarded legal custody of the
parties’ two children, subject to Rodolfo’s parenting time. The
decree also ordered Rodolfo to pay $1,265 a month in child
support plus an additional $300 to “avoid cost sharing non-
medical and non-childcare expenses” for the children.
On April 28, 2020, Rodolfo filed a motion to modify the
divorce decree as a self-represented litigant. This motion was
evidently prompted by Rodolfo’s move out of state, which
made certain provisions of the decree unworkable.
On August 30, 2021, Taina filed an amended answer and
counterclaim 	for 	modification. 	Rodolfo 	filed 	a 	reply 	on
September 2. Then on October 25, Taina filed a verified appli-
cation for an order to appear and show cause due to Rodolfo’s
failing to pay Taina various sums required by the amended
divorce decree. A trial on these matters was held on March
8, 2022.
On March 29, 2022, the district court issued its order of
modification that awarded Taina primary physical custody of
the children and increased Rodolfo’s child support obligation
to $2,188 per month. Also on March 29, the court issued an
order finding Rodolfo in contempt and instructing him to pay

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QUILES v. COLLAZO
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 180
Taina $57,622.52 for unpaid child support, alimony, property
settlement payments, attorney fees, court sanctions, and marital
residence sale proceeds. The district court then set a further
hearing for May 2 to determine the amount of attorney fees
Rodolfo owed Taina in relation to the modification and con-
tempt proceedings.
On April 28, 2022, Rodolfo filed a petition for chapter
13 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Florida. As part of the bankruptcy case, an auto-
matic stay was issued in the Nebraska proceedings.
On May 3, 2022, Rodolfo filed an interlocutory appeal
in the Nebraska proceedings that took issue with the court’s
March 29 orders. That appeal was ultimately dismissed by
this court because there was not a final, appealable order or
judgment.
On July 14, 2022, the bankruptcy court entered an order
lifting the automatic stay in the Nebraska proceedings so the
district court could determine how much Rodolfo owed Taina
in attorney fees for the modification, contempt, and bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Additionally, the bankruptcy court stated
the stay was being lifted so the district court could enter fur-
ther orders regarding the “payment of domestic support obliga-
tions from property that is not property of the estate, including
[Rodolfo’s] exempt retirement accounts.”
On September 2, 2022, the district court held a hearing
on Taina’s motion to determine attorney fees and payment of
support obligations, Rodolfo’s motion to dismiss that motion,
and Taina’s motion to reopen evidence from the March 8 trial
and recalculate child support. At this hearing, the court first
addressed the matter of attorney fees and received a certified
copy of the bankruptcy court’s order and an affidavit from
Taina’s attorney to support the requested attorney fees.
The court then addressed Taina’s motion to reopen evidence
from the March 8, 2022, trial. The hearing transcript reflects
that this motion was filed after Taina’s attorney discovered
that Rodolfo mispresented his income during the trial. In

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QUILES v. COLLAZO
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support of this motion, the court received an exhibit Rodolfo
filed with the bankruptcy court where he listed his monthly
income as $9,238.25; a copy of Rodolfo’s employment agree-
ment, which showed a biweekly income of $8,076.92; and
an updated child support calculation that reflected Rodolfo’s
monthly income as $20,419, as an aid to the court. Notably,
Taina’s attorney indicated that the difference between the
income listed in Rodolfo’s employment agreement and the
updated child support calculation was due to Rodolfo’s mili-
tary retirement pay, which had not changed. The court also
noted that because the motion to reopen evidence and recalcu-
late child support had been filed the same week as the hearing,
it was going to schedule a future hearing to provide Rodolfo
additional time to gather any evidence he wanted to submit.
The district court issued an order the same day that found
Taina was owed $17,176 in attorney fees for the modification
and contempt proceedings and $11,480 in attorney fees for
the bankruptcy proceedings. The court deemed these fees to
be domestic support obligations that Rodolfo had to satisfy
within 30 days “by liquidating his bankruptcy exempted retire-
ment funds.” Finally, the court set a further hearing to allow
Rodolfo an opportunity to introduce rebuttal evidence concern-
ing the recalculation of his child support obligations.
The hearing was scheduled for August 15, 2023, but before
it could take place, Rodolfo filed another interlocutory appeal.
This court ultimately dismissed that appeal on July 5 for the
continued lack of a final, appealable order or judgment.
On August 15, 2023, the hearing for Rodolfo to provide
rebuttal evidence took place. On August 23, the district court
issued an order finding that Rodolfo did not rebut Taina’s evi-
dence and that he had mispresented his income at the March 8,
2022, trial. The court then recalculated his child support obli-
gation to be $2,536 per month.
On August 29, 2023, Rodolfo, still proceeding pro se, filed
the current appeal.

