William Steve Crowley a/k/a Steve Crowley v. State of Mississippi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-KA-00589-COA

WILLIAM STEVE CROWLEY A/K/A STEVE APPELLANT
CROWLEY

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/29/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. KENT E. SMITH
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CHICKASAW COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: BENJAMIN F. CREEKMORE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/03/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND WEDDLE, JJ.

WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. A Chickasaw County Circuit Court jury found William Steve Crowley guilty of one

count of conspiracy, one count of burglary of a dwelling, and one count of grand larceny.

After finding that Crowley was a non-violent habitual offender under Mississippi Code

Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2020), the Chickasaw County Circuit Court ordered

Crowley to serve the following sentences concurrently in the custody of the Mississippi

Department of Corrections (MDOC): (1) five years for conspiracy, (2) twenty-five years for

burglary of a dwelling, and (3) five years for grand larceny. On appeal, Crowley argues that
the Chickasaw County Circuit Court erred by sentencing him as a habitual offender. Finding

no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2. Pursuant to a multi-count indictment, a Chickasaw County grand jury indicted

Crowley for one count of each of the following: conspiracy, burglary of a dwelling, grand

larceny, and possession of a stolen firearm. The State filed a notice of eligibility for

enhanced punishment as a non-violent habitual offender based on Crowley’s prior

convictions of uttering a forgery in Calhoun County and possession of cocaine in Clay

County. Prior to trial, the State dismissed Crowley’s indicted count for possession of a stolen

firearm. Following a trial on the remaining three counts, the jury found Crowley guilty of

conspiracy, burglary of a dwelling, and grand larceny.

¶3. At Crowley’s sentencing hearing, the prosecutor explained that after filing the notice

of eligibility for enhanced punishment, the State learned Crowley’s prior charge for cocaine

possession had been resolved in Crowley’s favor. As a result, the State intended to present

evidence regarding only two of Crowley’s prior convictions in Calhoun County for uttering

a forgery. The State entered into evidence Crowley’s multi-count indictment, his “Plea of

Guilty and Judgment of the Court,” and his amended notice of criminal disposition.

¶4. Crowley’s indictment reflected that a Calhoun County grand jury had indicted him in

1997 for four counts of uttering a forgery. Each count stated that on January 17, 1997,

Crowley presented a fraudulent check to an employee at either the Piggly Wiggly in Calhoun

City, Mississippi, or the Ward’s Quick Stop in Vardaman, Mississippi. Each check was in

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the amount of $250 but made payable to a different recipient. Crowley pled guilty to three

of the counts charged in the 1997 indictment, and the Calhoun County Circuit Court

sentenced him to serve five years for each count, with all three sentences to be served

concurrently in MDOC’s custody.

¶5. During Crowley’s sentencing hearing before the Chickasaw County Circuit Court, the

State offered proof of two of Crowley’s prior convictions—one conviction for uttering a

forgery at the Piggly Wiggly in Calhoun City, and one conviction for uttering a forgery at the

Ward’s Quick Stop in Vardaman. The State called Investigator Pammie Davidson to testify.

Investigator Davidson stated that she had worked with the District Attorney’s Office on

Crowley’s present case and had discovered his 1997 multi-count indictment and his

convictions for the three counts of uttering a forgery. Investigator Davidson testified that

Crowley’s convictions in 1997 stemmed from events that occurred on the same day and

involved two businesses. Investigator Davidson further testified, though, that the Piggly

Wiggly in Calhoun City and the Ward’s Quick Stop in Vardaman were not located right next

to one another. Instead, Investigator Davidson explained that the two businesses were

located about ten to fifteen minutes away from each other.

¶6. The State argued that “[t]here would have been sufficient time between leaving either

the Ward’s Quick Stop in Vardaman and going to Piggly Wiggly in Calhoun City or vice

versa for [Crowley’s] criminal passions to have cooled so that he had time to reflect.” As a

result, the State asserted that even though Crowley’s prior convictions were “on the same

indictment” and “occurred on the same day, . . . they qualify as separate incidences under

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[section] 99-19-81 and . . . [Crowley] should be convicted as a habitual offender.”