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QUILES v. COLLAZO
Cite as 33 Neb. App. 180
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Rodolfo assigns as follows: (1) The district court should
have adhered to the uniform code of legal procedures and not
awarded attorney fees against Rodolfo as in the nature of sup-
port and as a domestic support obligation, (2) the district court
should have adhered to the canons of the Nebraska Code of
Judicial Conduct and disclosed to Rodolfo a potential conflict
of interest between the district court judge and Taina’s prior
divorce counsel, and (3) the district court should have issued
tenable orders that would not unfairly deprive Rodolfo of sub-
stantial rights.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A trial court’s decision awarding or denying attorney fees
will be upheld on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Hawks
v. Hawks, 32 Neb. App. 70, 993 N.W.2d 688 (2023).
[2] Plain error is error plainly evident from the record and
of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in
damage to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial
process. Steffy v. Steffy, 287 Neb. 529, 843 N.W.2d 655 (2014).
[3] Whether an assignment of error and accompanying argu-
ment is too vague to be sufficiently raised before the appellate
court is a question of law. State v. Abdullah, 289 Neb. 123, 853
N.W.2d 858 (2014).
ANALYSIS
Attorney Fees.
Rodolfo first assigns the district court “should have adhered
to the uniform code of legal procedures and not award[ed]
attorneys’ fees against [Rodolfo] as in the nature of support
and as a domestic support obligation.” Within this assignment,
he makes several disjointed arguments. He starts by acknowl-
edging that there is a uniform course of procedure in Nebraska
that allows for attorney fees to be awarded in dissolution
actions. But he next asserts the district court should not have
awarded the fees because it did not adequately explain its rea-
soning for imposing a 30-day deadline to pay the fees, Taina’s

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attorney failed to provide certain facts about her employment
status, and Taina did not prevail in every one of her arguments.
He then shifts his argument to the district court’s failure to
articulate why the fees were domestic support obligations and
how the court lacked jurisdiction to make the awards when the
bankruptcy court purportedly had exclusive jurisdiction over
the dischargeability of his debts.
[4,5] 	We 	determine 	that 	this 	assignment 	fails 	because
Rodolfo is unable to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the dis-
trict court’s characterizing the attorney fee awards as domestic
support obligations. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2018
& Supp. IV 2022), any debt that is categorized as a “domestic
support obligation” is exempted from a chapter 13 discharge.
See In re Spencer, 868 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2017). A domestic
support obligation is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2018 &
Supp. IV 2022) as a debt (1) “owed to or recoverable by . . .
(i) a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor”; (2) “in the
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support”; (3) “established
. . . by reason of applicable provisions of . . . (i) a separation
agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agreement;
(ii) an order of a court of record; or (iii) a determination made
in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law”; and (4)
“not assigned to a nongovernmental entity, unless that obli-
gation is assigned voluntarily.” Thus, under this section, if a
debt is “‘actually in the nature of’” alimony, maintenance, or
support of a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, it is
nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Halouska v. Halouska, 7 Neb.
App. 730, 797, 585 N.W.2d 490, 503 (1998).
[6,7] The federal circuit courts have uniformly decided
that the determination of whether a particular debt constitutes
alimony, maintenance, or support within the meaning of 11
U.S.C. § 523(a) is a question of federal bankruptcy law, not
state law. See, In re Taylor, 737 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2013); In re
Phegley, 443 B.R. 154 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011); In re Sodergren,
802 Fed. Appx. 277 (9th Cir. 2020); In Matter of McCloskey,
659 Fed. Appx. 196 (5th Cir. 2016). And therefore, bankruptcy

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courts may afford deference to a state court’s categorization
of a debt, but they are not bound by the state court’s decision.
See, Halouska v. Halouska, supra; Ziegenhorn v. Iowa Dist.
Court, 510 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Iowa App. 1993) (“label placed
upon an obligation in a dissolution decree by either the state
court or the parties is not dispositive on whether the debt is
dischargeable [under] 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B)”); In re Weihs,
1 Fed. Appx. 578 (8th Cir. 2001).
In Halouska v. Halouska, supra, a Nebraska trial court
overseeing a divorce proceeding found in favor of the wife
and awarded her alimony, child support, attorney fees, and
the value of their shared property. In addition, the court took
an extra step to ensure the husband would pay those amounts
in the event of a bankruptcy by designating all his debts
as domestic support obligations. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the husband argued that the record did not support
categorizing the debt as a domestic support obligations and
that doing so demonstrated unequal treatment of the parties.
However, we determined the district court did not abuse its
discretion because the court’s order was only advisory to a
later bankruptcy court. And therefore, the husband was unable
to show he was prejudiced by the judgment.
[8] In finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion,
we discussed the factors that the federal bankruptcy courts uti-
lize in determining whether debts are nondischargeable under
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5):
“Factors to be considered by the courts in determining
whether an award arising out of marital dissolution pro-
ceedings was intended to serve as an award for alimony,
maintenance or support, or whether it was intended to
serve as a property settlement include, but are not lim-
ited to: the relative financial conditions of the parties
at the time of the divorce; the respective employment
histories and prospects for financial support; the fact that
one party or another receives the marital property; the
periodic nature of the payments; and whether it would

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be difficult for the former spouse and children to subsist
without the payments.”
Halouska v. Halouska, 7 Neb. App. 730, 747-48, 585 N.W.2d
490, 503 (1998) (quoting In re Moeder, 220 B.R. 52 (B.A.P.
8th Cir. 1998)). We next explained:
Although the trial court’s designation of the debts as
support might be one indication of the “function” the
award was intended to serve, it is obviously not con-
clusive. And certainly a declaration that the debts are
“nondischargeable in bankruptcy” is not binding on the
bankruptcy court. Rather, as is clear from In re Moeder,
a bankruptcy court will apply all of the principles enu-
merated above in determining whether an obligation is
a support obligation or a nonsupport obligation merely
disguised as one for support.
. . . .
In sum, based upon the clear language of § 523 and
the rationale of In re Moeder, supra, if and when the
dischargeability of the relevant debts becomes an issue,
a bankruptcy court will look beyond the designation in
the award and determine the dischargeability of relevant
debts based on federal bankruptcy law. Thus, the trial
court’s nonbinding declaration cannot be said to be an
abuse of discretion.
Halouska v. Halouska, 7 Neb. App. at 748-49, 535 N.W.2d
at 504.
[9] Rodolfo’s current assignment presents a similar situa-
tion. Although the bankruptcy court requested the district court
to determine the amount of attorney fees and whether they
constituted domestic support obligations, the district court’s
findings remained advisory. Because the categorization of
debts as domestic support obligations is a question of federal
bankruptcy law, not state law, we likewise determine that
Rodolfo was not prejudiced by the court’s characterization
of his debts. Therefore, we are unable to find that the court

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abused its discretion in awarding the attorney fees and labeling
them as domestic support obligations.
Judicial Conflict of Interest.
Rodolfo next assigns that the presiding district court judge
should have disclosed a potential conflict of interest he had
with Taina’s prior attorney, “Attorney Spomer.” See brief for
appellant at 22. He asserts that before taking the bench, the
judge worked with Spomer. Rodolfo generally asserts that the
judge should have disclosed this connection with Taina’s for-
mer counsel and that his failure to do so violated the Nebraska
Revised Code of Judicial Conduct.
[10-14] The Nebraska Revised Code of Judicial Conduct
says that a judge “‘shall perform all duties of judicial office
fairly and impartially.’” State v. Ezell, 314 Neb. 825, 835-36,
993 N.W.2d 449, 458 (2023). It is a judge’s duty to disqualify
himself or herself whenever “‘the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.’” Id. at 836, 993 N.W.2d at 458.
This duty exists even in the absence of a motion by a party
and continues throughout the proceedings. Id. Judges are under
a continuing obligation to disqualify themselves whenever
their impartiality may be reasonably questioned, and although
a judge may initially be free from bias and prejudice, dis-
qualification may well become necessary over the course of
a proceeding. Id. As the Nebraska Revised Code of Judicial
Conduct provides, a judge should disclose on the record any
information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers
“‘might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for
disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis
for disqualification.’” Id. at 836, 993 N.W.2d at 458. It is pre-
sumed that all judges in this state carry out all of their duties
competently and diligently. State v. Ezell, supra. Accordingly,
a defendant seeking to disqualify a judge on the basis of bias
or prejudice bears the heavy burden of overcoming the pre-
sumption of judicial impartiality. Id.
[15,16] Taina argues that because this is the first time
Rodolfo has raised this issue, he waived his ability to raise