¶7. Based on the evidence presented, the Chickasaw County Circuit Court agreed that

Crowley’s prior felony convictions arose from two separate incidents that occurred at

different times. Concluding that Crowley’s two prior felony convictions met the statutory

requirements to enhance Crowley’s sentence, the Chickasaw County Circuit Court sentenced

Crowley as a non-violent habitual offender to serve concurrent sentences in MDOC’s custody

of five years for conspiracy, twenty-five years for burglary of a dwelling, and five years for

grand larceny. Crowley moved unsuccessfully for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or,

alternatively, a new trial. Aggrieved, Crowley appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶8. On appeal, Crowley argues that the Chickasaw County Circuit Court erred by finding

that his two prior felony convictions satisfied the statutory requirements to sentence him as

a habitual offender. Crowley contends there was insufficient evidence to support the

Chickasaw County Circuit Court’s finding that his prior felony convictions arose from

separate incidents at different times. Alternatively, based on the United States Supreme

Court’s holding in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), Crowley asserts that “the

determination of whether his prior convictions arose out of separate incidents at different

times [was] a question that should have been submitted to a jury” because the question “goes

beyond the fact that the prior convictions exist and requires a finding about the circumstances

surrounding the crimes.”

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

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¶9. In reviewing Crowley’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must

determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of [s]ection 99-19-81

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Manuel v. State, 357 So. 3d 633, 639 (¶20) (Miss. 2023)

(quoting Brent v. State, 296 So. 3d 42, 52 (¶41) (Miss. 2020)). To be sentenced as a non-

violent habitual offender, section 99-19-81 requires Crowley to “have been convicted twice

previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out

of separate incidents at different times and . . . sentenced to separate terms of one (1) year

or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere . . . .”

Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the events

surrounding a defendant’s two prior felony convictions “should be sufficiently separate that

the offender’s criminal passions may have cooled so that he has time to reflect.” Manuel,

357 So. 3d at 640 (¶21) (quoting Pittman v. State, 570 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Miss. 1990)).

¶10. In reviewing the facts of prior caselaw, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that

in Pittman, this Court found that breaking into two different schools met the
statutory requirement of separate incidents at different times. [Pittman, 570
So. 2d at 1206]. Even though the crimes were committed on the same day, the
schools were close together, and the schools had “common use of the
auditorium and cafeteria,” the fact that the crimes involved burglarizing two
separate buildings was sufficient. Id. Similarly, in Burt v. State, 493 So. 2d
1325, 1329 (Miss. 1986), this Court found that breaking and entering two
separate dwelling houses met the requirement of separate incidents at different
times even though the acts were done on the same day and at the same address.

Id. at (¶22).

¶11. Unlike in Pittman and Burt, the record in Manuel contained no facts regarding the

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commission of the underlying felonies and merely showed that Manuel had pled guilty to two

charges of selling hydrocodone. Id. at (¶23). As a result, the Mississippi Supreme Court

concluded that it could not “determine whether [Manuel’s] drug sales occurred in rapid

succession, which would ‘not suggest the same repetitiveness of criminal design such that

the offender may be thought predictably habitual thereafter,’ or whether the sales occurred

on different days or in different locations[,]” which could demonstrate that “the defendant’s

convictions were sufficiently separate . . . .” Id. (quoting Pittman, 570 So. 2d at 1206).

¶12. Crowley argues that the facts of his case more closely align with those presented in

Manuel, but we disagree. Despite Crowley’s assertions, the record contains sufficient

evidence to support the Chickasaw County Circuit Court’s finding that his two prior felony

convictions of uttering a forgery satisfied the statutory requirements for enhancing his

sentence as a non-violent habitual offender. Even though Crowley committed both counts

of uttering a forgery on the same day, he presented the checks to two separate businesses

located about ten to fifteen minutes away from one another in two different towns. Upon

review, we find these circumstances were sufficient to demonstrate that Crowley’s

underlying convictions of uttering a forgery arose “out of separate incidents at different

times” as mandated by section 99-19-81. The time required for Crowley to drive from one

business to the other was enough to allow his “criminal passions [to cool] so that he ha[d]

time to reflect” before committing an additional count of uttering a forgery. Manuel, 357 So.

3d at 640 (¶21) (quoting Pittman, 570 So. 2d at 1206).

¶13. In addition, the record reflects that after Crowley pled guilty to three counts of uttering

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a forgery, the Calhoun County Circuit Court sentenced him to serve five years for each count,

with each sentence to be served concurrently in MDOC’s custody. Thus, Crowley was also

“sentenced to [two] separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal

institution” as required by section 99-19-81. We therefore find no error regarding the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Chickasaw County Circuit Court’s decision to

enhance Crowley’s sentence under section 99-19-81.

II. Applicability of Erlinger

¶14. Alternatively, Crowley argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

Erlinger requires a jury (rather than the circuit court) to determine if his prior felony

convictions for uttering a forgery occurred on separate occasions or during one criminal

episode. In Erlinger, the defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm,

which carried a maximum prison sentence of ten years. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 825-26. At

sentencing, however, the district court judge determined that Erlinger was eligible for an

enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which “impose[d] lengthy

mandatory prison terms on certain defendants who ha[d] previously committed three violent

felonies or serious drug offenses on separate occasions.” Id. The application of the ACCA

to Erlinger’s conviction increased the maximum ten-year sentence he had faced to a

minimum of fifteen years and a new maximum term of life imprisonment. Id. at 825.