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it on appeal. However, a party cannot waive the disqualifica-
tion of a judge due to the judge’s personal bias or prejudice
toward the party or the party’s lawyer. Id. This is because the
right to an impartial judge is guaranteed under the Due Process
Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, the param-
eters of which are coextensive. State v. Ezell, supra. However,
when a party fails to object to alleged judicial bias at trial, and
instead raises the issue for the first time on appeal, the appel-
late court’s review is limited to plain error. See, e.g., Russell v.
Anderson, 966 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2020) (reviewing appellant’s
allegations of judicial bias for plain error when objections to
district court’s comments were not made at trial). See, also,
U.S. v. Caldwell, 81 F.4th 1160 (11th Cir. 2023); U.S. v. Lanza-
Vázquez, 799 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2015).
[17] In the matter at hand, the record contains no informa-
tion about the presiding judge’s alleged conflict of interest. It
is incumbent upon the appellant to present a record supporting
the errors assigned. William P. v. Jamie P., 313 Neb. 378, 984
N.W.2d 285 (2023). The only information we have concerning
the judge’s purported relationship with Taina’s former attor-
ney comes from Rodolfo’s appellate brief. Notably, because
this is the only source of information, we do not even know
Spomer’s first name. Because there is nothing in the record
regarding this issue, we do not know when, or even if, this
“Attorney Spomer” represented Taina. Further, we have no
evidence linking this person with the district court judge.
And because the bill of exceptions in this matter is incom-
plete, we have no way to know whether the judge previously
disclosed this alleged relationship. With absolutely no record
or evidence concerning this purported conflict of interest, we
are unable to determine that the district court erred, let alone
plainly erred.
Orders Affected Rodolfo’s Substantial Rights.
Rodolfo next assigns that the district court “should have
issued tenable orders that would not unfairly deprive [him]
of substantial rights.” Within this assignment, he provides

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citations to various legal authorities about how to determine
whether the division of property in a dissolution proceeding
is equitable, the appellate standard of review for reviewing
alimony awards, whether an order is a final order or judgment,
and when a proceeding is related to a bankruptcy case. He then
asserts various facts not in the record concerning his alleged
offer to settle with Taina prior to the March 8, 2022, trial.
Next, Rodolfo cites to the transcribed recording for the
September 2, 2022, hearing where he argued that the court
could not liquidate his retirement account under the bank-
ruptcy code and that the 30-day deadline to satisfy the judg-
ments was untenable. He then generally argues that the court
incorrectly concluded that Taina’s awards could be satisfied
from his retirement account and that the district court did not
have authority to intrude upon the bankruptcy process. Lastly,
he cites several provisions of the federal bankruptcy code to
contend that the district court’s orders curtailed his right to file
for bankruptcy, because its orders limited his ability to pursue
other options provided by the bankruptcy code. He asserts
these other options include the ability to delay his filing, vol-
untarily dismiss his current filing, and change the “six-month
‘look back’” period used to determine his projected disposable
income. Brief for appellant at 32.
[18,19] We determine this assignment cannot be considered
on appeal. An alleged error must be both specifically assigned
and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the
error to be considered by an appellate court. State v. Sundquist,
301 Neb. 1006, 921 N.W.2d 131 (2019). A generalized and
vague assignment of error that does not advise an appellate
court of the issue submitted for decision will not be consid-
ered. Id. Depending on the particulars of each case, failure to
abide by the rules of the Nebraska Supreme Court may result
in an appellate court waiving the error, proceeding on a plain
error review only, or declining to conduct any review at all.
See County of Lancaster v. County of Custer, 313 Neb. 622,
985 N.W.2d 612 (2023).

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Rodolfo’s assignment broadly takes issue with the district
court’s “[un]tenable orders” because they affected his “sub-
stantial rights.” Beyond the vagueness of that assertion, his
argument section does nothing to clearly define the specific
matter he is discussing. As such, we are unable to discern
what specific issue he is submitting on appeal. And although
we reserve the ability to conduct a plain error review in such
cases where a party fails to abide by the rules of the Nebraska
Supreme Court, given the unintelligible nature of this assign-
ment, we decline to conduct any review at all.
CONCLUSION
We determine the district court did not abuse its discretion in
categorizing the attorney fee awards as domestic support obli-
gations, because its judgment was only advisory to the bank-
ruptcy court. We also determine that the court did not plainly
err as it relates to Rodolfo’s allegations of judicial misconduct,
and we do not consider Rodolfo’s third assignment of error
because it is insufficiently assigned and argued in his brief.
Affirmed.