¶15. Not long after Erlinger’s sentencing, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit “issued decisions indicating that two of the three offenses on which the

district court had relied” in sentencing Erlinger no longer qualified under the ACCA. Id. at

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826. During Erlinger’s new sentencing hearing, the prosecutors relied on a different set of

prior convictions to invoke the ACCA. Id. Erlinger had accumulated four prior convictions

of burglarizing multiple businesses over several days. Id. at 826-27. The prosecutors

contended that Erlinger’s prior burglary convictions “each could serve as an ACCA predicate

and collectively . . . support an ACCA sentence.” Id. at 827. Erlinger asserted, however, that

he had committed his prior burglaries during a single criminal episode rather than on separate

occasions and that the crimes therefore failed to satisfy the requirements for applying the

ACCA. Id. Moreover, Erlinger argued that he was entitled to have a jury assess the facts

surrounding his prior offenses and determine if the burglaries occurred on separate occasions

or during one criminal episode. Id.

¶16. After denying Erlinger’s request for a jury, the district court judge concluded that

Erlinger’s prior burglaries had occurred on separate occasions and constituted ACCA-

qualifying offenses. Id. As a result, the district court judge once again sentenced Erlinger

to fifteen years in prison. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted Erlinger’s petition

for certiorari after the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence. Id. at 828.

¶17. On appeal, the Erlinger Court emphasized that “[o]nly a jury may find ‘facts that

increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.’” Id. at

833 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). The Court explained the

principle “does not just apply when a judge seeks to issue a sentence that exceeds the

maximum penalty authorized by a jury’s findings (or a guilty plea). It is a principle that also

applies when a judge seeks to increase a defendant’s minimum punishment.” Id. In

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Erlinger’s case, “the sentencing court’s factual finding that [his] offenses occurred on at least

three separate occasions had the effect of increasing both the maximum and minimum

sentences he faced.” Id. at 835. Thus, the Erlinger Court concluded that for purposes of

applying the ACCA to increase a punishment, the defendant is entitled to have a jury (rather

than the trial court judge) engage in the fact-finding inquiry necessary to determine if the

defendant’s previous offenses occurred during a single episode or on separate occasions. Id.

“While recognizing [that] Erlinger was entitled to have a jury resolve [the] ACCA’s

occasions inquiry unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt,” the Court emphasized that

it was “decid[ing] no more than that” single question. Id.

¶18. Here, the State disputes Crowley’s contention that Erlinger applies to his sentencing

as a non-violent habitual offender. The State argues that the holding in Erlinger “applies

only to statutes that increase the mandatory minimum or maximum sentence, and

Mississippi’s non-violent habitual[-]offender statute does neither.” As amended in 2018,

section 99-19-81 no longer mandates an increased minimum sentence. Instead, section 99-

19-81 requires a court to sentence a non-violent habitual offender “to the maximum term of

imprisonment prescribed for such felony unless the court provides an explanation in its

sentencing order setting forth the cause for deviating from the maximum sentence, and such

sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or

probation.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81. Thus, the State notes that rather than increasing

a “crime’s punishment beyond the statutory maximum” sentence, section 99-19-81 “simply

eliminates eligibility for parole or early release.” And as the Mississippi Supreme Court has

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held, a limitation on a defendant’s parole or early release “only impact[s the defendant’s]

actual time to serve and not his sentence.” Fogleman v. State, 283 So. 3d 685, 691 (¶20)

(Miss. 2019) (emphasis added).

¶19. Unlike in Erlinger, where the application of the ACCA impacted the defendant’s

actual sentence by increasing the minimum and maximum punishments to be imposed,

Crowley’s sentencing under section 99-19-81 did not increase the sentencing range he faced.

Rather, as in Fogleman, Crowley’s sentencing as a non-violent habitual offender only

affected the portion of the prescribed sentence that he was to serve. See Miss. Code Ann.

§ 99-19-81. Accordingly, we find no merit to Crowley’s claims that the United States

Supreme Court’s holding in Erlinger applies to his sentencing under section 99-19-81.

CONCLUSION

¶20. Because we find no error in the circuit court’s decision to sentence Crowley as a non-

violent habitual offender under section 99-19-81, we affirm Crowley’s convictions and

sentences.

¶21. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.,
CONCUR.

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